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Abstract 
Interreligious concord constitutes one of the most important issues within the 
religiously diverse context of the late modern world. Among responses to the 
challenge of religious diversity, the discourse of pluralism affirms the equality of 
religions as a critical measure against exclusive and injurious claims to religious 
st:tperierity. Pll:tflllism contends that-the· fact of religious diversity in conjunction 
with the escalation of global crises calls for a deepening of interreligious dialogue 
and collaboration. The Christian tradition bas presented a highly developed 
articulation of the theological position of pluralism. This thesis, however, is 
primarily concerned with the ongoing construction of the discourse of Buddhist 
pluralism. With the intention of contributing to this discourse, this research 
applies the theory of pluralism towards an analysis of the contemporary teachings 
of the Vietnamese Buddhist monk Thich Nhat Hanh. 
The majority of extant research concerning Thich Nhat Hanh addresses his 
teachings of Engaged Buddhism and his social activism during the Vietnam War. 
Nhat Hanh's teachings regarding religious diversity have received far less 
recognition, and what attention they have received has issued from the domains of 
Christian theology. With the intention of advancing research of Nhat Hanh's 
teachings, and of providing an alternative interpretation, this thesis presents a 
contextual, textual, and theological investigation of Thich Nhat Hanh from the 
methodological perspective of Buddhist Studies. Within an analysis of Nhat 
Hanh's approach to tradition, modernity, and religious diversity, it is suggested 
that his teachings contain valuable resources that could contribute towards the 
discourse of Buddhist pluralism. 
Thich Nhat Hanh' s teachings concerning religious diversity propose the 
interdependence of religions. He affirms both the unity and diversity of religions, 
whilst asserting the need for interreligious engagement with the suffering of the 
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world. As such, his approach can be understood as constructive of an experiential, 
ethical, and engaged form of Buddhist pluralism. This thesis constructs the notion 
of Religious Interbeing to conceptualise Nhat Hanh's position of pluralism. It is 
contended that such a position could contribute to both the ongoing articulation of 
pluralism, and the dynamics of interreligious dialogue within the late modern 
global community. 
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Introduction 
Despite predictions of secularisation and proposals of homogeneity, a diversity of 
religions constitutes a defining feature upon the landscapes of the late modern 
world. Within the global context of religious diversity, the need for interreligious 
concord has become critically apparent. Among responses to the challenge of 
religious diversity, the discourse of pluralism affirms the equality of religions as a 
critical measure against exclusive and injurious claims to religious superiority. 
Pluralism calls for a critical interreligious collaboration, and asserts that every 
religion contains the necessary resources to affrrm religious equality and facilitate 
interreligious dialogue without undermining particularity and commitment. 
Indeed, for those who acclaim such a response, pluralism is considered to be both 
possible and necessary. 
This thesis is primarily concerned with the emergent discourse of Buddhist 
pluralism. In comparison to the plethora of Christian theological literature 
addressing the position of pluralism, the equivalent body of Buddhist literature is 
slight. However, as a tradition that has repeatedly flourished within religiously 
diverse cultures, and as a religion that is acknowledged for its tolerance, it is 
apparent that Buddhism has much to offer the pluralist debate concerning 
interreligious encounter and exchange. The primary intention of this thesis is to 
advance the research of Buddhist responses to religious diversity, and to 
contribute towards the ongoing construction of the discourse of Buddhist 
pluralism. To fulfil this task, this research specifically applies the theory of 
Buddhist pluralism to the teachings of the contemporary Vietnamese Buddhist 
monk Thich Nhat Hanh. 
The majority of research concerning Thich Nhat Hanh addresses his teachings of 
Engaged Buddhism and his activism during the Vietnam War. Nhat Hanh's 
teachings regarding religious diversity have received far less recognition, and 
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what attention they have received has mainly issued from the domains of Christian 
theology. As such, it is the further intention of this thesis to advance the research 
of the teachings of Thich Nhat Hanh by providing an analysis of his approach to 
religious diversity in relation to the Buddhist tradition and from the 
methodological perspective ofBuddhist Studies. 
In general, the extant research on Nhat Hanh's teachings of Engaged Buddhism 
has not taken into account his teachings regarding other religions. Moreover, the 
scant research on Nhat Hanh's teachings regarding religious diversity has not 
discerned the connection between his early teachings of Engaged Buddhism and 
his later engagement with religious others. It is a primary contention of this thesis 
that these two elements of Nhat Hanh's career and teachings should not be 
understood in separation. Accordingly, this research provides an initial 
investigation of Nhat Hanh's approach to tradition and to modernity in order to 
establish a contextual and textual foundation of understanding. Upon this 
foundation, a more constructive and theological analysis ofNbat Hanh's approach 
to religious diversity is presented. 
Thich Nhat Hanh' s teachings concerning religious diversity propose the 
interdependence of religions. He affmns both the unity and diversity of religions, 
whilst asserting the need for interreligious engagement with the suffering of the 
world. As such, his approach can be understood as constructive of an experiential, 
ethical, and engaged form of Buddhist pluralism. This thesis proposes the notion 
of Religious lnterbeing to conceptualise Nhat Hanh' s position of pluralism. It is 
contended that such a position could contribute to the ongoing articulation of 
Buddhist pluralism, the Christian theological debate concerning pluralism, and the 
global dynamics of interreligious dialogue. 
The corpus of Nhat Hanh' s written works constitutes the body of primary sources 
of this research. This research has also been supported by informal encounters 
with members of Nhat Hanh's monastic order, and the author's experience of 
attending a two-week meditation retreat at Plum Village, Nhat Hanh's monastic 
centre in France, in July 2006. The secondary sources of this research encompass 
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a wide range of theoretical and theological material addressing the issue of 
religious diversity, as well as relevant material concerning Thich Nhat Hanh. 
Part I of this thesis establishes the theoretical and methodological foundations of 
the research. Chapter One introduces the contemporary global context of religious 
diversity and explores the dimensions of the Christian theological response to its 
challenge. 
Chapter Two presents a literature review of the extant material addressing 
Buddhist responses-t<Heligtous diversity. It-applies the typology of exclusivism, 
inclusivism, and pluralism towards the literature concerning Buddhist responses 
and thereby constructs a 'Buddhist theology of religions'. 
Chapter Three constructs the methodological framework of the research. It begins 
by presenting a critique of an established analysis of Nhat Hanh's approach to 
religious diversity, and in response to the critique explores some suggestions from 
Philosophical Hermeneutics. It also examines the critique of Orientalism and its 
implications for Buddhist Studies. Finally, it draws upon the ctiscourse of 
Buddhist theology to establish a 'plural methodology' that combines 
contextual/historical, textuaVobjective, and constructive/theological forms of 
analysis. On the basis of this methodology, it is determined that Nhat Hanh's 
approach to religious diversity should be investigated in relation to the Buddhist 
tradition, Nhat Hanh 's cultural-historic context, and the corpus of his teachings. 
Part II of the thesis encompasses the investigation of the teachings of Thich Nbat 
Hanh and their application towards a proposal of Buddhist pluralism. Chapter 
Four examines Nhat Hanh's approach to tradition and thereby locates the origins 
of his contemporary interpretation of Buddhism within the cultural-historic 
context of the Vietnam War. This chapter examines the dynamics of continuity 
and adaptation within Nhat Hanh's teachings of Engaged Buddhism, and thus 
demonstrates the tractitional foundations of his pedagogy while elucidating his 
emphasis on the need for religious renewal and actualisation. 
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Chapter Five examines Nhat Hanh's approach to modernity, which constitutes a 
critique of the spiritual malaise of the modern West. This chapter explores Nhat 
Hanh's 'diagnosis' of modem ills, and also delineates the dimensions of his 
'cure', which encompasses a prescription of spiritual practice, the manifestation of 
community, and the enactment of dialogue between nations. This analysis ofNhat 
Hanh's approach to modernity presents the key elements of his pedagogy and 
demonstrates their continual actualisation within the context of the modern West. 
As the culmination of this thesis, Chapter Six draws upon the initial elucidation of 
Christian and Buddhist discourses of pluralism, and what has been discovered of 
Nhat Hanh's approach to tradition and to modernity, in order to theologically and 
constructively analyse his approach to religious diversity. Specifically, this 
chapter applies the theory of pluralism to Nhat Hanh's teachings concerning other 
religions, and thereby reveals a number of valuable resources that could be used 
towards the construction of a position of Buddhist pluralism. This chapter presents 
the notion of Religious Interbeing to conceptualise this position and affirms that 
such a position could contribute not only towards the discourse of pluralism, but 
also towards the dynamics of interreligious dialogue within the late modem global 
community. 
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1 
Religious Diversity and the Possibility of Pluralism: 
An Introduction 
Genuine ecumenism requires the communication and sharing, not only of information 
about doctrines which are totally and irrevocably divergent, but also of religious 
intuitions and truths which may turn out to have something in common ... Ecumenism 
seek<; the inner and ultimate spiritual 'ground' which underlies all articulated 
differences. A genuine~v fruitful dialogue cannot be content with a polite diplomatic 
interest in other religions and their beliefs. It seeks a deeper level. 
Thomas Merton 
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Throughout the progression of religious history, the world religions have generally 
maintained permeable boundaries of interaction and exchange. Within the current era 
of globalisatioo, however, technological advancements and political shifts have 
escalated the rate of interreligious encounter and increased the variety of religions 
encountered. Consequently, a diversity of religions constitutes a defining feature upon 
the landscapes of the late modern world. The global fact of religious diversity 
presents a direct challenge to all religious assertions of absolutism or ultimacy. At the 
heart of this challenge are issues concerning multiple and conflicting claims to 
universality, uniqueness, and a fmality of sal¥ific-tmth. Arnongst negative responses 
to this challenge, egregious eruptions of fundamentalism and the so-called 'clash of 
civilisations' are fiercely apparent reactions. However, more positive responses can 
be discerned within movements towards interreligious understanding and amity, 
which are quietly but steadily advancing. Within the dynamics and discourse of each 
world religion, the emergence of genuine interreligious communication is initiating 
the breakdown of old structures of superiority and imperialism. Such developments 
are contributing towards the evolution of an interreligious consciousness of pluralism, 
which affirms 'unity in diversity' within a vision of global community. 
In order to introduce the issue of religious diversity and explore the dimensions of its 
challenge, this chapter will investigate the specific response of Christianity. Due to 
the prolonged ascendancy of the Christian Church, religious diversity has presented a 
particularly acute challenge to the Christian tradition. Consequently, the discourse of 
Christian theology has articulated a highly developed and systematic theoretical 
response, which is articulated in the so-called 'theology of religions' . This chapter 
will investigate each element of the Christian theology of religions' three-fold 
typology of classification, consisting of exclusivism, inclusivism, and pluralism. As 
this thesis is specifically focused on the discourse of pluralism as a valid response to 
religious diversity, this chapter will pay particular attention to the theological and 
philosophical debate that surrounds this position. The principal concern of pluralism 
is the equality of religions. Within the domain of Christian theology this equality has 
been proposed in a number of different ways, some of which are contentious. In 
particular, we will examine the debate between identist and differential pluralism. 
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!dentist pluralism affirms religious equality on the basis of a shared religious essence 
or a universal category, and argues that each religion refers to the same salvific end -
the one ultimate reality or truth. In contention, differential pluralism argues against 
the assumption of unity, in recognition of the inherent danger of the imposition of 
alien categories and the consequent denial of difference. As such, differential 
pluralism affirms religious equality on the basis of religious difference, arguing that 
ultimate reality or truth is multifaceted and multidimensional, and that different 
religions therefore refer to different salvific ends. 
The philosophiGal---debate- between identist -and differential pluralism appears to lead 
to a logical impasse, which undermines the possibility of affirming both the unity and 
diversity of religions. However, as this chapter will demonstrate, alternative 
perspectives may be found within the domains of interreligious dialogue and religious 
experience. In particular, we will investigate the model of interior dialogue, as it has 
been represented by the American Trappist monk Thomas Merton. The type of 
pluralism manifested by Merton' s interior dialogue can be understood as a mystical or 
experiential pluralism. Often in reference to religious traditions from the East, 
experiential pluralism affirms both the unity and diversity of religions on the basis of 
spiritual experience, transformation, and the transcendence of religious language and 
forms. This chapter will culminate with an elucidation of arguments for experiential 
pluralism, which suggest that while pluralism may not be a philosophical or rational 
possibility, within the dimensions of religious dialogue and experience it may be a 
spiritual possibility. 
The intention of this chapter is to present the issue of religious diversity and explore 
the Christian theological response to its challenge. While the typology of exclusivism, 
inclusivism, and pluralism bas been constructed within the discourse of Christian 
theology, it is today utilised in cross-cultural discussion and interreligious exchange. 
Indeed, in the following chapter the typology will be applied to Buddhism, in order to 
investigate bow the tradition has responded to religious diversity and what it may 
have to contribute to the ongoing debate surrounding pluralism. Moreover, in Part II 
the discourse of pluralism will be specifically applied to the teachings of the 
contemporary Buddhist teacher Tbich Nhat Hanh, in order to examine his 
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contribution to Buddhist pluralism. As such, this chapter is intended to introduce the 
principal ideas and debates that form the theoretical background of this thesis and 
underlie its main propositions. 
The Christian Theology of Religions 
The theologian John Hick has observed, "Each of the great religious movements 
includes powerful strands of thought and feeling for which the fact of religious 
plurality constitutes not only a profound puzzle but a disturbing challenge."1 As 
mentioned above, the crux of this challenge is defined by conflicting claims to 
universality, truth, and uniqueness. As another-- theologian, Joseph DiNoia, has 
recognised, "Each religious community seems to combine a claim to the universal 
applicability of its teachings with an insistence on their privileged and indeed unique 
embodiment in the community's authentic traditions."2 While these observations may 
be true of all religions, it is apparent that religious diversity presents a specific 
challenge to the monotheistic consciousness of the prophetic traditions - Judaism, 
Christianity, and Islam. The Jewish covenant with God through Abraham and their 
distinction as the Chosen People, the Christian affirmation of the life, death, and 
resurrection of Christ as 'the Way, the Truth, and the Life', and the Islamic testimony 
of faith in the finality of the one God's revelation to the Prophet Muhammad, 
expressed in the shahada, 3 all make claims to absolute truth and a finality of salvific 
means and ends. As the theologian Geoffrey Parrinder has argued, "The challenge is 
acute for the Semitic or Western religions, Christianity, Judaism and Islam. They 
have been accustomed to think of themselves as supreme, in religion and culture, 
possessing the highest truths and the oldest and best philosophy.'"' 
Of the three monotheistic faiths, Christianity has demonstrated the greatest 
preoccupation with religious others. Underlying this preoccupation is Christianity's 
1 John Hick, "Religious Diversity as Challenge and Promise," in The Experience of Religious 
Diversity, ed. John Hick and Hasan Askari (Aidershot: Gower, 1985). 4 
2 J. A. DiNoia, "Pluralist Theology of Religions: Pluralistic or Non-Pluralistic?," in Christian 
Uniqueness Reconsidered: The Myth of a Pluralistic TI!eology of Religions, ed Gavin D'Costa 
(Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1990). 121 
J The shahada is the central creedal utterance and confession of faith in Islam. It claims: kl ilaha 
ilia Allah; Muhammad rasul Allah- "lltere is no God but Allah, and MuhallUD8d is the prophet of 
Allah." 
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historical ascendancy and its persistent assumption of superiority, as represented by 
the power of Rome and its salvific monopoly, and the missionary zeal of its European 
colonial empires. Christianity's attitude towards non-Christian religions has long been 
pursued within a theological discourse which has centred upon the question of 
salvation. Indeed, the so-called 'theology of religions' emerged out of the Christian 
missionary context in which the question of "who is saved and who is not" was at the 
forefront. 5 This question continued to lend its hue to Christian dialogical exchange 
until well into the twentieth-century. However, the interwar years witnessed a rapid 
growth in Christian interreligious endeavours, indicative of Christianity's increasing 
awareness of other religions. Following the sellapse of colonialism in the aftermath 
of World War II, the challenge of religious diversity became a principal concern 
within mainstream Christian theological debate. The theologian Langdon Gilkey has 
commented on this post-World War II era of Western and Christian collapse: 
Colonies vanished, Europe disappeared as a major power, other non-Western power 
centres appeared representing other ways oflife and other religions. The West no longer 
ruled the world; Western ways were no longer unassailable; Westem religion became 
one among the other world religions; and (not insignificantly) the Christian faith became 
the one now most morally culpable, the chief imperialistic, nonspiritual, and in fact 
barely moral faith! Correspondingly, Western culture became radically open to non-
Western religions; missionary influence flowed in the opposite direction; and the 
spiritual power of other faiths began to assert itself on Christian turf. . . This dramatic 
new situation has forced - and this is the right word I think -a new understanding of the 
interrelationships of religions, a new balance of spiritual power.6 
Throughout the last half-century, both the Roman Catholic Church and the Protestant 
World Council of Churches have become directly involved in theological endeavours 
concerning the interrelationship of religions. These endeavours have produced a 
three-fold paradigm of categorisation consisting of exclusivism, inclusivism, and 
pluralism. This trichotomy was introduced by John Hick and then circulated in the 
publications of his pupils. In particular, Alan Race's work Christians and Religious 
Pluralism: Pailerns in the Christian Theology of Religions is representative.7 In this 
4 Geoffrey Parrinder cited in J. J. Clarke, Oriental Enlightenment: The Encounter between Asian 
and Westem Thought (London & New York: Routledge, 1997). 132 
~ Teny C. Muck, "Instrumentality, Complexity, and Reason: A Christian Approach to Religions," 
Buddhist-Christian Studies 22 (2002). 119 
6 Langdon Gilkey, "Plurality and Its Theological Implications," in The Myth of Christian 
Uniqueness: Taward a Pluralistic Theology of Religions, ed. John Hick and Paul F. Knitter 
(Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1987). 40 
7 See Gavin D'Costa, Theology and Religious Pluralism (Oxford: Blackwell Books, 1986), John 
Hick, Problems of Religious Pluralism (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985), Alan Race, 
Chanter 1 11 
work, Race presents the paradigm as a "broad typological framework within which 
most of the current Christian theologies of religion can be placed."8 Today, the 
typology is used as a trans-religious tool. It is general1y assumed that it represents 
three basic attitudes of response to religious others that can be discerned not only 
within Christianity but also within the 'theology' of all religions. As the theologian 
Diana Eck has recognised, 
[TJhese three ways of thinking about the problem of diversity and difl'erence are not 
simply Christian theological positions, but are recognisable in the thinking of people of 
other religious traditions and in the thinking of nonreligious people. All of us -
Christians, Muslims, Hindus, and others- struggle to interpret the experienced facts of 
diversity to ourselves and to our communities.9 
In brief, the exclusivisl response asserts that the 'home religion' is the one and only 
truth and way to salvation, excluding all others. The inclusivist response claims that 
there are many religions and salvific truths, but the home religion is the superior 
culmination of the others, or is wide enough to include aspects of the others under its 
universal canopy, and in our own terms. Finally, the pluralist response affirms that 
truth is not the exclusive or inclusive possession of any one religion, but that the 
plurality of world religions each possesses salvific truth that is as valid, effective, and 
valuable as any other.10 We will now examine each of these attitudes as they have 
been represented within the history of Christianity's encounter with other religions. 
Exclusivism 
The early centuries of Christianity were a period of self-definition that witnessed a 
progression from Christocentrism to Ecclesiocentrism, a development that 
emphasised commitment to the Christian community and exclusive allegiance to the 
Church. Cyprianus' famous dictum extra ecclesiam nulla sa/us- "Outside the Church 
there is No Salvation" - was a well-established ecclesiastical position by the third-
century and it bas continued to influence the Christian attitude towards other 
Christians and Religious Pluralism: Patterns in the Christian 17teology of Religions (London: 
SMC Press, 1983). 
8 Race, Christians and Religious Pluralism: Pattems in the Christian Theology of Religions. 7 
9 Diana L. Eck, Encountering God: A Spiritual Journey from Bozeman to Banaras (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1993). 170. See also Peny Sclunidt-Leukel, "Exclusivism, Inclusivism, Pluralism: 
The Tripolar Typology - Clarified and Reaffirmed," in The Myth of Religious Superiority: A 
Mult{faith Exploration, ed. Paul F. Knitter (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2005). 13-27 
10 I have relied on Eck's descriptions of the three theological categories in my rendition. See Eck, 
Encountering God: A Spiritual Journey from Bozeman to Banaras. 168 
Chavter 1 12 
religions. Within the history of Christian exclusivism, religious others have often 
been perceived as superstitious heathen or idolatrous infidels, and interreligious 
relations have generally been characterised by either enmity or the fervour of 
proselytism. Christian exclusivism persists. Despite the developments enacted by the 
Second Vatican Council, Roman Catholicism continues to affirm the unique salvific 
efficacy of the Catholic Church, 11 while the Protestant Christological formulation 
asserts "Without Jesus Christ, there is no salvation."12 The Christian belief in God's 
incarnation in Christ, and Christ's role on Earth as the Saviour, defines the 
uniqueness of Christianity for its adherents and deems non-Christian representations 
of the absolute as radically separate or-incomplete. As John Hick has recognised: 
Until fairly recently it was a virtually universal Christian assumption, an implicit dogma 
with almost creedal status, that Christ/the Christian gospel/Christianity is 'absolute, ' 
'unique,' 'final,' ' normative,' 'ultimate' - decisively superior to all other saviours, 
gospels, religions. 13 
The work of twentieth-century Swiss Reformed theologian Karl Barth represents this 
attitude of irreducible uniqueness. In a critique of the nineteenth-century liberal 
tradition of Protestant theology, Barth's 'Neo-Orthodox' position reaffirms the 
uniqueness of Christian revelation. Barth depicts all non-Christian religions as merely 
human attempts to understand and approach God. In contrast, Barth defines 
Christianity not as a human phenomenon, a 'religion', but as a unique gift of 
revelation and a witness to God's initiative through Jesus Christ. Juxtaposing religion 
with revelation Barth claims, "Religion is unbelief. It is a concern, indeed, we must 
say that it is the one great concern, of godless man."14 Christian exclusivism has also 
been expressed in the work of the Dutch Reformed theologian Hendrik Kraemer, 
particularly in his book The Christian Message in a Non-Christian World. Following 
Banh, Kraemer stresses the "radical discontinuity" between the Gospel and all other 
religions, the latter being dismissed as merely "human attempts to apprehend the 
11 For example, see the recent Vatican docwnents: Christianity and the World Religions 
(International Theological Commission, August 1997) & Dominus Jesus (Congregation for the 
Doctrine of the Faith, September 2000). 
12 Martin Luther's damnation of idolatry and his denouncement of "those who remain outside 
Christianity, be they heathens, Turks, Jews or false Christians (i.e. Roman Catholics) although they 
believe in only one true God, yet remain in eternal wrath and perdition," colours Protestant 
exclusive attitudes in an equally negative light as the Catholic. Quoted and translated from 
Luther's collected works by Kenneth Cracknell, Towards a New Relarionship: Ch,-istians and 
People of Other Faiths (London: Epworth Press, 1986). II 
13 Hick, "Religious Diversity as Challenge and Promise." 16 
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totality of existence." 1 ~ Although Kraemer was involved in Orientalist pursuits and 
upheld a belief in the positive benefits of dialogical exchange between East and West, 
he still exemplifies the conservative Christian position of exclusivism, which 
essentially asserts that salvation is found in Christ alone, and discerns little, if any, 
salvific or religious value elsewhere. 
Looking further afield, there is no shortage of examples of exclusivism within other 
religions. As the theologian John Cobb has recognised, "The pluralistic situation can 
lead to fundamentalist self-isolation in all the traditions."16 Evidently, it can also lead 
to fierce proselytism--and violent opposition of the religious other. Within the 
exclusive position, belief systems are often utilised as "symbolic weaponry"17 upon 
humankind's numerous battlefields. It is indeed difficult to identify any recent 
situation of violent conflict that has not been fuelled by the powerful rhetoric of 
religious identity and difference and the dire strategies of religious communalism and 
fundamentalism. As one commentator has observed: 
There is no other sphere of discourse in which human beings so fully articulate their 
difterences from one anod1er, or cast these difterences in terms of everlasting rewards 
and punishments. Religion is the one endeavour in which us-them thinking achieves a 
transcendent significance. 18 
The boundaries of belonging and religious identity that demarcate the distance 
between 'us' and 'them' are further reinforced within the exclusive position by a 
prevalent disregard for interreligious dialogue and exchange. Positive interreligious 
dialogue presupposes an attitude of mutual appreciation and it depends upon being 
open to perspectives of the other, to "the possibilities of religious renewal and 
creative transforrnation."19 Within the context of exclusivism only monologues are 
beard. 
14 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, vol. 1 (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1956). 299-300. 
1 ~ Hendrick Kraemer, The Christian Message in a Non-Christian World (London: Edinburgh 
House Press, 1938). 135 
16 John B. Cobb, "Beyond 'Pluralism'," in Christian Uniqueness Reconsidered: The Myth of a 
Pluralisric Theology of Religions, ed. Gavin D'Costa (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1990). 87 
17 Diana L. Eck, "In the Name ofReligions," The Wilson Quarfer~v 17, no. 4 (1993). II 
18 Sam Harris, "Killing the Buddha," Shambala Sun, March 2006. 
19 Paul 0 . Ingram and Frederick J. Streng, "Prologue - Religious Dialogue in the Twentieth 
Century: Issues, Approaches, and Possibilities", in Paul 0 . Ingram and Frederick J. Streng, eds., 
Buddhist-Christian Dialogue: Muwal Renewal and Tronsfonnation (Honolulu: University of 
Hawai'i Press, 1986). 4 
Chavrer 1 14 
lnclusivism 
While exclusivism persists within contemporary forms of Christianity, particularly in 
fundamentalist and evangelist traditions, a growing liberal Christian discouTSe is 
representative of inclusivism. The inclusive position can be traced to members of the 
ancient Church, such as Justinus (second-century) and Eusebius (third/fourth-
century), who discerned aspects of Christian truth in Hellenistic philosophy and the 
Old Testament However, it was not until the twentieth-century, in response to the 
expansion of Christian cross-cultural consciousness and interreligious awareness, that 
inclusivism as a theological position became fully established. Theologically 
supported by the belief that the logos incarnate in Christ is-universally present-as-the 
'life and light' of all people, the Christian attitude of inclusivism is today the most 
common position towards non-Christian religions. Eck explains the historical and 
theoretical foundations of this attitude: 
At least one strong stream of the mission movement was fed not by an exclusivist 
theology that deemed all non-Christians to be lost heathens, but by an inclusivist 
"fulfilment theology" that held non-Christians to be genuine seekers of a truth found 
fully in Christ That is, other religious traditions are not so much evil or wrong-headed 
as incomplete, needing the fulfilment of Christ In some ways other religious traditions 
have prepared the way for the Good News of Christ While not wholly false, they are but 
partially true. All people of faith are seekers. and Christ, finally, is what they seek.20 
While Christian superiority is maintained within the inclusive paradigm, this position 
signifies a decline in the Church's exclusive insistence that it holds the only pathway 
to truth and salvation, and it therefore represents the emergence of religious tolerance. 
The Second Vatican Council (1962-65) played an important role in promoting 
developments within Christian inclusivism_ The Council's conclusive statement -
"Declaration of the Relation of the Church to Non-Christian Religions" (also known 
as Nostra Aetate) presents a deep appreciation of the value of religious others_ 
Affirming the world faiths, the document proclaims: 
The Catholic Church rejects nothing of what is true and holy in these religions. She has a 
high regard for the manner of life and conduct, the precepts and doctrines which, 
although diflenng in many ways from her own teaching, nevertheless often reflect a ray 
of that truth which enlightens all men. Yet she proclaims and is in duty bound to 
proclaim without fail, Christ who is the way, the truth, and the life (John 14:6). In him, 
~0 Eck, Encountering God: A Spiritual Journey from Bo::eman to Banaras. 179 
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in whom God reconciled all things to himself(2 Cor. 5:18-19), men frnd the fullness of 
their religious life?1 
While salvation outside the Church is still refuted, Nostra A elate confirms that God's 
"providence, evident goodness, and saving designs extend to all men."22 Thus, certain 
universalistic resources- God's universal love, the gift of God's grace, God's desire 
to save all men - are utilised to include religious others within the soteriological 
structure of Christianity. While this liberal approach recognises aspects of salvific 
value within other religious structures, they are understood as the result of God's 
redemptive work through Christ, and seen to be in need of fulfilment in Christ. Jesus 
becomes the_~'cosmic __ ChrisL~ whose saving Spirit is "active, in camouflaged ways, 
throughout the 'cosmos', especially in the religions of the world."23 The theologian 
Karl Rahner, who has been deemed the "chief architect of the inclusivist paradigm,"24 
has proposed the notion of the "anonymous Christian" to represent this kind of 
Christian inclusivism. Rahner asserts that the world religions are "positively included 
in God's plan of salvation." Accordingly, due to the universality of God's saving 
grace in the world, all followers of non-Christian religions are unwittingly saved by 
Christ, even though they do not "name the name."25 Rahner's position had a profound 
influence on Vatican II, and on the swelling of dialogical exploration that proceeded 
it. 
Looking further afield, it is evident that certain strains of understanding and belief 
within the world religions can be understood in inclusivist terms. Not only Christians 
speak of 'anonymous' believers. Within the Hindu tradition, the Supreme Brahman is 
believed to be the goal of all religions, and the Upanishadic notion of tat ekam is 
posited as the 'one reality' or 'mountain top' that all religions seek. Within the 
Buddhist tradition, the affirmation of the universality of Buddha-nature suggests that 
everyone, Buddhist or not, is capable of attaining Buddhahood. Finally, the Islamic 
tradition proposes that all people are born Muslims and are destined for submission to 
21 Nostra Aetate, in Austin P. Flannery, ed., Documents of Vatican 11 (Grand Rapids: Eerdman 
Publishing Co., 1975). 740 
22 Ibid. 
23 Paul F. Knitter, "Searching for the Common Thread within Religions," ReVision 22, no. 2 
(1999). 21 
24 Clarke, Oriental Enlightenment: The Encounter between Asian and Western Thought. 143 
25 Gerald A. McCool, ed., A Rahner Reader (New York: Seabury Press, 1975). 218 
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Allah, even if they have not found God through the prophet Muhammad. Inclusivism 
is perhaps the least demanding of the three positions - it does not require a vehement 
denouncement of religious others, nor a restructuring of one's own essential 
commitment. lnclusivism provides a seemingly adequate means of making sense of 
religious others within one's own religious framework. loclusivism affirms the value 
of other religions (though it may not be ultimate), and thereby establishes tolerance 
and acceptance, laying a firm foundation for open and possibly self-questioning 
dialogue. 
Pluralism 
The expansion of Christian consciousness towards the horizons of religious others has 
advanced alongside contemporary philosophical investigations into the significance 
of historical and cultural context in relation to the nature of knowledge and truth. 
With regard to Christianity's interactions with religious others, a recognition of the 
significance of context has generated an awareness of relativism and the adoption of a 
hermeneutical, as opposed to an absolutist, approach.26 In a discussion of these 
developments, the theologian Leonard Swidler has observed, "our understanding of 
truth and reality has been undergoing a paradigm shift," in which all statements about 
reality have come to be seen as "historical, praxial or intentional, perspectival, 
language-limited or partial, interpretive, and dialogic."27 Such a perspective is 
represented by the theological paradigm of pluralism, which acknowledges the 
equality and validity of all religions. According to the position of pluralism, no one 
religion can be considered as normative or superior to all others. Rather, all religions 
are seen as complex historically and culturally conditioned human responses to an 
absolute reality. From the perspective of Christianity, pluralism thereby implies that 
"the existence of the other great religious traditions, in their plurality and diversity, is 
26 As Mircea Eliade proclaimed: "Western culture will be in danger of a decline into a sterilising 
provincialism if it despises or neglects the dialogue with other cultures. Hermeneutics is Western 
man 's response - the only intelligent response possible - to the solicitations of contemporary 
history, to the fact that the West is forced ... to this encounter and confrontation with the cultural 
values of 'the others'. Mircea Eliade, Myths, Dreams and Mysteries (New York: Harper & Row, 
1960). 10 
27 Leonard Swidler in Leonard Swidler et al., Death or Dialogue? From the Age of Monologue to 
the Age of Dialogue (London: SCM Press, 1990). 59 
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not ultimately a threat to be warded off, or an embarrassment to be studiously 
ignored, but a reality of which we must seek to discover the positive meaning."28 
A wide range of theologians, such as John Hick, Wilfred Cantwell Smith, Paul 
Knitter, Diana Eck, John Cobb, Raimundo Panikkar, and Thomas Merton have 
contributed to the construction of this new paradigm of pluralism. A representative 
volume titled The Myth of Christian Uniqueness: Toward a Pluralistic Theology of 
Religions defines pluralism as "a move away from the insistence on the superiority or 
finality of Christ and Christianity towards a recognition of the independent validity of 
other ways."29 This work represents the magnitude of this movement-fer-Christianity 
by comparing it to Caesar's crossing of the River Rubicon in 49 BCE. Equating this 
river with the Christian claim to absoluteness, the pluralist move is defined as "the 
crossing of a theological Rubicon."30 However, while Caesar's motivations 
encompassed the deliberate and divisive desire for war, the irenic intentions of 
today's pluralists seek the demonstration of amity between the world religions. 
Conscious of the inappropriate and obsolete reification of Christian claims to 
superiority and imperialism, and convinced of the possibility of a greater unity, 
pluralism affirms parity among the diversity of religious expressions and perceives an 
imperative to establish mutual understanding and even transformation through 
constructive forms of dialogue. 
Because pluralism is often misrepresented, a number of theorists and commentators 
have chosen to explicate the pluralist approach through a kind of 'lens of inversion'. 
From this perspective, pluralism can best be defined in relation to what it is not. 
Appropriating this approach, we will here seek clarification of the pluralist position 
by exploring a number of its antitheses: plurality, tolerance, and relativism. 
When discussing pluralism as a theological discourse and paradigm, it is important to 
distinguish between plurality and pluralism as they are sometimes used 
28 Hick, "Religious Diversity as Challenge and Promise." 3 
29 Paul F. Knitter, "Preface," in The Myth of Christian Uniqueness: Toward a Pluralistic Theologv 
of Religion, ed. John Hick and Paul F. Knitter (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1987). viii 
3 John Hick and Paul F. Knitter, eds., The Myth of Christian Uniqueness: Toward a Pluralistic 
Theology of Religions, Faith Meets Faith Series (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1987). 
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interchangeably and this can be confusing. Religious plurality is simply another way 
of referring to religious diversity. To clarify, while plurality signifies an objective fact 
and implies no subjective interaction, pluralism necessitates direct subjective and 
theological involvement with the religious other. As Diana Eck defines, "Religious 
pluralism requires active positive engagement with the claims of religion and the facts 
of religious diversity."31 Paul Ingram has confirmed: 
[W]ithout engagement with one another, the mere facts of the existence of neighbouring 
churches, temples, and mosques are just salad bowl examples of religious diversity. We 
can study diversity, celebrate it, or complain about it, but diversity alone is not 
pluralism. Pluralism is not an empirical fact, as religious diversity is an empirical fact. 
Pluralism is an attitude, a theological orientation, a theoretical construct that seeks to 
coherently interpret the data of religious diversity.32 
Pluralism also denotes much more than tolerance. Religious tolerance is typically 
championed as a liberal approach to religious others. Indeed, the acceptance of 
difference implied by tolerance is worthy of such acclaim. However, is this what 
tolerance realJy implies? Such an 'open' approach may be deceptive; tolerance may in 
fact be nothing more than a sentimental platitude. As the contemporary religious 
scholar Harry Oldmeadow has perceived, "in the religious field [tolerance] can easily 
cloak an insolent condescension on one side or, worse, an impious indifference to 
each and every religion on the other. 'Tolerance' can often signify nothing more than 
a vacuum of any firmly-held beliefs or pieties."33 Furthermore, a position of tolerance 
can undermine the possibility of dialogue by establishing or reinforcing distance. As 
Eck has ascertained, "Tolerance alone does nothing to remove our ignorance of one 
another by building bridges of exchange and dialogue. It does not require us to know 
anything new, it does not even entertain the fact that we ourselves might change in 
the process. Tolerance might sustain a temporary and shaky truce, but it will never 
bring forth new creation."34 
31 Eck, Encountering God: A Spiritual Journey from Bozeman to Banaras. 192 
31 Paul 0 Ingram, "'That We May Know Each Other': The Pluralist Hypothesis as a Research 
Program," Buddhist- Christian Studies 24 (2004). 136 
33 Kenneth ("Harry") Oldmeadow, Traditionalism: Religion in the Light of the Perennial 
Philosophy (Colombo: The Sri Lankan Institute of Traditional Studies, 2000). 199. Note that Harry 
Oldmeadow also goes by the name of Kenneth Oldmeadow. 
34 Eck, Encountering God: A Spiritual Journey from Bozeman to Banaras. 193. For a further 
examination of the notion of tolerance in relation to religion, and particularly to the religious 
context of India, see Wilhelm Halbfass, Chapter 22 - " 'lnclusivism' and 'Tolerance' in the 
Encounter between East and West" in Wilhelm Halbfass, India and Europe: An Essay in 
Understanding (Albany, N.Y.: State University ofNew York Press, 1988). 403ff 
Chavter 1 19 
The recognition of the distinction between pluralism and relativism is critical to a 
thorough understanding of pluralism. Relativism is often considered an intellectual 
solution to many of the problems raised by religious diversity. Relativism explains 
religions as distinct human constructions, which are relative to and conditioned by the 
historical and cultural conditions in which they function. Accordingly, the beliefs and 
practices of any religious community are seen to be true for its adherents but 
irrelevant for others, because religious truths can only ever be understood in relation 
to their contexts. By affirming the relative truth of all religions, and therefore their 
equality, such a perspective may seem to represent a position of pluralism. Indeed, 
many critics have argued for the equation of relativism and pluralismo Coneemed 
with the issue of immorality or irreligion, some critics contend that pluralism implies 
a relative, uncritical, and therefore dubious acceptance of all claims to truth. Other 
critics contend that because pluralism affirms the relative truth of religions, they are 
each asserted as equally viable and therefore they each become equally worthless. 
In response to the critique of pluralism as relativism, it firstly needs to be 
acknowledged that while pluralists affirm the relative truth of all religions, this does 
not mean that they do not employ value-judgements regarding religious positions. As 
one commentator has explained, if this were the case a pluralist "would not be able to 
distinguish between the truth claims of, for example, the Confessing Church and 
those German Christians who followed Hitler."35 It also needs to be acknowledged 
that while pluralists affirm the relative truth of all religions, this does not mean that 
they deny the existence of an ultimate truth that provides the ultimate referent and 
thus value of all religions. Indeed, from the perspective of pluralism, such reductive 
relativism, which perceives religions as merely so many separate human constructs, 
amounts to nothing but nihilism. The theologian Langdon Gilkey has articulated this 
danger of relativism: 
[I]f they are relativised, God, Christ, grace and salvation, higher consciousness, dharnw, 
nirvana, and mukti alike begin to recede in authority, to take on the aspect of mere 
projections relative to the cultural and individual subjectivity of the projectors, and so in 
the end they vanish like bloodless ghosts. 36 
35 Rose Drew, "Reconsidering the Possibility of Pluralism," Journal of Ecumenical St11dies 40, no. 
3 (2003). 247 
36 Gilkey, "Plurality and Its Theological Implications." 43-44 
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What the theologian John Cobb has deemed the "corrosive acid of relativism"37 
ignores the pluralist affirmation of commitment, it undermines the possibility of 
dialogue, and it disavows the presence of any underlying foundation ofreal religious 
meaning. The Traditionalist Frithjof Schuon has referred to this kind of reductive 
nihilistic relativism, in which everything of religious import becomes merely "the 
fruit of a contingent elaboration: Revelation becomes poetry, the Religions are 
inventions, sages are thinkers ... and every principia! truth" is denied.38 With regard to 
relativism, Diana Eck has succinctly stated the pluralist position: 
Pluralism is not, then, the kind of radical openness to anything and everything that drains 
meaning from-partieillarity. It is; however, raditlal openness to Tmth - to God - that 
seeks to enlarge understanding through dialogue. Pluralism is the complex and 
unavoidable encounter, difficult as it might be, with the multiple religions and culn1res 
that are the very stufl' of our world, some of which may challenge the very ground on 
which we stand. Unless all of Hs can encounter one another's religious visions and 
cultural forms and understand them through dialogue, both critically and self-critically, 
we cannot begin to live with maturity and integrity in the world house. 39 
While all pluralists affirm the existence or presence of ultimate truth or reality, they 
differ in their understanding of religious representations of this reality. Two opposing 
camps of pluralism have thus emerged. The first considers that all religions are 
oriented towards the same religious object (whatever it may be called) and promote 
the same end or salvific goal. This universalist approach has been deemed identist 
pluralism. Because all religions are seen to refer to the same one reality, they are 
considered to be ontologically identist, and because they are united by a shared 
salvific essence, they are considered to be soteriologically identist. 40 In contention, 
the second camp underscores the uniqueness of each religion and attests that they 
each represent different ends or salvations by being oriented towards different 
religious objects. These objects are representative of different ultimate realities, or 
aspects of a reality that is multidimensional. This particularist approach has been 
deemed differential pluralism, as it considers religions to be ontologically and 
37 John B. Cobb in Swidler et al., Death or Dialogue? From the Age of Monologue to the Age of 
Dialogue. 4 
38 Frithjof Schuon, Dimensions qf /slam, cited in Oldmeadow, Traditionalism: Religion in the 
Light of the Perennial Philosophy. 135 
J9 Eck, Encountering God: A Spiritual JmJmeyfrom Bozeman ro Banaras. 196 
40 While identist pluralism may appear to be simply another form of inclusivism, it should be noted 
that its proponents consider the one reality to which all religions refer and the shared salvific 
essence that unites them to be non-tradition-specific, that is, a universal. See below for further 
discussion. 
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soteriologically different.41 While the first camp enters into dialogue on the basis of a 
common denominator or uniting essence, the second, affirming difference, 
endeavours instead to discover areas of complementarity. Exemplifying the first 
camp, the Buddhist philosopher Masao Abe has commented on the pivotal conception 
of the common essence: 
The most serious and crucial question in the current situation of religious pluralism is 
whether there is a basic unity or common denominator for world religions ... whether 
there is something common to, something universally true for, all religions ... whether 
there is an absolute One as the common essence of all religions.42 
Denouncing the idea of a common denominator as a superficial 'meta-theory', David 
Ray Griffin represents the second camp. Griffin pronounces 
... a call for deep pluralism - one that recognises that religious diversity involves real 
diflerences in the diagnosis of the basic human problem, the type of 'salvation' needed, 
and the nature of the ultimate reality to which attention is directed. A deep pluralism 
would, furthermore, see truth in other religions in relation to aspects in which they are 
different from one's own tradition, as well as in relation to aspects in which they are 
similar. 43 
ldentist Pluralism 
The theologian John Hick has been recognised as "the most articulate protagonist of 
the acceptance of religious pluralism as a systematic position in Christian theology as 
well as in the philosophy ofreligion.'>44 He has also been deemed "the most important 
representative" of the identist model of religious pluralism.45 Hick's theology of 
pluralism commenced with a call for a "Copernican revolution" to invert 
Christianity's "Ptolemaic" perception that all religions revolve around the 'sun' of 
Christ.46 In Hick's words: 
41 See David Ray Griffm, "Religious Pluralism: Generic, !dentist, and Deep," in Deep Religious 
Phwa/ism, ed. David Ray Griffin (Louisville, Kentucky: Westminster John Knox Press, 2005). 
24fT 
42 Masao Abe," 'There is No Conunon Denominator for World Religions': The Positive Meaning 
of this Negative Statement," in Masao Abe, Buddhism and interfaith Dialogue, ed. Steven Heine, 
Two vols., vol. I (Honolulu: University ofHawai'i Press, 1995). 40-41 
43 Griffin, "Religious Pluralism: Generic, !dentist, and Deep." 29 
44 Wolfhart Pannenberg, "Religious Pluralism and Conflicting Truth Claims: The Problem of a 
Theology of the World Religions," in Christian Uniq11eness Reconsidered: The Myth of a 
Pluralistic Theology of Religions, ed. Gavin D'Costa (Maryknoll, NY: Orb is Books, 1990). 97 
45 Yong Huang, "Religious Pluralism and Interfaith Dialogue: Beyond Universati~m and 
Particularism," International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion 37 (I 995). 128 
46 See John Hick, God and the Universe of Faiths: Essays in the Philosophy of Religion (London: 
Macmillan, 1973). viii-ix 
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We have to realise that the universe of faiths centres upon God, and not upon 
Christianity or upon any other religion. [God] is the sun, the originative source of light 
and life, whom all the religions reflect in their own dificrent ways.47 
Despite its honourable intent to traverse Christianity's 'Rubicon', Hick's initial 
position of theocentric pluralism received criticism for its exclusion of non-theistic 
traditions such as Buddhism. This critique proposed that the movement from 
christocentrism to theocentrism requires a further step beyond the dualism of theism 
and non-theism.48 In response, Hick established a corrective 'hypothesis' proposing a 
category of 'the Real' as the ultimate source and referent of the world religions. Hick 
explains: 
[T]he great world faiths embody different perceptions and conceptions of, and 
correspondingly difterent responses to, the Real from within the major variant ways of 
being human ... One then sees the great world religions as different human responses to 
the one divine Reality, embodying different rerceptions which have been formed in 
different historical and cultural circumstances.4 
The ultimate metaphysical referent of 'the Real' is epistemologically unknowable and 
therefore ineffable. Directly informed by Kant, and evidencing the influence of 
Rudolf Otto, Hick employs a distinction between the noumenal, which is independent 
of human perception, and the phenomenal, which can be humanly perceived. so 'The 
Real' refers to a divine noumenal reality - "that putative reality which transcends 
everything other than itselfbut is not transcended by anything other than itself."51 Yet 
it is ontologically real and can be authentically encountered and experienced through 
the phenomenal personae or impersonae - the different gods and impersonal 
absolutes venerated in the world religions, which are embodiments or manifestations 
of transcendent divine reality. Hick suggests a further identification between the 
47 Jolm Hick, God Has Many Names (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1980). 71 
48 For example, Sumner B. Twiss has obsoved, "a recognition of the possible ill fittingness 
between Hick's claim and some religious traditions suggests the possibility that his claim might 
well be theistically loaded and at best applicable only to those theistic traditions that are 
historically related (e.g., Judaism, Christianity, Islam)." Sumner B. Twiss, "The Philosophy of 
Religious Pluralism: A Critical Appraisal of Hick and His Critics," Journal of Religion 70 (1 990). 
557,n.37 
49 Jolm Hick, An Interpretation of Religion (London: Macmillan, 1989). 240 
~See Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Ho~v: An Inquiry into the Non-Rational Factor in the Idea of 
the Divine and Its Relation to the Rational, 2nd ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1958). And 
for a succinct discussion of Otto's distinction between the noumena and the phenomena, see 
Chapter 3, "The Numinous Experience" in Philip C. Almond, Rudolf Otto: An Introduction to His 
Philosophical Theology (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1984). 55-87 
~~ Jolm Hick, Disputed Questions in Theology and the Philosophy of Religion (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1993). 164 
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soteriologies of the various religious traditions, which are all seen to transform 
religious adherents from 'self-centredness' to 'Reality-centredness': 
[W]ithin each of [the world religions] the transtonnation of human existence from self-
centredness to Reality-centredness is taking place. These traditions are accordingly to be 
regarded as alternative soteriological 'spaces' within which, or 'ways' along which, men 
and women can find salvation/liberation/ultimate fultilment.52 
Uniting the world religions within a cohesive metaphysical divine reality and a 
common soteriological core, Hick ostensibly affirms the equal value of religions. 
According to the identist position of pluralism, the confirmation of a common essence 
or shared soteriological goal among the world religions is a crucial corrective to 
religious imperialism; the realisation of the common essence affirms that all religions 
have equal inherent value. Furthermore, if the goal of all religions is understood as 
the authentic embodiment or actualisation of this essence, it becomes a criterion of 
evaluation that can be used to judge the efficacy of each religious system. Finally, 
owing to this common essence, the meeting of the religions can take place on an 
ostensibly common ground, in reference to some trans-religious category of 
understanding, such as 'the Real' . In addition to Hick, numerous Christian 
theologians, as well as philosophers and commentators from other religions, have 
proposed ' theories of essence'. We will here present but a few. 
Wilfred Cantwell Smith, the eminent historian of religions, has identified 'faith' as 
the common substance of all religions, the essence which unites them within a single 
historical continuum. Emphasising the primacy of ' personal truth' over the truth of 
doctrines, Smith defines faith as "a universal quality of human life."53 Indeed, Smith 
compares faith to beliefs or doctrines, which he considers to be mere 
intellectualisations about faith. Faith is the essence of the various human responses to 
ultimate reality, 
.. . a serenity and courage and loyalty and service: a quiet confidence and joy which 
enables one to feel at home in the universe and to tind meaning in the world and in one's 
own life, a meaning that is profound and ultimate.~4 
52 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion. 240 
~3 Wilfred Cantwell Smith, Tawards a World Theology: Faith and the Comparative History of 
Religion (Marylcnoll, New York: Orbis, 1981). 113 
S-4 Wilfred Cantwell Smith, Faith and Belief(Pri nceton: Princeton University Press, 1979). 12 
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From the ethical perspective of liberation theology, Paul Knitter has proposed the 
centrality of ' soteria' or 'soteriocentrism' as the unifying factor of the world 
religions. Knitter suggests that a common 'liberative spirit', while differently 
expressed, can be discerned within all religious traditions: 
If the religions of the world . .. can recognise poverty and oppressiOn as a common 
problem, if they can share a common commitment (expressed in different forms) to 
remove such evils, they will have the basis for reaching across their 
incommensurabilities and difierences in order to hear and understand each other and be 
transformed in the process. 5s 
Perhaps the most obvious proposal of the common essence of religions issues from 
the realms of mysticism. Every ml\ior relig-ion of the world has manifested a traditi~ 
of mysticism, including the Advaita Vedanta of Hinduism, the Kabbalah of Judaism, 
Gnosticism and the apopbatic or negative theology of Christianity, and the Sufism of 
Islam. While the ascetic or esoteric practices of mystical traditions may lead to a 
variety of experiences, including pantheistic, panentheistic, dualistic, and 
nondualistic, they are united by their concern with the inner world of self-
transformation and gaining access to the ultimate dimension of reality. The 
transformative experiences of mysticism encompass a transcendence of the normal 
modes of perception, and the communion, union, or direct encounter with ineffable 
divine or absolute reality.56 William James, one of the most esteemed scholars of 
mystical experience, bas observed the trans-religious manifestation of mysticism: 
55 Pau] F. Knitter, "Towards a Liberation Theology of Religions," in The M_wh of Christian 
Uniqueness: Toward a Pluralistic Theology of Religions, ed. John Hick and Paul F. Knitter 
(Marykno!J, NY: Orbis Books, 1987). 186 
56 This description of mysticism is necessarily brief and it should be noted that the debates that 
surround its proposals are more complex and involved than space allows us to discuss here. While 
more will be said on mysticism and related debates, it is worth here noting a number of 
representative works. Sec Denise Lardner Cannody and John Tully Cannody, Mysticism: Holiness 
East and West (New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), Robert K. C. Forman, ed., 
The Innate Capacity: Mysticism, Psychology, and Philosophy (New York & Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1998), Robert K. C. Fonnan, ed., The Problem of Pure Consciousness: 
Mysticism and Philosophy (New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), Steven T. Katz, 
"Language, Epistemology and Mysticism," in Mysticism and Philosophical Ana~vsis, ed. Steven T. 
Katz (London: Sheldon Press, 1978), Steven T. Katz, ed., Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis 
(London: Sheldon Press, 1978), Steven T. Katz, ed., Mysticism and Religious Traditions (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1982), Rudolf Otto, Mysticism East and West: A Comparative 
Ana~vsis of the Nature of Mysticism (New York: Meridian Books, 1957), Walter T. Stace, 
Mysticism and Philosophy (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1960), R. C. Zaehner, Mysticism, Sacred and 
Profane: An Inquiry into Some Varieties of Praeter-Natural Experience (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1957). 
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In Hinduism, in Neoplatonism, in Sufism, in Christian mysticism, in Whitmanism, we 
find the same recurring note, so that there is about mystical utterances an eternal 
.. n 
unammtty: 
According to the mystical traditions of every religion, mystical experience opens a 
kind of spiritual doorway that leads beyond the confmes of specific religious 
boundaries to a universal current or essence of truth that is the ultimate source and 
centre of all religions. Among the vast company of mystics, a suitable representative 
can be found in the thirteenth-century Sufi poet Jalal al-Din Rumi, who has 
articulated the mystical view of pluralism in a succinct analogy, which proclaims: 
"The lamps are different, but the Light is the same. "58 
Bearing similarities and indeed direct links to the position of mysticism, the school of 
Traditionalism affirms the 'perennial philosophy' or the sophia perennis as the 
uniting factor of religions.59 One of the most renowned Traditionalists, Frithjof 
Schuon, has presented an esoteric understanding of the common essence as the 
"transcendent unity" of religions: 
[T]he unity of the religious forms must be realised in a purely inward and spiritual way 
and without prejudice to any particular form. The antagonisms between these forms no 
more atTect the one universal Truth than the antagonisms between opposing colours 
affect the transmission of the one uncoloured light. .. Just as every colour, by its 
negation of darkness and its afflfmation of light, provides the possibility of discovering 
the ray that makes it visible and of tracing this ray back to its luminous source, so all 
forms, all symbols, all religions, all dogmas, by their negation of error and their 
atTifmation of Truth, make it possible to follow the ray of Revelation .. . back to its 
Divine Source.60 
The Hindu spiritual activist Mobandas K. Gandhi has utilised a similar analogy of 
light to represent the unity of religions from a Hindu perspective. Gandhi proclaims: 
"Truth is the same in all religions though, through refraction, it appears for the time 
being variegated, even as light does through a prism."61 Gandhi utilises the Sanskrit 
57 William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Shtdy in Human Nature (London: 
Longmans Green, 1902). 410 
58 Reynold A. Nicholson, ed., The Mathnawi of Jalalu'ddin Rumi, 8 vols. (Cambridge: The 
Trustees of the "E.J.W. Gibb Memorial", 1925-40). Volume III, verse 1259 
59 For a comprehensive analysis of the connections between Traditionalism and the question of 
religious diversity see Chapter 16, "Dialogue, Pluralism and the Inner Unity of Religions" in Harry 
Oldmeadow, Journeys East: 20th Century Western Encounters with Eastern Religious Traditions 
(Indiana: World Wisdom, 2004). 420-449 
60 Frithjof Schuon, The Transcendent Unity of Religions (Wheaton, 11.: Quest Books · 
Theosophical Publishing House, 1984). xxx.iv 
61 Mohandas K.. Gandhi in Robert Ellsberg. ed, Gandhi on Christianity (Maryknoll, New York: 
Orbis Books, 1991). 61 
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word satya to characterise the essence of religion. Satya can be translated as 'truth' 
and in Gandhi's vision it signifies the truth- that which all religions ultimately refer 
to but which transcends any particular religious expression. Like the relativist, 
Gandhi perceives the integral role of culture and language in constructing rei igions, 
but unlike the relativist, he affirms truth as an ineffable unity underlying each 
attempted expression: 
Even as a tree has a single trunk, but many branches and leaves, so is there one true and 
perfect Religion, but it becomes many, as it passes through the human medium. The one 
Religion is beyond all speech. Imperfect men put it into such languages as they can 
command, and their words are interpreted by other men equally imperfectly. Whose 
interpretation is to be held to be the right one?62 
The prospect of a universal religion to unite humankind has appealed to many 
theorists and has found particular resonance within Hinduism.63 To provide another 
example from the East, His Holiness the Dalai Lama XIV 's approach initially 
confirms the view of 'one religion'. From a pragmatic and utilitarian perspective, His 
Holiness emphasises the affective dimension of religions - the importance of the 
function and purpose of religious doctrines over and above their philosophical 
peculiarities. For the Dalai Lama, it is not a question of which philosophical system is 
right and which is wrong, but a question of the efficacy of each in actualising its 
intention. According to the Dalai Lama, this goal is universal - the cultivation and 
promotion of love, compassion, inner peace, a deep respect for others and 
engagement with their suffering, lasting happiness for all, and a respect for a "higher 
force."64 Explicitly, the Dalai Lama describes the "essence of religion" as 
"compassion"65 and proposes the possibility of "a universal religion of love.'>66 In 
reference to this altruistic goal as the ultimate trans-religious purpose, the Dalai Lama 
62 Ibid. 62 
63 See Arvind Sharma, "All Religions Are: Equal? One? Same? A Critical Examination of Some 
Fonnulations of the Neo-Hindu Position," Philosophy East and West 29, no. 1 (1979). 
64 Dalai Lama XIV (HH Tenzin Gyatso), "'Religious Harmony' and Extracts from the Bodhgaya 
Inte1,.·iews," in Christianity through Non-Christian Eyes, ed. Paul J. Griffiths (Maryknoll, NY: 
Orbis Books, 1990). 163-166 
65 Dalai Lama XIV, "Religious Values and a Human Society," in Dalai Lama XIV (HH Tenzin 
Gyatso), Kindness. Clarity, and Insight, trans. Jeffiey Hopkins (New York: Snow Lion 
Publications, 1984). 13 
66 DaJai Lama XIV (HH Tenzin Gyatso), '"Religious Harmony' and Extracts from the Bodhgaya 
Interviews." 165 
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suggests, "we must consider the question of religious diversity from this 
viewpoint. .. when we do, we find no conflict."67 
In spite of such clear evidence of universalism within the Dalai Lama's interreligious 
discourse, His Holiness poses a relatively unique case; staying true to the 'middle 
path', his position of universalism is balanced by a position of particularism. 
Reinforcing his utilitarian approach to religions with an analogy, common to 
Buddhist discourse, of sickness and cure, the Dalai Lama affirms the value of 
religious differences. Based upon an awareness of the historical and cultural 
relevance of religions, the Dalai Lama's analysis suggests: "Different medicines are 
prescribed-for different diseases, anda-medicme-which is appropriate in one situation 
may be inappropriate in another. Thus I cannot say of Buddhism very simply, 'This 
medicine is best'.'>68 As we shall now see, the critique of identist pluralism and the 
position of differential pluralism are underscored by such affirmations of religious 
difference. 
Differential Pluralism 
A prevalent metaphor within the discourse of identist pluralism presents the image of 
a single mountain traversed by many different paths that all lead to its summit. This 
image is used to symbolise the assertion that all religions, or paths, lead to the same 
one ultimate reality, or mountain top. The critique of identist pluralism has reworked 
this image. No longer is there only one mountain and one summit, but a vista of many 
mountains, of contrasting terrain, traversed by many paths, some of which intersect, 
and all leading to a diversity of summits.69 As this revision implies, the critique of 
identist pluralism argues against the existence of a common ground (or mountain) and 
a common goal (or summit) among religions. In their attempt to undermine claims to 
superiority and grant value to all religions, it is argued that the identists have 
subsumed religious differences beneath ostensibly neutral meta-theories and allegedly 
universal categories. Such propositions as 'the Real', 'faith', 'soteria', ' transcendent 
61 Ibid. 167 
68 Dalai Lama XJV (HH Tenzin Gyatso), Kindness, Clarity, and Insight. 49 
69 Stephen Kaplan's recent publication exemplifies this perspective. Kaplan presents a threefold 
typology of paths and mountains - the paths of the theists who seek communion with God; the 
path of Advaita Vedanta, which aims at fmal identity with the changeless real; the paths of the 
many forms of Buddhism, which seek to realise the interconnected nature of the self and the 
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unity', 'truth', and 'compassion' fail to provide any universal denotation of the 
essence of religion, as they are all in fact tradition·specific categories. The identists 
are accused of imposing these categories upon other religions, thereby distorting and 
misrepresenting them. In the name of religious unity, real religious differences are 
ignored and the original endeavour of pluralism paradoxically defeats itself. 
Essentially, this critique discerns a problem of imperialism ensuing from the 
assumption of neutral ground, and a danger of homogenisation posed by the denial of 
context and religious differences. The proposition of differential pluralism is offered 
as an ostensible corrective to this problematic position of identist pluralism. 
The objection to imperialism is based upon a recognition of "the myth of the neutral 
observer"70 in pluralist views. The argument suggests that identist pluralism has 
"pretensions to occupy an Olympian neutral position"71 beyond the positions of all 
traditions. In practice, this purported neutrality ironically becomes just another 
absolutist position. The theologian Gavin D'Costa has advanced an incisive critique 
of an apparent imperialism within John Hick's pluralist hypothesis. D'Costa's article 
"The Impossibility of a Pluralist View of Religions"72 argues that the pluralist, in 
practice, employs tradition-specific criteria according to an exclusivistic logic. The 
neutral ground claimed by pluralists is in fact illusory because, according to D'Costa, 
there can be "no non-tradition-specific approach."73 D'Costa explains: 
[T]here is no such thing as pluralism because all pluralists are conunitted to holding 
some form of truth criteria and by virtue of this, anything that falls fowl of such criteria 
is excluded as counting as truth (in doctrine and in practice). Thus, pluralism operates 
within the same logical structure as exclusivism and in this respect pluralism can never 
really aflirm the genuine autonomous value of religious pluralism for, like exclusivism, 
it can only do so by tradition specitic criteria for truth.74 
process that is reality. See Stephen Kaplan, D(fferent Paths. Different Summits: A Model f or 
Religious Pluralism (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002). 
70 Eric 0. Springsted, "Conditions of Dialogue: John Hick and Simone Wei!," Journal of Religion 
72, no. 1 (J992).22f 
71 Alan Race, Interfaith Encounter: The Twin Tracks of Theology and Dialogue (London: SCM 
Press, 200 1 ). Ill 
n It is worth noting that D'Costa was originally one of Hick's students. See Gavin D'Costa, "Tile 
Impossibility of a Pluralist View of Religions," Religious Studies 32, no. 2 (1 996). 223-232. See 
also Gavin D'Costa, The Meeting of Religions and the Trinity (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 2000). 
73 D'Costa, The Meeting of Religions and the Trinity. 19 
7~ D'Costa, "The Impossibility of a Pluralist View of Religions." 225-6 
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In other words, D'Costa argues that pluralists impose their own understanding of 
salvation as universally true. Thus, while claiming neutrality, the approach inevitably 
misrepresents and subsumes the religious other. In another publication, The Meeting 
of Religions and the Trinity, D'Costa directly applies this critique to Hick, suggesting 
that his "apparently neutral, disembodied location is in fact the tradition-specific 
starting point of liberal modemity."75 Drawing upon the theory of such postmodem 
theologians as John Milbank, Alasdair Macintyre, and Kenneth Surin, D'Costa argues 
that Hick's position fails to address plurality, since "disputants are invited to leave 
their traditions (which constituted the original points of disagreement), so as to join a 
common and new one: liberal modernity."76 In-other-words, Hic-k's pluralism-is-in 
fact a form of exclusivism defined by the values and presuppositions of Western 
liberal modernity. 
Another critic, the theologian S. Mark Heim, is credited with providing "what may be 
the best-argued critique of pluralist theologies of religion in print" .77 Heim has 
mounted a critical deconstruction of the kind of pluralism presented by theologians 
like John Hick, Wilfred CantweJI Smith, and Paul Knitter.78 Like D'Costa, Heim 
affirms that in practice pluralist theologies are ironically not in fact very pluralistic. 
Rather, they amount to forms of reductionism that eradicate religious differences and 
are in fact no less imperialistic than the positions of inclusivism or exclusivism that 
they criticise. According to Heim, the theory of such pluralists 
... appears to deconstruct the pluralism it seeks to affirm. They insist that despite any 
apparent indications to the contrary, there is no diversity in the religious object (Hick), in 
the human religious attitude (Smith), or the primary religious function (Knitter). Thus 
they agree that the faiths cannot be regarded as serious religious alternatives. 79 
Focusing specifically on Hick, Heim argues that his model of pluralism attempts, but 
fails, to function as a neutral religious Esperanto, into which "the sentences from 
Swahili are first translated . .. and then from that structure into French or any other 
75 D'Costa, The Meeting of Religions and the Trinity . 19 
76 1bid. 20 
77 James L. Fredericks, "Book Review· Salvations: Tnllh and Difference in Religion by S. Mark 
Heim," The Journal of Religion 77, no. 4 (1997). 641 
18 See S. Mark Heim, Salvations: Tnllh and Difference in Religion (Marynoll, New York: Orbis 
Books, 1997). 
79 Ibid. 102 
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tongue. "80 Heim argues that Hick's 'language' represents "the cultural structures of 
plausibility against which modern Western Christianity has been tested."81 According 
to Heim, Hick's category of 'the Real', despite its claim to be 'meta-religious', is in 
fact a religiously specific perspective, which asserts a claim about salvation, and then 
alleges that this salvation is at work in the doctrinal systems of other religions. In 
accord with D'Costa, Heim denounces the imposition of Western and Christian 
standards onto all religious traditions.82 Indeed, another of Hick's students, Kenneth 
Surin, has equated Hick's hypothesis to the universalisation ofMcDonalds.83 
The-underlying-issue-ofthese crili'l\165--conGems GOflt@tuality and the inev itability--of 
perspective. These critics emphasise the fact that the ground upon which we stand is 
always located in time and space and that our perspective is therefore inevitably 
determined by our cultural-historic-religious context. In confirmation, Gordon 
Kaufman has argued against positions that penetrate "beneath all the 'accidental' and 
'historical' differences among humans and their religions to some supposed 'essential 
oneness' we all share." Affirming historical consciousness, Kaufman states: 
[E]very religious (or secular) understanding and way of life we might uncover is a 
particular one, that has grown up in a particular history, makes particular claims, is 
accompanied by particular practices and injunctions, and hence is to be distinguished 
from all other particular religious and secular orientations. Doubtless there are 
similarities, parallels, and overlappings of many different sorts within this enormous 
human diversity - and it is just as important to grasp these connections as to apprehend 
the differences - but it seems tmdeniable that every position to which we might tum is 
itself historically specific. A universal frame of orientation for human understanding and 
life is no more available to us than is a universallanguage. 84 
George Lindbeck, in articulating his cultural-linguistics theory of religion, echoes 
Kauffman: 
[I]t is just as hard to think of religions as it is to think of cultures or languages as having 
a single generic or universal experiential essence of which particular religions - or 
80 S. Mark Heim, "Pluralism and the Otherness of World Religions," First Things 25 ( 1992). 34 
Sl Jbid. 29 
82 See Heim, Salvations: Truth and Difference in Religion. 13-43. 
83 See Kenneth Surin, "A 'Politics of Speech': Religious Pluralism in the Age of the McDonald' s 
Hamburger," in Christian Uniqueness Reconsidered: The Myth of a Pluralistic Theology of 
Religion, ed. Gavin D'Costa (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1990). 
84 Gordon D. Kaufman, "Religious Diversity, Historical Consciousness, and Christian Theology," 
in The Myth of Christian Uniqueness: Toward a Pluralistic Theology of Religions, ed. John Hick 
and Paul F. Knitter (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1987). 5 
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cultures or languages - are varied manifestations or modifications. One can in this 
outlook no more be religious in general than one can speak language in general.8$ 
The recognition of contextuality undermines the proposal of universal categories as it 
denies the existence of any kind of universal perspective from which such categories 
could be discerned or applied. Indeed, to propose that such neutral ground can be 
located assumes a privileged position, somehow untainted by context or perspective, 
in possession of a bird's eye view, as an 'outsider'. According to these critiques, 
however, human experience is necessarily located within its context, perspective is 
thereby predetermined by that context, and thus we are all 'insiders'. 
These arguments are informed and reinforced by critiques of mysticism and the 
purported universality of mystical experience that have issued from the school of 
Constructivism. As exemplified by S.T. Katz, the Constructivist critique argues: 
There are NO pure (i.e. unmediated) experiences . . . all experience is processed through, 
organised by, and makes itself available to us in extremely complex epistemological 
ways.86 
Katz asserts that the interaction of beliefs and experience form a reciprocal 
relationship, or a "two-directional symmetry". Certain "constructive conditions of 
consciousness" such as memory, apprehension, expectation, language, accumulation 
of prior experiences and concepts, produce the grounds on which religious experience 
becomes possible.87 Indeed, according to Katz, all religious experience is " 'over-
determined' by its social milieu", which shapes and colours the experience through its 
specific "concepts, images, symbols and values."88 Finally, for Katz, different 
religious conceptions of ultimate reality cannot be equated because each tradition bas 
"differing mental and epistemological constructs, ontological commitments and 
metaphysical superstructures which order experience in differing ways."89 According 
to Constructivism, propositions of universal categories and perspective, such as those 
presented by mysticism and identist pluralism, can only ever amount to what has been 
as George A Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Post/iberal Age 
(Philadelphia: Westminster, 1984}. 23 
86 Katz, "Language, Epistemology and Mysticism." 26 
87 Ibid. 30, 59 & 63 
81 Ibid. 46 
89 Ibid. 62 
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called "a view from nowhere"90 - a metaphysical perspective dislocated from its 
cultural and ideological presuppositions and thereby invalidated. 
In alliance with contemporary postmodern theory, these critics articulate a 'discourse 
of difference'. This discourse repudiates essentialist 'meta-theories' for undermining 
real religious difference by asserting putative universal truths or categories of 
judgement. According to these critics, identist pluralism fails to encompass the vast 
differences between the world religions. Rather, it homogenises them by forcing them 
into a tradition-specific, cultural-relative framework, ignoring or discarding any bits 
that don't-seem to fit. In contention,- -it-is argued that interreligious exchange can be 
just as fruitful when based upon differences as when based upon similarities. As F. J. 
Hoffman has professed, "differences between religions are at least as important as 
similarities"; diversity should be viewed as "a sign of great human vitality rather than 
eth. b h . d " 91 as som mg to e omogemse . 
The theologian J. A. DiNoia has argued against the identist strategy for dealing with 
the specific features of different religions. According to DiNoia, this strategy 
"construes religious differences about the nature of the objects of worship and quest 
as ultimately resolvable into a higher synthesis which transcends the reach of the 
doctrines of all existing religious communities."92 Such an approach, observes 
DiNoia, "would in effect modify rather than actually encompass the existing 
particularities of religious affrrmation."93 Thus, DiNoia calls for a new strategy 
which, "rather than suggesting major alterations in the world's religious 
landscape . .. would attend to its specific features and strive to account for them in all 
their intractable diversity."94 
Heim also argues against the identist debasement of religious differences. Heim is 
particularly concerned with Hick's Kantian distinction between the phenomena, 
signifying the diversity of religions, and the noumenon, which is definitively singular. 
90 SeeM. Raphael , Rudo!( Otro and the Concept of Holiness (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997). I 
91 F . J. Hoffman cited in Clarke, Oriental Enlightenment: The Encounter between Asian and 
Western Thought. 138 
92 DiNoia, "Pluralist Theology of Religions: Pluralistic or Non-Pluralistic?." 128 
9) Ibid. 125 
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What this suggests, according to Heirn, is that "differences over historical and trans-
historical facts may remain between the traditions, but none of them can be 
religiously significant since salvation/liberation takes place as well on one side or the 
other."95 In endeavouring to grant autonomy and equality to all religions, Hick has 
affirmed that all paths lead to salvation. What Heim disagrees with, however, is the 
singular defmition of salvation. As Heim sees it, to tell the Muslim that she or he is 
seeking the same thing as the Hindu is not likely to be well received.96 In contrast, 
Heim proposes a model that takes into account the varieties of "salvations" and 
constitutes "a true religious pluralism in which the distinctness of various religious 
ends is acknowledged. "97 It also asserts the possibility of a variety of ultimate-t"ealities 
because, "the God in whom we [Christians] believe is not quite the same as that of the 
Jew or Muslim, since our God's character is fundamentally defined by a different 
standard."98 Heim utilises the image of lock and key to metaphorically defme his 
vision of a plurality of religious paths leading to a diversity of salvations within a 
multifarious ultimate reality. While each key belongs to its own particular lock, there 
is no universal key to open them all. 
While Heim' s approach would appear to remain bound to relativism, other 
theologians have suggested dialogical models of pluralism that emphasise the 
complementarity and even congruence of religions and affirm the possibility of 
interreligious communion. The Catholic priest, esteemed scholar of religions, and 
venerated Hindu holy man Raimundo Panikkar provides an apt example. Panikk.ar has 
embraced Christianity, Hinduism, and Buddhism as his personal faiths and his work 
represents a 'multi-theological' perspective. Panikkar argues against the reduction of 
religious diversity into any kind of unifying category or system - the imposition of 
the 'one' onto the 'many'. For Panikkar, the diversity of religions reflects the 
diversity of reality itself. He argues that the fact of religious diversity "does not allow 
for a universal system. A pluralistic system would be a contradiction in terms. The 
incommensurability ofultimate systems is unbridgeable. This incompatibi1ity is not a 
94 Ibid 133 
9~ S. Mark Heim, 'The Pluralistic Hypothesis, Realism, and Post-Eschatology," Religious Studies 
25 (1992). 211 
96 S. Mark Heim, Is Christ the Only Way? (Valley Forge: Judson Press, 1985). 29 
97 Heim, Salvations: Truth and Difference in Religion. 6 
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lesser evil. .. but a revelation itself of the nature of reality. Nothing can encompass 
reality."99 While Panikkar affirms the diversity ofreligions, and indeed reality itself, 
he goes against the grain of relativism in his assertion of the value of interreligious 
dialogue. Indeed, Panikkar has articulated a celebrated model called in/rareligious 
dialogue, which proposes the necessity of moving beyond 'outside' knowledge of 
religious others towards an interior experience and an understanding from 'within'. 100 
On the basis of such internal dialogical understanding, the value of religious 
difference of can be realised. 
The theologian John Cobb has proposed a similar view .. -In a c-emparative analysis of 
Buddhism and Christianity, Cobb bas criticised the notion of a singular religious 
object or ultimate reality, in light of the fact that "Emptiness is not an object of 
worship for Buddhists." As such, Cobb argues that "it is not illuminating to insist that 
Emptiness and God are two names for the same noumenal reality."101 Moreover, 
Cobb asserts that Christian notions of salvation are radically different to Buddhist 
conceptions of nin•ti~Ja or the Zen satori. Cobb has observed that "there are many 
Buddhists who do not understand themselves as seeking communion with the 
ultimate." Thus, he concludes that in comparison to Christianity, Buddhism offers "a 
different path to a different goal, a different name of a different aspect of reality, a 
different language through which something quite different from conununion is 
sought."102 
In recognition of such fundamental differences, Cobb bas proposed a position of 
differential or complementary pluralism, which is based upon the pbilosopbico-
theological system of Alfred North Whitehead. This position suggests that "different 
religions emphasise the different salvific implications of different aspects or 
dimensions of the total truth." Moreover, Cobb's position "sees a central task of 
98 Heim, Is Christ the Only Way? 143 
99 Raimundo Panikkar, "The Jordan, the Tiber, and the Ganges: lbree Kairological Moments of 
Christie Self-Consciousness," in Hick and Knitter, eds., The Myth of Christian Uniqueness: 
Toward a Pluralistic Theology of Religions. op. cit. p. 110 
100 See Raimtmdo Panikkar, The Intrareligious Dialogue (New York: Paulist Press, 1978). 
101 John B. Cobb, Beyond Dialogue: Toward a Mutual Transformation of Chn·srianity and 
Buddhism (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1982). 43 
101 John Cobb, cited in Swidler et al., Death or Dialogue? From the Age of Monologue to the Age 
of Dialogue. 81-82 
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theological dialogue to be the discovery of how these various doctrines are 
complementary rather than contradictory."103 An essential premise of this position is 
that "the totality of what is, is very complex, far exceeding all that we can ever hope 
to know or think."104 Regarding the different religious expressions of this totality, 
Cobb suggests: 
[I]n difTerent parts of the world at different times, remarkable individuals have 
penetrated into this reality and discovered features of it that are really there to be found. 
[Thus], alongside all the errors and distortions that can be found in all our traditions 
there are insights arising from profmmd thought and experience that are diverse modes 
of apprehending diverse aspects ofthe totality ofreality.105 
Cobb's position presents a pluralistic metaphysics that proposes three kinds of 
'ultimates': (1) the formless or acosmic, including Buddhism's Siinyatii, Advaita 
Vedanta's Nirguna Brahman, Meister Eckhart's Godhead, and Heidegger and 
Tillich's Being Itself; (2) the formed or theistic, including such forms of God or the 
Supreme Being as Amida Buddha, Saguna Brahman, Ishvara, Yahweh, Christ, and 
Allah; and (3) the cosmic, including affirmations of the sacredness of the universe and 
the totality of finite things, as represented in primal religions, Taoism, and Native 
traditions such as the Native Americans. 106 It is worth here noting a correspondence 
between Cobb's three ultimates and R.C. Zaehner's three types of mysticism: 
monistic mysticism, theistic mysticism, and nature mysticism. 107 Like Zaehner, Cobb 
discerns a diversity of types of religious experiences - monistic/formless/acosmic, 
theistic, and naturalistic/cosmic - and thus locates a diversity of ultimate realities. 
Furthermore, he also suggests a concurrent diversity of dialogical forms. The notion 
of complementarity comes to the fore within the dimensions of dialogue. For 
example, dialogue between two proponents of a theistic directed religion would 
encompass a dialogue of purification. But a dialogue between interlocutors from a 
theistic directed religion and an acosmic directed religion could be a dialogue of 
enrichment, which can involve a dynamic of complementarity and mutual 
103 David Ray Griffin, "John Cobb's Whiteheadian Complementary Pluralism," in Deep Religicms 
Pluralism, ed. David Ray Griffin (Louisville, Kentucky: Westminster John Knox Press, 2005). 39 
104 John B. Cobb, Transforming Christianity and the World: A Way Beyond Absolutism and 
Relativism (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1999). 135 
105 Ibid. 74 
106 Ibid. 184-5 
107 See Zaehner, M;vsticism, Sacred and Profane: An Inquiry into Some Varieties of Praeter-
Nafllral Experience. 
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transformation.108 Complementary pluralism offers an alternative to the idea of a pre-
established common ground as the basis of dialogue. Furthennore, its fundamental 
aim is reconciliation - "to transform contradictory statements into different but not 
contradictory ones", and thereby move "toward a more comprehensive vision in 
which the deepest insights of both sides are reconciled." 109 Indeed, differential 
pluralism has been proposed as a perspective that "can recognise the effective truth of 
what is truly other."1 1° Furthermore, as Cobb contends, "it helps those who accept it 
to acknowledge the deep differences among religious traditions without denying that 
each has its truth."1JI 
Among many contemporary theologians and scholars of religion, the 'discourse of 
difference ' is considered to be the most philosophically acceptable pluralistic 
approach towards religious diversity. Due to the contemporary intellectual emphasis 
on context, and a recognition of potential connections between identist approaches 
and the 'totalising' discourse of Western cultural imperialism, universalism is today 
decidedly unfashionable. 1 12 Attempts to unearth a "religious Esperanto"113 or 
establish a "world theology"114 have born the brunt of the anti-identist critique; the 
latter has denounced such attempts at universalism as reductive and subsuming in 
their imposition of ideological systems onto religious others. Indeed, the insistence on 
acknowledging perspective and context is difficult to refute (though some have 
108 This description is based on Griffin 's. See Griffin, "John Cobb's Whiteheadian Complementary 
Pluralism." 47 
109 Cobb, Transforming Christianity and the World: A Way Beyond Absolutism and Relativism. 7 4 
110 Heim. Salvations: Tn1th and Difference in Religion. 124 
111 Cobb, Transforming Christianity and the World: A Way Beyond Absolutism 011d Relativism. 
186 
112 A number of critics have suggested that the discourse of identist pluralism is in alliance with 
Westem imperialism and nmctions as a covert means of subsuming religious differences within 
the dominant globaJising model. For example, see Kenneth Surin, "Towards a 'Materialist' Critique 
of 'Religious Pluralism': A Polemical Examination of the Discourse of John Hick and Wilfred 
Cantwell Smith," in Religious Pluralism and Unbelief Studies Oitical and Comparative, ed. Ian 
Hamnet (London & New York: Routledge, 1990). See also articles by Surin, Leslie Newbigin, 
JUrgen Moltman, and John Milbank in Gavin D'Costa, ed., Christian Uniqueness Reconsidered: 
The Myth of a Pluralistic Theology of Religions, Faith Meets Faith Series (Maryknoll, New York: 
Orbis Books, 1990). See also Clarke, Oriental Enlightenment: The Encounter between Asian and 
Western Thought . 138 
113 See Leonard Swidler, ed., Towards a Universal Theology of Religion (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis 
Books, 1987). 
114 See Smith, Towards a World Theology: Faith and the Comparative History of Religion. 
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tried 115). As theorists such as D'Costa, DiNoia, Heim, and Katz so convincingly 
argue, it would appear that there is no escape from our cultural-historic-religious 
perspectives, which inevitably construct, interpret, and define our experience. As 
such, the identist-differential debate presents a specific dilemma that raises a number 
of questions. Essentially, do particularism and perspectivism preclude any possibility 
of establishing any kind of unity between the world religions? Do they undermine the 
possibility of ever really understanding the religious other? Does the inevitability of 
perspectivism determine that there can be no possibility of bridging the 'gaps of 
incommensurability,' 116 of ever establishing any kind of foundation of pluralism upon 
which all religions may stand-tegether-in-their differences? Finally, is there any 
possibility of establishing a pluralist position that can affirm the parity of all religions, 
whilst not undermining particular commitment or doing any injustice to the other'? In 
other words, can there be a pluralist position that affirms unity and diversity at the 
same time? As the suggestions of experience and complementarity offered by such 
theologians as Raimundo Panikkar and John Cobb imply, answers to these questions 
may be found within the multifarious field of dialogue. 
Dialogue 
Grappling with the issues presented by the universalism-particularism debate, Diana 
Eck bas proposed a suggestive definition of pluralism that appears to be neither 
identist or differential, or perhaps both: 
[T]he universal is us\UIIty somebody's particular writ large. Pluralism, however, is a 
distinctively difJerent perspective. The pluralist does not expect or desire the emergence 
of a universal religion, a kind of religious Esperanto. Nor does the pluralist seek a 
common essence in all religions, though much that is common may be discovered The 
commitment of the pluralist is rather to engage the diversity, in the mutually 
transformative process of tmderstanding, rather than obliterate it. 117 
What is implied by Eck' s reference to ' engaging diversity' in a 'mutually 
transformative process of understanding' is dialogue. While pluralism as a 
theological position attempts to affirm unity or diversity theoretically, the practice of 
pluralism consists of manifesting this affirmation through the dynamics of dialogue. 
liS See Fonnan, ed., The Problem of Pure Consciousness: Mysticism and Philosophy. And 
Forman, ed., The Innate Capacity: Mysticism, Psychology, and Philosophy. 
116 See Katz, "Language, Epistemology and Mysticism." 
117 Eck, "In the Name ofReligions." 99 
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Evidently, those who hold positions of exclusivism or inclusivism may also come 
together at the dialogical table. However, their motivations, methods and goals may 
greatly differ from those of pluralists. It has been suggested that dialogue in the case 
of exclusivism and inclusivism "can only be a convenient name for the religious 
mission of converting all to the only true or the onJy absolutely true religion after the 
demise of colonialism."118 Indeed, there is a general consensus within the plethora of 
literature addressing dialogue that the prime conditions for its authentic practice 
demand an affirmation of the ultimate value, difference, and integrity of each 
religious tradition. In order for dialogue to be constructive and transformative, an 
open attitude unhampered by-degmatism and proselytism is essential. However, at the 
same time, dialogue cannot shirk the points of collision by dodging the critical issue 
of commitment. As Masaaki Honda, a Japanese Christian, observes: "We cannot find 
the real field of dialogue without our own convictions, however criticised that may be 
from the academic side."119 
The tension between the universal and the particular that is represented in the identist-
differential debate is also evident within the dimensions of interreligious dialogue. 
Interreligious dialogue presupposes a commitment to a particular truth, in 
combination with an openness towards others that has the potential to generate 
renewal, transformation, or even conversion. Commenting on "the theoretical 
dilemma that plurality has forced upon us", Langdon Gilkey has observed, "There 
seems no consistent theological way to relativise and yet to assert our own symbols -
and yet we must do both in dialogue."120 According to the critiques of identist and 
differential pluralism, dialogue from both these perspectives would indeed seem 
problematic. Despite the identist endeavour to democratically deconstruct 'the myth 
of uniqueness' by equalising all religions as responses to the one reality, this position, 
according to its critique, is destined to impose alien ideology onto the other. 
Differentialism, guarding against such ideological imposition, leaves only one option 
118 Huang, "Religious Pluralism and Interfaith Dialogue: Beyond Universalism and Particularism." 
127. Huang cites the Evangelical John Stott who argues that in "tnte" dialogue and encounter, "we 
seek both to disclose the inadequacies and falsities of non-Christian religions and to demonstrate 
the adequacy and truth, the absoluteness and finality of the Lord Jesus Christ." Seep. 141 , n. 3 
ug Masaaki Honda, cited in Winston L. King, "Interreligious Dialogue," in The Sound of 
Liberating Tmth: Buddhist-Christian Dialogues in Honour of Frederick J Streng, ed. Sallie B. 
King and Paul 0. Ingram (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon, 1999). 48-9 
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- to assert that different religions are different human responses to different Realities. 
Thus, as critiques of differentialism have recognised, dialogue can only ever hope to 
confirm these differences, as the inherent relativism of the position determines that 
boundaries can never be transcended and real influence or transfonnative exchange 
would seem to be beyond reach. 121 When dialogue is understood and undertaken 
purely on the level of the conceptual or the discursive, this would seem to be the case. 
However, other forms of dialogue enacted as spiritual praxis may provide a way out 
of this impasse. Indeed, recent arguments have emerged that attempt to reconcile the 
debate between identist and particularist pluralism by looking beyond a philosophical 
pluralism towards a dialogical and experiential-plw=alism. These arguments S\Jii!Ji!est 
that the dynamics of dialogue, spiritual experience, and transformation provide a 
means of affmning both the unity and diversity of religions. 
Paul Ingram has proposed that "dialogue between the religious traditions of the world 
is the most appropriate means of understanding and confronting the theological and 
philosophical issues posed by the facts of modem religious (and secular) 
pluralism.''122 However, what exactly is meant by dialogue? In 1974, Eric Sharpe 
observed, 'The literature of 'inter-religious dialogue is already extensive, and 
growing rapidly; but it is not always clear in what sense (or senses) the word is being 
used, and what are the presuppositions that lie behind it." Sharpe also perceived that 
the word dialogue bas become so "excessively popular" that "in many cases it has 
degenerated into a cliche."123 By way of clarification, Sharpe identifies four kinds of 
dialogue: ( 1) discursive dialogue, which involves "meeting, listening and discussion 
on the level of mutual, competent intellectual inquiry"; (2) human dialogue, which 
penetrates "divisive doctrinal and ideological rationalisations" and locates dialogue at 
the level of "common humanity"; (3) secular dialogue, which focuses on the situation 
of humanity "in the world" and the "need for joint secular action, irrespective of 
120 Gilkey, "Plurality and Its Theological Implications." 44 
121 See Huang, "Religious Pluralism and Interfaith Dialogue: Beyond Universalism and 
Particularism. "136ft". And John Hick, "The Possibility of Religious Pluralism: A Reply to Gavin 
D'costa," Religious Studies 33 (1997). 
122 Paul 0 . Ingram, "Interfaith Dialogue as a Source of Buddhist-Christian Creative 
Transfonnation," in Buddhist-Christian Dialogue: Muh1al Renewal and Transjon11otion, ed. Paul 
O.lngram and Frederick J. Streng (Honolulu: University ofHawai'i Press, 1986). 79 
123 Eric J . Sharpe, "The Goals of Inter-Religious Dialogue," in Trnth and Dialogue: The 
Relationship between World Religions, ed. John Hick (London: Sheldon Press, 1974). 77-8 
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divergencies in religious conviction"; and (4) interior dialogue, which "owes little 
either to the intellectual or the existential tradition" but rather finds its locus in the 
"mystical, contemplative tradition."124 While all these forms of dialogue are integral 
to the process of interreligious exchange, in our endeavour to explore non-
philosophical or non-conceptual ways in which pluralism may be affirmed, it is the 
latter of Sharpe's forms - interior dialogue- that we shall focus on here. 
Interior Dialogue and Thomas Merton 
Arguably the most esteemed and influential twentieth-century Western representative 
of the -~entemplative tradition-is---the A~a Trappist monk Thomas Merton. 
Merton is widely acknowledged as a prime contemporary exemplar of the spiritual 
life of Christianity. Merton' s writings are acclaimed for their profound insights into 
religious experience and Christian mysticism, as well as their explorations into the 
relationship between the religious traditions of East and West Following his death in 
1968, Merton's spiritual vision has continued to provide inspiration and guidance, 
while his more critical musings and social commentary have maintained a standing of 
significant contemporary import. 125 As a modem monastic, one of Merton' s principal 
concerns was the encounter with other religions. Specifically, Merton discerned the 
significance of a contemplative contribution to interreligious dialogue. We will here 
examine the dimensions of Merton's contribution, including: his proposal of 
monasticism as a universal ideal, the possibility of establishing interreligious 
congruence and complementarity at the level of spiritual experience, the practice of 
contemplative dialogue, and the encounter between Zen Buddhism and Christianity. 
In a book called Mystics and Zen Masters published in 1967, a year before his death, 
Merton wrote: 
One of the most important aspects of the interfaith dialogue bas also so far been one of 
the least discussed: it is the special contribution that the contemplative life can bring to 
the dialogue, not only among Christians, but also between Christians and the ancient 
religions of the East, perhaps even between Christians and Marxists.126 
124 Ibid. 82-9 
m To mention but a few of Merton' s most influential works, see Thomas Merton, Conjectures of a 
Guilty Bystander (New York: Doubleday, 1966), Thomas Merton, New Seeds of Contemplation 
(New York: New Directions, 1972), Thomas Merton, &ids on the Unspeakable (New York: New 
Directions, 1966), Thomas Merton, Thoughts in Solih1de (New YorK: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 
1958). 
126 Thomas Merton, Mystics and Zen Masters (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1967). 203 
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At this stage of his life Merton was well advanced along the contemplative path, 
having spent the last nineteen years of his life as a monk, living much of the time in 
solitude, exploring the wisdom and mystical traditions of Christianity, both 
intellectually and experientia1ly. By this time, Merton was also deeply involved in an 
exploration of the traditions of the East. He was particularly interested in Zen 
Buddhism, which he had come to know through an ongoing dialogue with the 
renowned Zen Buddhist thinker D. T. Suzuki, as well as Sufism, which he had 
encountered through correspondences with the Traditionalist Marco Pallis and the 
French scholar of Islam, Louis Massignon. 127 Based upon his experience within 
Christian monasticism and his knowledge of the contemplative traditions of the East, 
Merton regarded monasticism to be a universal ideal. According to Merton, the life of 
contemplation, meditation, and prayer encompassed by monasticism could provide a 
meeting ground for the religious traditions of East and West (even where monasticism 
is not institutionalised, as in Islam). Merton refuted the escapism implied by the 
monastic ideal as illusory; he discerned monasticism to be "at once personal and 
communal" and "in a certain sense suprapersonal". He continues: 
This monastic "work" or "discipline" ... goes beyond a merely psychological fulfilment 
on the empirical level, and it goes beyond the limits of communicable cultural ideals (of 
one's own national, racial, etc., background). It attains to a certain universality and 
wholeness which have never yet been adequately described - and probably cannot be 
described- in terms of psychology. Transcending the limits that separate subject from 
object and self from not-self, this development achieves a wholeness which is described 
in various ways by the different religions; a self-realisation of atman, of Void, of life in 
Christ, offana and baqa (annihilation and reintegration according to Sufism) ... 128 
While Merton's 'intermonastic' approach to dialogue may appear tangential to our 
purposes, in fact the monastic perspective represents a concentration of one of the 
principal themes of the above-discussed debate - commitment. Indeed, Merton 
insisted that "contemplative dialogue must be reserved for those who have been 
seriously disciplined by years of silence and by a long habit of meditation ... [and] for 
those who have entered with full seriousness into their own monastic tradition and are 
127 On Merton's correspondence with Suzuki see Robert E. Daggy, ed., Encounter: Thomas 
Merton and D. T Su::uki (Monterey, KY: Larkspur Press, 1988). On Merton's correspondences 
with Pallis and Massignon see Rob Baker, "Merton, Marco Pallis, and the Traditionalists" and 
Sidney H. Griffith, "Merton, Massignon, and the Cha11enge of Islam" in Rob Baker and Gray 
Henry, eds .. Merton and Sufism: The Untold Story (Louisville, KY: Fons Vitae, 1999). 193-265 & 
51-78 
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m authentic contact with the past of their own religious community." 129 This 
insistence upon a foundation of tradition and discipline is indicative of the absolute 
commitment enjoined by the monastic ideal. 
Merton's comments relating to the above-mentioned arguments concerning the 
universality of mystical experience and the issue of perspectivism further clarify and 
reinforce his position. Merton has referred to: 
... a certain type of concordist thought today [which] too easily assumes as a basic 
dogma that 'the mystics' in all religions are all experiencing the same thing and are all 
alike in their liberation from the various doctrines and explanations and creeds of their 
less fortunate co-religionists. All . religions thus ' meet at the top,' and their various 
theologies and philosophies become irrelevant when we see that they were merely means 
for arriving at the same end, and all means are alike efficacious.130 
For Merton, this is a "very complex question" that has "never been demonstrated with 
any kind of vigour." He is concerned that it "seems to imply a purely formalistic view 
of the theological and philosophical doctrines, as if a fundamental belief were 
something that a mystic could throw off like a suit of clothes and as if his very 
expenence itself were not in some sense modified by the fact that he held this 
belief."13 1 
Merton's acknowledgements ofthe important role of religious commitment within the 
dimensions of intermonastic exchange, and the defming impact of tradition upon 
mystical experience, are further fortified by his approach to religious difference and 
syncretism. Merton asserts the necessity for "a scrupulous respect for important 
differences" within dialogue. He explains: "There are differences that are not 
debatable, and it is a useless, silly temptation to try to argue them out. Let them be 
left intact until a moment of greater understanding." Furthermore, Merton voiced his 
opposition to what he called "facile syncretism, a mishmash of semireligious verbiage 
and pieties, a devotionalism that admits everything and therefore takes nothing with 
128 Thomas Merton, The Asian Journal of Thomas Merton, ed. Naomi Burton, Patrick Hart, and 
James Laughlin (New York: New Directions, 1975). 310 
129 Ibid. 316 
130 lbomas Merton, "A Christian Loolcs at Zen," in Thomas Merton on Zen (London: Sheldon 
Press, 1976). 101. This article was origina11y as the preface to John Wu's The Golden Age of Zen, 
and is a1so published in Zen and the Birds of Appetite. 
J)J Ibid. 
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full seriousness." 132 These perspectives would seem to put to rest any suspicions of 
Merton as a counterfeit idiosyncratic psuedo-spiritualist/mystic, of which there is a 
CIDTent veritable plague, and of which we should rightly be wary. On the contrary, it 
is clear that Merton has built his house on the solid rock of the Christian tradition. 
Despite these particular qualifications, Merton nevertheless proclaims the "special 
value of dialogue and exchange among those in the various religions who seek to 
penetrate the ultimate ground of their beliefs by a transformation of the religious 
consciousness." In other words, he affirms the value of dialogue on a contemplative 
or interior level - on the level ofreligious experience - between committed monastics 
or contemplatives from different traditions. He explains: 
Without asserting that there is complete unity of all religions at the "top", the 
transcendent or mystical level - that they all start from different dogmatic positions to 
"meet" at this smnmit- it is certainly true to say that even where there are irreconcilable 
differences in doctrine and in formulated beliet: there may still be great similarities and 
analogies in the realm of religious experience . .. Cultural and doctrinal differences must 
remain, but they do not invalidate a very real quality of existential likeness . 
. . . on this existential level of experience and of spiritual maturi~, it is possible to 
achieve real and significant contacts and perhaps much more besides. 1 3 
While the above comments demonstrate careful stipulation regarding proposals of 
'transcendent religious unity', it is apparent that the kind of experiential, 
contemplative dialogue Merton is describing implies a shared spiritual quest, the 
association of spiritual techniques such as meditation and prayer, and therefore some 
kind of mystical concord between religions. Indeed, it is worth noting the influence 
on Merton's approach to other religions of the sophia perennis, as represented by the 
school of Traditionalism As previously mentioned, in his later years Merton 
maintained a correspondence with the Traditionalist Marco Pallis, and he was invited 
by Frithjof Schuon to enjoin the Sufi order of the Maryamiyya. It has been suggested 
that Merton's journey into Traditionalism and Sufism may have gone further, has his 
life not been cut short. 134 Either way, it is clear that the sophia perennis and the 
131 Merton, The Asian Journal of Thomas Merion. 316 
133 Ibid. 312 
1~ See Rob Baker, "Merton, Marco Pallis, and the Traditionalists" in Baker and Heruy, eds., 
Merton and Su.ftSm: The Untold Story. 193-265 and Mark J. Sedgwick, Against/he Modern World: 
Traditionalism and the Secret lnte/lechwl History of the Twentieth Cenhtry (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004). 162-1 65 
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notion of mystical conununion between religions had a direct bearing upon Merton's 
proposal of contemplative dialogue. 
Another distinguished Western Catholic monk involved in contemplative dialogue 
with the East, the Benedictine Dom Bede Griffiths, has also referred to a kind of 
contemplative dialogue, defining it as "a meeting of the different religious traditions 
at the deepest level of their experience of God." Griffiths followed in the footsteps of 
Dom Henri Le Saux as the head of a Hindu-Christian ashram in Tamil Nadu, 
Southern India. As he has explained, "Hinduism is based on a deep mystical 
experience and everywhere seeks not simply to· know 'about' God, -but to 'know 
God', that is to experience the reality of God in the depths of his soul. It is at this 
level that Christian and Hindu have to meet." Like Merton, Griffiths proposes 
monasticism as a universal ground, suggesting that this kind of meeting should take 
place within the setting of the contemplative life, "in which contact can be made with 
the Hindu mystical life." m In concord, Merton has suggested that contemplative 
dialogue extends and encompasses both before and beyond intellectual or 'discursive' 
forms of dialogue. Merton is here worth quoting at length: 
Tme communication on the deepest level is more than a simple sharing of ideas, of 
conceptual knowledge, or formulated truth. The kind of comnnutication that is necessary 
on this deep level must also be "conununion" beyond the level of words, a communion 
in authentic experience which is shared not only on a "preverbal" level but also on a 
"postverbal" level. 
The "preverbal" level is that of the unspoken and indefinable "preparation," "the 
predisposition" of mind and heart, necessary for all monastic experience whatever. .. 
[The monk] must be wide open to life and to new experience because he has fully 
utilized his own tradition and gone beyond it. This will pem1it him to meet a disciple of 
another, apparently remote and alien tradition, and tind a common ground of verbal 
Wlderstanding with him. The "postverbal" level will then, at least ideally, be that on 
which they both meet beyond their own words and their own understanding in the 
silence of an ultimate experience which might conceivably not have occurred if they had 
not met and spoken ... 
This I would call "conununion." I think it is something that the deepest ground of 
our being cries out for, and it is something for which a lifetime of striving would not be 
enough. 136 
m B. Griffiths in Sharpe, "The Goals of Inter-Religious Dialogue." 88. See Bede Griffiths, Christ 
in India: Essays Towards a Hindu-Christian Dialogue (Springfield: Templegate, 1984), Bede 
Griffiths. The Marriage of East and West (London: Collins, 1982), Bede Griffiths, Return to the 
Centre (London: Collins, 1976). 
136 Merton, The Asian Journal of Thomas Merton. 315-6 
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These three levels of contemplative dialogue can be applied to Merton's encounter 
with Buddhism. In doing so, it can be demonstrated how he was able to hold positions 
of particularism and universalism at the same time - how he maintained his 
commibnent as a Catholic monk of the Trappist Order, whilst locating universal 
ground with the religious other at the level of contemplation and the spiritual 
experiences it engenders. Having established his 'preverbal' predisposition through a 
deep immersion in his own monastic tradition, Merton approached the verbal 
dimension of dialogue when he initiated a correspondence with D.T. Suzuki in 1959. 
Through this dialogue, Merton developed an understanding of Zen Buddhism and 
came to find- oongruence and resooaaGe-betweeu the "metaphysical intuition" of Zen 
and apophatic aspects of Christianity represented by experiences of union with Christ 
in 'the Word of the Cross' and the self-emptying of kenosis. 137 As such, Merton sees 
Zen and Christian mysticism, and indeed Christian belief, as "perfectly compatible" 
and proposes that "both Christians and Buddhists can equally well practice Zen ... if 
by Zen we mean precisely the quest for direct and pure experience on a metaphysical 
level, liberated from verbal formulas and linguistic preconceptions. On the 
theological level," Merton qualifies, "the question becomes more complex." 138 
Indeed, Merton was well aware that at the stage of verbal dialogue, or dialogue 
concerned with the linguistic, doctrinal and theological aspects of religion, 
differences may erect barriers to understanding. Demonstrating an opposing 
perspective to the theory of Constructivism, as represented by such philosophers as 
Katz, Merton claims that "the great obstacle to mutual understanding between 
Christianity and Buddhism lies in the Western tendency to focus not on the Buddhist 
experience, which is essential, but on the explanation." 139 Because Christianity begins 
with revelation, it has continued to focus its attention on the objective doctrine and 
non-experiential theology. According to Merton, "this obsession with doctrinal 
formulas, juridical order and ritual exactitude has often made people forget that the 
heart of Catholicism, too, is a living experience of unity in Christ which far 
transcends all conceptual formulations."140 Merton has quite clearly affirmed the 
imperative element of theology and the inviolability of religious forms. However, he 
137 See Merton, "A Christi an Looks at Zen." I 05 ff 
138 1bid 102 
139 1bid. 95 
140 lbid97 
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concurrently proposes the existence of an intuitive, mystical affinity between 
religions at the non-linguistic level of experience, and the potential agency of this 
affinity and complementarity to generate renewal, especially between East and West. 
He states: 
I think we have now reached a stage of (long-overdue) religious maturity at which it 
may be possible for someone to remain perfectly faithful to a Christian and Western 
monastic commitment, and yet to learn in depth from, say, a Buddhist or Hindu 
discipline and experience. I believe that some of us need to do this in order to improve 
the quality of our own monastic life and even to help in the task of monastic renewal 
which has been undertaken within the Western Church.141 
Elsewhere, Merton clarifies the dimensions of this kind of exchange: "The 
combination of the natural techniques and graces and the other things that have been 
manifested in Asia and the Christian liberty of the gospel should bring us all at last to 
that full and transcendent liberty which is beyond mere cultural differences and mere 
externals - and mere this or that. "142 
Through his own interior dialogue with Buddhism, as well as other spiritual traditions 
such as Sufism, Merton discovered doctrines and spiritual techniques that certainly 
complimented his own contemplative practice. Describing his intentions for travelling 
to Asia in 1968, Merton defined himself as "a pilgrim who is anxious to obtain not 
just information, not just 'facts' about other monastic traditions, but to drink from the 
ancient sources of monastic vision and experience.''143 In a period of less than two 
months, Merton attended conferences in Bangkok and Calcutta, met with several 
Tibetan lamas including the Dalai Lama, and visited various historic religious sites in 
India, Thailand, and Sri Lanka. Merton's famed epiphany at Polollllaruwa, a Buddhist 
site in Sri Lanka, is indicative of the depth of his spiritual attainment and the degree 
of impact that Buddhism bad had on his mystical vision. Merton described his 
experience of emptiness and union as a realisation that "there is no puzzle, no 
problem, and really no 'mystery'. All problems are resolved and everything is clear, 
simply because what matters is clear. The rock, all matter, all life, is charged with 
dharmakaya . .. everything is emptiness and everything is compassion."144 It goes 
••• Merton, The Asian Journal of D1omas Merton. 313 
142 Ibid. 343 
•• 
3 Ibid. 312-3 
144 Ibid. 235 
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without saying that something more than just conceptual understanding is involved in 
a Trappist monk having what we would normally defme as a Buddhist experience of 
awakening. Evidently, Merton had reached the 'postverbal' stage of his dialogue with 
Buddhism. Essentially, this encompassed the deconstruction of the ego and a direct 
encounter with ultimate reality, a process that eventuated in compassion and love for 
the world. Within the dimensions of dialogue, the realisation of the illusory nature of 
the egoic self implies a direct encounter with the other: 
It is what is seemingly not present, the void, that is really I. And the 'I' that seems to be I 
is really a void. But the West is so used to identifying the person with the individual and 
the deeper self with the empirical self that the basic truth is never seen. It is the Not-I 
that is most of all the I in each of us. 14s 
Merton's dialogical insights resonate with the proposals of a number of other theorists 
on dialogue. To refer once again to the theologian Raimundo Panikkar, parallels may 
be discerned with his notion of the intrareligious dialogue. As mentioned above, 
Panikkar's proposal suggests the dialogical, interior, and experiential understanding 
of other religions. In order to achieve this perspective, our normal notions of self and 
other need to be deconstructed. Panik.kar explains, "The intrareligious dialogue is a 
religious phenomenon, it's a religious attitude which implies an emptying of the self 
in order to be able to love the other as myself."146 Thus, within the dynamics of 
intrareligious dialogue, I meet the other "in and as myself."147 In other words, I 
realise the other as none other than myself. OJ:, as Diana Eck puts it, "We are other to 
one another."148 For Merton, this emptying of the self lay at the heart of his monastic 
vocation; in emptying his self of the ego he found the totality of God, of other 
persons, and of reality. This, for Merton, encompassed the intermonastic goal of total 
inner transformation. Finally, the encounter with reality as transcendent union with 
the other is the foundation of communion between religious traditions. 
14~ Letter to John Wu written in 1965. See Thomas Merton, The Hidden Ground of Love: The 
Leiters o.fThomas Merton on Religious Experience and Social Concerns, ed. William H. Shannon 
(New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1985). 627 
146 Interview with Panikkar on Compass (ABC Television Program), "The Quiet Revolution: New 
Prophets (Episode 1)," in The Quiet Revolution (Australia: ABC TV, 2007). 
147 Panikkar, The lntrareligiou.s Dialogue. 40 
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Experiential Pluralism 
The debate between identist and differential pluralism, and the dialogical dilemma of 
professing commitment within open encounter, centre upon the issue of the 
concurrent affirmation of the unity and diversity of religions. In the wake of the 
acknowledgement of perspectivism, this endeavour would seem to become 
impossible. It would appear that no end of theologising or philosophising about 
pluralism could conftrm its viability or possibility. However, as the case of Merton 
has revealed, within the experiential dimensions of dialogue, and in particular those 
forms of dialogue that go beyond the intellectual and the conceptual, some kind of 
reselution may be found. Indeed, it could be suggested that the multi-dimensional 
nature of religion precludes its analysis from a purely philosophical perspective, that 
is, a philosophical perspective that is bound by the dictates of rational thought and 
logical process and does not address the non-conceptual realm of experience. 
Recent arguments proposed by Judson Trapnell, and further elaborated by Rose 
Drew, directly address the possibility of reconciling and affirming the position of 
pluralism within the dimensions of spiritual experience and dialogue. Such a position 
can be understood as one of experiential pluralism. Presenting a response to 
D'Costa's philosophic arguments concerning the supposed impossibility of pluralism, 
constructed in an analysis of Buddhism, Jainism, and M. K. Gandhi, Trapnell 
suggests that "these Indian sources demonstrate that a pluralistic view is not primarily 
a theory subject to rules of logic but is a vision grounded in spiritual discipline. That 
is, what is not possible logically may indeed be realisable in practice." 149 Arguing 
against the finality of the theories of contextualism, perspectivism, and 
constructivism, and seemingly in unanimity with Merton, these authors propose that 
Indian sources provide evidence of the possible experiential transcendence of the 
confines of our linguistic, tradition-defmed perspectives within the moment of 
authentic ineffable spiritual experience. As Drew explains: 
HI! Eck, "In the Name of Religions." 97 
H 9 Judson B. Trapnell, "Indian Sources on the Possibility of a Pluralist View of Religions," 
Journal of Ecttmenica/ Studies 35, no. 2 (1998). 212 
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The possibility of having experiences that transcend the conceptual categories of one's 
own tradition suggest that pluralism should he understood as experientially rather than 
theoretically based. Understood in this way, pluralism is possible. J:IO 
Trapnell begins his investigation with Buddhism's teaching of co-dependent 
origination, suggesting that the enlightened perception of interdependent reality it 
implies can be lent to the support of pluralism. This perception envisages each object 
as a "combination of elements," constantly in flux and in ever-changing 
"relationships of mutual conditioning with other objects." As such, "the approach to 
differences, whether of times of day or religions, found in the awakened mind is not 
the same as what most of us experience in that it causes suffering neither to ourselves 
nor to the other who is being compared."151 According to Trapnell, such a 
perspective, in conjunction with other practices and principles such as nonviolence 
and nonattachment to views, is supportive of an experiential pluralism. As Trapnell 
discerns, the spiritual praxis of Buddhism leads to the transformation of 
consciousness and the attainment of an enlightened vision of interdependence, which 
is able to uphold both the integrity of the part and the unity of the whole. He explains: 
The kind of seeing the Buddha exemplifies would be integral to a pluralist view: the 
ability to see elements both in their autonomy (without projection) and in their 
irreducible interrelationship (without resorting to mere plurality or relativism). m 
Trapnell's examination of the Jain doctrine of many-sidedness further explores 
alternative apprehensions of reality that may support . pluralism. According to 
Trapnell, the Jain doctrine of the many-sided nature of reality implies the realisation 
that one's own perspective and language convey only a partial reality. This vision of 
metaphysical plurality suggests: "In its wholeness, any reality is the coexistence of 
contradictory elements, such as eternity and transience, or unity and multiplicity."153 
Once again, we see the concurrent affirmation of the whole and the part, unity and 
diversity, self and other. The implication for pluralism is the possibility of reconciling 
opposing or contradictory truth claims through such spiritual disciplines as meditation 
or self-purification, which may lead to the attainment of a "synoptic view whereby all 
contradictions are reconciled in the experience ofreality in its wholeness."154 
1~ Drew, "Reconsidering the Possibility of Pluralism." 245 
Dl Trapnell, "Indian Sources on the Possibility of a Pluralist View of Religions." 217 
m Ibid. 215 
m Ibid. 220 
1.14 Drew, "Reconsidering the Possibility of Pluralism." 257 
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The kind of spiritual experience Trapnell and Drew are referring to is defined by "a 
fundamental transformation in consciousness, the implications of which may be 
intimated beforehand but cannot be lived consistently prior to that transformation."155 
By way of clarification, Drew presents the analogy of comprehending colour or pain, 
which cannot be known, let alone imagined or envisioned, without direct experience 
of the colour red, for example, or the pain of a wound. The spiritual (as opposed to 
philosophical or logical) justification of pluralism is dependent upon such directly 
informing experience. As Drew contends: 
It is possible, through spiritual training, to transcend the epistemological limitations of 
one's exclusivist -tfamewerk-, -such that the truth of claims---that were identified as 
C<lntradictory at a cognitive, rational, analytic level of consciousness is experienced 
directly . .. [T)he possibility of such a transformation of consciousness supports the 
conclusion that pluralism does not depend on assenting to a philosophical 
hypothesis ... 156 
Of course, the implication here is that such experience and transformation defy logic 
and belong to the realm of the ineffable and irrational. However, according to Drew 
this does not decrease their status as valid and informing modes of consciousness. 
Indeed, in contrast to the acclamation of logic in the Western attempt to understand 
the 'other' that has been continuing since the European Enlightenment, the East has 
long prioritised other forms of consciousness based on spiritual insight as superior. In 
reference to this discrepancy, Trapnell suggests "this is precisely one of the 
challenges consistently offered by Indian philosophers and sages, the existence of 
other states of consciousness . .. , states in which the relation between the parts (points 
of view) and the whole (many-sided truth) is seen more synthetically."157 
Any number of the constructivist or perspectivist or particularist critiques we have 
examined could be directed at such propositions. We can do no better than to return to 
Heim, who has argued that there may be many "religious ineffables". Commenting 
upon the question of trans-religious experiences that transcend language and tradition, 
Heim is unable to look beyond linguistic accounts to any experiential verification: 
What is actual tor them, whether in all the cases it is one and the same thing ... and 
whether or not even those persons are in a position to be able to determine such 
m Trapnell, "Indian Sources on the Possibility of a Pluralist View of Religions." 213 
156 Drew, "Reconsidering the Possibility of Pluralism." 257 
m Trapnell, "Indian Sources on the Possibility of a Pluralist View of Religions." 234 
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questions, we simply do not know. Cenainly, if we credit the various religious accounts 
of their aims, the presumption is that they are different. LIS 
In response to suggestions that their experiential pluralism is guilty of denying 
religious difference, both Trapnell and Drew turn to an analysis of language to 
reinforce their central claim that pluralism can support both unity and diversity - the 
value of the other and individual commitment- at the same time. As Heim's above 
comment implies, the only non-experiential, linguistic evidence of ineffable spiritual 
experience available for investigation is demarcated by tradition-specific language. 
According to the logical, philosophical theory of scholars like Heim, the lack of 
neutrality in linguistic expressions of the ineffable predudes____the_ possibility of 
pluralism. In contention, however, Drew argues that "living out the implications of 
pluralism is not dependent on such neutrality. When it comes to communicating an 
experience, I will use my tradition-specific language, but that does not mean that the 
experience I describe is necessarily mediated by the categories of my own 
tradition."159 Elsewhere, she clarifies: 
Language demarcates the limits of ordinary perception rather than the limits of what is 
or what can be perceived by one who has undergone radical transformation. An 
experience might be interpreted within a specific religious context, but that does not 
mean the experience is itself bound by that context160 
We may here draw reinforcement from the dialogical theory of Diana Eck, who has 
observed: 
.. . to some extent all religious people are inclusivists as far as we use our own panicular 
religious language - God, Jesus Christ, the Holy Spirit, the Buddha, Vishnu - and 
struggle with the limits and meaning of that language. As long as we hold the religious 
insights of our particular traditions, cast in our particular languages, to be in some sense 
universal, we cam1ot avoid speaking at times in an inclusivist way. 161 
Despite the limitations of language, Eck denies the necessity or possibility of 
establishing "some neutral terminology" to support pluralism. Pluralism requires "that 
we cease speaking only to ourselves and in the terms of our own internal Christian 
conversation." Rather, Eck asserts, "we will speak in the context of interreligious 
1 ~8 S. Mark Heim, "Salvations: A More Pluralistic Hypothesis," Modem Theology 10 (1994). J45 
159 Drew, "Reconsidering the Possibility of Pluralism." 264 
160 Ibid. 262 
161 Eck, Encountering God: A Spiritual Journey from Bo::eman to Banaras. 180 
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dialogue." 162 Having discounted the potential of the philosophical or logical 
perspective, both Trapnell and Drew affrrm Eck's dialogical and experiential 
hypothesis of pluralism. As Trapnell concurs, while "reason cannot argue with full 
logical consistency, [the pluralist view] may be experienced in the interreligious 
encounter, in the dialogical relationship that itself constitutes a kind of ascesis."163 
Indeed, in the sources from India Trapnell identifies an emphasis on "praxis, 
.. .implying that what cannot be consistently reasoned out can in fact be lived in the 
context of interpersonal relationship or dialogue."164 
Much congruence and complementarity can be discerned between the propositions 
put forth by Trapnell and Drew and Thomas Merton's approach to religious diversity. 
Indeed, Trapnell and Drew's arguments for the experiential, spiritual expression of 
pluralism offered by Indian sources may help to explain Merton's interest in the East, 
his grasp of ineffable transcendence in the experience of mystical union with reality, 
his understanding of 'existential likeness' between religions and the ' inner and 
ultimate spiritual ground which underlies all articulated differences', as well as his 
assertion of the value of the contemplative contribution to dialogue. These arguments 
may also clarify the dynamics of Merton's 'postverbal' dialogue with Buddhism that 
allowed him to attest to "points where a genuinely common ground between 
[Buddhism and Christianity] exists,"165 despite being firmly grounded in the Trappist 
monastic tradition. Indeed, without denying religious difference on the level of 
theology, doctrine, or commitment, Merton was able to affirm interreligious unity 
based upon self-transformation and a realised interreligious complementarity 
discerned through religious praxis and experience. There is no doubt that Merton's 
experience of the stone statues of the Buddha at Polonnaruwa was directly influenced 
by the Buddhist tradition. However, it may also be interpreted as a direct encounter 
with that ineffable and ultimate dimension of reality, in which differences of religious 
form and language are reconciled in a realisation of 'transcendent unity'. Only a week 
after this experience, and not long before he died, Merton gave a speech in Calcutta to 
an audience of fellow monastics. Here he professed, 
162 Ibid. 186-7 
163 Trapnell, "Indian Sources on the Possibility of a Pluralist View of Religions." 233 
164 Ibid. 231 
16~ Merton, "A Christian Looks at Zen." 99 
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... the deepest level of communication is not commtmication, but communion. It is 
wordless. It is beyond words, and it is beyond speech, and it is beyond concept. Not that 
we discover a new unity. We discover an older unity. My dear brothers, we are already 
one. But we imagine that we are not. And what we have to recover is our original unity. 
What we have to be is what we are. 166 
Within this introductory chapter, we have investigated the global fact of religious 
diversity and the Christian response to its challenge. In so doing, we have explored 
the Christian theology of religions and its typology of responses, consisting of 
exclusivism, inclusivism, and pluralism. In our specific analysis of the position of 
pluralism as a valid response to religious diversity, we discerned three main models. 
!dentist pluralism is concerned with religious unity and equates religions on the basis 
of a philosophical proposition of conunon essence or salvific goal. Differential 
pluralism is concerned with religious differences and equates religions on the basis of 
their difference but potential complementarity. Presenting a possible reconciliation of 
these two views is a position of experiential pluralism, which is concerned with 
spiritual experience and transformation, and affrrms the equality of religions, their 
unity and diversity, on the basis of the transcendence of religious language and form 
and the dialogical encounter with the other within ultimate reality. While these three 
models are representative of Christian positions of pluralism, we have also introduced 
elements of a Buddhist position. As we shall now see, an application of the categories 
of exclusivism, inclusivism, and pluralism to Buddhist responses to religious diversity 
reveals that certain resources within Buddhism may have much to contribute to the 
ongoing debate concerning religious diversity and the possibility of pluralism. 
166 Merton, The Asian Journal of Thomas Merton. 308 
54 
2 
Buddhism and Religious Diversity: 
A Literature Review 
As a Buddhist, I do not have any significant issues with religious diversity, nor do 
I think Buddhism historically has regarded religious diversity as anything except 
a normal fact of existence. Buddhism has always existed in a multi-religious 
context, often as a minority religion and rarely as the majority religion. But 
Buddhism is also the on(v religion to spread worldlt•ide without a strong 
imperative to become the world's sole religion ... I know that on some occasions, 
versions of Buddhism have become addicted to the notion that they are sole{v 
relevant, but this, I think, is a historical possibility for any religious perspective ... 
I also think that basic Buddhist ideas have some resources that could prove useful 
in worldwide discussions of religious diversity. 
Rita M. Gross 
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The extent of the debate surrounding Christianity's relationship to other religions, 
and the resultant plethora of theological literature addressing the issue, can be 
explained by the nature of the tradition's origins, its approach to language, and its 
historical and cultural circumstances. For similar reasons, debate regarding other 
religions, and a related body of literature, are relatively absent from the discourse 
and libraries of Buddhism. By way of an introduction to this chapter, which 
concerns Buddhist responses to religious others, let us briefly examine the origins 
of these two great religions, their contrasting approaches to language, and their 
contextual-eireumstanees in relation to religious diversity. 
Christianity and Buddbi~m Compared 
As Thomas Merton has acknowledged, the nature of Christianity's ongms m 
revelation, and the tradition's consequent emphasis on the value of the logos, has 
led to a preoccupation with articulation, justification, vigorous debate, and the 
extensive analysis and qualification of theological issues and positions. Within the 
historical domains of the Church, such theoretical endeavours have been 
prioritised, often in relation to religious experience. As Merton has explained, "for 
Christianity, a religion of the Word, the understanding of the statements which 
embody God's revelation of Himself remains a primary concern. Christian 
experience is a fruit of this understanding, a development of it, a deepening of it." 1 
The nature of Christianity's origins in revelation has also been the catalyst for 
resolute claims to uniqueness, fmality, and superiority, and the historically 
momentous Christian commitment to proselytism, a commitment that has been 
characterised by exclusive and often extreme measures. Despite this history of 
encounter at the perimeters of its domain, Christianity historically maintained a 
privileged and powerful ascendancy within singular religious environments. The 
modem day encroachment of religious diversity has therefore presented a serious 
challenge to Christianity. As we have seen, this challenge has produced the 
enterprise of the theology of religions. This profusion of debate and literature is, 
then, congruent with, and at the fore of, a long intellectual and theoretical tradition 
1 Thomas Merton, "A Christian Looks at Zen," in Thomas Merton on Zen (London: Sheldon Press, 
1976). 98 
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of theological reflection that has structured Christian belief, practice, and indeed, 
experience. This is a tradition of 'faith seeking understanding', or fides quaerens 
intellectum as Anselm of Canterbury put it. Within contemporary contexts this 
constitutes the great challenge of faith seeking understanding in a religiously 
diverse world. 
In contrast, the origins of Buddhism lie not in a revelation of the Word from a 
divine source, but in an ineffable religious experience - one man's direct 
encounter with the true nature of reality and insight into the human problem 
necessitating salvation. As ·the-narrative recounts, beneath the bod hi tree the 
Buddha discerned the conditioned, impermanent, and interconnected nature of 
reality, and the human tendency to misapprehend this nature. The Buddha's 
theodicy, as articulated in the Four Noble Truths, suggests that ego-centred human 
beings tend to perceive a world of separate entities, to mistake and reify illusory 
transient phenomena for permanent realities, and to thereby painfully 'mis-react' 
to them in line with habitual patterns of craving and aversion. The Buddha 
contended that this false perception of things as permanent, and the notion of a 
separate enduring self, is what holds humanity in the grip of suffering SW!lSiira, 
perpetually wandering through the countless rebirths of cyclic existence. Having 
penetrated through the veils of ignorance, however, the Buddha was released from 
the suffering of sa7Jzsiira and into the ultimate realm of the unconditioned, 
nin•ii~;w, transcending all concepts of self, other, God, world, and indeed, concepts 
and words altogether. 
A pervasive tension between the conceptual language of rational thought and the 
direct knowledge of spiritual experience appears to characterise Buddhism as a 
whole. Essentially, language belongs to the realm of representations and can 
therefore only ever approximate truth. Belonging to the realm of the relative, 
language also has the potential to reinforce the deluded dualistic thought processes 
of the discursive mind, which reify the illusion of a separate self, and thus 
perpetuate suffering. Language therefore does not belong to the enlightened realm 
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of the unconditioned, the realm of prajnii, or truth, which remains ineffable.2 
Much has been written about this specific Buddhist understanding of the status of 
language. Particular attention has been paid to the 'Fourteen Undeclared Views ': 
fourteen philosophical and metaphysical questions which the Buddha 'answered ' 
by remaining sileot.3 The Vimalakirti-nirde5a Sutra, which tells of Vimalakirti's 
'thundering silence', has also been acknowledged. So too have a number of 
Mahayana texts that reiterate the claim: "From the moment of his enlightenment 
to the time he passed away, the Tathagata Buddha did not utter a single word.'.4 
The point to be ascertained is that according to Buddhism, ultimate reality cannot 
--be expressed in words.5 Ultimate reality can only be experienced - it cannot be 
accurately or exhaustively expressed in language because it transcends words and 
speech, concepts and ideas, as the realm of the 'signless' . Finally, any direct 
discourse on metaphysical nonduality is inherently self-defeating. 
Despite the Buddha's comprehension of the ineffability of ultimate reality, 
language is integral to the Buddhist tradition. In addition to his theodicy, the 
Buddha proposed a soteriology; not only did he diagnose the problem of human 
suffering, he also prescribed a cure - a universally available path of practice that 
leads towards the salvific experience of the unconditioned. Indeed, the Buddha is 
said to have spent forty itinerant years offering his teachings as a wandering 
ascetic. According to tradition, the Buddha disclaimed any divine status for 
himself, asserting that his teachings simply expressed the truth about the nature of 
things - the order of reality that exists and operates regardless of whether a 
Buddha appears to identify it. As such, according to the classical literature, the 
2 Prajnii is a Sanskrit tenn for truth, and is also translated as wisdom, insight, discriminating 
knowledge, and intuitive apprehension. NB. In general, Sanskrit tenninology will be used within 
this text. Where specific terminology is required, both Pali and Sanskrit terms will be provided. 
The abbreviations P and Swill be used to denote Piili and Sanskrit terms, respectively. 
3 See Jose Ignacio Cabe:zOn, Buddhism and Lang11age.- A Study of Indo-Tibetan Scholasticism 
(Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1994), David L. McMahan, Empty 
Vision_· Metaphor and Visionary Imagery in Mahayana Buddhism (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 
2002), Gajin Nagao and Leslie S. Kawamura, Madh.vamika and Yogacara: A Study of Maha.vana 
Philosophies.- Collected Papers of G.M. Nagao, Suny Series in Buddhist Studies. (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1991). For an atypical interpretation of the Buddha's silence see T. 
R. V. Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism: A Study of the Madhyamika S.vstem (London: 
George, Allen & Unwin, 1960)- And for a critique ofMurti's analysis see Richard Hayes, "Gotama 
Buddha and Religious Pluralism," Journal of Religious Pluralism I (1991 )_ 
4 See Cabez6n, Buddhism and Language: A Study of Indo-Tibetan Scholasticism. 171 
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role of a Buddha is to disclose this order, known as the Dharma, so that others 
may achieve liberation. As the Sa1fJyutta Nikiiya reads: 
Whether T athligatas arise or not, this order exists, namely the fixed nature of 
phenomena, the regular pattern of phenomena or conditionality. This the Tathagata 
discovers and comprehends; having discovered and comprehended it, he points it 
out, teaches it, lays it down, establishes, reveals, analyses, clarifies it and says 
"Look".6 
Commenting on the Buddhist reaffirmation of language as an expressive and 
pedagogic tool, the Buddhist scholar Leo Lefebure has observed, "Without the 
interplay of language and silence, we cannot distinguish the silence of the wise 
from the silence of the fools."7 Indeed, whi1e the Bud<ilia's experience of insight 
was beyond words, language became necessary for the expression of this insight 
to others. 
In line with the specific origins of Buddhism and its understanding of language is 
a structural emphasis on experience and praxis. Certainly, this emphasis has not 
deterred Buddhism's various traditions from producing vast amounts of scripture 
and commentarial literature, nor from engaging in centuries of Scholastic debate. 
On the contrary, the collections of Buddhist literature are vast; moreover, 
Buddhism possesses a highly sophisticated and ancient intellectual and 
philosophical heritage. 8 Nor has it deterred Buddhism from the endeavour of 
mission. Again on the contrary, the history and geography of Buddhism's 
expansion and cultural assimilation encompasses many countries and many 
cultures. However, in contrast to Christianity, praxis and experience generally 
form the foundation of Buddhist doctrinal formulations, philosophical expositions, 
and ideally also the conviction of the adherent. Indeed, the Buddha exhorted 
others to follow his path not out of blind obedience or veneration but on the basis 
of their own experiential substantiation.9 
5 Walpola R.ahula, What the Buddha Taught (New York: Grove Press, 1959). 35 
6 Saf!fyrttta-nikiiya II, 25, cited in Kalatissa Nanda Jayatilleke, "The Buddhist Attitude to Other 
Religions," in Christianity through Non-Christian Eyes, ed. Paul Griffiths (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis 
Books, 1990). 143 
7 Leo D. Lefebure, The Buddha and the Christ: Explorations in Buddhist Ch1i~tian Dialogue 
(Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1993). xvii 
8 See Cabez6n, Buddhism and Language: A Shtd_v of Indo-Tibetan Scholasticism. 
9 See, for example, the Buddha's advice to the Kalamas in the Ariguttara-nikiiyu I, 189: "Come 
now, JUi.lamas, do not accept anything on the grounds of revelation, tradition or report or because it 
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The particular origins of Buddhism and its experiential and praxial emphases have 
purportedly provided the tradition with a solid platform for the tolerance and 
inclusion of other religions. As the Buddhist scholar Kalatissa Nanda Jayatilleke 
has observed: 
[Buddhism's] dispassionate and impartial but critical outlook, the causal conception 
of the universe and the conception of the Buddha as a being who discovers the 
operation of certain moral and spiritual laws and reveals them to us, may be said to 
be the first plank on which Buddhist tolerance rests. 10 
Indeed, Buddhism currently enjoys the reputation of being "one of the leading 
voices in a chorus that sings the praises of religious tolerance."11 While 
Christianity is often cast as a crusading faith of violent coercion and oppressive 
colonialism, painted in dark tones of dogmatism and domination, Buddhism is 
generally depicted as a religion of nonviolence, tolerance, and peaceful inclusion. 
This depiction has been justified by the recognition that Buddhism has "repeatedly 
flourished in religiously plural cultures. As a consequence," David Chappell 
relates, "patterns of interreligious competition and mutual exclusion have been 
less extreme or brutal than in the West, and have often been balanced by many 
experiences of mutual co-existence, accommodation, and collaboration, and m 
some instances even of equality."12 Furthermore, Buddhism is a religion of 
significant internal diversity - perhaps the most internally pluralistic of all the 
world religions.13 In a discussion of internal ecumenics, Judith Simmer-Brown has 
suggested: 
Inclusivism is much more common in Buddhism [than exclusivism], an approach 
which suggests that all forms of Buddhism have partial truth, but the most complete 
truth is contained in one's own scriptures, practices, and lineages of teachers ... 
is a product of mere reasoning or because it is true from a standpoint or because of a superficial 
assessment of the facts or because it conforms with one' s preconceived notions or because it is 
authoritative or because of the prestige of your teacher. When you, Kalamas, realise for youTSelf 
that these doctrines are evil and unjustified, that they are condenmed by the wise and that when 
they are accepted and lived by, they conduce ill and sorrow, then you should reject them." Cited in 
Jayatilleke, "The Buddhist Attitude to Other Religions." 142 
10 Ibid. 143 
11 Hayes, "Gotama Buddha and Religious Pluralism." Hayes goes on to question whether this 
status is deserved, in relation to the classical Buddhist texts of the Pali canon, and finds that it is 
not. 
12 David W. Chappell, "Buddhist Interreligious Dialogue: To Build a Global Community," in 
Buddhist-Christian Dialogue: Muh1al Renewal and Transformation, ed. Paul 0. Ingram and 
Frederick J. Streng (Honolulu: UniveTSity ofHawai'i Press, 1986). 6 
13 John Hick, "Religious Diversity as Challenge and Promise," in The Experience of Religious 
Diversity, ed. John Hick and Hasan Askari (Aldershot: Gower, 1985). 16 
Chf10ter 2 60 
Besides, in Buddhism the primary realms of dispute between schools have less to do 
with tmths and more to do with efticacy or expediency [of practices]. 14 
We can thus conclude that the particular origins of Buddhism, its prioritisation of 
experience over language as the agent of truth, the universality of its salvific 
structure and means, its internal diversity, and its inclusive and tolerant approach, 
can account for the lacuna in Buddhist discourse regarding its specific responses 
to religious others. Due to such characteristics, the current global fact of religious 
diversity seems to have presented less of a challenge to Buddhism than to 
Christianity, and has not necessitated the articulation of its theological 
positionings. The eminent Japanese- Buddhist philosophet-Masao Abe. has 
acknowledged this contrast: 
[W)hile 'religious pluralism' is now a conunon challenge to Christians and 
Buddhists, the seriousness and nature of the challenge is not altogether equal in the 
two instances. In this regard, one may say that in our time, Christianity has moved 
from a relatively nonpluralistic situation to one radically pluralistic, whereas 
Buddhism has moved from the old pluralistic situation to a new pluralistic one. 15 
Questioning Stereotypes 
While the contrast between Christianity and Buddhism may seem self-evident, 
there are a few related finer points that we ought to address and qualify. Not least 
is the historical person and venerated being of Jesus Christ. The above analysis of 
Christianity as a religion of the Word and the Book is certainly not meant to deny 
the spiritual and soteriological agency of Jesus Christ, either as the historical 
figure of the Messiah, who's sacrificial passion, death, and resurrection redeemed 
humankind from sin, or as the ongoing living presence of the Holy Spirit, with 
which Christians commune through the ritual of the Eucharist, and through which 
they are ritually and experientially united with God. Nor is the above analysis 
meant to presuppose that the historical Church Fathers were mere theoreticians, 
bent on perfectly articulating the doctrine of the Trinity, whilst forgoing any 
experience of it. Indeed, Christianity, like Buddhism, has long been aware of "the 
14 Judith Sinuner-Brown, "Piurali&m and Dialogue: A Contemplation on the Dialogue 
Relationship,n in Buddhist Theologv: Critic4l Reflections by Contemporary Buddhist Scholars, ed. 
Roger R. Jackson and John Malcransky (Richmond, Surrey: Cw·zon Press, 2000). 313 
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inadequacy of human language to communicate the reality of God in any literal, 
univocal fashion."16 Rather than the reiteration of tired stereotypes, our intention 
here has been to demonstrate the different kinds of challenge religious diversity 
has presented each tradition, and to account for the differences in their responses 
to this challenge. 
We also ought to give some mention to the question of Christianity's tolerance 
within the context of mission, and in comparison to Buddhist tolerance of 
religious others. The uniqueness of Christ within the Christian faith as the only 
ineamation of God within ·history and -the-sole mediator between humanity and 
God necessitates an inevitable degree of exclusivism and absolutism within the 
belief system. While the Biblical narrative of Jesus himself depicts a ministry 
better characterised by inclusion, love, and sanctity, an ironic incongruence 
between the teachings and exemplar of Jesus and the institutionalised measures of 
the Christian Church cannot be refuted. This incongruence is nowhere more 
apparent than within the recurrent oc<:asions of religious crusade, persecution, and 
inquisition within the history of the Christian Church. In such instances, the 
potential exclusivism and absolutism of Christianity has translated into an 
uncompromising, violent zeal towards conversion and an extreme, dogmatic 
affirmation of the ultimate truth of the Christian way. Measures of suppression or 
eradication of the other have also greatly characterised much of the Christian 
missionary endeavour to preach the Word of God and provide salvation to the 
world. Within the mission context, the revelatory and doctrinal delineations of the 
Christian faith have established distinct boundaries between believers and non-
believers, which become all the more reified as they claim a transcendent 
significance in centring on the crucial and ultimate question of salvation. In a 
discussion of Buddhism and Christianity, Hans Kiing has recognised that such 
divinely sanctioned boundaries do not allow much room for religious tolerance: 
On the whole, mystical religions seem to have an easier time with tolerance than do 
religions in which God's prophetic word demands a decision, provokes a "crisis, " 
" M. Abe, "A Dynamic Unity in Religious Pluralism: A Proposal from the Buddhist Point of 
View" in Masao Abe, Buddhism and lnteifaith Dialogue, ed_ Steven Heine, Two vols_, vol. I 
(Honolulu: University ofHawai'i Press, 1995)_ 19 
J6 Lefebure , The Buddha and the Christ: Explorations in Buddhist Christian Dialogue. xix 
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and so virtually creates a division between those who listen and those who do not, 
between the chosen and the not chosen, and finally between the saved and the 
damned17 
While this depiction of Christianity as a zealous faith, bent on coercion and 
conversion, does indeed have some historical validity, it is also decidedly 
formulaic, and to a large degree obsolete. As we have seen, for a large number of 
Christians today who are conscious of the regrettable brutalities of an aggressive 
exclusivism, there is a deeper Christian reality. Furthermore, from a historical 
perspective, it should be recognised that the Church has not always been distanced 
from liberal movements that have taken place beyond the boundaries of politics 
and proselytism. Kung again: 
Alongside all the horror stories of dogmatic, ecclesiastical, and political domination, 
alongside all the outrages of "Christian" imperialism and colonisation, is there not 
also a history of tolerance. of freedom of conscience, that made an epochal 
breakthrough, from the Church' s standpoint, in the Reformation "freedom of a 
Christian man" and, for society as a whole, in the religious freedom of the 
Enlightenment (though the decisive impulses for this came from outside the 
Church)?18 
Speaking of the contemporary shift in Christian attitudes towards other religions, 
Wilfred Cantwell Smith has claimed: '"Dialogue' between members of differing 
traditions is nowadays replacing polemics, debate, and monologue preaching of 
traditional missionary policy." 19 While this may be true, Eric Sharpe has 
cautioned against such blanket statements as 'monologue preaching of traditional 
missionary policy'. Sharpe has recognised that the "old order" of Christian 
attitudes "was never as universal, even in the nineteenth century, as we are 
sometimes lead to believe. Certainly negative attitudes towards non-Christian 
religions were expressed; but to suppose that because the Christian was persuaded 
of the theological inadequacy of some particular form of non-Christian belief he 
was therefore devoid of sympathy and respect for all its manifestations, is simply 
untrue."20 In fact, Sharpe contends that the role of Christian missionaries in India 
17 Hans Kung, 'The Buddhist Community and its Earlier History - Hans KUng: A Christian 
Response," in Hans Kung, ed., Christianity and the World Religions: Paths of Dialogue with 
Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism (London: Collins, 1987). 353 
18 Ibid. 
19 Wilfred Cantwell Smith, The Meaning and End of Religion (London: S.P.C.K. Press, 1978). 177 
10 Eric J. Sharpe, "The Goals of Inter-Religious Dialogue," in Tmth and Dialogue: lhe 
Relationship ber.veen World Religions, ed. John Hick (London: Sheldon Press, 1974). 79 
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was often pioneering and innovative; the encounter with the spiritual depths of 
alien cultures and traditions often compelled missionaries to question the rigid 
exclusivism of the Church.21 Indeed, with regard to the missionary context, a 
degree of caution exercised against "the simplistic picture of an all-destroying 
missionising juggernaut"22 is advisable. 
Just as we should question one-sided depictions of Christianity, so too should we 
critically examine the assumption of an all-inclusive, tolerant Buddhism. While 
this assumption is not without some definite historical foundation, Buddhism has 
been accused of employing an uncritical--kind of 'over-tolerance' that has at times 
involved the tradition in instatices of direct intolerance. Indeed, as we have seen, 
tolerance is not a clear-cut concept, and is even less so when put into practice. 
The popular imagining of Buddhism depicts a religion of peace and harmony, 
governed by a passive morality centred on nonviolence, t1hi1!1sli, and other non-
adversarial ethics. Indeed, an admonishment against harming or killing another 
living being constitutes the cardinal precept of Buddhism, and as Winston King 
has obse!Ved, "the principle of non-killing is as near an absolute as one can get in 
practical Buddhist ethics."23 Such foundational ethics and precepts have played 
instrumental roles in the historical formation of apparently peaceful Buddhist 
societies. An exemplar can be found in the kingdom of Asoka Maurya, the 
Buddhist emperor who created a historically remarkable 'humanitarian welfare 
state' during his reign in India (272-236 BCE). What is known of Asoka's 
'welfare state' is derived from his inscriptions -rock-carved edicts which detail 
his ethical, social and political operative principles. Among the edicts are those 
that emphasise nonviolence towards animals and all living beings (Rock Edict 
IV), environmental preservation (Pillar Edict V), the equality of all classes (Maski 
Edict), the importance of the welfare of his people (Rock Edict VI), the glory of 
the Dharma and transcendent goals (Rock Edict XIII), meditation (Pillar Edict 
21 Ibid. 79ff 
22 Kenneth Oldmeadow, Traditionalism: Religion in the Light qf the Perennial Philosophy 
(Colombo: The Sri Lankan Institute ofTraditional Studies, 2000)_ 202, n. 14 
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VII), and indeed, an apparent religious tolerance (Rock Edict VII and XII). 
Appeals to Buddhism's religious tolerance often refer to these two edicts. The 
Seventh Rock Edict reads: 
King Priyadar8i (Asoka) wishes members of all faiths to live everywhere in his 
kingdom. 
For they all seek mastery of the senses and purity of mind. Men are different in 
their inclinations and passions, however, and they may perform the whole of their 
duties or only part. 
Even if one is not able to make lavish gifts, mastery of the senses, purity of 
mind, gratitude, and steadfast devotion are commendable and essential. 
And an excerpt from the Twelfth Rock Edict: "The faiths of others all deserve to 
be honoured for one reason or another. By honouring them, one exalts one's own 
faith and at the same time performs a service to the faith of others. By acting 
otherwise, one injures one's own faith and also does disservice to that of others."24 
Asoka set the precedence as an exemplar of the Buddhist ruler, an ideal that 
inspired later emulation by such figures as Aniruddha of Pagan (eleventh-century) 
and Tilokaraja of Chiang Mai (fifteenth-century)_25 His 'Dharma-empire' also 
influenced the later evolution of Buddhist states throughout Asia. It would appear 
that such societies, governed within the parameters of Buddhist ethics, would have 
harmoniously advanced the Buddha's teachings and maintained the stability of 
Buddhist institutions, even in the midst of religious diversity. Indeed, the positive 
and peaceful co-existence of Buddhism, Confucianism, and Taoism in China, and 
Buddhism and Shinto in Japan provide two exemplary models here.26 However, 
the dynamics of acculturation and appropriation involved in the transmission of 
Buddhism to the East and its assimilation under the patronage of kings in China, 
Japan, and other South and East Asian monarchies, effectively removed the 
Sangha from the socio-political realm, a development with problematic 
2 ~ Winston L. King, cited in Cynthia Eller, "The Impact of Christianity on Buddhist Nonviolence 
in the West," in Inner Peace, World Peace: Essays on Buddhism and Nonviolence, ed. Kenneth 
Kraft (Albany, NY: State University ofNew York Press, 1992). 92 
24 Edicts XII and XII translated in and by N. A. Nikam and Richard McKeon, eds., The Edicts of 
Asoka (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978). 51-2 
2 ~ See Donald K. Swearer, "Exemplars of Nonviolence in Theravada Buddhism," in Inner Peace, 
World Peace: Essays on Buddhism and Nonviolence, ed. Kenneth Kraft (Albany, NY: State 
University of New York Press, 1992). 64-66 
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consequences defined by an excess of tolerance. The Buddhist scholar and poet 
Gary Snyder has criticised institutional Buddhism in Asia as having been 
"conspicuously ready to accept or ignore the inequalities and tyrannies of 
whatever political system it found itself under."27 Indeed, throughout the history 
of Buddhism in Asia it is apparent that the Sangha has made countless 
compromises m order to be accepted and tolerated themselves. Among 
commentators who have recognised and criticised this tendency towards 'over-
tolerance' in Buddhism, the philologist Sir M. Monier-Williarns claimed the 
tradition to be too "tolerant, liberal, and eclectic" to survive intact. Moreover, the 
British colonial administrator Sir Charle!t ·Eliot discerned a Bttddhist-tendency 
towards the corruption of their tradition. Declaring Buddhism to be "dangerously 
tolerant," Eliot considered that "their courteous acquiescence in other creeds 
enfeebles ... their own."28 Within the contemporary movement of Critical 
Buddhism, Hakamaya Noriaki has argued that "Buddhists should not give in to a 
compromising and mushy 'tolerance' that uncritically accepts all things."29 In 
concord, Hans Kting has recognised the "problem of an easy, cheap tolerance in 
Buddhism." In relation to Buddhism's contemporary Western acculturation, Kting 
has suggested, "There is a danger of uncritical assimilation, of an opportunistic 
attitude of compromise, of a dangerous lack of discrimination and insufficient 
resistance to some highly dubious Western 'achievements.' "30 
At times throughout Asian history, such 'over-tolerance' has led Buddhism into 
contexts of intolerance that have seriously undermined the tradition. Asian history 
has evidenced Buddhist monastic armies, particularly in imperial China, Korea, 
26 See Wing-tsit Chan, "The Historic Chinese Contribution to Religious Pluralism and World 
Ci>mmunity," in Religious Pluralism and World Community: Interfaith and ]lllercultural 
Communication, ed. E.J.Jurji (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1969). 115-123 
27 G. Snyder, "Buddhism and the Coming Revolution" in Gary Snyder, Earth House Hold: 
Technical Notes & Queries to Fellow Dhamra Revolutionaries (New York: New Directions, 
1969). 90. This original article was appended and republished as Gary Snyder, "Buddhism and the 
Possibilities of a Planetary Culture," in The Path of Compassion: Writings on Socially Engaged 
Buddhism, ed. Fred Eppsteiner (Berkeley, CA: Parallax Press, 1985). 82-85 
28 Both Monier-Williams and Eliot are cited in Kristin Beise Kiblinger, Buddhist Jnclusivism: 
Attitudes Towards Religious Others (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2005). 3 
29 Cited in PaulL. Swanson, "Why They Say Zen Is Not Buddhism," in Pnming the Bodhi Tree: 
The Stonn over Critical Buddhism, ed. Jamie Hubbard and PaulL. Swanson (Honolulu: University 
of Hawai'i Press, 1997). 17 
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and Japan.31 Buddhist support of military regimes has been most strikingly 
evinced by the Japanese Sangha's fervent embrace of militarism during World 
War ll.32 The Law of the Dharma is textually unequivocal about its doctrine of 
ahif!lSii (S. 'nonviolence'). The Brahmajala Siitra propounds that Buddhists 
should not go to war, take part in rebellions or revolts, watch a battle let alone 
even look at an army, or give approval to killing in any way.33 Despite such 
textual admonitions, however, B.G. Gokhale has observed that in the early texts 
"the horrors of war are duly recognised but no decisive or overt effort seems to be 
made to insist on outlawing war itself... the Buddha never advised his 
contemporary kings to disband-their Mmies and beat their-swords into plough-
shares."34 Indeed, while many have argued that Buddhism has not marred world 
history by enacting armed crusades in the name of the Buddha, historically there is 
no lack of a 'just-war' doctrine and it is evident that Buddhism's commitments to 
nonviolence and religious tolerance are not traditionally or culturally unanimous.35 
For present day confmnation, we need only look towards such countries as Sri 
Lanka, Ladakh, and most recently Burma, where Buddhist laity and monastics are 
involved in contexts of religious intolerance and war. While many Buddhists 
involved in these conflicts do so from a firm ethical foundation , many also have 
taken up arms.36 Evidently, there is no single view of other religions within any 
3° KUng, ed., Chrisrianity and the World Religions: Paths of Dialogue with Islam, Hinduism, and 
Buddhism. 353-354 
31 See Heruy 0. Thompson, World Religions in War and Peace (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 
1988). 96-97 
32 There are a number of credible books and articles dealing with the connections between 
Japanese Zen Buddhism and militarism. In particular, see Robert H. Sharf, "The Zen of Japanese 
Nationalism," in Curators of the Buddha: The Study of Buddhism under Colonialism, ed. Donald 
S. Lopez Jr. (Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press, 1995), Brian (Daizen) A. Victoria, 
Zen at War (New York & Tokyo: Weatherhill, 1997), Brian (Daizen) A. Victoria, Zen War Stories 
(London; New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003). 
33 Brahmajala-siitra, cited in Thompson, World Religions in War and Peace. 102 
34 B. G. Gokhale cited in Ian Harris, ed., Buddhism and Politics in Twentieth Century Asia 
(London: Pinter Books, 1999). 5 
3~ For a revealing discussion of the variety of contemporary Buddhist opinions war and the 
question of 'just-war', see Kenneth Kraft, "New Voices in Engaged Buddhist Studies," in Engaged 
Buddhism in the West, ed. Christopher S. Queen (Sometville, MA: Wisdom Publications, 2000). 
491-3 
36 The situation in Sri Lanka has been extensively investigated: see Sarath Amunugama, 
"Buddhaputra and Bhumiputra'?: Dilemmas of Modem Sinhala Buddhist Monks in Relation to 
Ethnic and Political Conflict," Religion 21, no. 2 ( 1991 ), K. M. de Silva et al., eds., Ethnic Conflict 
in Buddhist Socieries: Sri Lani«J, Thailand and Burma, International Centre for Ethnic Studies 
Series (London & New York: Continuum International Publishing, 1988), Peter Schalk, "'Unity' 
and 'Sovereignty': Key Concepts of a Militant Buddhist Organization in the Present Contlict in Sri 
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one tradition, and in relation to Buddhism it is apparent that we can discern any 
number of attitudes towards religious diversity.37 
T owanls a Buddhist Theology of Religions 
It has recently been observed that, 
... rigorous philosophical work utilising the categories of exclusivism, inchtsivism, 
and pluralism from a Buddhist perspective are extremely rare. Comparative studies 
on particular topics are available, as are historical studies of the relations between 
Buddhism and other faiths, but theoretical work analogous to Christian philosophical 
and theological arguments for certain approaches to religious others are not:18 
Despite this lacuna, an emergent body of commentarial academic literature 1s 
beginning to fill the gap. In one of the few comprehensive investigations of 
Buddhist responses to religious diversity, David Chappell has discerned six 
attitudes towards religious others that have been espoused by Buddhists over the 
centuries: a separate and superior attitude, a compassionately engaged attitude, a 
developmental attitude, a complementary attitude, an attitude that affirms the 
relativity of all religious traditions, and an attitude that affirms a shared essence of 
religions.39 While Chappell has not utilised the Christian typology, it is apparent 
that these approaches could be categorises as such. Indeed, a number of theorists 
have explicitly analysed Buddhist responses in terms of the Christian typology, 
including Richard Hayes, John Makransky, Kristin Kiblinger, Rita Gross, Judith 
Simmer-Brown, and David Chappell. Moreover, a number of contemporary 
Buddhist figures, such as His Holiness the Dalai Lama, Masao Abe, and Buddhad-
asa Bhikkhu, have directly addressed the issue of Buddhism and religious 
Lanka," Temenos 24 (1989), Stanley Jeyaraja Tambiah, Buddhism Betrayed?: Religion, Politics, 
and Violence in Sri Lanka, Monograph of the World lnstih1te for Development Economics 
Research (Wider) of the United Nations University. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992). 
The recent uprising in Burma has not yet been represented by any in depth research. On the 
situation in Ladakh, see Jolm Crook, "Buddhist Ethics and the Problem of Ethnic Minorities: The 
Case of Ladakh," in Buddhist Ethics and Modem Society, ed. Charles Wei-hsun Fu and Sandra A. 
Wawrytko (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991). 
37 As Paul Griffiths has noted: "It should be emphasised that there is no such thing as the Jewish, 
Buddhist, Islamic, or Hindu position on Christianity, just as there is no single Christian position on 
the signitlcance of any non-Christian religious community." See Paul Griffiths, "Introduction," in 
Paul J. Griffiths, ed., Christianity through Non-Christian Eyes, Faith Meets Faith Series 
(Maryknoll, New Yodc: Orbis Books, 1990). 3 
38 Kib1inger, Buddhist lnclusivism: Attitudes Towards Religious Others. 2 
39 David W. Chappell, "Buddhist Responses to Religious Pluralism: What Are the Ethical Issues?," 
in Buddhist Ethics and Modem Society, ed. Charles Wei-hsun Fu and Sandra A. Wawrytko (New 
York: Greenwood Press, 1991). 355fT 
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diversity. Based upon the slight but solid foundation of literature offered by these 
theorists, we will now attempt, in the limited space available within this chapter, 
to construct a 'Buddhist theology of religions'. 
Before we begin, some brief words should be said about the feasibility of the 
typology itself, for while the terms exclusivism, inclusivism, and pluralism have 
achieved standard status and usage within academic and theological discourse, in 
recent years they have also attracted some criticism. In an analysis of these 
criticisms, Perry Schmidt-Leukel has identified eight key areas of objection, 
which, it should be noted;··fta.ve-aH issued from the realms of Christian theology. 
The typology has been deemed too narrow, too broad, too abstract and sterile, 
offensive, and pointless; its structure has been considered inconsistent, as well as 
misleading, for obscuring the real intention of a theology of religions, and for not 
taking into account the diversity of religions.40 We may attest to some of these 
criticisms. We have already encountered D'Costa's suggestion that pluralism is an 
impossibility, and that there can only ever be forms of exclusivism. The objection 
that the typology is too broad would also seem to apply to the suggestion that the 
limitations of our language and tradition-defined perspective deny access to any 
affirmation of pluralism. On the other hand, we have also encountered the 
possibility that the typology may be too narrow in the argument that pluralism 
may be understood philosophically while manifested experientially. Indeed, many 
have argued for a fourth option to be amended to the typology.4 1 Finally, the claim 
that the typology is too abstract and coarse, in the sense that it does not do justice 
40 See Perry Schmidt-Leukel, ''Exclusivism, lnclusivism, Pluralism: The Tripolar Typology -
Clarified and Confinned," in The Myth of Christian Supen·ority: Mu/tifaith Explorations of 
Religious Pluralism, ed. Paul F. Knitter (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2005). 13-27 
41 For example, Paul Knitter, has reconfigured the typology, renaming exclusivism ' 'the 
replacement model'', inclusivism "the fhlfillment model", pluralism "the mutuality model", and 
adding a fourth called "the acceptance model". See Paul F. Knitter, Introducing Theologies of 
Religions (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2002). 173-215. Furthermore, contributions from beyond 
Christianity have questioned the cultural universalism of the three categories. At the annual 
meeting of the Society for Buddhist~hristian Studies in 2000, scholars addressed the theme -
"Beyond the Usual Alternatives in Buddhist-Christian Dialogue". A central concern was the 
possibility of developing a fourth alternative to the three Christian theological categories, or a 
different mode of utilisation, which could possibly resonate with the logic of non-Western 
traditions. See Edward L Shirley, "The 2000 Meeting of the Society for Buddhist-Christian Studies 
(News and Views)," Buddhist - Ch1-istion Studies Annual (2001). 103-4 and Virginia Straus, 
"Beyond the Usual Alternatives? Buddhist and Christian Approaches to Other Religions," 
Buddhist- Christian Sh1dies 22 (2002). 123-4 
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to the complex and nuanced reality of real theologies, is noteworthy. As we have 
seen, it is not a question of simply categorising an approach - the rigidity of 
categorisation does not take into account the possibility that a respondent could 
embrace all three responses at different moments or on different levels of 
experience.42 Indeed, as we are about to see, the approach of the Buddha as 
represented in Buddhist literature can be classified as exclusivist, inclusivist, and 
pluralist, depending on which aspects of his teachings, which pedagogic tools, or 
which religious experiences we choose to examine. Despite these criticisms and 
related queries, however, it may still be acceptable to utilise the typology as a 
structural apparatus or conceptual framework in which to analyse Buddhist 
responses to other religions, so long as we bear in mind that such responses are 
generally more complex than the inherent categorisation of the typology implies. 
Buddhist Exclusivism 
The search for Buddhist responses to other religions that can be defined by the 
paradigm of exclusivism leads us back to the historical and cultural origins of the 
tradition in fifth-century BCE northern India. Ancient Indian religion at this time 
was characterised by two contrasting and opposing movements represented by the 
Brc"i~nuuJas and the .Srumar;u1s (P. BriiJ:unal}as and Smnuuyas). The genesis of 
Buddhism can be understood in relation to both these movements - in response to 
the former and in affiliation with the latter. The tradition emerged in the midst of 
and in response to the Vedic worldview of Brahmanic culture. This mainstream 
culture was defined by the religion of the BriiQmru)as, a householder cult of 
sacrifice governed by the Brahmin priests and authorised by the ancient 
collections of the Vedic scriptures. It was a highly structured system, with the 
ritually and cosmologically pure governing elite - the Bral).ma1~as - positioned at 
the hierarchical apex.43 In contrast to this system was the movement of 
renunciants - the Srrunm~as - whose ideology provided a radical contrast to that of 
the Brahmanic householder religion. As expressed in the Sanskrit studies of Greg 
Bailey, a "polemic" dynamic or "dialectical" relationship existed between pmvrtti 
42 See Robison B. James, Tillich and World Religions: Encountering Other Faiths Today (Macon, 
Georgia: Mercer University Press, 2003). 51-73 
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- the way of the householder, one who "participates actively in the world and 
embodies in his life-style all that evaluates the world and society in a positive 
manner", and nil'[lli - the way of renunciation, which "advocates the adoption of 
an ascetic life-style.'M Investigating its historical origins, Bailey suggests that the 
ascetic ideology developed in India from the seventh to the fifth centuries BCE, in 
a time of socio-economic crisis that acted as an impetus for religious speculation, 
the development of heterodoxies, and the rise of the ideal of renunciation. In turn, 
the way of the householder was made explicit. From the Mahabharata, Bailey 
gives the example of Yudhi~~hira, who is committed to the life of a householder, 
but yearns to be an ascetic.45 These collectives of Srama(las ·{P. Swna~ws, 
'strivers') rejected the orthodox teachings of the DraQma~as. Consequently, with 
regard to the ancient (and also modern) Indian social structure, the Srama~as were 
considered to be socially 'dead'. Having renounced the obligations of family, 
economic production and ritual duty, the Sram~a went forth into a homeless 
mendicant life in search of liberating truth. The soteriological concerns of the 
Srama~as lead to austere practices and meditative extremes in the endeavour to 
transcend the cycle of rebirth with the attainment of salvific knowledge. In 
contrast to the rigidity of the Brahmanic system, the amorphous community of 
Sram~as typically collected around a particular teacher of leader in small groups. 
Among such teachers were Makkhali Gosala who founded the prominent sect 
called the Ajivakas, Mahavira, the leader of the Jains, and the Buddha, or as he is 
frequently referred to in the Pali canon, 'the sam~a Gotama'. 
The contrast between the unorthodox Srama~as and the orthodox BJiil.tmai~as. and 
the tension between the ideologies of pravrtti and nivflti, are represented within 
the narrative of the Buddha's life, particularly his renunciation. The Buddha's 
renunciation can be understood within the greater context of the Sramm)a tradition 
of the inward spiritual quest for salvific knowledge. This notion of the spiritual 
quest finds particular expression in the Upani~ads. Forming one division of the 
43 The tenn Brahmin, referring to a member of the priestly class of Hinduism, is the anglicisation 
of the Piili and Sanskrit term Briihmunu. 
44 Greg Bailey, Materials for the. Shtdy of Ancient lndia11 Ideologies: Pra~·rtti and Nivrtti (Torino: 
Pubblicazioni di 'lndologica Taurinensia', 1985). 10 
~~ Ibid. 12 
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Vedic scriptures, the Upani~ads present an esoteric interpretation of the meaning 
of the Vedic sacrifices, affirming the identification of the microcosmic sacrifice 
with the macrocosmic universe. The culmination of the Upani~adic teachings 
reveals the ultimate identification of self (S. iitman), the true unchanging core or 
essence of one's being, and Brahma, the true, unchanging core or essence of the 
universe. As the Brhadi.ira~lyaka Upw1i~ad states: 
If a man knows 'I am brahman' in this way, he becomes the whole world. Not even 
the gods are able to prevent it, for he becomes their very self ({rtman). So when a 
man venerates another deity, thinking 'He is one, and I am another' , he does not 
understand_ . _ 
It is his self (iifman}alone that a man should venerate as his world. And if 
someone venerates his self alone as his world, that rite of his will never fade away, 
because from his very self he will produce whatever he desires.46 
The question of whether the Buddha was aware of the Upani~ads, and if so, the 
degree to which they influenced him, has been the topic of much scholarly debate. 
Most recently, Richard Gombrich has argued: 
[T]he central teachings of the Buddha came as a response to the central teachings of 
the old Upani~ads, notably the Brhudiirt11.JYCiktJ. On some points, which he perhaps 
took for granted, be was in agreement with the Upani~adic doctrine; on others he 
criticised it.47 
Indeed, we have already discussed the Buddha's understanding of the illusory 
nature of the self, and his teachings ofnon-self(P. anatlii; S. anCitman). According 
to Gombrich, the early Buddhist texts present a destabilising, confrontational, and 
mocking critique ofthe teachings of the Upani~ads. As such, Gombrich's account 
draws attention to early instances of exclusivism. 
In an investigation of Buddhism and pluralism, Richard Hayes has also recognised 
a pervasive tone of mockery within the early texts. Responding to a perceived 
tendency among modem scholars to interpret original Buddhism as supportive of 
pluralism, Hayes' study provides textual evidence to attest to the fact that Gotama 
Buddha was decidedly 'anti-pluralist'_ According to Hayes' analysis of the 
literature, the Buddha was distinctly derisive and critical of the Brai:unai_las: 
46 BrlwJiirm;ryaka Upc1ni~ad (1: 4: 10/15) in Upanisads, trans. P. Olivelle (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1996). 15&17 
47 Richard Gombrich, How Buddhism Began: The Conditioned Genesis of the Early Teachings 
(London & Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Athlone Press, 1996}. p. 31 
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ln the Pali literature the principal object of ridicule is the Brahman, who is often 
caricatured as a self-serving, undisciplined, unprincipled bungler, who somehow 
manages, despite his many obvious shortcomings, to think of himself as superior to 
all other people.48 
Hayes questions whether classical Buddhism was supportive of a teleological 
plurality (many goals}, an orthopractical or pragmatic plurality (many methods), 
and a doctrinal or cosmological plurality (many belief-systems). Based upon the 
literature, his answers are conclusively negative. According to such texts as the 
Ariyapariyesanii Sullo ('Discourse on the Noble Quest') in the Majjhima Nikayo, 
there is only one goal- the quest for nin•cl~u (P. nibbana), "the ultimate security 
against bondage." As Hayes explains, ''Compared to this goal, other goals are 
regarded not only less than ultimate, but also as ultimately ignoble and 
unworthy.'>49 Hayes continues to demarcate "the Buddha's attitude towards the 
bootlessness of all methods but one,"50 this being renunciation, right conduct, and 
the meditative endeavour to overcome the tendency to identify with mind and 
body. In contrast, in the Tevijja Sutta in the Digho Nikaya, the Buddha defines the 
Br~ma~as as: 
. .. those who are bmmd by the chains of sensuality, ill-will, laziness, anxiety and 
doubt, who are encumbered with family possessions, and who are impotent 
(avassavatti) owing to their lack of discipline. It is impossible that Brahmans such as 
this will see Brahms tace to face either during the present life or after the breakup of 
the body. Therefore the knowledge contained in the Vedas is like a desert (fril:w), a 
wilderness (vipina) or a wasteland (lJ'OSana). ~1 
Furthermore, regarding those Briii:tmat~as who claim to have directly encountered 
Brahma, the Buddha considered their teachings "risible (hos.mka), empty (rilloka) 
and vain (tucchoka).''::-2 Finally, Hayes examines the Buddha's approach to 
doctrinal plurality, focusing on the Buddha's refusal to answer speculative 
questions about such issues as the size of the world or life after death. As Hayes 
explains, this was because "doctrines concerning questions of cosmology, 
psychology and thanatology do no good in a person's search for imperturbable 
48 Hayes, "Gotama Buddha and Religious Pluralism." 18 
49 Ibid. 10 
so Ibid. 12 
~ 1 1bid. 13 
$l lbid. 
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mental freedom."53 While some doctrines may be unhelpful with regard to 
progress on the spiritual path, others may also be harmful. According to Hayes' 
analysis of the Sui/a N;pata, the Buddha here contends that "beliefs in the efficacy 
of rituals not only leads to the unnecessary suffering and destruction of innocent 
beings but also reinforces the greed for sensual pleasure that impedes the 
attainment of nibbiina."54 As Hayes explains, this is due to the capacity for 
doctrines, and attachment to their outcomes, to reinforce deluded patterns of 
thought: 
[A)ccording to classical Buddhism, most religious doctrines arise either out o f 
ignorance;-·or-fear, or vested interests, or an unwillingness to face unpleasant 
realities. Religious doctrines, in other words, are seen as arising out of superficial 
thinking of the sort that accompanies the habit of identifying oneself with the body 
and mind. And having thus arisen, most religious doctrines are said to have the etTect 
of supporting the survival of the very kind of dysfunctional thinking that gave rise to 
them in the first place. Such an attitude towards religious doctrines and their 
accompanied practices can hardly be called a form of religious pluralism.~~ 
John Makransky has also examined these kind of exclusive moves and critiques in 
the early Buddhist texts. According to Makransky, the Buddha judged the 
doctrines and methods of other religious systems according to their efficacy in 
penetrating deluded patterns of thought, dismantling reifications of self, and 
realising impermanence and nonattachrnent. In other words, the Buddha judged 
other religious systems in relation to the structures of truth and soteriological 
goals that are represented in the Fow Noble Truths. Makransky cites the 
Brahmajii/a Sutta (' Discowse Concerning the Net of Brahmanic Opinions') from 
the Digha Nikiiya in which the Buddha rejects sixty-two types of 'speculative 
opinion' or 'view' (P. dif!i; S. dr~ri) prevalent in ancient India, including the 
notions of iitman and a 'creator-God'.56 According to the Buddha's theodical 
diagnosis, the dr~!i of a creator-God, understood as a separate, inviolable, 
53 Jbid. 16 
~4 1bid. 17 
S5Jbid. 
56 The Digha Nikiiya also contains the So1_1udu(U,lu Sulfa and the Siini<Jiiiiuphulu Suttu, in which the 
Buddha again discusses Brahmanic views as well as the doctrines of other religious systems of his 
time. The Brahmajiila Srtfta not only rejects the Jnti of iitman (satkiiya-Jr~fi, 'personality belief') , 
but also the belief that the self is eternal (.sii.Svata-Jr~!i) and the belief that the self is destroyed at 
death (uccheda-Jr~fi}. The two 'extreme views' of etemalism (siisvata-viida) and aiUlihilationism 
(uccheda-viida) were both condemned by the Buddha. According to the principle of the Middle 
Way (madhyamii-pratipad), the 'self is neither eternal nor annihilated at death but passes within a 
dynamic continuity of the individual from one life to the next. 
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omnipotent bestower of salvation, is a product of the deluded mind. In ignorance 
of the conditioned nature of all phenomena and ideas, the mental construction of 
'God' becomes absolutised in the unenlightened mind as an object of attachment. 
This reinforces the illusion of a separate self but removes the locus of liberation 
from the individual mind, directing religious efforts towards an ostensible divine 
power. This kind of wrong perception obscures the conditioned nature of suffering 
inflicted by attachment or aversion, and thus perpetuates suffering. It was on this 
basis that the Buddha denounced the theistic Vedic belief in the supreme Brahmii 
as the creator of all other gods, and as the core essence of the universe. As John 
Makransky has explained: 
In the very moment that one thinks about God as the seemingly external cause of all 
being and experience, one is not looking directly in that moment into the causal 
genesis of clinging and aversion in one's own mind, nor seeing through them to the 
unconditioned dimension that transcends them. ~7 
The early Buddhist critique of the reification of conceptual constructs, such as 
God or selfhood, has its doctrinal foundations in the teaching regarding the 
causation and ontological status of phenomena - co--dependent origination (P. 
puficca-samuppiida; S. pralftya-samutplida). The important corollary of this 
teaching is that there is nothing that comes into being through its own power or 
volition; there are therefore no entities or metaphysical realities, such as God or 
self, that transcend the causal nexus or exist in separation. In relation to others 
religions, the Buddha accordingly considered any non-Buddhist tradition that 
absolutised their religious objects, establishing a dr~!i and reinforcing the notion 
of a separate self, an inadequate means of achieving salvation. It is important to 
note that the Buddha, as represented in the classical texts, did not deny the 
existence of God, or gods, or the possibility of a direct encounter with them; on 
the contrary, the Buddha claimed such an experience for himself. It was the 
deluded mental processes by which a notion of ' God' becomes reified and 
absolutised, and the conception of this 'God' as an omnipotent power or absolute 
that exists separate to the self, which the Buddha rejected. Any speculative 
approach to reality which reified dualistic constructions of self, other, God, or 
57 John Makransky, "Buddhist Perspectives on Truth in Other Religions: Past and Present," 
Theological Studies 64, no. 2 (2003). 346 
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world, thereby absolutising them as objects of clinging and aversion, perpetuating 
delusion and suffering, and obscuring rather than disclosing nin'ii!fa, was thus 
revoked. 
A number of theorists have examined the contexts and historical developments of 
the early Buddhist critiques of theism. Richard Hayes and John Makransky have 
both recognised that Buddhist critiques of theism are but one aspect of 
Buddhism's greater concern to deconstruct any conceptions of unity, permanence, 
or enduring substance that perpetuate suffering and obscure unconditioned reality. 
Over time, however, such arguments against theism developed into-systematic 
exclusivist critiques. These critiques sought to affirm the Four Noble Truths as the 
ultimate ontological, theodical, and soteriological explanation against any absolute 
notion of God. Hayes specifically focuses on the fifth-century CE Indian Buddhist 
scholar Vasubandhu, who refuted the concept of a single, undivided, unchanging 
and perfect God. As Hayes demonstrates, Vasubandhu questioned how such a 
'creator' could be sufficient cause for the diversity of minds, bodies, and worlds 
changing within time. Vasubandhu also addressed the problem of evil, questioning 
why such a God deserves worship if he is the creator of so much suffering in the 
world.58 In a study of the critique of theism presented by the seventh-century 
Indian Buddhist logician Dharmakirti, Roger Jackson has recognised that 
Buddhism's refutation of theism in toto was part of a larger theist-atheist 
controversy that pervaded the history of the Indian philosophical tradition. 
Jackson also examines the extensive history of the debate within the Buddhist 
tradition itself, following its progression from the nikiiya literature, through to the 
first-century writings of A§vagho~ and Niigliljuna, the Abhidharmika literature of 
succeeding centuries, including Vasubandhu and Asailga (fourth-century), and 
finally Bhavaviveka (sixth-century).59 Jackson presents Dharmakirti's anti-theistic 
arguments as the culmination of Buddhist atheism, acclaiming them for their 
~ 8 Richard Hayes, "Principled Atheism in the Buddhist Scholastic Tradition," Jo11mal of Indian 
Philosophy 16 ( 1988). 
~9 Roger R. Jackson, "Dharmakirti's Refutation of Theism," Philosophy East and West 36, no. 4 
(1986). To Jackson's list we could also add the earlier figure of Aryadeva, whose anti-theist 
arguments are presented in his Cutu/;Jsutuku (second-century CE). and the later works of 
Sllntara~ita and his student Kamalasna (eighth-century CE). See D. Seyfort Ruegg, The Literah1re 
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philosophical and logical sophistication. Jackson examines Dharmakirti's 
refutation of the isvara doctrine, which asserts a cosmological creator entity. As 
Jackson demonstrates, Dharmakirti rejected its authority, its syllogism, and its 
status as an agent of causality. Following an overview of developments post-
Dharmakirti, Jackson concludes "the assertion of an omniscient, permanent, 
independent, unique cause of the cosmos is rejected throughout the length and 
breadth of the Indian Buddhist tradition."60 
Exclusive Buddhist atheism has persisted, finding its most apparent contemporary 
expression within Buddhist-critiques of Christianity. The question of congruence 
between Buddhism and Christianity regarding the nature and existence of God 
provides a pivotal point for much contemporary Buddhist-Christian and Buddhist-
Jewish dialogue. Indeed, many exchanges between the theistic religions and 
Buddhism have revealed degrees of consonance and complementarity between 
certain Judea-Christian conceptions of God and such Buddhist teachings as 
emptiness (P. sunnattli; S. sunyalli).61 Even so, as the contemporary Buddhist 
scholar Rita Gross explains, the "essence of theism", or the idea of an "external 
saviour who confers or bestows liberation on another. .. [is] the most puzzling and 
unrealistic doctrine of Christianity to a Buddhist. "62 
The work of Sri Lankan apologist Gunapala Dharmasiri provides a good example 
of contemporary Buddhist atheistic exclusivism. Dharmasiri's principal work, A 
Buddhist Critique of the Christian Concept of God, addresses and discounts the 
of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1981). 52 & 
62-3 
60 Jackson, "Dhannakirti's Refutation ofTheism." 319 
61 The exemplars of this dialogical field are the Japanese philosopher from the Kyoto School 
Masao Abe, and the American Christian theologian John B. Cobb Jr., who together established the 
Theological Encounter with Buddhism Group. This group has brought together numerous 
Christian theologians and many representatives from various Buddhist traditions. Since 1984, most 
of its meetings have been reported in the University of Hawai 'i journal Buddhist-Christian Studies. 
See also Masao Abe, Buddhism and Interfaith Dialogue: Part One of a Two-Volume Sequel to z,., 
and Western Thought, ed. Steven Heine, Two vols., vol. I (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 
1995), John B. Cobb, Jr., "Buddhist Emptiness and the Christian God," Journal of the American 
Academy of Religion 45, no. 1 ( 1977). And Roger Coreless and Paul F. Knitter, eds. , Buddhist 
Emptiness and Christian Trinity: Essays and Explorations (New York/Mahwah, N.J.: Paulist 
Press, 1990). More recently, the group has initiated dialogues with Judaism. See John B. Cobb and 
Christopher Ives, eds., The Emptying God: A Buddhist-Jewish-Christian Conversation, Faith 
Meets Faith Series (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1990). 
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Christian belief in the soul as an eternal entity, and the correlated belief in an 
eternal creator-God.63 Upon a methodological foundation of empiricism and 
verificationism, Dharmasiri presents the Buddhist argument against an enduring 
self or soul and thereby challenges the Christian conception of God. If the notion 
of an enduring self can be disproved and realised as an illusion detrimental to 
moral or spiritual progress, then, because of the Christian connection between the 
notion of soul and belief in God, so too can the notion of an enduring God. As he 
explains, "a Buddhist would not find soul a morally and spiritually edifying 
concept. Therefore, in that sense, he would maintain that the soul cannot be a 
good analogy to a mora1Jy and spiritually -perfect God either."64 Essentially, 
Dharmasiri confronts the Christian metaphysical assertion of God via the Buddhist 
philosophical deconstruction of enduring substances and reified entities, and its 
empirical affmnation of complete causality. In doing so, Dbarrnasiri presents an 
uncompromising exclusivism. 
From this overview of instances of Buddhist exclusivism, we may agree with 
David Chappell that "only rarely have Buddhists acknowledged that Buddhism 
was equally conditioned and as fallible as others, or accepted other religions as 
equally able to save ... The usual Buddhist view of other religions was negative. 
Doctrinally other religions were sometimes depicted as good but usually as 
inadequate, distracting, distorted, or evil.'.65 Indeed, it would be difficult to argue 
for an absence of exclusivism in any religious tradition, particularly if we examine 
their origins. As Hayes has acknowledged: 
[V]ery few of the major religious traditions have espoused the notion that more than 
one claim to ultimacy can be valid. On the contrary, most of the historical religions 
are based in some way either on an explicit rejection or denigration of another 
religious tradition or traditions or on aristocratic claims of ethnjc or racial 
supremacy. Examples of religions based on the denigration of other religions are 
original Buddhism, Mahayana Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam ... That aJl these 
religions are traditionally triumphalist and not pluralistic is simply something that 
must be acknowledged; it would be ideologically anachronistic and intellectually 
dishonest to try to find anticipations of a now fashionable way of thinking [i.e. 
62 Rita M. Gross, "This Buddhist's View of Jesus," Buddhist - Christian Studies 19 ( 1999). 70 
63 Gunapala Dhannasiri, A Buddhist Critique of the Christian Concept of God (Colombo: Lake 
House Investments Ltd., 1974). 
64 Ibid. 23 
6~ Chappell, "Buddhist Interreligious Dialogue: To Build a Global Conununity." 5 & 6 
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pluralism] in traditions that evolved in a social and political setting entirely different 
from that of the present world. 66 
Buddhist lnclusivism 
Despite evidence of exclusivism within early Buddhism, its philosophical 
developments, and its contemporary apologetics, many Buddhist approaches to 
religious others can be classified by the paradigm of inclusivism. The Indologist 
Paul Hacker has recognised that the term 'inclusivism' and philosophical 
articulations regarding its meaning are Jacking within Indian contexts. 67 In 
response to this lacuna, a number of scholars have taken up the task of locating 
instances and excavating ilie- -d1mensions of Buddhist inclusivism. Once again, 
these sources lead us back to the origins of Buddhism and the figure of the 
Buddha. Examining early textual representations of the Buddha's pedagogic 
methods, his approach towards religious identity, and his teachings regarding 
religious doctrines, these scholars have revealed the foundations of Buddhist 
inclusivism. They have also explored certain doctrines that emerged with the 
evolution of Mahayana Buddhism and provided further resources for the 
development of Buddhist inclusivism, particularly in relation to the cultural 
transmission of Buddhism from India into Asia throughout the first millennium 
CE. Throughout this transmission, Buddhism encountered, incorporated, and very 
often converted a variety of religious others through a variety of inclusive 
strategies. 
Referring to the early literature, John Makransky has identified both exclusive and 
inclusive elements within the Buddha's approach: 
On one hand, non-Buddhist traditions came tmder the Buddha's critique insofar as 
they might contribute to the very problem he had diagnosed, by absolutising their 
religious objects and concepts of self as objects of clinging or aversion ... 
On the other hand, the Buddha was skilled at speaking his truths in remarkably 
accessible ways, often communicating them to others through their own (non-
Buddhist) modes ofthought.68 
66 Hayes, "Gotama Buddha and Religious Pluralism." 19 
67 Paul Hacker, cited in Kiblinger, Buddhist Jnclusivism: Attitrtdes Towards Religiorts Others . 2 
68 Makransky, "Buddhist Perspectives on Truth in Other Religions: Past and Present" 335 
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Makransky defines this latter approach as an inclusive paradigm, in which the 
symbolic systems and modes of discourse of religious others are recognised as 
communicating, in their own ways, aspects of the Buddha's salvific truth, or 
contributing, albeit incompletely, to the revelation and realisation of the 
Buddhadharma. This inclusive approach is demonstrated in the early texts within 
various dialogues between the Buddha and followers of non-Buddhist 
philosophical or religious traditions. These dialogues reveal a central element of 
the Buddha's pedagogy- his 'skilful means' (S. upflya-kausalya)- through which 
he established a new 'religio-philosophical' discourse in order to communicate the 
Dhanna-. ·Indeed, it is widely acknowledged within the tradition that the Buddha 
adapted his teachings to suit the cultural conditions and spiritual level of those 
being taught. He also insisted that his teachings be conveyed in vernacular 
languages, rather than the elite Sanskrit of the Br~nmt:~as. Through this approach, 
the Buddha retained and utilised religious terminology from Vedic culture, which 
grounded his teachings in tradition. Yet he also reinterpreted such terminology in 
order to express his innovative ideas and, as the dialogues demonstrate, skilfully 
encourage his interlocutors to critically analyse their beliefs, an approach which 
often Jed to conversion. As Makransky explains, because the Buddha's skilful 
discourse was formed by "reinterpreting inherited Indic terms," it was "engaging 
enough to attract traditional Brahmins and rigorous enough to guide his followers 
in the distinctive practices of his path."69 As Chappell confirms, this approach of 
redefinition enabled the inclusion of the other, because "Buddhists could accept 
the inherited religious traditions of others, but would actively redefine their key 
concepts in a way that would be consistent with the vision of the Buddha."70 Let 
us address a few examples. 
From the Dlgha Nikaya, Makransky offers the example of the Buddha's dialogue 
with Vasettha, a Brat_una~ priest and devotee of the supreme creator-God 
Brahma. A number of different Vedic traditions taught a path towards union with 
Brahma, and in the dialogue Vasettha asks the Buddha which of the paths he 
considers to be correct. In reply, the Buddha asks Vasettha two questions: 'Have 
69 Ibid. 344 
70 Chappell, "Buddhist Responses to Religious Pluralism: What Are the Ethical Issues?." 358 
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any on these teachers seen God face to face?' and 'Are any of these teachers, like 
Brahmii, unencumbered by attachment, hatred, ill-will, an impure heart, or a lack 
of discipline?' Vasettha answers in the negative on both counts. Consequently, the 
Buddha questions, 'How can a teacher who does not know God, has not seen God, 
or, being encumbered, has nothing in common with God, teach a path to union 
with God?' Acc{)rding to the Buddha, this is not possible. Vasettha then asks if the 
Buddha knows the way to union with God, and the Buddha replies in the 
affirmative. The Buddha details four contemplative practices to manifest and emit 
to all beings boundless love, compassion, equanimity, and sympathetic joy.71 
According to the Buddha;-ooe-who practices ·in- this ·way is- tmeDCumbered by 
hatred, ill-will, an impure heart, or a lack of discipline. Having much in common 
with 'God', "such an unencumbered monk, after death, ... should attain to union 
with the unencumbered God - that is possible." As Makransky explicates, within 
this dialogue, by skilfully utilising the notion of God within his pedagogic 
discourse, the Buddha is able to deconstruct this very notion within Vasettha's 
mind. The Buddha does not deny the reality of God, but encourages a direct 
experience of this God through the cultivation of the qualities 'He' is thought to 
manifest. The meditative cultivation of the qualities of 'God' within the 'self is 
intended to deconstruct the duality between self and God, gearing Vasettha 's mind 
to become more receptive to the nonduality of unconditioned reality beyond 
attachment to all thought constructs of self and God. Ultimately, the Buddha 
contends that direct experience should form the foundation of belief, rather than 
religious authority, and he invites Vasettha to affirm this for himself. Indeed, 
Buddhagho~'s fifth-century CE commentary on this text, the Sumwigu.laviliisini, 
reveals that Vasettha became ordained as Buddhist monk and eventually attained 
enlightenment. 72 
In one of the most comprehensive studies of Buddhist inclusivism, Kristin 
Kiblinger provides a further example, again from the Dlgha Nikiiya, of the 
Buddha's skilful means employed in inclusive dialogue with religious others. In 
71 These four practices are known as the Brahma-viharas, or the 'Abodes of Brahma '. Also known 
as the 'Four lnuneasurable Minds' and the 'Four Pure Abodes' . 
72 Makransky, "Buddhist Perspectives on Truth in Other Religions: Past and Present " 342-3 
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the Kiifadcmta Sutta, the Buddha induces doubt in the mind of the Bral).mal)a 
Kii!adanta about the value of sacrifice by proposing the comparative benefits of 
making an offering of virtue, sincere generosity, upholding the moral precepts, 
taking refuge, stability of attention, penetrating insight, and the cessation of 
distorted emotional habits. As Kiblinger explains, in this instance the Buddha 
reinterprets the Vedic sacrifice according to Buddhist morality and practice. 73 
Kiblinger offers a further example of ethical reinterpretations of Vedic practices in 
the Aggi Suua. Here the Buddha denounces the ritual of fire sacrifice because it 
involves killing animals, but he also suggests new ways of conceiving of the fires 
as symbolic of-poople, and tlms worthy ofrespect and-devotion. Commenting on 
the inherent inclusivism within these strategies, Kiblinger has explained that such 
texts "are not subordinating sacrificial rituals under higher level Buddhist 
practices; rather, they are replacing metaphysics with ethics."74 A final example of 
this kind of inclusivism based on reinterpretation can be found in the Sigiilaka 
Sutta. Here the Buddha reinterprets the traditional householder practice of paying 
homage in the six directions. The Buddha proposes to the householder Sigalaka 
that a more constructive way to make homage would be to practice virtue in six 
types of relationships: with respect to one's mother and father (east); teachers 
(south); wife and children (west); friends (north); servants (nadir); and ascetics 
and priests (zenith).75 Evidently, the Buddha's ontological and soteriological 
emphasis is upon the individual cultivation and practice of virtue and insight; 
depending upon his interlocutor's ethical and spiritual capacities, the Buddha's 
attitude is inclusive, regardless of the individual's religious affiliation. As 
Makransky has perceived, in such early textual instances of inclusivism and 
skilful means, the Buddha's interlocutors are very often "moved to adopt practices 
taught by the Buddha as the very way to fulfil their own traditions deepest intent 
for virtue, salvific truth, and freedom."76 
While the Buddha's dialogues of inclusivism often result in conversion, there are 
occasions within the early texts when the possibility of salvation beyond 
73 Kiblinger, Buddhist Incl11sivism: Attitudes Towards Religious Others. 41-2 
74 Ibid. 42 
7~ Makransky, "Buddhist Perspe(;tives on Truth in Other Religions: Past and Present" 344 
7~ Ibid. 
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Buddhism is affirmed. In such instances, the Buddha acknowledges the 
equivalence of other practitioner's paths to liberation. As David Chappell has 
recognised, this acknowledgement was given doctrinal status in two ways. Firstly, 
through the recognition of the existence and salvific agency of past and future 
Buddhas. And secondly, through the recognition of pratyekabuddhas (P. 
paccekabuddhas) - highly spiritually accomplished practitioners who were not 
considered part of the Buddhist fold. While later Mahayana texts tend to debase 
the 'Way of the Pratyekabuddhas' (Pratyekabuddhayiina) in relation to the 
Sriivakayiina ('Way of the Hearers or Arhats ') and the Bodhisattvayiina ('Way of 
the Bodhisattva'), as Chappell notes, "in the early tex-ts there is a clear- kinship 
between these figures and the Buddhist community." Chappell continues to 
explain the cultural context that supported this kind of inclusivism: 
Gautama Buddha and his followers were just one group among many others who 
were part of a larger ascetic, srummp.1 movement that evolved in opposition to the 
ideas and practices of the established hereditary brahmin priesthood. Questioning the 
authority of the Vedas, rejecting animal sacrifices, and denying the ultimate 
sufficiency of the gods, these groups affirmed the spiritual capacities of individuals 
as not limited to caste birth, while emphasising the importance of personal ascetic 
practice and contemplative realisation.7 
Indeed, on one occasion, the Buddha went so far as to openly accept 'multiple 
religious identity'. In the Upiili Sutta of the Majjhima Nikaya, the Buddha advises 
Upali, a recognised lay member of the Jaina community, that if be should take 
refuge in the Buddha his allegiance to the Jains would not need to be severed. 
Commenting on this passage, Kiblinger has observed that this move indicates the 
Buddha's concern for the continued patronage of other religious communities, and 
thus presents an affirmation of their value. Furthermore, according to Kiblinger 
the passage demonstrates the Buddhist inclusivist assertion that some traditions 
may be suitable to, or helpful for, the needs, disposition, and spiritual stage of 
development of some practitioners, more so than Buddhism.78 Jayatilleke has also 
recognised this kind of inclusive tendency within the early Buddhist texts, 
referring to the Angunara Nikiiya, which claims that "the Dharnma is to be 
preached to all beings though all beings may not profit by it, just as much as all 
77 Chappell, "Buddhist Interreligious Dialogue: To Build a Global Coi1Ul1unity." 7 
78 Kiblinger, Buddhist Jnclusivism: Attitlldes Towards Religious Others. 35 
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sick people are to be treated although some may get well or succumb to their 
illnesses despite the medicines given."79 
This capacity for the affirmation of other religious paths and multiple religious 
belonging is dependent upon a specific understanding of religious identity. It is 
apparent that the terminology 'multiple religious identity' issues from the lexicon 
of modernity and finds no equivalent expression in the early Buddhist texts. This 
can most easily be explained by the fact that the phenomenon would have been a 
given norm in the religious life of ancient India. As Paul Williams has discerned: 
When householders in ancient times met and were impressed by the Buddha and 
'took refuge' in him, we need not assume that they thereby ceased entirely to make 
offerings to other teachers or gods ... The only problem with all this would come if a 
Buddhist took refuge in a god, implying that the god had the key to final liberation. 
The gods concern only the worldly (Sanskrit: /aukika). The Buddhas are beyond the 
world (lokottara), both in terms of their own status and also in terms of their final 
concerns in helping others. Thus whereas one would not expect to see an orthodox 
Christian making ofterings to Hindu gods, prostrating to them, making requests of 
them, or going into trance and being possessed by them, there is no contradiction to 
Buddhism in Buddhists doing this. To be a Buddhist for Buddhists is not the same 
sort of phenomenon as being a Christian is for Christians. Allegiance in different 
religions does not have the same sort of exclusivity. This is not an example of 
'Buddhist syncretism', or 'popular Buddltism', or even 'Buddhist tolerance' .80 
Evidently, religious identity, as understood in the early texts and contexts of 
Buddhism, was defined by the praxial actualisation of specific qualities of 
spiritual attainment, rather than by a label or specific allegiance. Chappell has 
recognised that such qualities "involve fully understanding attachments and going 
beyond all forms, both intellectual and ritual." Evidently, these qualities are 
defined by the measures of the Buddhism system. Indeed, it is important to note 
that this approach still implies inclusivism rather than pluralism, as the others' 
spiritual or soteriological goals that are affirmed by Buddhism are done so 
because they conform to Buddhist soteriological and spiritual goals. Nevertheless, 
according to the Buddha, the efficacy of practice, rather than the specificity of 
doctrines or the confines of commitments, determined one's salvation, and also 
thereby the Buddha's inclusion. Chappell continues: "What was important was not 
79 A1igutturu Nikiiyu (1:12()..21), cited in Jayatilleke, "The Buddhist Attitude to Other Religions." 
144 
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membership in a group, nor belief in certain doctrines, but following a certain 
kind of practice that urged non-attachment to the kinds of distinctions that 
separated religious groups."81 Indeed, while divergence ofbeliefs and practice was 
extensive among the heterodox communities of Sramal)as, it is apparent that these 
groups were united in their shared emphasis upon personal ascetic practice and 
meditative realisation, and their collective position of opposition towards the 
hereditary establishment of the Br~a~as. Thus, in the Sutta Nipata, the Buddha 
attests to the liberation of sages and priests beyond the refuge of the 
Buddhadharma: 
I do not say that all religious teachers and Brahmins are wrapped in the shroud of 
birth and ageing', said the Buddha. 'There are some who have let go of world-views, 
of teaching traditions of thoughts. They have let go of religious practices and rituals, 
they have left all the ditferent forms behind and they have a total understanding of 
attachments. For them, there are no inner poison drives. These, tmly, are the ocean-
crossers. 82 
The pragmatic, non-reified, and non-attached approach towards religious identity 
that is demonstrated in the early texts is also applied to religious doctrines. In the 
Sullo Nipata, the Buddha advises, "To be attached to one view (i.e. dr~·fi) and to 
look down upon other views as inferior- this the wise men call a fetter."83 Indeed, 
asserting the primacy of practice and the actualisation of qualities over the 
limitations of identity and the metaphysics of religious doctrines, the Buddha 
extended his prescription against attachment to include nonattachment to his own 
teachings. This is most aptly demonstrated by the analogy of the Raft.84 Upon 
reaching a certain stage upon the spiritual path, the practitioner becomes known as 
a ' Stream Enterer' who then journeys across the waters of suffering to 'the other 
shore' of enlightenment upon the 'raft' of the Buddha's teachings.85 Once the 
practitioner has reached the other shore, the raft is to be abandoned, as it is no 
longer necessary. In the words of the Majjhima Nikirya, "the Dhamma is similar to 
a raft, being for the purpose of crossing over, not for the purpose of grasping .. . 
80 Paul Williams, Buddhist Thought: A Complete Introduction to the Indian Tradition (London and 
New York: Routledge, 2000). 6 & 5 
81 Chappell, ~Buddhist Interreligious Dialogue: To Build a Global Conununity.~ 7-8 
82 Sutta-nipata 1082, cited in Ibid. 7 
83 Sutla-nipota 798, cited in Rahula, What the Buddha Taught. 53 
84 The first occurrence of this renowned simile is found in the Mojjhimo Nikaya I, 134-5 
85 See R. M. L. Gethin, The Buddhist Path to Awakening : A Study of the Bodhi-Pakkhiyo 
Dhamma. Brill's lndo/ogical LibrmJ', V. 7. (Leiden; New York: E.J. Brill, 1992). 116 & 206 
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You, bhikkhus, by understanding the Parable of the Raft, should get rid even of 
(right) mental objects, all the more of wrong ones."86 Commenting on this parable, 
Kiblinger has explained its importance for Buddhist inclusivism: 
According to inclusivists, Gautama is saying that if another tradition can get you 
[across the river], or somehow assist you in your journey, then its value can be 
accepted ... Religions, in this mode of argument, are to be evaluated according to 
their fmits and according to whether they serve a function sanctioned by Buddhism. 
Beyond a religion's usefulness, no special loyalty or attachment to it is desirable, not 
even to Buddhism in relation to other faiths.87 
The early Buddhist pragmatic and instrumental approach towards religious 
doctrines was further developed by the evolution of Mahayana Buddhism. A 
quintessential Mahayana text- the Amtw.nsaka Siitra88 -reiterates the symbolic 
meaning of the 'raft' in the pronouncement: "All the Buddha's teachings are a 
finger pointing to the moon". According to this teaching, the finger directs the 
practitioner towards the moon, but the two must not be identified. When the finger 
is mistaken for the moon, the practitioner no longer looks in the direction the 
fmger is pointing; they no longer seek the moon and become attached to the 
fmger, and any direct enlightening experience of the moon, or truth, is obfuscated. 
In other words, the teachings are to be understood as secondary in salvific 
importance to the efficacy of the practices and the manifestation of praxial goals. 
From this Mahayana perspective, Buddhism locates its doctrines within the realm 
of skilful means, upiiya, rather than experience, truth, wisdom, or prajfiii. 89 This 
approach has had direct implications for Buddhist inclusivism and pluralism. 
In a comprehensive study of skilful means, Michael Pye observes that "The 
Mahayanists saw the whole Buddhist religion as a vehicle for 'crossing over' ... In 
short, Buddhism is skilful means. "90 According to Pye, this understanding of the 
86 Majjhima Nikaya cited in J. Hick, "Religion as "Skilful Means": A Hint from Buddhism," 
International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion 30, no. 3 (1991). 142 
87 Kiblinger, Buddhist Jnc/usivism: Attitudes Towards Religious Others. 37 
88 Also known by its longer title- Mahiiraipulyapumu-Buddhii•·atumlu7Jlsalw Siitra- "The Great 
and Vast Buddha Garland Sutra". 
89 See Gross, "This Buddhist's View of Jesus." 66. And Rita M. Gross, "Excuse Me, but What's the 
Question?: Isn't Religious Diversity Normal?," in The Myth of Christian Superim·ity: Multifaith 
Explorations of Religious Pluralism, ed. Paul F. Knitter (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2005). 82-
86 
90 Michael Pye, Skilful Means: A Concept of Mahayana Buddhism (London: Duckworth, 1978). 
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nature of doctrines enabled Buddhism to adapt itself to new cultural contexts 
throughout its transmission into Asia during the early centuries CE. Indeed, as 
Buddhism encountered new cultures and traditions, the provisional understanding 
of doctrines allowed them to use the symbols, languages, and worldviews of 
religious others as skilful means in order to teach and adapt the Buddhadharma. 
Buddhism was able to absorb and include alien religious forms, whilst altering 
and adapting its own. As Pye confirms, "The concept of skilful means has to do 
with the status of religious language and symbols of all kinds."91 Indeed, 
throughout the first millennium CE, the doctrine of skilful means functioned as a 
powerful missionary agent of inclusivism and conversion, enabling the 
development of a plural world-view in which religious others were encompassed 
via various inclusive moves and thereby seen as co-participants in the salvific 
work of the Buddha. 
Makransky has also analysed the role of skilful means in the emergence of 
Mahayana Buddhism in India, its transmission into Asia, and its consequent 
contributions to the development of Zen, Pure Land, and Tibetan Buddhist 
traditions. In particular, Makransky investigates the skilful means of the 
Bodhisattva: 
It is the Bodhisattva's wisdom that discems what form the message of liberating 
truth must take for others to catch on to it, to release their grasping. That skillfulness 
at imparting salvific truth and practice ... hearkens back to Gautama Buddha's 
skillful means for triggering liberating insight in his interlocutors.92 
The Mahayana understanding of the Bodhisattva's use of skilful means enabled 
this new movement to inclusively view non-Buddhist teachers and even secular 
leaders as 'anonymous' Bodhisattvas or Buddhists. The Bodhisattva exemplar was 
thereby established as a trans-religious agency of universal salvation. As 
Makransky has explained, this approach was dependent upon further doctrinal 
developments including the Mahayana understanding of nin·ii~za. The latter was 
re-envisaged by the Mahayana as "the empty, radiant nature of life, of this very 
mind, body, world, directly encountered" in the present moment of ordinary 
91 Michael Pye, "Skilful Means and the Interpretation of Christianity," Buddhist- Christian Srudies 
10 ( 1990). 19 
92 Makransky, "Buddhist Perspectives on Troth in Other Religions: Past and Present." 348 
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samsaric reality. The principal implication of this new conception of nirl'tti)U was 
"that any aspect of the experienced world can function as skilful means, 
sacramentally expressing the nirvanic nature of ordinary things, to whoever is 
prepared to perceive it" - be it a blade of grass, a soup bowl, or a spiritually 
realised practitioner from a non-Buddhist tradition.93 As Makransky relates, in 
some textual instances the exemplar of the Bodhisattva, armed with skilful means, 
conjoined with the reconceived nin ·il~zu to produce occasions of "theological 
inclusivism". Such occasions occur in the depiction of venerable teachers of non-
Buddhist religions "as if they were Bodhisattvas, embodiments of nirvana, who 
use non-Buddhist-- means to prepare their followers-for-the Buddhist path to 
liberation." Makransky cites the Vimalakirti-nirdesa Siitra, which claims that 
"[Bodhisattvas], by devoting themselves ... to all the strange sects of the world, 
develop all beings who have attached themselves to dogmatic views."94 He also 
refers to the passage which sees Bodhisattvas manifesting as "chieftains, captains, 
priests, ministers, or even prime ministers" in their salvific and altruistic quest to 
help all sentient beings. According to Makransky, within this kind of inclusivism, 
Buddbahood communicates through holy persons of any tradition who impart 
elements of the path to freedom as understood by Buddhists: virtue, generosity, 
compassion, and wisdom penetrating self-grasping patterns of thought and action.9~ 
Kiblinger has also investigated Mahayana doctrinal and cosmological 
developments that have had direct implications for Buddhist inclusivism. As 
K.iblinger relates, such teachings as the trikaya (S. ' three bodies') doctrine, the 
doctrine of universal Buddha-nature, and ekayana (S. ' the One Way or Vehicle') 
theory, have all been used in the service of inclusivism. The trikiiya doctrine 
presents a tripartite configuration of Buddhahood and the cosmos. Within this 
configuration the wisdom-mind of the Buddhas which pervades all existence (S. 
dharmakaya) is communicated through visionary dimensions of being (S. 
sw.nbhogakiiya), through nature, and through persons (S. nimulf.Ulkiiya).96 Thus, 
the Buddha is believed to have 'three bodies', or ways of emanating and 
93 Ibid. 
114 1bid. 349 
9~ Ibid. 
96 See Chapter 13, Jolm Makransky, Buddhahood Embodied: Sources of Controversy in India and 
Tibet , Suny Series in Buddhist Studies. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997). 
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communicating the Dharma. Providing a contemporary example, Kiblinger cites 
D. T. Suzuki, who has suggested that non·Buddhist religious teachers can be 
understood as nimriir.wkiiya embodiments, manifesting in particular contexts in 
order to suit the needs and dispositions of particular cultures.97 Evidently, this 
kind of inclusivism may be defined as 'anonymous Buddhism' , in which the truth 
or virtue of non-Buddhist teachers is affirmed but subsumed to a Buddhist 
world view. 
The inclusive use of the trikaya doctrine has been reinforced by the elaboration of 
the doctr-ine-of-universal Buddha-nature. This doctrine arose in response to the 
question of whether all people can and will, eventually, achieve enlightenment. 
Answering in the affirmative, Mahayana Buddhism asserts that the true inherent 
nature of all sentient beings is Buddha-nature (S. buddhata, buddhadhatu), and 
thus all people are potential Buddhas. While on the surface people may exhibit 
ignorance, greed, fear, or selfishness, beneath these defilements every being's 
essential nature is the compassionate and wise nature of a Buddha. The classic 
Ch'an text, the Pia/form SzUra of the Sixth Patriarch, compares inherent Buddha· 
nature to the moon covered by clouds - when the wind blows the clouds away, the 
moon is revealed. While this doctrine originally functioned ecumenically, that is, 
in relation to the various traditions of Buddhism, it came to understood and 
utilised in an interreligious, inclusive, and even pluralistic fashion. Because all 
beings are understood as 'Buddhas to be', they can also be understood as 
'anonymous Buddhists'. 98 
As Kiblinger has recognised, the doctrine of universal salvific Buddha-nature has 
often been used in conjunction with the ekayona or 'One-Vehicle' doctrine. As 
represented in such texts as the Lotus Siitra and the Snmiiliidevlsi'!rhamida Siitra, 
e/wyana theory teaches that the three ways (S. triyana) of the Srava/wyana, the 
Pratyekabuddhayana, and the Bodhisattvayona, rather than being equal paths to 
97 Kiblinger, Buddhist Inclusivism: Allitudes Towards Religious Others. 53 
98 See also Sallie King's comments on the pluralistic application of Buddha-nature in Sallie B. 
King, "A Pluralistic View of Religious Pluralism," in The Myth of Christian Superiority: Mu/tifaith 
Explorations of Religious Pluralism, ed. Paul F. Knitter (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2005). 90-
92 
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salvation, are in fact provisional and are ultimately resolved into the single way of 
Mahayana. This teaching is most aptly represented in the well-known parable of 
the Burning House from the Lotus S1ltra, in which a father rescues his trapped 
children with promises of various kinds of 'carts' but then rewards them all with 
the one same splendid 'cart' once they have been lured to safety. According to this 
teaching, Buddhahood is the one and only truly efficacious soteriological goal and 
all beings will eventually attain it through the Mahayana vehicle. This appears to 
be a fulfilment type of inclusivism in which "non-Mahayana others are included 
but only by positing that they are inevitably aids for or stages advancing towards 
the Mahayana. Multiple ways are merged into a single path along which only·the 
Mahayana vehicle can take you the whole way."99 
Once again it should be noted that this kind of one-vehicle inclusivism was 
initially ecumenical in practice, relating to the relationship between the Mahayana 
tradition and earlier schools of Buddhism. However, as Kiblinger argues, this 
mode of relating "set a pattern for Buddhist treatment of non-Buddhis t others as 
well." 100 The same can be said of the doctrine of skilful means. Initially, this 
doctrine allowed the Mahayana to comprehend apparent contradictions and 
divergences in the Buddhist teachings. For example, the early representation of 
nin•cl1_1u and the mundane world (P. & S. SW!lSllra) as separate realms was 
explained by the Mahayana as the Buddha's way of imparting truth to 
practitioners at a lower level of spiritual development, and gradually preparing 
them for the 'higher' truth of st7nyata (S. 'emptiness') in which nim11Ju and 
.m1Jtsilru are united. This hierarchical ecumenical approach paved the way for later 
fulfilment inclusivism in relation to religious others. 
David Chappell has observed this kind of fulfilment inclusivism, or what he 
defines as a "developmental model", within the context of China. The introduction 
of Buddhism into China involved an encounter with Taoism and Confucianism. 
While the three religions allegedly co-habited harmoniously under the banner "the 
99 Kiblinger, Buddhist Jnclusivism: Afliludes Towards Religious Others. 46-7 
100 Ibid. 44 
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three religions are one" (san-chiao ho-i), according to Chappell they also 
functioned within a hierarchy of practices. Chappell explains: 
Other paths, such as Confucianism and Taoism, have some validity as preliminary 
stages of spiritual development... However, Confucianism and Taoism are only 
'provisional' teachings, whereas Buddhism is both 'provisional' and 'ultimate'. As 
people grow spiritually it is expected that they will move beyond the limited 
provisional practices based on morality and merit, and will advance to higher stages 
totmd only in Buddhism. 101 
In all the above instances of Buddhist inclusivism - the Buddha's conversion and 
inclusion of religious others through his skilful means, the veneration of non-
Buddhist teachers as Bodhisattvas, the understanding of Buddhahood as a 
pervasive universal power, blessing and inspiring all beings to its ultimate 
realisation, and the recognition of the Buddha's salvific truth disclosing itself in 
immeasurably diverse ways and through diverse cultures and religions - it is 
apparent that Buddhism maintains a superior position atop the religious hierarchy. 
Indeed, this is the mark of inclusivism. Buddhist inclusivism appears to have had 
much historical precedence, and the resources it incorporates within this kind of 
approach have found continued contemporary usage as Buddhism continues its 
transmission into new cultures, particularly, as we are witnessing today, into 
Western cultures. However, in many contexts the contemporary confrontation 
with religious diversity has initiated the further application of many inclusive 
resources towards the paradigm of pluralism. While it is lacking in explicit 
historical precedence, pluralism, as we shall now see, is emerging as a Buddhist 
response to religious others. 
Buddhist Pluralism 
The conjunction of the contemporary fact of religious diversity, and the globalised 
status of Buddhism, has created an opportunity, some would say an imperative, 
for the Buddhist tradition to articulate an essentially unprecedented position of 
religious pluralism. By way of clarification, let us briefly reiterate the meaning of 
pluralism as a theological position. The principle of pluralism proposes direct 
engagement with an equality of religions via the deconstruction of any claims to 
absolutism or superiority on the part of one's own religious position. Or, in other 
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words, a pluralist does not consider their religion to be superior to all others as the 
only true faith or path to salvation, and engagement with other religions is done so 
upon this foundation of equivalence. Despite this concordant approach, pluralism 
still maintains the value of particular commitments in its assertion of the value of 
plurality itself, or the value of religious difference. While some pluralists contend 
that the parity of religions is determined by uniting the divergent traditions on a 
common ground or through a common essence, others assert that affirming the 
equal value of the religions in their d~fference is the only viable option. While 
some commentators deem pluralism a philosophical and logical impossibility, 
others propose ·that each religion contains the resources within its traditions, 
doctrines, and practices, to support the position of pluralism. Indeed, supporters of 
pluralism consider that humanity has "reached a point in its cultural and geo-
political development where it is possible, even necessary, to move beyond 'better 
than thou' assertions."102 
Pluralistic approaches do not find much historical precedence within the traditions 
of Buddhism. However, this is not surprising given the fact that pluralism is a 
specifically modern phenomenon, which has evolved in order to deal with modern 
contexts of religious diversity .103 Within the small but comprehensive body of 
relevant literature, a number of Buddhist 'theologians' have argued that anything 
other than pluralism would constitute an inauthentic Buddhist response to 
contemporary contexts of religious diversity. This assertion is based upon the 
contemporary application and radical understanding of certain key doctrines, such 
as emptiness (P. sunfialtii; S. sunyatii) and the theory of two truths (S . satya-
dvaya). It is also based upon certain traditional doctrinal prescriptions and 
dictates, the implicit implications of which have been fully articulated and 
explicated in relation to specific modern contexts. These doctrinal elements 
include Buddhism's inbuilt measures against absolutism, and the use of ethical 
criteria of judgement, rather than metaphysical, to determine religious value and 
101 Chappell, "Buddhist Responses to Religious Pluralism: What Are the Ethical Issues?." 358 
102 Paul F. Knitter, "Introduction," in The Myth of Religious Superiority: A Multifaith Exploration, 
ed. Paul F. Knitter (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2005). vii 
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establish common ground. These Buddhist resources - the doctrines of emptiness 
and the two truths, non-absolutism, and using ethical criteria of evaluation - are 
but four examples from an expanse of different approaches used in the support of 
pluralism. However, because they are widely acknowledged within the literature 
they can be considered as comprehensive in representing Buddhist pluralism and 
we shall therefore examine them as such. Our investigation will address some 
criticisms that have been laid against these aspects of Buddhist pluralism; it will 
also reveal how these pluralistic moves have informed Buddhist modes of 
interreligious dialogue. 
One of the earliest narrative representations of a Buddhist response to religious 
diversity is found in the parable of the Blind Men and the Elephant. 104 In this 
story, a group of blind men surrounds an elephant, each grasping at one part of the 
animal and attempting to define it. One decides it is a tree trunk, another a rope, 
and another still a snake. Because each man reaches a different conclusion about 
the nature of the elephant, and because they are each blind to the perceptions of 
the others, the men argue whilst attempting to assert their individual 
understandings as superior and ultimate. In contrast, surveying the scene through 
his enlightened vision, the Buddha is able to see the entirety of the elephant, the 
whole truth, and can therefore transcend the dispute. 
Like many Buddhist resources for dealing with religious diversity, this parable can 
be used in the service of both inclusivism and pluralism; in both contexts each of 
the men represent religions other than Buddhism and the elephant represents 
ultimate reality. With regard to inclusivism, the implication is that while the men 
may have a grasp on a partial aspect of truth, their 'blindness' (which may 
represent blind or non-empirical belief or absolutism) limits their views, and their 
means can only ever be considered as provisional in relation to Buddhism. When 
the parable is interpreted in relation to pluralism, however, we get a somewhat 
103 As Richard Hayes has acknowledged, "pluralism is a distinctly modem ideology that, li.lce all 
ideologies, has evolved to help people deal with the problems of a particu]ar age in history." See 
Hayes, "Gotama Buddha and Religious Pluralism." l8 
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different picture. Here the implication is that the enlightened vision of the Buddha 
can perceive the relativity and therefore equality of all religious positions as 
different perceptions of ultimate reality. Within this depiction, however, it could 
be argued that the Buddha's position is posited as one of superiority or neutrality -
a 'God's eye view' from which he surveys the scene. According to Buddhist 
pluralists, however, the Buddha's position is de-absolutised, 'emptied' of 
ultimacy, and thereby embodies what has been called a 'positionless position'. 
Many theorists have referred to the notion of a positionless position. Diana Eck 
has-observed-that-"some Buddhists may insist that the 'positionless position' of a 
nondogmatic Buddhism is what clears the ground for pluralism. " 105 Furthermore, 
in an examination of the implications of the doctrine of emptiness for dialogue, 
Judith Simmer-Brown has applied the traditional Madhyamika form of logic (S. 
catu~kofi) to the various possible dialogical positions. Revealing the problematics 
involved in regarding the other's view as the same, totally other, both, or neither, 
she arrives at a conclusive "positionless position which has been given the label, 
stlnyata [emptiness]."106 Finally, Masao Abe's explorations into Buddhist-
Christian dialogue have applied emptiness to religious pluralism and unearthed a 
"positionless position, in which both the diversity and the unity of the world 
religions are fully and dynamically realised."107 Essentially, the positionless 
position is the outcome of utilising the doctrine of emptiness in the service of 
Buddhist pluralism. In order to understand this position, we should first outline the 
notion of emptiness itself. 
The pivotal doctrine of emptiness (P. suiiiiutii; S. sunyc1tii) evolved out of the early 
doctrine of co-dependent origination (P. paficca-samuppilda; S. pralitya-
samutpiida) within the philosophical schools of the Mahayana, particularly the 
104 This parable is found in the Tittha Sutta in the Udiina (68-69), however it is not uniquely 
Buddhist. The parable appears in Hindu, Jain, and Islamic works, so its original source is much 
debated. 
ws Diana L. Eck, Encountering God: A Spin"tual Joumey from Bozeman to Banaras (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1993). 187 
106 Simmer-Brown, "Pluralism and Dialogue: A Contemplation on the Dialogue Relationship." 320 
107 Masao Abe, "'There Is No Common Denominator for World Religions': The Positive Meaning 
of This Negative Statement," in Buddhism and Interfaith Dialogue, ed. Steven Heine (Honolulu: 
University ofHawai'i Press, 1995). 42 
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Madhyamika followed by the Yogacara. Elucidated by the great Buddhist 
philosopher Nagarjuna in the second-century CE, the philosophy of emptiness 
challenged the Abhidharma system of dharmas. According to Nagatjuna, this 
essentialist philosophy seemed to assert that all things, dharmas, were possessed 
of an inherent nature, or self-essence (S. svabhiiva), a contradiction of the 
Buddha's teaching of aniitman (P. anattii, 'selflessness'). Nagarjuna's 'correction' 
affirmed that all things are in fact 'empty' of svabhiiva and exist within a causal 
network of interdependence. For Nagatjuna, the notion of independent self-
existence or enduring substance, applied even to the teachings of the Buddha, 
leads-only to absurdity and contradiction. Niigarjuna 's famous dictum reads: "The 
pratftya-samutpiida we call silnyatii; this apprehension, i.e. taking into account all 
things, is the understanding of the Middle Way."108 In other words, the correct 
understanding of pratllya-samulpiida (P. JXt!icca-samuppiida) , the doctrine of the 
interrelatedness of all things, reveals that everything has its being by virtue of 
other things, and is therefore ultimately 'empty' of any inherent abiding self-
nature or enduring substance. Thus, the doctrine of silnyatii affirms that all things, 
including the five aggregates that constitute the self, are 'empty' of independent 
existence; that the true nature of reality is nondual; that all things are 
interconnected, interdependent, and arise simultaneously in mutual constant co-
production and in constant change. According to tradition, Nagarjuna received his 
name by virtue of being presented with the earlier texts of the Praji'liipiiramitii 
Si'itras by the King of the Nagas, a mythical race of serpents. Nagatjuna's 
philosophy was directly informed by the proposals of the Prajniipiiramitii texts, 
the authors of which (whoever they may have been) were principally concerned 
with the doctrinal theme and metaphysical fact of siinyatii. A quintessential texts, 
the Prajftiipiiramitii Heart Slitra, is famous not only for its paradox "form is 
emptiness, emptiness is form," but also for its strategic emptying of the 
foundational tenets of Buddhism - the Four Noble Truths. Indeed, the chief 
corollary ofNagarjuna's philosophy is that not only are thought constructs of self, 
other, God, or world to be deconstructed, but also words themselves, the substance 
of doctrine.s, including siinyatii itself. Even the notions of 'Buddhism' and 'the 
108 Nagliljuna, Miila-madhyamaka-kiirikiis 24:18, Frederick Streng's translation in Frederick J. 
Streng, Empfi11ess: A Study of Religious Meaning (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1967). 213 
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Buddha' need to be relinquished as objects of attachment if one is to achieve 
enlightened experiential insight into the ultimate empty nature of true reality. 
A number of contemporary Buddhist scholars have discerned the importance of 
the doctrine of emptiness in relation to religious diversity and have recognised 
various instances where it has formed the foundation of pluralistic positions. As 
Simmer-Brown has observed, 
... exclusivism, and probably inclusivism as well, are contrary to a Buddhist 
understanding of things as they really are. The Buddhist view of an absolute cannot 
be the exclusive property of any teacher, community, or lineage, for a radical 
understanding of siirryatii carries with it an appreciation of the variety of fonns and 
practices which arise. 109 
While she is evidently speaking on ecumenical terms, Simmer-Brown's insights 
could be equally related to an interreligious context. From such a perspective, a 
radical understanding of siinyata implies an appreciation of the diversity of 
religions, and thus the deconstruction of any exclusive Buddhist claims to truth, 
and the inevitable adoption of pluralism. David Chappell bas acknowledged this 
kind of employment of emptiness in the service of asserting a shared essence of 
religions: 
It has been common in Mahayana, especially in the Perfection of Wisdom (praj i'iii-
piiramitii) tradition, to emphasise the emptiness of all conventional distinctions, and 
even to atiirm the nonduality of things ... Having removed our own fal se mental 
distinctions (nin·ika/po) that divide omsdves and other traditions, this nondual 
attitude affirms non-diflerence among world religions. This Buddhist idea of 
nonduality does not gloss over difierences, but acknowledges them. Then it affirms 
that their true nature is the shared mark of emptiness (srlnyot5). no 
Perhaps the most developed employment of emptiness towards comparative and 
interreligious concerns can be found in the work of Frederick Streng, particularly 
in his influential work Emptiness: A Study in Religious Meaning (1967).111 
109 Sinuner-Brown, "Pluralism and Dialogue: A Contemplation on the Dialogue Relationship." ~ 13 
11° Chappell, "Buddhist Responses to Religious Plumlism: What Are the Ethical Issues?." 361 
JJJ While this work constitutes a translation of Niigii.Ijuna's M1llamadhyamalwkarikii, it should be 
noted that Streng is mentioned in the above context not as an exemplar of Nagiirjunian philology 
but for the import of the interreligious theological points he raises in his conunentary. Among the 
most acclaimed current translations of Nagarjuna's Miilamadhyamakakiirikii are Jay L. Garfield, 
The Fundamental Wisdom qf' the Middle Way: Nagarjrma 's Ml1/amadhyamakakiirikii (New York 
& Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), David J. Kalupahana, Miilamadhyamai«Jkiirikii of 
Nagarjuna: The Philosophy of the Middle Way (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1991 ), and Kenneth K. 
lnada, Nagarjuna: A translation of his Miilamadhyamakakiirikii with an Introductory Essay 
(Tokyo: Hokuseido Press, 1970). For comprehensive discussion see also Andrew P. Tuck, 
Chapter 2 96 
Drawing upon the Madhyamika tradition, Streng takes emptiness beyond its 
traditional boundaries and applies it as a way of understanding the equivalence of 
religions. He states: "There is, according to Nagiil:juna, a universally valid means 
for avoiding all c1aims to ultimacy, and this is the awareness of their 
emptiness." 112 In confirmation, John Keenan has deemed the Mahayana notion of 
emptiness as "the most radical deconstructive tool of doctrinal thinking."113 
Indeed, Streng uses emptiness as a trans-religious agent for dismantling all 
assertions of propositional absoluteness. This approach is based upon Nagru:iuna' s 
revelation of the conventional status of all religious doctrines, or "the recognition 
that religious-statements are-fundamentally-·a--'means' of apprehending truth." 
According to Streng, this observation "has implications not only for a workable 
definition of what is 'religious' but also for understanding different religious 
expressions."114 John Keenan, who has investigated and developed Streng's use of 
emptiness as a paradigm for understanding world religions, can offer some 
explanation here: 
The notion of emptiness does indeed have a universal scope, tor it t'Ocuses strongly 
on criticising not just the objective content of religious discourses but also, with even 
more insistence, the manner in which all such discourse is engendered and carried 
tonh. Emptiness entails a shift to a new mode of understanding, wherein language 
does not capture the inner essence of religious meaning, either through dialectical 
clarity or through any mystical or intuitive grasp. Rad1er, emptiness ftu1ctions as a 
conventional dispeller of attachment to views taken as representative of reality. All 
language is conventional and none privileged as anything more than conventiona1. 1 1 ~ 
Streng justifies his argument on the basis of Nagat:iuna' s insistence on the 
extension of his philosophy to include the doctrine of emptiness itself, and his 
claim that this 'emptying of emptiness' involves the experiential realisation of 
emptiness. Streng refers to this as the "religious meaning of emptiness", 
emphasising the essential import of emptiness as an agent of transformation, and 
thus salvation. Indeed, emptiness is not to be understood as descriptive of a 
transcendent perspective on the world or some kind of o~jective reality beyond 
Comparative Philosophy and the Philosophy of Scholarship: On the Western Interpretation of 
Niigarjuna (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990). 
112 Streng, Emptiness: A Study of Religious Mea11ing. 169 
113 John p_ Keenan, "Emptiness as a Paradigm for Understanding World Religions," Buddhist-
Christian Studies 16 (1996). 62 
114 Streng, Emptiness: A Study of Religious Meaning. l 78 
w Keenan, "Emptiness as a Paradigm for Understanding World Religions." 58 
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appearances; such conceptions of emptiness would only reinforce the potentiality 
for attachment and thereby the continuation of suffering. Rather, it is best 
understood as an experiential process of 'emptying' that transforms 
consciousness. Commenting on this aspect of Streng's argument, Randall Nadeau 
has explained, "Emptiness is transformative, and Streng uncovers the 
soteriological thrust of Nagfujuna's works - 'the meaning of living in the world 
for one who knows that all things are empty.' A transformed consciousness 
recognises the dependent co~origination of things and ideas and experiences the 
freedom and dynamism of relational existence."1 16 Streng analyses the 
relationship between the religions from the perspective of this transformed 
consciousness, proposing that the distinct traditions can be understood on the 
conventional level of particularity and diversity -in the context of their "specific 
historical practices and ideas." Yet, they can also be perceived as unified in 
emptiness, from the perspective of "the 'ultimate context' or 'depth awareness' 
which both transcends and participates in the concrete forms of religious life." 11 7 
The endeavour to use the experiential realisation of emptiness as a means of 
reconciling the diversity of religions without undermining their differences has 
also been attempted by Marco Pallis, a Buddhist scholar from the school of 
Traditionalism. Pallis' suggestion issues from a different perspective to Streng's, 
but is worth noting here as it may shed further light on this pluralistic stratagem. 
Based on an understanding of the esoteric~exoteric relationship that is a central 
concern of Traditionalism, Pallis proposes the construct of Dharma and the 
dharmas as a means of reconciling the separate, exoteric religions forms within a 
unitive, esoteric vision of reality. Pallis suggests that "the range of ideas [that 
dharma] stands for, must needs be found, at least implicitly, in the substance of 
every religion," and he calls for "a recognition of the dharmic principle as 
applying to interreligious relationships."118 Justification for these arguments is 
JJ6 Randall Nadeau, "Frederick Streng, Madhyamika, and the Comparative Study of Religions," 
Buddhist- Christian Studies 16 ( 1996). 67 
117 Frederick l Streng, "Understanding Christian and Buddhist Personal Transfonnation: Luther's 
Justification by Faith and the Indian Buddhist Perfection of Wisdom," Buddhist- Christian Studies 
2(1982).15 
118 Marco Pa1li5, "Dharma and the Dhannas as Principle of Inter-religious Communication" in 
Marco Pallis, A Buddhist Spectntm (London: Allen & Unwin, 1980). 102 
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once agam found in the doctrine of sunyatii, which is equated to the singular 
conception of Dharma; this serves as a metaphysical principle offormlessness that 
subordinates (though does not annihilate) the exoteric dogmatisms of religious 
forms, which are equated with the plural conception of the Dharmas. Pallis 
explains: 
Dharma, in its pristine immunity to any trace of restrictive distinction, is properly 
describable as void (shunyala), while comprising rupa, form, among the indefinitely 
varied aspects and consequent relations to which its own non-duality gives rise, 
though without the least addition to, or subtraction from, its own imperturbable 
reality. 1 19 
Upon this foundation, Pallis presents his argument: 
Dharma and the dharmas, unitive suchness and the suchness of diversified existence: 
here is to be found the basis of an inter-religious exegesis which does not seek a 
remedy for historical conflicts by explaining away formal or doctrinal factors such as 
in reality translate differences of spiritual genius. Far from minimising the 
importance of these differences in the name of a facile and eventually spurious 
ecumenical friendliness, they will be cherished for the positive message they 
severally carry and as necessities that have arisen out of the differentiation of 
mankind itself. 120 
A final example of this kind of sunyatii-based pluralism can be found in the 
philosophy of Masao Abe, an eminent Japanese philosopher from the Kyoto 
School, particularly as represented in his work Buddhism and Interfaith Dialogue 
(1995). Abe is concerned with the imperative to realise the "Oneness of ultimate 
reality" as a means of opening "a dimension in which positive tolerance and 
peaceful co-existence are possible among religions." However, he is conscious 
that assertions of oneness usually entail "exclusiveness, intolerance, and religious 
imperialism, which [can cause] conflict and dissension not only within a given 
religion but also between the various religions." Therefore, Abe articulates a 
specific kind of oneness - "nondual oneness or unity" - and proposes that it "may 
provide a real common basis for the contemporary pluralistic situation of world 
religions." 121 According to Abe, nondualistic oneness or "dynamic st7nyatii" is a 
view from a "positionless position" - an ostensibly neutral viewpoint that is 
119 1bid. 103 
120 Ibid. 109-10 
121 Masao Abe, "Buddhist-Christian Dialogue: Its Significance and Future Task," in Buddhism and 
Interfaith Dialogue: Part One of a Two-Volume Sequel to Zen and Western Thought, ed. Steven 
Heine (Honolulu: University ofHawai'i Press, 1995). lO-ll 
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"inherently non-dogmatic and free from one-sidedness or bias." It is, he explains, 
"a position which is completely free from any particular position that is 
surreptitiously taken as the absolute or universal standpoint." Furthermore, it is a 
view of emptiness that does not "admit one absolute, ultimate Reality because it 
realises ... the non-substantiality of everything." Finally, Abe claims that within the 
Buddhist tradition "there is no criterion ... [Buddhism] tries to overcome any and 
all discrimination in order to attain non-discrimination, that is, complete 
equality."122 The justification for Abe's assertions is once again found in the tenet 
that true silnyatii can only be realised through the experiential 'emptying of 
emptiness', or what Abe calls "double negation". In a discussion of the critical 
question of a common denominator that unites the world religions, Abe elucidates: 
If we realise 'no-common-denominator' in all religious traditions thoroughly, by 
overcoming both the affirmative view of the presence of a common denominator and 
the negative view of its absence, then a complete emptiness is opened up. This is a 
positionless position, a standpoint that is free from any standpoint. This horizon of 
emptiness or positionless position is reached for us at the end of the double negation 
of the atlirmative and the negative views of a common denominator for all religions; 
however, being free from all human presuppositions and conceptualisations, it 
manifests itself as the reality in terms of the standpoint at the basis of all religions. 
The clear and complete realisation of 'no-common-denominator' for all world 
religions will serve as the common basis for the pluralistic situation of world 
religions. m 
A plethora of criticisms have been levelled at Abe's apparent pluralism. In 
particular, such criticisms are concerned with the use of emptiness to establish an 
ostensibly neutral position; such a position, it is argued, is in fact tradition-
specific. Indeed, such reproach could be made against all our examples of 
silnyata-based pluralism. Akin to the criticisms of identist pluralism, which we 
encountered in Chapter One, the critical issues are the assumption of imperialism 
and the debasement of difference. From the movement of Critical Buddhism, 
Jamie Hubbard has observed that Abe's strategy "seeks to include all differences 
within a linguistically transcendent or epistemologically prior experience of 
'reality'." According to Hubbard, such an approach "tends to downplay or even 
deny the reality of actual historical differences" by claiming that "such 
122 Abe, Bmfdhism and lnteifaith Dialogue: Part One of a Two-Volume Sequel to Zen and Western 
Thought. viii, 13, 23-4, and 100-1 
123 Abe, '"There Is No Common Denominator for World Religions': The Positive Meaning of This 
Negative Statement." 47 
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conceptualisations and discriminations are precisely the source of suffering."124 
Focusing more specifically on the use of emptiness to create a positionless 
position, Kristin Kiblinger has argued that "Buddhists often see emptiness, or 
siinyata, as an antidote to all positions (rather than itself another position), so that 
Buddhism becomes not just one religion among others but stands above all, 
transcending religion with a qualitative leap. Buddhists claim that their religion 
represents a non-view or special, exceptional view that, by its very nature, trumps 
all particular ones."125 On these grounds, and arguing from her position of 
'alternative-ends-recognising inclusivism', Kiblinger claims that Abe 
.. .is guilty of a problematic use of Emptiness that leads him to hope for one 
universal end ... he develops his own Buddhist end as if it floats above all systems as 
a criterion valid for all. Although the notion of interdependence that is at the heart of 
Buddhism is a rich potential resource for valuing diversity, instead Abe uses 
Emptiness to suffocate otherness. 126 
Another critique of Abe has issued from Thomas Dean, who suggests that within 
Abe's work, "there would seem to be a logical inconsistency between maintaining 
that one is not engaged in judging which system is superior while noting that 
one's judgements are being made from the standpoint of one's own tradition."127 
Abe has articulated a direct response to Dean, which may also refer to the other 
critiques. Here, Abe insists that his philosophical propositions are intended to 
form a foundation for dialogue, and this is how they should be understood: 
The basic standpoint of my comparative work is but sunyata ... Being itself empty 
and nonsubstantial, sunyata lets every other position stand and work just as it is. 
Naturally, Zen Buddhism does not exclude other faiths as false but recognises the 
relative truths they contain. This recognition, however, is a starting point, not the 
end, for Buddhist life. Properly speaking, Zen Buddhism starts to work critically and 
creatively through this basic recognition of the relative truths contained in other 
positions, hoping for productive dialogue and cooperation with other faiths.123 
124 Jamie Hubbard, "Topophobia," in Pnming the Bodhi Tree: The Stonn over Critical Buddhism, 
ed. Jamie Hubbard and Paul L. Swanson (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1997). 81-112 
m Kiblinger, Buddhist Inclusivism: Attitudes Towards Religious Others. 52 
126 Ibid. Ill 
127 Thomas Dean, cited in Donald W. Mitchell, ed., Masao Abe: A Ze11 Life of Dialogue (Boston: 
Tuttle Publishing, 1998). 397 
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Indeed, the doctrine of emptiness has some significant implications for the 
practice of interreligious dialogue, which have been recognised by a number of 
commentators. Hans Waldenfels has investigated the question of whether the non-
linguistic experience of silnyata can be shared across religious traditions through 
the linguistic medium of dialogue. Although conscious of the perils of addressing 
silnyata in such a universal way, and aware of the possibility that an experience of 
silnyata may only be possible within a Buddhist context, Waldenfels sees 
connections between the experience of siinyata and 'sharing' in general. He 
concludes by proposing that siinyata may be realised through the act of sharing 
itself: 
'Sharing' as such is an experience which is not restricted to an exchange of ideas, 
reasons, and arguments... 'Sharing,' therefore, cannot be reduced to pure 
knowledge.. . Within the context of Buddhist thought, 'sharing' demands 
participation in prajiiii 'wisdom,' and karu1,1ii ' sympathy and selfless love.' 'Sharing' 
in this sense calls for an exchange of arguments and ways of understanding, on the 
one hand, and for the practice of selfless love, on the other ... In a way, we might 
even say that any tme kind of 'sharing is itself a kind of self-emptying. ' Sharing ' in 
general and the experience of sfmyatii are in this sense more thoroughly connected 
than we might have imagined.129 
In a similar vein, Simmer-Brown concludes her discussion of pluralism and 
dialogue by acknowledging the role of realising emptiness in breaking down 
barriers between self and other. She explains: 
Authentic exchanges dawn when the presuppos1t1ons concerning the relationship 
begin to break down ... In Buddhist language, pluralism is an expression of discovery 
of slinyata, the recognition that there is no way to grasp conceptually what the 
relationship is with the dialogue partner. Out of this positionless position, 
tremendous warmth and interest arises naturally. In environments such as these, 
attempts to appropriate, categorise, or subjugate the partner have been given up and 
genuine interest in communication has dawned. When we have this kind of interest, 
we appreciate that the truth of the other person is his or her own, and we might learn 
from the partner's truth. 130 
A second doctrinal resource that has been used to substantiate Buddhist pluralism 
is the doctrine of two truths (S. satya-dvaya). This theory is extant in the 
Abhidharma tradition but also finds clear articulation in the Madhyamika tradition 
of Mahayana Buddhism. It is also related to the doctrine of emptiness, but has 
129 H. Waldenfels, "Can Stu1yata Be Shared? Religious Experience in Dialogue," in On Sharing 
Religious Experience: Possibilities of Interfaith Mutuali~v, ed. Jerald D. Gort, et al. (Amsterdam: 
Editions Rodopi, 1992). 207 
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been used in a somewhat different way, and not so extensively, within the domain 
of religious diversity. The doctrine divides truth or reality into two levels, which 
are known as relative or conventional truth (S. sa,_nvrti-satya) and absolute or 
ultimate truth (S. paramartha-satya). Originally, this doctrine had epistemological 
and ontological relevance within the Madhyamika system. However, when used in 
the contemporary context of Buddhist pluralism, satya-dvaya has clear theological 
relevance. When applied to religious diversity, the doctrine suggests that 
differences between religions can be understood on the linguistic, conceptual, and 
discursive level of form - the level of conventional or relative truth. On the non-
linguistic;· non-conceptual level of the formless the level of absolute or ultimate 
truth - distinct entities are realised as substantially empty and so differences 
between the religions are transcended. 
Among Buddhist pluralists, a twentieth-century Theravada monk from Thailand, 
Buddhadasa Bhikkhu ( 1906-1993), has incorporated the distinction between these 
two perceptions of reality within his approach to religious diversity. As a monk, 
an ascetic, a philosopher, a social activist, and an interreligious dialogist, 
Buddhadiisa has been extremely influential in Thailand, though also controversial. 
During the 1950s he began to call for mutual understanding and cooperation 
among religions and he became an important voice within the movement of 
Interreligious Exchange in Siam. Essentially, Buddhadasa saw all religions as 
united by their endeavour to eliminate selfishness, and their consequent common 
enemy - materialism. Thus he considered that religions should work together for 
the welfare of all humanity. His 'Three Resolutions' (S. panidhana) demonstrate 
this theme: 
I. To help everyone realise the heart of their own religion; 
2. To help bring about mutual good understanding among religions; 
3. To work together to drag the world out from under the power ofmaterialism.131 
130 Simmer-Brown, "Pluralism and Dialogue: A Contemplation on the Dialogue Relationship." 327 
131 The Three Resolutions of Buddhadiisa Bh;kkhu, cited in Santikaro Bhikkhu, "Buddhadasa 
Bhikkhu: Life and Society through the Natural Eyes of Voidness," in Engaged Buddhism: 
Buddhist Liberation Movements in Asia, ed. Christopher S. Queen and Sallie B. King (Albany, 
NY: State University ofNew York Press, 1996). 184 
Chaofer 2 103 
A further element to Buddhadasa' s approach to religions is encompassed within 
his delineation of the three levels of meaning within religious discourse. On an 
outer level, religions appear dissimilar in their representations. This level 
corresponds to the level of conventional or relative truth, sa1JtV(fi-satya. On an 
intermediary inner level, religions are united in their common humanistic goal to 
eliminate selfishness and to foster an inner spirit of freedom, Jove, and humility. 
According to David Chappell, on this level Buddhadasa affirms the "shared 
essence" of religions. 132 On the inmost level, historical religions are perceived as 
empty of substantial independent existence, as temporal linguistic constructs that 
attempt to represent the ineffable, unconditioned emptiness of true reality. This 
level corresponds to the dimension of absolute or ultimate truth, paramiirtha-
satya. At this level, Buddhadasa proposes that even the concept of 'religion' 
disappears. 
Buddhadasa uses two different analogies to represent his analysis - an analogy of 
water and an analogy of language. The analogy of water initially depicts the 
various kinds of water, which may come from different sources and contain 
different minerals or pollutants- rainwater, ditch water, or the ocean, for example. 
This represents the relative level of conventional truth where things exist in their 
distinct forms and religions are perceived as different historically and culturally 
conditioned entities. On the inner level, however, where all minerals and 
pollutants are removed, the various 'waters' are realised as simply pure water. 
Here the religions are perceived as having the same substance or essence and are 
accordingly unified. Finally, at tbe innermost level, water is deeply experienced 
and realised to be made up of hydrogen and oxygen - thus, the very concept of 
'water' disappears. As Buddhadasa explains: 
In the same way, one who bas attained to the ultimate truth sees that there is no such 
thing as religion! There is only reality ... Call it what you like- dharma or truth- but 
you cannot particularise that dharma or truth as Buddhism, Christianity, or Islam .. _ 
The label 'Buddhism' was attached only after the fact, as it was with Christianity, 
Islam and every other religion. None of the great religious teachers ever gave a name 
m Chappell, "Buddhist Responses to Religious Pluralism: What Are the Ethical Issues?." 363-4 
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to their teachings; they just went on teaching throughout their lives about how we 
should live. m 
Buddhadasa's analogy of language presents two kinds of language. The first is 
"conventional language" and it corresponds to the level of relative truth - it 
affrrrns difference and functions in the world of discrete entities. The second kind 
of language corresponds to Buddhadasa 's middle level, where water is realised in 
its purity and the different religions share the same essence. Buddhadasa calls this 
the "language ofDhamma," and defines it as "a special kind of religious language 
embodying the 'inner world', the culture of mind, of the heart." When the 
different religions are understood thmugh.the 'language of Dhamma' they~are de-
absolutised, and agreement and correspondence can be realised "by keeping in 
mind the truth hidden in between the letters or behind the sound of speech." This 
truth is of course the truth of emptiness, which is perceived on the innermost level, 
where words dissolve and the reality beyond religious constructs is directly 
apprehended. Buddhadasa applied this theory of language and doctrinal constructs 
to a comparative analysis of Buddhism and Christianity: 
In the language of Dhamma, God and the 'Law of Karma' are one and the same 
thing. Such being the case both religions can well go together as far as the essential 
is concerned .. . [W]hich term is used depends upon how we were taught to label 
things or how we were brought up. 134 
Kristin Kiblinger has critiqued Buddhadasa's approach not as pluralist but as 
inclusivist; she claims that he uses the analogy of language "as a convenient 
way ... to subordinate other religions to his form of Buddhism." According to 
Kiblinger, Buddhadiisa links his application of the two truths with a "common 
core theory of religions" and assumes an "experientialist theory of religious 
teachings," which all together impose a Buddhist soteriological structure on other 
religions and effectively undermine their uniqueness and distinction.135 In 
contrast, John Makransky bas suggested that "Buddhadasa Bhikkhu's way of 
anchoring his theological pluralism within emptiness makes an interesting contrast 
133 Buddhadasa Bhikkhu, "No Religion," in Me and Mine: Selected Essays of Bhikkhu 
Buddhadasa, ed. Donald Swearer (Albany, NY: State University ofNew Yorlc Press, 1989). 146-7 
134 Buddhadasa Bhikkhu, Christianity and Buddhism: Sinclair Tiwmpson Memorial Lecture 
(Bangkok: Kam Pim Pranakom Partnership, 1967). 32, 66 
m Kiblinger, Buddhist JnclttSivism: Attitudes Toward~ Religious Others. 50-1 
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to those Western theological pluralists who understand diverse religions to refer 
ultimately to one God."n6 
The principle of justification behind most instances of Buddhist pluralism based 
on siinyatii or satya-dvaya refers to the traditions inbuilt self-corrective 
methodology, which functions as a kind of 'ejector seat' that brings any flyaway 
claims to absolutism or ultimacy back down to earth. On level ground, Buddhism 
de-absolutises itself and locates itself within the realm of relativity, within the 
causal nexus of interdependence, where it exists alongside other religious 
traditions as simply one more linguistic system that needs to be relinquished for 
salvation to occur. Among contemporary scholars concerned with this aspect of 
Buddhism and its relation to religious diversity, a small handful, including Rita 
Gross and Sallie King, has specifically examined the Buddhist perception of 
religions as relative language systems. They have also acknowledged two 
principal consequences of this approach: one constitutes a mode of interreligious 
judgement based on ethical and praxial criteria, and the other presents a particular 
form of humanistic interreligious dialogue centred on social engagement and the 
pursuit of global community and peace. We will here examine the theories of 
pluralism presented by Rita Gross and Sallie King. We will also give some 
mention to the specific approach of His Holiness Tenzin Gyatso, the Dalai Lama 
XIV, who, alongside the venerable Thich Nhat Hanh, exemplifies the approaches 
of contemporary Buddhist pluralism and dialogue. Finally, we shall refer to David 
Chappell's comments on the emergent mode of Buddhist interreligious dialogue. 
The contemporary Buddhist scholar Rita Gross has presented a clear and 
insightful analysis of the position of Buddhist pluralism, focusing specifically on 
the problem of absolutism and the possibility of employing ethical criteria for the 
evaluation of religions. Rather than discerning a predicament regarding religious 
diversity, Gross begins from a perspective of acceptance. According to Gross, 
religious diversity is a normal fact of human existence; she advocates celebration 
of such diversity, and mutual learning between religions, as opposed to the endless 
n
6 Makransky, "Buddhist Perspectives on Truth in Other Religions: Past and Present." 356 
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search for theological validations.137 Gross's primary concern is why religious 
diversity poses such a problem for some religions. The answer to this question, 
according to Gross, is represented by the connections between monotheism, 
imperialism, and absolutism, which together have generated exclusivism and, as 
h · " cr · a1 · ,ug s e puts tt, suuenng, not s vation. 
In response to the fact (not the problem) of religious diversity, Gross presents two 
main resources: the view of religions as method, rather than truth, and the use of 
ethical, rather than metaphysical, criteria of judgement. Discussing the nature of 
religions; Gross relates: 
Religions are language systems, and no language is universal and absolute. End of 
problem. In one fell swoop, as we concede the relativity of all our language games, 
we also recognise that more than one language could be 'valid,' whatever that might 
mean. There is no reason to assume that all people speak my language and it wm1ld 
be illogical to claim that people who don't speak my language are deficient. The 
worth and utility of my language is in no way diminished because it is not the only 
language in the world. Language is a tool through which we communicate, and any 
language could be a useful tool, so long as we don't endow it with tmiversal 
relevance, more freight than it can bear. 139 
When religions are understood as linguistic expressions that attempt to represent 
an ineffable absolute, each religion can further be perceived as culturally specific 
and contextualised, and therefore relativised rather than universal. Continuing 
with her analogy of language, Gross explains that "Arabic, Hebrew, Greek, and 
English are not universal languages, and only extreme hubris could claim the 
Formless Absolute speaks my language, not yours. Thus, even if religions owe 
their genesis to some transcendent, nonhistorical source, they can be codified and 
captured only in a relative manner, in English or in Arabic, for example, and in the 
specific cultural institutions and limitations associated with those languages."140 In 
other words, religious doctrines should be valued for their "verbal utility" rather 
than for their "verbal truth", and from this de-absolutised but not de-valued 
perspective, foreign symbol systems that may be incompatible with one's own can 
still be appreciated rather than deemed 'incorrect'. Gross uses a different analogy 
137 Gross, "Excuse Me, but What's the Question?: ]sn't Religious Diversity Nonnal?." 76 
138 1bid. 80 
139 Rita M Gross, "Religious Identity and Openness in a Pluralistic World," Buddhist - Christian 
Studies 25 (2005). 15 
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of aesthetic preference to further explain her theory; from this perspective, "a 
religious myth or symbol would be regarded as a poem rather than a historical or 
scientific statement." She explains: 
Generally, people are much more tlexible and nonexclusive about aesthetic 
judgements than about historical or scientific claims. No one would want to abolish 
all poetry in the world except tor one's favourite poem, nor even expect everyone to 
agree that this is the most wonderful poem ever written. Why should it be dift'erent 
with religious doctrines, which are ultimately mythopoeic, not discursive, in their 
mode of discourse?141 
With regard to the nature of the absolute, an issue that has plagued many Christian 
pluralists, Gross is unconcerned. She states: 
There may or may not be a formless absolute that grounds all finite existence. All 
religions assert that there is, whether as a being or an experience. But beyond that 
assertion nothing can be determined because all such assertions must be expressed in 
language or some other limited expression - an expression in form. There is no other 
option. Much as we might long to transcend expression in form and leap into mind-
to-mind transmission, in a public medium that is not possible ... And so we are stuck 
with our myriad expressions of a formless, transcendent absolute and cannot even 
determine for sure if we are talking about the same thing when we try to express the 
inexpressible. 142 
Thus, religious doctrines remain fingers pointing to the moon, and while there are 
many fingers, which may point to a moon in the sky, a moon reflected in water, or 
a picture of the moon, as long as they don't try to grab the moon, there is no 
danger of any finger thinking its better than any other. w In other words, as long 
as the limitations of language, as the medium of doctrines, are recognised, and 
thus the relativity of religions is affirmed, there can be no danger of absolutism. 
Just as Gross concedes to the limits of language, she also asserts the necessity of 
establishing the limits of pluralism. Indeed, as Richard Hayes has acknowledged, 
"the perennial dilemma for anyone endorsing pluralism is whether one must be 
open even to those who are hostile to openness."144 While the position of 
pluralism, and Buddhism also, would seem to suggest that pluralism should be 
140 Ibid. 16 
141 Gross, "This Buddhist's View ofJesus." 67 
142 Gross, "Religious Identity and Openness in a Pluralistic World." 15 
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complete in its acceptance of diversity, Gross contends that "Pluralists are 
relativists in the sense that we claim that all religious symbol systems are 
relatively, rather than absolutely, true. But we are not relativists in the sense that 
we make no judgements at a11 about religious beliefs and symbols."145 Gross 
answers this dilemma in reference to morality and the basic Buddhist concern with 
suffering and transformation. This constitutes judging religions by their ethical 
guidelines and the fruits of their practice, rather than the validity of their claims to 
truth. Aware of the potential accusation that could be levelled against her 
approach - that she is "merely substituting one absolute - pluralism - for 
another," Gross explains that- she is suggesting an ethical absolute and a 
methodological absolute, not a doctrinal absolute. 146 This emphasis on the 
morality and utility of a religious doctrine, Gross argues, is critical and essential 
for the positive interaction of world religions today. She explains: 
If people are kind and compassionate to one another, to strangers, to animals, and to 
the environment, why should I worry about whether or not they believe in Jesus 
Christ as their only saviour, regard the Qur'an as the deity's tinal revelation to 
humanity, or meditate correct! y on emptiness? . .. Let us put aside, once and for all, 
the question of truth in our discussion of the basis for a pluralistic theology of 
religions. Let us centre on questions of ethics not metaphysics; let us focus on the 
impact our theologies have on our lives rather than searching for a generic theology 
we can all live with or some wriggle room in our own doctrines that allow for the 
legitimacy of other religions. It is more important that we learn how to live together 
than that we all think: alike religiously. And since we are never all going to think 
alike religiously, we must not pin peace and security on theological agreement. 
Theological agreement is irrelevant to building a better, more peaceful world.147 
The Buddhist scholar Sallie King's approach is very much in accord with Gross' s 
position. King has approached the position of Buddhist pluralism from the 
perspective of her openly confessed dual religious identity as a Quaker and a 
Buddhist. King understands her dual religious identity in relation to the different 
but equally effective measures in both Quakerism and Buddhism that guard 
against absolutism. Both religions comprehend the separation of their 
representations from the absolute, and both are equally mindful of their own 
144 Richard Hayes, "Pluralistic Dharmacentricity" (paper presented at the Interfaith Perspectives on 
Justice and Universality: Texntal Precepts Versus Practices, Montreal, Quebec, September 20 
2004). I 
145 Gross, "Religious Identity and Openness in a Pluralistic World." 18 
146 Gross, "This Buddhist's View of Jesus." 68 
147 Gross, "Excuse Me, but What's the Question?: Isn't Religious Diversity Nonnal?." 82 
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relativity and non-ultimacy. King affirms the differences between Quakerism and 
Buddhism as methods, forms, or vehicles to truth, but also explains that "neither is 
bound to claim for itself 'possession of ultimate Truth, much less exclusive 
possession of ultimate Truth."148 Truth, rather, as Quakerism and Buddhism both 
profess, is "experiential, not doctrinal or dogmatic, much less creedal." 149 In other 
words, truth is "epistemically transcendent"- it is beyond conceptual knowledge, 
language, and culture, and real spiritual knowledge cannot be mediated through 
beliefs, tradition, or authority, but through one's religious experiences. As King 
relates, these elements of both Quakerism and Buddhism underscore her dual 
religious identity and have direct implieatioos for elumlism: 
With respect to religious pluralism, if religious truth is experiential, rather than 
doctrinal, then there will be no impulse to identitY the particular verbal teaching of a 
particular religion as tn1th itself, or believe in it as necessary for salvation. If 
religious truth is experiential, and especially if that religious experience is 
universally available, then it is not the possession of any religion and not under any 
religion's control. It is outside of all that, something that is available to human 
beings simply by virtue of our being human.150 
Despite clear areas of congruence between Quakerism and Buddhism, King 
maintains and asserts the value of their difference: 
I am a Quaker and a Buddhist, but I do not want to say that these religions ' say the 
same thing'. They do not say the same thing; their forms - their languages, 
ceremonies, and so forth - are quite different. They are different life-worlds, 
internally quite consistent but, as forms, far apart. 1 ~ 1 
Nevertheless, these two systems, according to King, do not contradict each other, 
and have much to learn from one another. This is due to their congruent 
understandings of religious experience and their equal emphasis on judging a 
religion by its fruits, which King defines as: unconditional love, selflessness, 
nonviolence, gentleness, kindness, and an avoidance of rigid dogmatism. 151 
The Dalai Lama takes a similar approach. Because we have already had occasion 
to discuss the Dalai Lama's approach to religious diversity, our comments here 
148 King, "A Pluralistic View ofReligious Pluralism." 90 
149 Ibid. 93 
130 Ibid. 95 
l~l Ibid. 99 
m Ibid. 100 
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will be brief in their intention to confirm the position of Buddhist pluralism from 
the perspective of an active dialogist and monastic. The Dalai Lama is renowned 
for his tolerant, pragmatic, and humanistic approach to other religions, and has 
been acknowledged for his concordant view of the diversity and unity of religions. 
As Jane Compson has recognised, the Dalai Lama's "acceptance of other religions 
is enabled precisely by his adherence to the teachings of dGe Lugs Buddhism as 
ultimate."153 Nevertheless, as we have seen, the Buddhist capacity to de-absolutise 
itself reconciles this apparent paradox and validates the Dalai Lama's pluralism. 
Indeed, as E. K. Dargyay has recognised, based on their Madhyamika philosophy, 
"the Tibetans have something to contribute -to the debate about the validity of 
truth-claims ... As a philosophical view which rejects any system of thought, 
because the systemisation of thought restricts the universality of reality, 
Madhyamika [can] be helpful in reconciling conflicting truth-claims without 
reducing them to a counterfeit of one's own position." 154 
Based upon the Madhyamika system, the Dalai Lama has recognised the inherent 
relativity, and therefore non-ultimacy, of the notion of truth: 
We can have a conception of truth that is multidimensional. This is the case 
especially from the Madhyamika philosophical standpoint, in which even the very 
notion of truth has a relative dimension. It is only in relation to falsity, it is only in 
relation to some other perception that anything can be said to be true. But to posit a 
concept of truth that is atemporal and eternal, something that has no frame of 
reference, would be quite problematic. m 
Because of his comprehension of the multidimensional, relative notion of truth, 
the Dalai Lama is able to affirm the diversity of religions and evaluate them 
according to their contexts and utility. In this sense, he relates the religions to 
medicines: "Different medicines are prescribed for different diseases, and a 
medicine which is appropriate in one situation may be inappropriate in another. 
m Jane Compson, "The Dalai Lama and the World Religions: A False Friend?," Religious Studies 
32, no. 2 (1996). 279 
1~ E. K. Dargyay, "The Response of the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan Conununity in the Indian 
Exile," in Modern Indian Responses to Religious Pluralism, ed. Harold G. Coward (Albany, New 
York: State University of New York Press, 1987). 326 
155 Dalai Lama XIV (Tenzin Gyatso), The Good Heart: A Buddhist Perspective on the Teachings 
<?{Jesus (London: Rider, 1996). 81 
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Thus, I cannot say of Buddhism very simply, 'This medicine is best'."156 In 
affirming difference, the Dalai Lama acknowledges that some metaphysical and 
doctrinal divergences cannot be reconciled. Indeed, in relation to Buddhism and 
Christianity he warns that an uncritical combination of the traditions would be like 
putting a yak's head on a sheep's body! 157 Nevertheless, in the Dalai Lama's 
strategy, practice and morality are prioritised over philosophy: 
Philosophical teachings are not the end, not the aim, not what you serve. The aim is 
to help and benefit others, and philosophical teachings to support those ideas are 
valuable. If we go into the differences in philosophy and argue with and criticise 
each other, it is useless. There will be endless argument; the result will mainly be 
that we irritate each other - accomplishing nothing. Better to look at the purpose of 
the philosophies and to see what is shared - an emphasis on love, compassion, and 
respect for a higher force. m 
Indeed, the Dalai Lama asserts that the practice of morality is of pnme 
importance, and that "on this level there is hardly any difference between 
Buddhism, Christianity, or any other religion."159 Therefore, the Dalai Lama does 
not advocate conversion but encourages practitioners to attempt to implement the 
teachings of their respective traditions, which would be of benefit to all. As he 
explains: 
I am not interested in converting other people to Buddhism but in how we Buddhists 
can contribute to human society, according to our own ideas ... The motivation of all 
religious practice is similar- love, sincerity, honesty -each type of system seeking 
in its own unique ways to improve human beings. If we put too much emphasis on 
our own philosophy, religion, or theory, are too attached to it, and try to impose it on 
other people, it makes trouble.160 
Essentially, the Dalai Lama contends that religions share a common goal, and he 
suggests that this should form the foundation of interreligious dialogue. He 
proposes, 'The teachings of tolerance, love, and compassion are the same [in all 
religions]. A basic goal is the benefit of humankind ... Most important is that we 
respect each other and learn from each other those things that will enrich our own 
156 
"Religious Harmony" in Dalai Lama XIV (Tenzin Gyatso), Kindness, Clarity, and Insight, 
trans. Jeffrey Hopkins (New York: Snow Lion Publications, 1984). 49 
m Dalai Lama XIV (Tenzin Gyatso), The Good Heat·t: A Buddhisr Perspective on the Teachings 
ofsJesus. 81, 103 
1 8 Dalai Lama XIV (HH Tenzin Gyatso), '"Religious Harmony' and Extracts from the Bodhgaya 
Interviews," in Christianity through Non-Christian Eyes, ed. Paul J. Griffiths (Maryknoll, NY: 
Orbis Books, 1990). 164 
159 Dalai Lama XIV (Tenzin Gyatso), Kindness, Clarity, and Insight. 13 
160 Ibid. 49 
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practice. "161 Evidently, the Dalai Lama views religious diversity and interreligious 
dialogue from the perspective of global harmony and the need for cooperation and 
peace, rather than violence and conflict. While this approach is firmly grounded in 
the ancient heritage of the Buddhadharrna, it can also be attributed to the tragic 
context of the Chinese occupation of Tibet. In the endeavour to overcome 
exclusive barriers and ignorance, which can create such extreme destruction and 
suffering, the Dalai Lama has championed the critical value of dialogue as the 
essential medium for interreligious exchange and interspiritual understanding. He 
has made the observation that it is good 
... to meet genuine practitioners of different religions. Here you cannot really say 
'no' to the value of other religious traditions. According to my own religious 
experience and through personal contacts, my appreciation and knowledge about the 
deeper value of Christianity grew. These kinds of meetings can give a really 
powerful understanding about the value of other religious traditions.162 
In one of the few specific analyses of Buddhist interreligious dialogue, David 
Chappell confirms the Dalai Lama's approach in an exploration of contemporary 
forms of Buddhist exchange. Chappell recognises that due to "various social 
factors, including the state control of Buddhism, colonialization (sic), and war, as 
well as its own religious cultivation of emptiness and meditation," Buddhist 
interreligious dialogue has evolved differently from Western and Christian 
models. In reference to Eric Sharpe's identification of four main types of dialogue 
-discursive, human, secular, and interior/spiritual dialogues163 - Chappell defines 
Christian interreligious dialogue as predominately discursive: its focus is largely 
theological, concentrating upon the conflict and concord of doctrines and the 
central issue of salvation. While an attitude of empathy and openness to 
transformation are ideal to Christian interreligious dialogue, Chappell argues that 
the communion of shared spiritual practice and the notion of interfaith humanistic 
union and action are secondary to the intellectual exploration of philosophical and 
doctrinal interface. Turning to Buddhism, however, Chappell discerns that the 
dominant form and rationale of contemporary Buddhist interreligious dialogue 
161 Dalai Lama XIV (HH Tenzin Gyatso), "'Religious Hannony' and Extracts from the Bodhgaya 
Interviews." 1 66 
162 Dalai Lama XIV (HH Tenzin \.ryatso), "Dialogue on Religion and Peace," in Buddhist 
Peacework: Creating Culhtres of Peace, ed. David W. Chappell (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 
1999). 191 
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cannot be defined by any of Sharpe's categories. In contrast, Chappell identifies 
an emphasis on "global mission": 
When there is serious interreligious dialogue by modem Buddhists, it is often based 
not on intellectual curiosity but on moral values in an effort to deepen the spiritual 
life of society, to remove discrimination and exploitation, and to nurture a sense of 
global commtmity in a divided world.164 
According to Chappell, the principal motivation behind much contemporary 
Buddhist dialogue is "a moral commitment to build a global community of peace 
through interreligious collaboration, even ifthat means temporarily suspending or 
subordinating the distinctive features of their own religious traditions."165 In other 
words, peace, global unity, and interreligious harmony are more important than 
religious identity. This unique dialogical emphasis stands in sharp contrast to "the 
more intellectual view of dialogue that has evolved within the privileged elite of 
Western Christians,"166 a difference which Chappell attributes to the two 
tradition's relative global and political power relations. As Chappell explains, due 
to the contexts of political suppression, colonialism, and prevalent warfare in the 
majority of Asian Buddhist countries, the theological dimensions of discursive 
dialogue, such as the exchange of knowledge, objective discussion, and doctrinal 
debate, are considered less important to Buddhist dialogists than the pressing need 
for the world's religions to realise a shared humanism and cultivate spiritual and 
communal values so that everyone, regardless of religious affiliation of belief, 
may be 'saved' from war and conflict, economic exploitation, and social 
injustice.167 
In conclusion, it can be acknowledged that although the body of literature that 
deals with Buddhist responses to religious diversity is small in comparison to its 
Christian counterpart, it is comprehensive and informative. Indeed, we have been 
profitable in our attempt to construct a 'Buddhist theology of religions ', and to 
thereby review this body of literature, demonstrating the diversity of responses to 
religious diversity that have emerged, within historical and contemporary 
16~ See Sharpe, "The Goals of Inter-Religious Dialogue.'' 77-95 
164 Chappell, "Buddhist Interreligious Dialogue: To Build a Global Community." 4 
1 6~ Ibid. 22 
166 1bid. 24 
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contexts, from the Buddhist tradition. In particular, our investigation of resources 
that have been used in the service of a Buddhist position of pluralism is of 
significance. It is apparent that the Buddhist response contains some valuable 
points for contribution to the contemporary debate that continues to drive circles 
of Christian theology. Not least is its emphasis on the imperative for de~ 
absolutism and the recognition of the relativity of religions. Nor its proposal of an 
ethical foundation based on the utility of doctrines, as opposed to a metaphysical 
foundation based on doctrinal truth~claims, for the value judgements of other 
religions. Furthermore, Buddhism's capacity to affirm both diversity and unity, 
'form· and-emptiness', could offer some valuable suggestions for the debate that 
continues to wage between identist and differential pluralists. Our investigation of 
Buddhist pluralism has also been significant as in Part II we shall be relating its 
various strategies and perspectives to the approach taken towards religious 
diversity by Thich Nhat Hanh. Before we can undertake this task, however, we 
must first Jay bare the specific methodological tools and discourses that will 
underscore and inform our endeavour, and it is to these that we now tum. 
167 Ibid. 23-24 
115 
3 
Hermeneutics, Orientalism, and Buddhist Theology: 
Methodological Considerations 
Man cannot live without hope; that is the only proposition which I would gladly 
continue to defend without qualification. 
Hans-Georg Gadamer 
Buddhism is a major intellectual and spiritual force in the messy contemporary 
world of political chaos, environmental degradation, and social-economic 
injustice, not merely a set of philosophical texts and artefacts from limes past. 
Therefore, the study of Buddhism need not be limited to historical and 
philological questions, as if Buddhism were irrelevant in the contemporary world 
and its confusion and pain, or did not participate in them. Given the profimdity of 
the Buddhist tradition historically and its impact on world history as a whole and 
on major cultures, it is strange to imagine that exploring what that tradition might 
have to offer today is deemed 'off limits' by some who make claims about what 
should and should not be discussed by contemporary Buddhist scholars. 
Rita M. Gross 
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Within the broad conceptual framework of Buddhism and religious diversity, the 
specific investigative focus of this thesis concerns the classification and analysis 
of Thich Nhat Hanh 's particular approach to other religions. I have chosen to 
focus on this area of Nhat Hanh' s discourse because, in comparison to his 
teachings on Engaged Buddhism, it is a largely unexplored realm. Moreover, what 
research has been undertaken in this field has mainly been done so from the 
methodological perspective of Christian theology, and on the basis of theories 
regarding religious diversity which have been presented by Christian theologians. 
As we have seen, Buddhism and-Ghristiftni.ty have comprehended the issue of 
religious diversity from different perspectives and have articulated quite different 
theological responses. Therefore, I would suggest that using Christian theory to 
examine a Buddhist response may present only one side of the story; while such 
an approach may be adequate within the dimensions of its intentions and 
acceptable in relation to its audience, it may not, I would contend, present an 
integrated depiction of Nhat Hanh' s position. In contrast, I intend to undertake an 
analysis of Nhat Hanh from the methodological perspective of Buddhist Studies 
and the tradition of Buddhism itself. This analysis, which will take place in Part II, 
will interpret Nhat Hanh within the context of the Buddhist theology of religions, 
which was established in the previous chapter, and particularly in relation to 
Buddhism's contemporary articulation of pluralism. Furthermore, it will interpret 
Nhat Hanh in relation to the philosophical categories and internal dynamics of his 
tradition, as well as his cultural-historic context. This chapter is intended to lay 
bare the methodological bones behind what will be the body of my thesis. 
By way of an introduction to this chapter, I shall outline the main elements and 
lines of argument that constitute my methodological skeleton. The reasoning 
behind my intention to examine Nhat Hanh in relation to Buddhist Studies and 
Buddhism itself will initially be substantiated in relation to a critique of an 
established analysis ofNhat Hanh's position, which has issued from the domain of 
Christian theology. It will also be based upon an acknowledgement of certain 
hermeneutic propositions concerning the dynamics of interpretation, namely the 
'hermeneutic circle', Hans-Georg Gadamer's theory of prejudices, and Paul 
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Ricoeur's proposal of the 'hermeneutics of suspicion' versus the 'hermeneutics of 
trust'. My methodological emphasis on contextuality will then be reinforced 
through an examination of recent methodological debates within the discipline of 
Buddhist Studies that have initiated a shift from the traditional textual approach 
towards a more comprehensive contextual approach. I want to suggest that just as 
we should analyse a Buddhist response to religious diversity in relation to the 
theories of a Buddhist theology of religions, so too should we take into account 
the historical and cultural context out of which that response has emerged. 
A final element-of-my methodology-·eoneems my specific stance as a scholar of 
religion, and of Buddhism in particular. My proposal to examine Nhat Hanh's 
approach to religious diversity in relation to his cultural-historic context suggests I 
am a student of the history of religions, or perhaps cultural studies. However, my 
interest in theology and pluralism suggests more normative concerns. By way of 
clarification here, I would like to propose that much of what we have learnt so far 
regarding Theologies of Religion and religious diversity can be applied to the 
academic study of religion. In particular, the arguments of perspectivism or 
constructivism, which assert that there are no value-free perspectives within the 
domain of theology, reveal the fallacy of methodological neutrality or objectivity 
within the domain of scholarship. Furthermore, the general increase in cross-
cultural awareness and knowledge, generated by the global fact of religious 
diversity, has instigated further growth and development within the field of 
Religious Studies. However, it has also created a greater need for serious 
reflection on the nature of religion in the modem world and its purpose and 
meaning in the global village. Conscious of these issues and developments, I do 
not consider that choosing either Re/igionswissenschaft or theology is viable. 
Instead, I have chosen to adopt what Rita Gross has called a "method of 
inseparability." One half of this methodology encompasses an objective approach 
devoid of "partisan apologetic loyalties" and in employment of the critical 
apparatus of academic scholarship. The other half constitutes a more subjective, 
normative, and hermeneutic approach, which will facilitate direct engagement 
with my topic, theological reflection, and the ability to make constructive 
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propositions. 1 In addition to Gross's suggestions, such a methodological approach 
has been articulated within the emergent discourse of Buddhist theology. 
Regarding both the dimensions of this combined approach, I would like to 
mention a further relevant theological element that was revealed m our 
investigation of Buddhist pluralism - the issue of absolutism. Following on from 
Buddhist pluralism's advocacy of the need to recognise the relativity and therefore 
non-absolute status of religions, I would suggest that such a recognition should 
also apply to the objective/analytical and subjective/nonnative study of religion. 
ln applying non-absolutism to--my-awn approach; I woulti-like to state that this 
thesis does not intend to claim any solutions regarding religious diversity, any 
definite answers regarding the debate surrounding pluralism, nor any ultimate 
conclusions concerning the investigation of Thich Nhat Hanh. On the contrary, 
my intentions are much more humble and purport only to further the exploration 
of the possibilities of pluralism, to offer an alternative perspective on Nhat Hanh's 
position regarding religious diversity than has already been presented, and to 
suggest that his approach contains some valuable dimensions and elements that 
could contribute to the ongoing and necessary task of reconciling interreligious 
relations in the late modern world. 
Essentially, this chapter will demonstrate what I intend to do, and how I intend to 
do it. It will begin by presenting an analysis of Tbich Nhat Hanh's approach to 
religious diversity that has been offered by the Buddhist scholar Kristin Kiblinger, 
and will follow with a critique of this analysis. My critique will lead us towards 
one of the principal propositions underlying this thesis - the imperative for Nhat 
Hanh' s approach to be interpreted in relation to his tradition and his cultural-
historic context, both of which underlie his approach to other religions. This 
proposition is informed by certain theories issuing from modern hermeneutics, as 
well as a 'methodological shift', which is continuing to define new modes of 
investigation within the field of Buddhist Studies. We will examine this shift in 
1 See Rita Gross, "Appendix B - Religious Experience and the study of Religion: The History of 
Religions" in Rita M Gross, Buddhism after Patriarchy: A Feminist History, Anu~'l--sis, and 
Reconstn1ction of Buddhism (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1993). 305-317 
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relation to the history of Buddhist Studies itself, and developments folJowing the 
critique and demise of Orientalism. Up to this point, the elements of my 
methodology constitute the side of objective, non-apologetic, academic 
scholarship. The fmal element, however, turns to the other side, where 
Religionswissenschaft is balanced by theology. Here we will examine Rita Gross's 
suggestions regarding the "method of inseparability", and the emergent discourse 
of Buddhist theology. In its entirety, I would suggest that my proposed 
methodology constitutes an adequate and feasible means for undertaking a 
comprehensive analysis, and achieving an integrated perspective, of Thich Nhat 
Hanh's approach to religious diversity. 
Kiblinger's Analysis 
In recent years, a number of doctoral dissertations have emerged from Europe and 
the United States addressing the theme of Nbat Hanh' s approach to other 
religions, and they have all done so from the perspective of Christian theology. 
Indeed, the Christian faith has formed the reigning discourse and focal point of 
these dissertations. Areas of investigation have included, for example, the 
application of Nhat Hanh' s analysis of Christianity towards the construction of a 
late modern Christian spirituality/ and the impact of Nhat Hanh's analysis of 
Christianity upon Christian self-understanding and identity, and its implications 
for developing Christian practice. 3 A number of further dissertations and some 
published works have also examined Nbat Hanh in comparison to major Christian 
figures . In these instances, Christianity bas continued to hold centre stage; Nhat 
Hanh has been utilised as a reference point, or point of comparison, rather than a 
central topic of investigation. Nbat Hanh has been compared to Sri Lankan 
Christian theologian Aloysius Pieris, Catholic activist Dorothy Day, the Quaker 
founder George Fox, medieval German mystic Meister Eckhart, and Father 
Thomas Merton.4 Curiously, only one scholar has attempted any thorough analysis 
2 Arm Elisabeth Alden, "Religion in Dialogue with Late Modem Society: A Constructive 
Contribution to a Christian Spirituality Informed by Buddhist-Christian Encounters" (Doctor of 
Philosophy: Theology, Lunds Universitet (Sweden), 2004). 
3 Laju M. Balani, "Tbich Nhat Hanh on Buddhist-Cluistian Dialogue" (Doctoral of Philosophy: 
Religion, Baylor University (U.S.), 2005). 
4 In order, see Phuoc Thinh Nguyen, "Two Dift'ereot Joumeys and a Convergence: Buddhist-
Christian Dialogue through the Works of Thich Nhat Hanh and Aloysius Pieris" (Doctor of 
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of Nhat Hanh' s approach to other religions from the perspective of the three-fold 
typology of theological classification. Kristin Kiblinger's dissertation of 2002, 
titled A Critical Analysis of Buddhist Jnclusivism towards Religious Others, 5 
presents a philosophical critique of Nhat Hanh's approach within a wider 
discussion of Buddhism and inclusivism. Kiblinger's work, which has been 
published under the title Buddhist Jnclusivism: Attitudes towards Religious 
Others, has been a significant springboard for the construction of some of the 
argwnents presented in this thesis. Indeed, Kiblinger's research is incisive, 
provocative, and above all commendable. However, in critique of Kiblinger, I 
would like to discuss some reservations I have-regarding her methodology,-whieh, 
I contend, generates a one-sided, un-integrated analysis of Nhat Hanh's position. 
In doing so, I hope to further define my own chosen method. 
In recognition of the lacuna within contemporary Buddhist Studies and Buddhism 
itself regarding articulated responses to religious diversity, Kiblinger's principal 
aim is to construct a tenable form of Buddhist inclusivism. The inspiration for this 
project, Kiblinger reveals, issues from the Christian theology of S. Mark Heim, 
whom we have already encountered, and his invitation to assess the application of 
his theory to non-Christian religions.6 To recall, Heim has argued against the 
position of identist pluralism, which posits a common ground upon which all 
religions may unite. Such ground, argues Heim, is non-existent, as all perspectives 
are value-laden or tradition-specific, and the only viable way to approach religious 
others is therefore on the basis of recognising religious difference. Following on 
from Heim, Kiblinger argues for a "preferred" type of inclusivism, which she calls 
"altemative-ends•recognising inclusivism" or "multiple-ends inclusivism". This is 
Philosophy, Graduate Theological Union, 2002). Sallie B. King, ''Transfonnative Nonviolence: 
The Social Ethics of George Fox and Thich Ntmt Hanh," Buddhist- Christian Studies 18 (1998), 
Janet W. Parachin, "Educating for an Engaged Spirituality: The Union of Spiritual Nurture and 
Acts of Compassion and Justice in the Lives of Dorothy Day and Thich Nhat Hanh" (9931775, 
School of Theology at Claremont, 1999), Brian J. Pierce (OP), We Walk the Path Together: 
Learning from Thich Nhat Hanh and Meister Eckhart (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 2005). 
And Robert H. King, Thomas Merton and Thich !v'hat Hanh: Engaged Spirilllality in an Age of 
G/obalisation (New York: Continuum, 2003). 
s Kristin Anne Beise, "A Critical Analysis of Buddhist lnclusivism Towanls Religious Others" 
(Doctor of Philosophy: Divinity School, The University of Chicago, 2002). Note that Beise was 
Kristin Kiblinger's maiden name. 
6 Kristin Beise Kibtinger, Buddhist lnclusivism: Attitudes Towards Religious Others (Aidershot: 
Ashgate Publishing, 2005). 129 
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attributed to Heim's theory, as well as Paul Griffiths' construction of "open 
inclusivism," as opposed to "closed."7 Alternative-ends recognising inclusivism 
does just that - it recognises that there may be a variety of different ends or 
salvific goals among religious traditions. More specifically, it is inclusive towards 
other religions in that it may acknowledge aspects of partial truth in another 
tradition's doctrines and practices, as well as granting its distinctive aims or ends, 
yet it still prioritises and privileges the truth and ends of the home tradition. 
This proposition is constructed in opposition to "single-ends inclusivism," which 
generally utilises "commen--eore!!..-~x-periential" theories of religion. This 
"problematic" type of inc1usivism seeks to identify similarities and overlap 
between traditions, rather than distinct differences. It therefore inevitably involves 
the imposition of "anonymous religiosity." The "experiential-expressivist" 
understanding of doctrines is common to this kind of inclusivism. According to 
Kiblinger, this perspective sees doctrines as inexact expressions of feelings and 
experiences, and because they cannot express the experience perfectly, doctrines 
are de-emphasised in favour of the ineffable to which they point. This view is 
often reinforced, explains Kiblinger, by common core theory, which claims that 
all religions share a common essence but vary due to cultural and historic 
circumstance. 8 Indeed, we have already encountered elements of these 
perspectives in our examination of Buddhist responses to religious diversity. 
According to Kiblinger, these kinds of perspectives would seem to make 
inclusivism easy: "One can accept an element from an alien system by simply-
some might say charitably - assuming its agreement with the home system on a 
'deeper' or experiential leveL" However, Kiblinger argues: 
This type of inclusivism ... is superficial, for it sees the home system in the other 
system rather than seeing the other system clearly on its own terms. By nature, it 
imposes and presumes. If there are major differences between the home community 
and the alien community, they are overlooked in favour of the common essence that 
is presumed a priori.9 
7 Ibid. 8 
8 Ibid. 16-1 7 
9 Ibid. 17 
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It is upon these foundational arguments that charges are laid against Thich Nhat 
Hanh. Nhat Hanh is accused of employing experientialism in conjunction with 
common core theory, on the basis of which he supposedly attempts to reconcile 
doctrinal differences between Buddhism and Christianity in relation to "some 
shared foundational experience". He is accused of "articulating unhelpful, 
ridiculously broad similarities," such as "highlighting as shared 'elements of 
stability, joy, peace, understanding, and love'." Nhat Hanh's use of such doctrinal 
resources as two truths theory, universal Buddha-nature, skilful means, and 
emptiness are deemed problematic and flawed. Kiblinger denounces his "refusal 
to absolutise traditions", which "enables him to accept multiple religious 
allegiances." According to Kiblinger, this leads to a problematic religious identity, 
which in turn inspires him to "take liberties with his interpretation of 
Christianity." These liberties are evidenced in his application of anonymous 
Buddhist moves to an understanding of baptism, the Holy Spirit, the Eucharist, as 
well as the Jewish Passover Seder, which both "blatantly" and indeed "violently" 
interprets Christianity "through Buddhist lenses." Finally, Kiblinger directs the 
critique of the "positionless position" at Nhat Hanh's ostensible attempt to elevate 
Buddhism to a level "not on par with other religions." She states: 
[TJhe goal of striving for non-attachment from all views is itself a view; it arises 
from the very Buddhist presuppositions that it supposedly transcends ... The aim of 
such a mystical or intuitive breakthrough, especially for those who have yet to 
achieve that aim, cannot free Buddhism from the conflicts involved in being one 
religion alongside others.10 
While Kiblinger does recognise some elements of Nhat Hanh's discourse that "at 
least pay lip service to real differences," ultimately, he does not conform to her 
proposed model of inclusivism. Kiblinger explains that "while alternative-ends-
recognising inclusivists would argue that similarities can be seen at the surface 
level but that deeper down differences become more significant, Nhat Hanb 
argues the reverse." Thus, finally, Nhat Hanh's "anonymous Buddhism and his 
habit of seeing a common core to all world religions - a core that seems to be 
10 Ibid. 100 
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Buddhist - dissolve the distinctiveness of the other and absorb the other into his 
own Buddhism."'' 
Evidently, Kiblinger's chief concern is with doctrinal and formal differences 
between religions, and the degree to which Nhat Hanh accepts and confirms these 
differences. This is the starting point, and the end point, of her argument. 
Kiblinger eschews the experientialist view of religions in favour of a "rule-theory" 
of doctrines and truth, so that she can further demarcate the distinctions between 
traditions.12 From this perspective, religious traditions appear to be separate, 
discrete entities. Indeed, she·is-not--eoneemed-with dialogue or the possibilities of 
. any kind of transformative interreligious exchange, nor is she interested in the 
dimensions of religious practice, which do not come into clear focus anywhere in 
her book. Rather, she logically and systematically attempts to define a 
philosophically sound means of articulating inclusivism, and then offers it to 
Buddhists as the best model. 
Within the scope and framework of her proposal - in relation to her motivations 
and goals - Kiblinger's research seems to be watertight. However, what is 
problematic about Kiblinger's study, and what ultimately undermines her results, 
is not the dimensions of her argument, the likes of which we have heard before, 
but the methodology that supports it. I have arrived at two main interrelated areas 
of concern regarding Kiblinger's methodology, a method that, I contend, is 
misrepresentative of Thich Nhat Hanh. My first concern is related to the issue of 
context, and the notion of the 'henneneutic circle' of interpretation. My second 
concern is related to the ' insider/outsider' debate within Religious Studies, and the 
hermeneutic notion of the location and subjective agency of the interpreter. 
In addition to her emphasis on difference, Kiblinger is also insistent about the 
importance of perspective and context. In reference to the postmodem theory of 
such philosophers as George Lindbeck and Alasdair Mcintyre, and the 
contemporary theology of S. Mark Heim and Joseph DiNoia, Kiblinger 
11 See Chapter 5 - "Case Studies of Two Prominent Buddhist lnclusivists" in Ibid. 91-102 
12 This "rule-theory" is derived ti·orn the theory of George Lindbeck. See Ibid. 18 
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acknowledges the inevitability ofperspectivism and the consequent imperative for 
interpretation to occur in relation to context. At a recent conference in Salzburg, 
Kiblinger clarified her criticisms of Nhat Hanh in relation to these themes. 
According to Kiblinger, such "inclusivist types" as Nhat Hanh, tend to "take 
aspects of the other systems out of their contexts and interpret them within the 
context of the home tradition, when in fact, aspects can be meaningfUl only within 
their own contexts. These methods can lead to massive reinterpretations ... "13 It is 
apparent that Kiblinger's main concern is with the misrepresentation and 
distortion of the unique form of Christianity. However, in the process of arguing 
against such ostensible distortion, I would suggest that she herself misrepresents 
and distorts Thich Nhat Hanh by not interpreting him in relation to his context. 
That is, she fails to comprehend Nhat Hanh's approach to other religions in 
relation to his complete body of written work, in particular his teachings of 
Engaged Buddhism, and also the cultural-historic context out of which these 
writings and teachings first emerged, this being the traditional Buddhist culture of 
Vietnam and the Vietnam War. Furthermore, Kiblinger does not interpret Nhat 
Hanh in relation to the dimensions of religious practice, which are so integral to 
his teachings, or the dynamics and arena of dialogue, which are where Nhat 
Hanh' s interreligious teachings are directed. 
Kiblinger's focus is on the issues of doctrines, truth, and salvation, which, we 
have seen, are central to the Christian theology of religions. However, as we have 
also seen, doctrines, truth, and salvation are not accorded an equivalent status 
within a Buddhist theology of religions. Here, doctrines are understood to be non-
absolute methods, or skilful means, and are not valued for their verbal truth but 
their verbal utility. Furthermore, truth is considered to be experiential, not 
doctrinal, and experience is understood as the only real basis for salvific spiritual 
knowledge. Therefore, it can be suggested that Kiblinger judges Nhat Hanh 's 
approach to other religions against a model of Buddhist inclusivism that is based 
upon Christian theological presuppositions and concepts. Furthermore, her chosen 
13 Kristin Beise Kiblinger, "Buddhist Attitudes to Other Religions: An Overview" (paper presented 
at the Buddhist Attitudes to Other Religions - Seventh Conference of the European Network of 
Buddhist-Christian Studies, University of Salzburg, Austria, 2007). Unpublished. Podcast 
available at http://www.buddhist-christian-studies.org 
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model of Buddhist inclusivism is rigidly academic and intellectual, rather than 
theological and religious, and would therefore seem to be an inadequate means by 
which to interpret the position of a monk. Indeed, Kiblinger admits as much when 
she states, "I must stress that Nhat Hanh is not an academic, and his position on 
other religions is not developed systematically." Thus, she explains, she has 
"gathered his scattered statements in order to condense them into a cohesive 
position.''14 In doing so, I would suggest that she has taken his statements out of 
context and tried, but failed, to fit them into her chosen model of inclusivism. In 
the end, this constitutes nothing less than the imposition of an academic, 
Christian-based model of inclusivism onto an authentic· Buddhist response to 
religious diversity. Is it any wonder Nhat Hanh's position does not fit? 
Admittedly, in relation to her specified task and its particular framework, it would 
appear that Kiblinger's criticisms hold weight and that her analysis is correct. 
However, this task and its framework are essentially inadequate and their 
imposition onto Nhat Hanh ultimately de-contextualises and thus misrepresents 
his position, generating a myopic, biased view. Essentially, Kiblinger accuses 
Nhat Hanh of doing to Christianity what she in fact does to him. 
The above acknowledgement of Kiblinger's Christian bias leads to my second 
area of methodological concern, which relates to the insider/outsider debate within 
the context of the discipline of Religious Studies. In a review ofKiblinger's book, 
Terry Muck observes that her methodological stance is "more than 
phenomenologist, definitely not theologian, yet not quite buddhologian ... She 
writes as an outsider taking the voice of an insider.''15 In another review, Amos 
Young states: "Kiblinger does not self-identify religiously as a Buddhist even 
while she is attempting, in this work, to take this particular conversation to the 
next level among Buddhologists and Buddhist intellectuals."16 Thus, as these 
critics explain, Kiblinger is attempting constructive, normative, theological work 
within a tradition to which she holds no commitment, and of which she has no 
14 Kiblinger, Buddhist lnclusivism: Attitudes Towards Religious Others. 92 
15 Terry C. Muck, "Review - Buddhist Jnc/usivism: Buddhist Attitudes Towards Religious Others 
bl Kristin Kiblinger," Buddhist - Christian Studies 27 (2007}. 171, 169 
1 Amos Yong, "Review - Buddhist lnc/usivism: Al1itudes Towards Religious Others by Kristin 
Kiblinger," Japanese Journal of ReligiorLS Sh1dies 33, no. I (2006). 214 
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experiential knowledge. Kiblinger does refer to arguments put forward by Jose 
Cabez6n, which suggest that 'Buddhist theology' requires an experiential and 
praxial foundation, as well as a degree of authentication in tradition. She states, 
'There is something to be said for Cabez6n 's claim that theologians of Buddhism 
are, at least in some ways, aided by having practiced Buddhism and experienced 
the rewards of that practice." However, she continues to express her opinion that 
"while such first-hand experience may be helpful, it is not necessary." Rather, she 
argues, an outsider-scholar can become sufficiently adept in the grammar of 
another religion so as to be equipped to do constructive work within that 
tradition. 1 7 
Terry Muck has argued for an implicit inclusivism within Kiblinger's 
methodology itself. According to Muck, she proposes that "there are good, better, 
and best forms of inclusivism, and she then chooses one of those positions as the 
best for Buddhists." 18 Indeed, Kiblinger specifically focuses on the doctrine of 
triyiina (S. 'three bodies') to support her model of inclusivism. 19 However, in 
doing so she critiques and discards an array of other Buddhist strategies of 
inclusivism that have been used extensively within the Buddhist tradition. 
Furthermore, not only Nhat Hanh but other eminent Asian Buddhist philosophers 
such as Masao Abe and Buddhadasa Bhikkhu, do not fit Kiblinger's mould of 
preferred inclusivism and are accordingly disclaimed, while the strategies of such 
academically-trained American Buddhist scholars such as John Makransky and 
Sallie King are acclaimed.20 Despite the comprehensiveness of Kiblinger's 
research, which is indeed commendable, I would suggest that areas of potential 
bias within her methodology, and confusion regarding her methodological stance, 
tend to undermine her conclusions. 
17 Kiblinger, Buddhist Inclusivism: Attitudes Towards Religious Others. 70 
18 Muck, "Review - Buddhist lnclusivism: Buddhist Attitudes Towards Religious Others by Kristin 
Kiblinger." 171 
19 See Kiblinger, Buddhist Jnclusivism: Attitudes Towards Religious Others. 78-82. See also 
Klistin Belse Kiblinge:r, "Using Three-Vehicle Theory to Improve Buddhist Inclusivism," Buddhist 
-Christian Studies 24 (2004). 
20 See Kiblinger, "Buddhist Attitudes to Other Religions: An Overview". Podcast available at 
http://www.buddhist-christian-studies.org 
ChaDter 3 127 
Philosophical Hermeneutics: Some Suggestions 
It ought to be clarified that in the above examination of Kiblinger I do not mean to 
suggest that scholars from one tradition should not attempt to interpret another 
tradition from their own specific perspective. On the contrary, this is what cross-
cultural and interreligious understanding is all about. As we have seen, our 
traditions and their languages and ideologies shape and inform our perspectives, 
our experiences, and our world-self-other understandings, in myriad invaluable 
ways. My principal concern with Kiblinger's approach is that her particular 
perspective is undisclosed, or not openly professed, and yet its presuppositions, 
-structure, and concepts define her methodology and therefore also- her 
conclusions. Kiblinger's methodology constructs Buddhology through the un-
professed lens and with the undisclosed tools of Christian theology, and this 
would seem to be problematic. Like Kiblinger, I am also concerned with context 
and perspective. Yet, I am concerned with both the context of the object being 
interpreted, and the subjective context of the interpreter. To provide some 
foundation and clarification to these concerns, let us briefly address some 
suggestions offered by the contemporary school of Philosophical Hermeneutics. In 
particular we will mention, in a necessarily but regrettably simplified manner, 
Schleiermacher's understanding of the 'hermeneutic circle', Gadamer's 
affirmation of 'prejudices' as inevitable and constructive, and Ricreur's notion of 
the 'hermeneutics of suspicion' as opposed to the 'hermeneutics of trust' . 
It is widely acknowledged that the field of modem hermeneutics begins with the 
German philosopher and Protestant theologian Frederick Schleiermacher (1768-
1834). Schleiermacher is known for his proposal of a general hermeneutics that 
could be applied to all fonns of interpretation, not just to the classical domain of 
biblical exegesis. One of the main elements of Schleiermacher's discourse that is 
of particular relevance to our discussion here is the notion of the 'hermeneutic 
circle'. While this notion featured in the rhetoric of classical hermeneutics, it 
becomes emblematic of Schleiermacher' s theory of interpretation. An example of 
Schleiermacher's treatment of the circle explains the existence of 
. .. an opposition between the unity of the whole and the individual parts of the work, 
so that the task [of interpretation) could be set in a twofold manner, namely to 
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understand the unity of the whole by the individual parts and the value of the 
individual parts via the unity of the whole.11 
In other words, within the act of interpretation, understanding the 'parts' of a text 
depends on understanding the 'whole' of the text, and vice versa - the movement 
is circular. A significant implication of this view that was emphasised by 
Schleiennacber is that this circularity is also reflected in the interaction between 
an author of a text, and their entire opus of writings and their cultural-historic 
context. Indeed, Schleiermacher was particularly interested in the mind of the 
author. This idea is particularly indebted to Romanticism, which emphasised the 
resonance between_an instance ..of expression and its wider cultural context or 
'spirit' (Geist). Michael Inwood has explained Schleiermacher's view of a 
constantly expanding hermeneutic circle, in which meaning becomes relative to 
context: 
At each level of interpretation we are involved in a hermeneutic circle ... We cannot 
fully tmderstand the text unless we know the author's life and works as a whole, but 
this requires knowledge of the texts and other events that constinne his life. We 
cannot fully understand a text tmJess we know about the whole culnrre from which it 
emerged, but this presupposes a knowledge of the texts and so on that constitute the 
culnrre.22 
Martin Heidegger (1889-197 6), a later German hermeneutic philosopher, is 
renowned for initiating the phenomenological and existential turn in modem 
hermeneutics. This tum encompassed the universalisation of hermeneutics, or the 
expansion of the domain of interpretation and understanding to include all facets 
and events of human existence (Dasein). 23 Heidegger developed the notion of the 
hermeneutic circle in relation to this ontological perspective. He discerned an 
underlying ' fore-structure' of understanding - a foundation of assumptions, 
expectations, and categories that is granted and inherited by one's cultural and 
historic context, and is pre-reflectively projected onto one's experiences, thereby 
21 Andrew Bowie, ed., Frederick Schleiermacher: Hermeneutics and Criticism and Other 
Writings, Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1998). 109. 
22 Michael Inwood, "Henneneutics," in Routledge Encyclopediu of Philosophy, ed. E. Craig and L. 
Floridi (London: Routledge - http://www.rep.routledge.com'article/P023SECT2, 1998). See also 
Richard L. Corliss, "Schleiennacher's Henneneutic and Its Critics." Religious Studies 29, no. 3 
(1993). 
23 See David Couzens Hoy, "Heidegger and the Hermeneutic Tum," in The Cambridge Companion 
to Heideg_~er, ed. Charles B. Guignon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 170-194 
Ch(JD/er 3 129 
determining one's interpretation and understanding. In other words, Heidegger's 
hermeneutic circle spins upon an axis that traces pre-understanding, interpretation, 
and understanding. As he explains in his magnum opus Being and Time, "Any 
interpretation which is to contribute understanding must already have understood 
what is to be interpreted."24 The principal corollary ofHeidegger's analysis is that 
a presupposition-less interpretation or a context-less understanding is an 
impossibility. 
A student of Heidegger, Hans-Georg Gadamer (J 900-2002), further emphasised 
the inevitability of-- presuppositions. Moreover, Gadamer clarified that the 
existence of presuppositions, or the 'embedded-ness' in context, applies both to 
the object being interpreted, and the subjective interpreter. Indeed, according to 
Gadamer, the interpreter is directly implicated in the 'event' of meaning, or the 
instance of interpretation.25 As represented in the title of his magnum opus, Truth 
and Method, Gadamer argued that tn1th is not simply a matter of scientific 
objectivity or rational method, but it involves the subjective agency - its cultural 
reference points and its 'prejudices'. Within this work, which constitutes a direct 
critique of the Enlightenment, Gadamer argues that prejudices are at the 
foundation of all understanding. Rather than functioning as disabling, distorting 
biases, prejudices are in fact what make understanding possible - they are where 
interpretation begins and do not, therefore, need to be hidden or discarded. Within 
the dynamics of interpretation, the interpreter approaches the object of 
interpretation from the professed perspective of their prejudices, and encounters 
the object at the edge of its 'horizon of meaning'. What ensues is a ' fusion of 
horizons' - Gadamer's term for the activity of understanding, which, being 
suggestive of more than simply gaining knowledge, involves negotiation, 
agreement, and even transformation. As Gadamer explains: 
The horizon is the range of vision that includes everything that can be seen from a 
particular vantage point_ Applying this to the thinking mind, we speak of narrowness 
24 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans_ John Macquarie and Edward Robinson (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1962)- 32 
25 For interesting and comprehensive discussions of these elements of Gadamer's philosophy, see 
Anders Odenstedt, "Gadamer on Context-Dependence," The Review of Metaphysics 57, no. l 
(2003). And Rudolf Bemet, "Gadarner on the Subject's Participation in the Game of Truth," The 
Review of Metaphysics 58, no. 4 (2005). 
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of horizon, of the possible expansion of horizon, of the opening up of new 
horizons ... Understanding ... is always the fusion of these horizons ... 26 
According to Gadamer, the process of interpretation and understanding is 
dialogical, rather than rational or methodological, and the truth that is arrived at is 
never finalised or definite. Chris Lawn has clearly explained this hermeneutic 
dynamic: 
The interpreter projects provisional meanings but these are disturbed and re-defined 
when the interpreter's own prejudices are questioned by the horizon of the text or the 
partner in dialogue. Ultimately, Gadamer claims, meanings can never be complete?1 
Indeed, Gadamer emphasises the importance of acknow !edging. one's prejudices: 
"The important thing is to be aware of one' s own bias, so that the text may present 
itself in all its newness and thus be able to assert its own truth against one's own 
fore-meanings. "28 
If we were to apply these hermeneutical insights to Kiblinger's analysis of Thich 
Nhat Hanh, her methodology would be found to be lacking. Firstly, Kiblinger fails 
to interpret Nhat Hanh in relation to the context of his whole body of written 
works, nor in relation to his cultural-historic context. Thus, the hermeneutic circle 
is incomplete. Secondly, Kiblinger's own context - the presuppositions and 
prejudices of her own subjective agency as interpreter- remain undisclosed in her 
attempt to asswne the objective stance of an outsider. Ironically, this situation 
remains even while she argues for the necessity to account for context and 
perspective. As she attempts to undertake 'insider ' work, her prejudices and 
presuppositions continue to function. Therefore, what eventuates is not a 
dialogical 'fusion of horizons' but the imposition of one closed horizon onto the 
other. These methodological shortcomings, I would suggest, generate a dislocated 
and, to a degree, distorted interpretation of meaning. 
If we are to accept the analyses of these hermeneutic philosophers as valid and 
informative, our methodology ought to encompass, firstly, a cootextualised 
26 Hans Georg Gadamer, Troth and Method, trans. William Glen-Doepel, 2nd ed. (London: Sheed 
and Ward, 1979). 269, 273 
27 Chris Lawn, Gadamer(London: Continuum, 2006). 3 
28 Gadamer, Tnlfh and Method. 238 
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interpretation - an understanding of Nhat Hanh within the 'hermeneutic circle'. 
Secondly, my own subjective location as the interpreter ought to be clearly stated 
and 'brought to the dialogical table'. An acceptance of these directives of 
interpretation can be reinforced and validated in reference to methodological 
arguments issuing from the domain of Buddhist Studies. However, before we 
examine these arguments, I would like to mention a further hermeneutic resource 
that may aid our endeavour. 
Despite the fact that Gadamer's opus constitutes a direct attack on the 
Enlightenment projee·Hmd-its "prejudice against prejudice itself,"29 as well as the 
structures of modernity, particularly the Cartesian inheritance of scientific 
rationalism, he does not easily fit into the postmodem mould. Indeed, in 
opposition to discourses of alterity and difference, which continue to flourish in 
the wake of deconstructivism and influence such scholars such as Kiblinger, 
Gadamer affmns the possibilities of commonality and unity, defined by the 
universal potential for understanding. From Gadamer's perspective, "the way that 
we experience one another, the way that we experience historical traditions, the 
way that we experience the natural givenness of our existence and of our world, 
constitutes a truly hermeneutic universe, in which we are not imprisoned, as if 
behind insurmountable barriers, but to which we are opened.":w Gadamer's 
positive emphasis on the dialogical structure of interpretation affirms that 
communication in some form is always possible, regardless of initial divisions. As 
Lawn has observed, "The 'fusion of horizons' ensures that some measure of 
clarity of understanding is always under way if never fmally concluded. Gadamer 
speaks of a necessary trust in communication, a trust in the willingness of the 
other in dialogue to reach out, in good faith, to reach understanding."31 Indeed, 
Gadamer exhibits what has been called a 'hermeneutics of trust', in reference to 
the French hermeneutic philosopher Paul Ricceur's conception of the 
29 Ibid. 240. For a discussion of this element ofGadamer's theory see L.M. Palmer, "Gadamer and 
the Enlightenment's 'Prtiudice against All Prejudices'," CUO 22, no. 4 (1993). 
30 Gadamer, Truth and Method. xiv 
3 1 Lawn, Gadamer. 129 
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"hermeneutics of suspicion."32 Not surprisingly, Gadamer's hermeneutics of trust 
have attracted the criticisms of a number of postmodern theorists, most 
prominently Jacques Derrida. Coming from the perspective of a hermeneutics of 
suspicion, Derrida has perceived too much trust and goodwill in Gadamer's 
propositions. Indeed, Derrida' s deconstructive method suspects all understanding 
to be an act of appropriation, a seizure of the other and its otherness, whether 
implicit or explicit, rather than interpretation. 33 It seems apparent to me that 
Kiblinger's analysis of Nhat Hanh rests upon such an anti-dialogical hermeneutic 
of suspicion. In contrast, I intend to embrace a hermeneutics of trust, following in 
the path of Gadamer, who has suggested, "The soul of hermeneutics lies in the 
fact that the other can be right. "34 
Buddhist Studies, Orientalism, and the Methodological Shift 
The hermeneutical emphasis on context has recently been the catalyst for 
methodological developments within the academic discipline of Buddhist Studies. 
In response to the pervasive recognition among Buddhist scholars of the internal 
diversity of the Buddhist tradition, this new methodological perspective advocates 
the contextual analysis of each cultural manifestation of the Buddhadharma. Such 
an approach stands in contrast to the philological methods of traditional Buddhist 
Studies, and as such it calls into question the legacy of Orientalism within the 
discipline. While some scholars such as Donald Lopez, have approached these 
developments from a 'suspicious' postmodem perspective of critique, others, such 
as Jose Cabez6n, discern a movement towards a more integrated approach to the 
study of Buddhism. In support of my intention to investigate Thich Nhat Hanh 
from textual, contextual, and theological perspectives, it would be worth our while 
to examine the dimensions of this 'methodological shift'. 
The initial proposal within the argument that supports this methodological 
movement refers to the term 'Buddhism' itself. According to the argument, the 
32 See Paul Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation, trans. Denis Savage (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1970). 32-35 
33 See Richard E. Palmer and Diane P. Michelfelder, Dialogue and Deconstruction: The Gadamer-
Derrida Encounter, Suny Series in Contemporary Continental Philosophy. (Albany, NY: State 
University of New York Press, 1989). 
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term Buddhism is an encompassing, panoptic word that signifies a wide array of 
religious manifestations. Indeed, as mentioned in our previous chapter, the first-
centuries CE witnessed the expansion of Buddhism, from India and into East Asia, 
South East Asia, and Tibet, and its assimilation into a diversity of cultures. Within 
this process of cultural transmission, indigenous elements were absorbed and 
radical transformations of doctrine and practice transpired. The result was a 
variety of Buddhisms. To illustrate this fact, Lopez has referred to the diversity of 
names used to signify 'Buddhism' in its various cultural contexts: in Sri Lanka it 
is known as the siisana, Piili for the 'teaching'; in Tibet it is referred to as nang 
pa 'i chos, the 'religion of the insiders'; in China, it is-fojioo, the ' teaching of the 
Buddha'; and in Japan, it is butsudo, the 'way of the Buddha' . Asserting the 
significance of this diversity, Lopez claims: 
In the history of the Buddhist traditions in Asia, there has been a consistent 
recog11ition of (and nostalgia for) India as the birthplace of dte Buddha, embellished 
by mydts that be also visited other lands, like Sri Lanka and Burma. Apart from dtis, 
dte cog11izance and acknowledgement dtat the various local tonns of Buddhism 
together constitute or derive a single entity called Buddhism has waxed and waned 
and waxed again over the course of Asian history.3s 
According to Lopez, therefore, the term Buddhism implies a singular faith and a 
degree of uniformity which in actuality is a conceptual myth. Rather, the word 
Buddhism is an inclusive referent, containing a multiplicity of beliefs and 
practices that have manifested in an expanse of different regions, linguistic 
contexts, dynasties, and times. In recognition of such diversity, many scholars are 
today calling for the necessity to study 'Buddhisms' in relation to their cultural 
contexts. Such a methodology differs from the traditional textual and philological 
modes of Buddhology. While some scholars consider that old methods may be 
combined with new, others, such as Lopez, argue that the old methods are 
problematic due to their involvement in the dubious history of Western Buddhist 
Studies and its apparent construction of a single Buddhism. 
3-4 Hans-Georg Gadamer, in Jean Grondin, "Gadamer's Hope." Renascence 56, no. 4 (2004). 288 
3~ D. Lopez, "Introduction: Impressions of the Buddha" in DonaldS. lopez Jr., ed., Critical Tenns 
f or the Study of Buddhism, Buddhism and Modernity (Chicago and London: The University of 
Chicago Press, 2005). 6 
CltaE..ter 3 134 
This leads to a second related aspect of the argument, which concerns the 
recognition of the "late vintage"36 of the term 'Buddhism' and its status as an ism, 
apparently formulated within the discourses of European scholarship to represent 
a pan-Asian tradition and an object of inquiry. The contemporary Buddhist scholar 
Stephen Batchelor has emphasised this point, stating: "There are as many kinds of 
Buddhism as there are ways the fragmented and ever-changing European mind 
has to apprehend it."37 Batchelor is here referring to the many ways -
Rationalistic, Romantic, Orientalist- that the West has attempted to comprehend 
the object of fascination that is Buddhism. Likewise, Lopez has observed that 
Buddhism has been variously represented in the West as "a form of idolatry, as a 
religion of reason, as a religion of science, and as no religion at all."38 Lopez has 
further explored the origins of this Western construction of Buddhism, which he 
locates at the end of the eighteenth-century. At this time, Lopez explains, 
European scholars and missionaries began to realise that: 
... the religions observed in Burma, Siam, Ceylon, Tartary, Japan, and Cathay were 
somehow the same, that the idols encountered by travelers - whether it be the 
Godama of Burma, the Sommona Codom of Siam, the Fo of China, the Khodom of 
Bali , or the Boodhoo oflndia- were somehow the same person?9 
Thus began the projection and reification of a pan-Asian entity called Buddhism. 
At this time, European colonial powers dominated much of Buddhist Asia. 
According to Lopez, the founding Buddhologists of the emergent field of 
Buddhist Studies conceptualised 'Asia' and 'Buddhism', claiming interpretative 
authority, in an alliance (whether explicit or implicit, conscious or unconscious) 
with colonial political agendas and Western structures of elitism. As such, the 
Western construction of Buddhism was highly influenced by the strategies of 
domination and misrepresentation inherent in the discourse of Oriental ism. 
The Western tradition of intellectual and existential engagement with the East -
also known as Orientalism - has been continuing since the days of antiquity. 
However, the 1960s saw the emergence of a searing critique that deemed 
J6 1bid. 7 
37 Stephen Batchelor, The Awakening of the West: The Encounter of Buddhism and Western 
Culture (Berkeley: Parallax Press. 1994). 274 
38 Lopez, " Introduction" in Lopez Jr., ed:, Critical Terms for the S111d,v of Buddhism. 1. 
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Orientalism a highly problematic domain of scholarship, an agent of Western 
imperialism and cultural vandalism. Through the work of such scholars as Anouar 
Abdel-Malek, A.L. Tibawi, Bryan Turner, and most prominently, Edward Said,40 
a tide of anti-Europeanism, anti-colonialism, and anti-elitism denounced the past 
achievements of the Orientalists as obsolete and iniquitous. According to the 
critique, Orientalism attempted to construct and hold authority over the 'Orient' in 
an alliance with European colonialism. Purportedly, in relegating 'the oriental' to 
a realm of 'otherness' - the irrational, the aberrant, the backward and the inferior 
- the discourses of Orientalism have contributed to the construction of Western 
hegemony. Ostensibly, Orientalism -falsely· represented the East;-depri-ved-whole 
populations of genuine self-representation and self-definition, and reinforced the 
processes of alienation and subjugation inherent in colonialism. 
Since the emergence of the critiques of Orientalism, post-colonial theorists have 
been continuing to question the discourses of domination inherent in what Said 
calls this particularly 'narcissistic' tradition of European scholarship, based as it 
was on 'colonising knowledge' and the urge for power. In reference to Marxist 
analysis of Colonialism and Capitalism, as well the French high theory of 
postmodemism, in particular Foucaldian discursive theory, Said's initial main area 
of interest was the Western perception and subjugation of the Islamic world ofthe 
Middle East. Said's thesis was eventually extended to include European 
interactions with the Asian continent in toto. This has given occasion for Buddhist 
scholars to draw out the implications of the critique of Orientalism for the domain 
of Buddhist Studies.41 Among these, Lopez has examined contributions made by 
the founders of Buddhist Studies to the critiqued Orientalist discourse. These he 
locates in: 
39 D. Lopez, "Buddha" in Ibid. 15. 
40 See Anouar Abdei-Malek, "Oriental ism in Crisis," Diogenes 44, no. Winter ( 1963). A. L 
Tibawi, English Spealcing Orientalists (London: Luzac, 1964; reprint, Reprinted in A.L. Macfie, 
Orienta/ism: A Reader, p. 57-78). B. S. Turner, Marx and the End ofOrientalism (London: Allen 
& Unwin, 1979). Edward W. Said, Orienta/ism (London: Penguin, 1978). 
41 Based on a panel titled "Buddhism and Orientalism at the Tum of the Century" presented at the 
American Academy of Religion meeting in November 1991, Lopez's edited book Curators of the 
Buddha is the first collection of studies concerning the impact of the European colonial experience 
on the Western academic interpretation of Buddhism. See DonaldS. Lopez Jr., ed., Curators of the 
Buddha: The Study of Buddhism under Colonialism (Chicago and London: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1995). 
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... the creation of a reified entity called "Buddhism" and the writing of its history, as 
well as in the creation of a biography of the Buddha, who would come to be both 
exalted and condemned as the paradigm of an Oriental mentality. This "Buddhism" 
and this Buddha played a specific role in what Said calls "Romantic Orientalism," 
with its fantasies of lost wisdom, its constructions of classical ages long past, its 
search for the languages of Eden, and it degradation of the Oriental modern.42 
Further, Lopez adds that European Indologists denigrated the 'Oriental' by 
consistently privileging the written text over the word of the native informant, a 
process that strengthened the reification of Buddhism as a static, essentialised 
entity. Commencing with Brian Houghton Hodgson's delivery of a number of 
Sanskrit manuscripts to Eugene Burnouf in 1837, European scholars began to 
collect Buddhist texts and commenced philological projects of translation and the 
creation of the object of 'Buddhism'. As Phillip Almond has explained, this object 
existed "over and against the various cultures which can now be perceived as 
instancing it, manifesting it, in an enormous variety of ways. "43 In their 
representation of Buddhism to the West, European scholars constructed this 
'classical' Buddhism based upon what Lopez has called a "tradition of high 
textuality,'>44 in which the text was continuously removed from its context of 
production, philosophic meaning, or ritual usage. Said has deemed this process of 
Western scholarly preservation and cultural stewardship of the Orient to be a 
"paradigmatic fossilisation" based upon the "fmality and closure of antiquarian or 
curatorial knowledge.'>45 Thus, the European creation of the object of 'Buddhism' 
became more real than its cultural existences, and against this unitary 'primitive', 
'pure' and 'original' artefact, the varieties of living cultural expressions of the 
Buddhadharma - the many Buddhisms of Asia - have continuously been judged 
by Western scholars, and found lacking. 
Critiques of the thesis against Orientalism justifiably abound. Indeed, I feel it 
necessary to express my own reservations regarding many aspects of Said's thesis. 
Not least is the denial of any positive elements of Orientalism. The blanket 
42 D. Lopez, "Introduction" in Ibid. 12. 
43 Philip C. Almond, The British Discovery of Buddhism (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988). 12. 
44 Lopez, "lnlroduction" in Lopez Jr., ed., Curators of the Buddha: Tite Swdy of Buddhism tmder 
Colonialism. 7. 
45 Edward Said, "Orientalism Reconsidered," Race and Class 27, no. 2 (1985). 5, 14. 
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condenmation of Orientalism as allied with the endeavours of Western 
imperialism effectively undermines the vast achievements of the Orientalists. Here 
I am in agreement with J.J. Clarke, who has asserted: 
Oriental ism ... cannot simply be identified with the ruling imperialist ideology, for in 
the Western context it represents a counter-movement, a subversive entelechy, albeit 
not a unified or consciously organised one, which has in various ways often tended 
to subvert rather than to conform to discursive structures of imperial power.46 
Furthermore, it would appear that the employment of secular strategies and 
modernist values within 'post-Orientalist' discourse constitutes an approach that is 
just as subjective and prejudiced as the next. However, such strategies and values 
remain unacknowledged. While not necessarily disputable in themselves, when 
applied to the domain of religion and the spiritual lives that inhabit the traditions, 
these strategies and values inevitably lead to reductionism. As such, it is apparent 
that 'post-Orientalist' discourse is dominated by the 'hermeneutics of suspicion'. 
In contrast, Mircea Eliade has recognised: 
We have indeed pillaged other cultures. Fortunately, however, there have been other 
Westerners who have deciphered the languages, preserved the myths, salvaged 
certain artistic masterpieces. There have always been a few orientalists, a few 
philosophers, a few Eoets striving to safeguard the meaning of certain exotic, extra-
European traditions. 7 
And in confirmation, Harry Oldmeadow has observed: 
Whilst their work [i.e. the Orientalists] was no doubt often contaminated by mixed 
motives and . .. sometimes turned to dubious ends, the scholarly enterprise in itself 
was a noble one and their heroic labours ought to elicit our admiration and gratitude 
rather than opprobrium. This is especially the case amongst those writers who, far 
from aiding and abetting colonial regimes or reinforcing racist and progressivist 
ideologies, were inspired by a sense that the East had philosophical, artistic and 
spiritual riches which could be shared by a Western world which bad lost its 
religious bearings.48 
46 J. J. Clarke, Oriental Enlightenment: The Encounter between Asian and Western Thought 
(London & New York: Routledge, 1997). 9 
47 Mircea Eliade, Ordeal by Labyrinth: Conversations with Claude-Henri Racquet (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1982). 68 
48 Harry Oldmeadow, Journeys East: 20th Century Western Encounters with Eastern Religious 
Traditions (Indiana: World Wisdom, 2004). 13. For further critiques of Said's thesis, see Sadik 
Jalal al 'Azm, Bernard Lewis, and Sheldon Pollock in A. L. Macfie, ed., Orienta/ism: A Reader 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000). For feminist critiques see Ania Loomba, 
Co/onia/ism!Postcolonialism (London: Routledge, 1998), Lisa Lowe, Critical Terrains: French 
and British Orienta/isms (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1991 ), Billie Melman, Women s Orients 
(London: Macmillan, 1992). And Rosane Rocher, "British Orientalism in the Eighteenth Century: 
The Dialectics of Knowledge and Government," in Orienta/ism and the Postcolouial Predicament, 
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Critiques of Lopez's application of 'post-Orientalism' to his analysis of Western 
Buddhist Studies have also received warranted criticism. Indeed, Lopez's 
deconstruction of Buddhism as a unitary entity is suspect for its apparent 
elimination of any kind of cohesion with regard to the Buddhist tradition. In the 
case of Lopez, it would appear that the postmodem endeavour to dismantle the 
grand narratives has gone too far. If Buddhism is simply a Western construct, 
invented as a means of administering hegemony, or simply for the sake of 
scholarly pursuits, what meaning is left for the Buddha and his experience of 
enlightenment, the salvific agency of the Dharma, and the fellowship of the 
Sangha? Indeed, while-Buddhism- is · ·a highly diverse tradition, the Buddha, 
Dharma and Sangha remain the place of refuge for all Buddhists, the nucleus of 
all traditions, providing Wlity and identity, community and faith, moral and 
spiritual guidance for a vast number of people around the world. While it is 
unquestionable that the diversity of Buddhist traditions demand contextualised 
interpretations, this should not be enforced, I would suggest, at the expense of the 
integrity of the Buddhist tradition itself. 
With further regard to his methodological suggestions, Jan Nattier has written an 
extensive review of Lopez's edited collection Curators of the Buddha. She raises 
some important queries regarding Lopez's argument, particularly questioning the 
validity of its underlying assumptions. These include: 1) that those whose work 
focuses on written texts necessarily have as their object a reified entity called 
Buddhism, and 2) that such scholars have as their ultimate aim the sinister and 
arrogant issuing of a pronouncement, binding upon scholars and Buddhists alike, 
about the true nature of this supposed entity. This, Nattier argues, is not an 
adequate portrait of Western Buddhist Studies as a whole. She also argues that in 
his denouncement of the "bibliophilia" of Western Buddhist Studies, or the 
supposed extreme focus on written sources and the concomitant assumption of 
interpretative authority, Lopez is holding a "partisan position", or in traditional 
ed. Carol A. Breckeruidgc and Peter van der Veer (Philadelphia: Philadelphia University, 1993). 
See also James Clifford, The Predicament of Culture (Cambridge, MA: Hatvard University, 1988). 
Richard King, Orienta/ism and Religion: Postcolonial Theory, India and the Mystic East (London: 
Routledge, 1999). And Bart Moore-Gilbert, Po~;tcolonial Theory•: Contexts, Practices, Politics 
(London: Verso, 1998). 
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Buddhist terms, an "extreme view". In other words, Nattier contends that to value 
written works over the oral tradition, or vice verse as Lopez does, is 
methodologically suspect. In response, Nattier calls for a more balanced 
approach.49 
Despite the shortcomings of Lopez's arguments, the 'post-Orientalist' 
deconstruction of a reified notion of' original Buddhism' as an authentic historical 
artefact that can be textually distilled, and the concurrent recognition of the 
multiplicity of 'Buddhisms' in the world, have encouraged a methodological shift 
within contemperary Buddhist Studies. The text·critical philological model of 
traditional Buddhology continues to define contemporary Buddhist Studies. 
However, the discipline is currently bearing witness to the adaptation, renewal and 
reinvention of its scholarship, with the development of methodologies that 
emphasise the contextual over the textual, and explore the interface between 
Buddhism and its cultural contexts. Buddhist Studies is thereby becoming a 
multidisciplinary and comparative endeavour which is accepting and 
incorporating new kinds of source material and new modes of discourse. 
This new methodological school reaches perhaps its most extreme expression in 
the work of Gregory Shopen, who, like Lopez, has presented an extensive 
argument against textual analysis. Schopen has criticised a methodological 
narrowing which has ostensibly prevented many scholars from using approaches 
other than philology, deeming this bias a "Protestant presupposition."50 According 
to Schopeo, textual material is an inadequate source as it was intended to 
"inculcate an ideal," in that it "records what a small, atypical part of the Buddhist 
community wanted that community to believe or practice." Schopen champions 
other sources such as archaeological and epigraphical material, which purportedly 
"record or reflect at least a part of what Buddhists - both lay people and monks -
49 Jan Nattier, "Buddhist Studies in the Post-Colonial Age," Journal of I he American Academy of 
Religion 65, no. 2 ( 1997}. 469-485 
50 Gregory Schopen, "Archaeology and Protestant Presuppositions in the Study of Indian 
Buddhism," History of Religions 31, no. I ( 1991 ). 19ff 
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actually practiced and believed."51 Schopen's emphasis is on the contextual 
meaning and function of Buddhism as a living religion. However, like Lopez, he 
can be accused of holding an 'extreme view'. In contrast to Schopen and Lopez, 
and in a similar vein to Nattier, Jose Cabez6n has articulated a more balanced 
view of the methodological shift, which may provide us with some concrete 
guidance: 
There is today a caJI for the increased investigation of alternative semiotic forms -
oral and vernacular traditions, epigraphy, ritual, patterns of social and institutional 
evolution, gender, Jay and folk traditions, arts, archaeology and architecture .. . The 
critique is really a call for greater balance and holism within the field; it is not only a 
demand that equal recognition be given to new areas o( research, but a caJLior an 
integrated and mutually interpenetrating research program aimed at the 
understanding of Buddhism as a multifaceted entity. 52 
Cabezon has argued extensively for the evolution of new methodological 
approaches in the field of Buddhist Studies. While he maintains the value of the 
"rigorous text-critical work" that is the "legacy ofBuddhology," he has also made 
a significant claim for "a form of normative discourse, self-avowedly rooted in 
tradition, with certain formal properties" that has come to be known as Buddhist 
theology.53 While the deracinating theories of postmodem scholars like Lopez 
continues to deconstruct Buddhist Studies from the hermeneutical perspective of 
suspicion, a collective of Western Buddhist scholars who are openly Buddhist 
have begun to develop this theological approach, thereby providing a positive 
slant to the methodological shift. We will now examine the dimensions of this 
emergent discourse, which has suggested the possibility of formulating a truly 
plural methodology for my study of Thich Nhat Hanh, one that incorporates 
textuaVdescriptive, contextual/historic, and constructive/theological approaches. 
~1 Gregory Schopen, Bones, Stones, and Buddhist Monks: Collected Papers on the Archaeology, 
Epigraphy, and Texts of Monastic Buddhism in India , Shldies in the Buddhist Traditions. 
(Honolulu: University ofHawai'i Press, 1997). 1 
52 Jose Ignacio Cabez6n., "Buddhist Studies as a Discipline and the Role ofTheory," Journal of the 
International Association of Buddhist Sh1dies 18, no. 2 ( 1995). 262-3 
S) Jose Ignacio Cabez6n, "Buddhist Theology in the Academy," in Buddhist Theology: Critical 
Reflections by Contemporary Buddhist Scholars, ed. Roger R. Jackson and John Ma.kransky 
(Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press, 2000). 29, 25 
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Buddhist Theology 
Jose Cabez6n recently commented upon a prevalent divisive rhetoric within the 
discipline of Religious Studies: 
.. .in the interest of portraying itself as objective - the legacy of the Enlightenment -
we fmd in much of the work of the religious studies academy today a rhetoric whose 
goal is to distinguish between scholarship and religious discourse, considering the 
two incompatible. The former is portrayed as rigorous, o~jective, unbiased; the latter 
as pietistic, fideistic, and plagued by religious partisanship; or alternatively, as a 
form of discourse that is to be shielded from any public scmtiny . .s.e 
Indeed, the field of Religionswi~·senschaft has historically been attentively 
distanced from the nonnative concerns of Christian theology. While Christian 
theology has maintained a distinguished position in the Western academy, the 
study of non-Christian religions has remained confined within the ' objectivity' of 
a psuedo-scientific methodology. However, in recent years such disciplines as 
Buddhist Studies have witnessed Buddhist scholars turning their attentions to their 
own tradition, armed with the tools of critical analysis but conscious of, and 
curious about, the normative and contextual meanings of Buddhism as a living 
religion. Speaking from within Buddhist traditions as committed Buddhists, such 
scholars have begun offering critical perspectives on aspects of Buddhism in the 
modern world. The methodology of such scholars can best be described as 
'theological' and the emergent field has been titled 'Buddhist theology'. 
Representative of the recent methodological developments within Buddhist 
Studies, Western Buddhist theology can be understood as the examination of 
various forms of Buddhism in Western cultural contexts and how they relate to 
these contexts. This enterprise consists of an amalgamation of various forms of 
scholarship. The critical apparatus of academic scholarship are used to present 
prescriptive, normative, interpretative discourses intended to advance 
understandings of the meanings of Buddhism within late-modem Western 
contexts. 
Within the representative volume Buddhist Theology, Roger Jackson has explored 
the history and evolution of this methodologically religious discourse. As Jackson 
S4 Jose Ignacio Cabez6n, "Scholarship as Interreligious Dialogue," Buddhist - Christian Studies 18 
(1998). 90 
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recogmses, since the time of the 'original' Buddhist theologian, Sakyamuni 
himself, Buddhists have consistently reflected intellectually on their tradition, 
particularly within monastic contexts.55 This modem enterprise is therefore not 
historically unprecedented. Buddhist monasteries, particularly in the Indo-Tibetan 
traditions, have consistently combined meditative practice with intellectual 
philosophical endeavours. However, as Jackson notes, following the incursion of 
Western modernity into Asia the Buddhist practice of theology moved beyond the 
monastic walls to become more lay and academically oriented. Within these new 
modern contexts, Jackson explains, Asian Buddhist theologians have worked "at 
the crossroads where-tradition and modernity meet, reinterpreting-Buddhism in the 
face of the perplexities and challenges of the brave new world in which they, and 
their audience, find themselves."56 As Western academic and popular interest in 
Buddhism has progressed, Buddhist theology has continued the task of 
"reinterpreting authoritative tradition in changing circumstances."57 As Jackson 
recognises, this emergent field of Western Buddhist theology is today gaining 
credence alongside Christian theology in the Western academy. 
One of the principle concerns of this emergent academic field is the appellation of 
'Buddhist theology' itself. Many Buddhist theologians have noted the potential 
'oxymoronic' status of this term, as have a number of critics. In his review of 
Jackson and Makransky's volume, Paul Griffiths (decidedly nol a Buddhist 
theologian) has disparagingly deemed the "phrase" to have "an exotic and 
awkward sound." As Griffiths queries, '"Theology,' after all, is a technical term 
from the lexicon of Christianity, and it means, etymologically and also practically, 
'reasoned discourse about God.' In what sense is there a Buddhist version of this 
enterprise?"58 Despite such attempts to undermine the use of the term, however, a 
number of Buddhist theologians have made convincing claims for its use, as well 
as for the discourse itself. 
55 See Jackson, Roger R & Makransky, John J. (eds.) Buddhist Theology- Critical Reflections by 
Contemporary Buddhist Scholars, Cunon, Riclunond, Surrey, 2000, 5 
56 Ibid. 7 
~7 1bid. 
58 Paul J . Griffiths, "Review- Buddhist Theology: Critical Reflections by Contemporory Buddhist 
Scholars Edited by Roger Jackson and John Makransky," Jo 11mal of Global Buddhism l (2000). 
56 
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For example, Jackson has defined, and responded to, three possible points of 
objection to the use of the term. Firstly, he recognises that Buddhism's "fearless 
abjuration of all presuppositions" would seem at odds with the practice of 
theology as "intellectual reflection." In response, he observes, 
... for every Buddhist text that employs a rhetoric of tmfettered inquiry, there are 
probably ten more that are frankly rooted in religious presuppositions and purposes, 
and ... furthermore, even texts that claim to eschew all presuppositions often invoke 
them unconsciously. Thus, theology is probably at work even where it appears to be 
absent.w 
A second possible objection could be that in relation to Buddhism's emphasis on 
non-rational experientialism, "theology, even if it exists in Buddhism, is beside 
the point, a merely conventional and provisional exercise at best." In response, 
Jackson refers to Buddhism's huge corpus of written works, which attests to "a 
vast legacy" of "intellectual reflection."60 Finally, Jackson voices the potential 
objection that: 
... there is not and never has been any such thing as 'Buddhist tJteology' for the 
simple reason that the term is an imported one, with no precise equivalent in any 
Asian language, and that in using it, therefore, we gloss over a variety of important 
distinctions that Buddhists themselves have made in reflecting intellectually on their 
tradition.61 
Most contemporary Buddhist theologians have addressed, in some way, this 
critical point concerning the Western and Christian origins of the term ' theology' . 
Jackson refers to David Tracy, who has argued that originally theology delineated 
discourse (logia) about the divine (theo), which may have been, and may still be, 
conceived as one God, many gods, or some notion of ultimate reality. Jackson also 
appeals to the term's "broad cross-cultural applicability," suggesting that "for 
purposes of conversing with members of other traditions, it would be useful for 
Buddhists to admit that ' theology' (at least in Tracy's sense) is something that 
they do and have done.'.62 Cabezon, too, has addressed the issue, insisting that 
"Buddhist theology is not an oxymoron." Cabez6n proposes that while 'theology' 
~9 Roger R. Jackson, "Editor's Introduction," in Buddhisl Theology: Critical Reflections by 
Contempora1y Buddhist Scholars, ed. Roger R. Jackson and John Makransky (Richmond, Surrey: 
Curzon Press, 2000). 2 
60 Ibid. 
61 1bid. 3 
62 1bid. I, 3 
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understood etymologically would seem to have no bearing for an "atheological" 
tradition like Buddhism, if our understanding of the word is reconfigured, it may 
suggest meaning: 
Understood rhetorically, ... as a kind of discourse with certain tormal properties, and 
fimctionally, as having certain applications and pwposes in the context of culture, 
"theology" can be meaningfully modified by the adjective "Buddhist".6J 
And finally, Rita Gross has suggested two validating reasons why the term 
theology should be used to define this discourse. Firstly, the term is "well-known 
and at least reasonably well understood by the audiences to which we write and 
speak as professional academics who think about religion." This is important, 
Gross explains, because such audiences are not always made up of just Buddhists 
or Buddhologists. Thus, the term has practical purpose and value within the wider 
academic sphere of Religious Studies. Secondly, the term is definitive of the 
subjective location of the scholar, as it "clearly connotes that we are thinking 
within the confines of a specific tradition, not as free agents, and we place 
ourselves under the authority of that tradition. Of course," Gross continues, "this 
does not mean that we accept the received tradition lock, stock, and barrel without 
suggesting contemporary interpretations of that received tradition. That is why we 
are 'theologians,' not only historians or philologists."64 In relation to our earlier 
examination of hermeneutics and the suggestions of Gadamer concerning the 
subjective agency of the interpreter, Gross's final point is significant. Cabez6n has 
also recognised this critical point of the "subjectivity of the Buddhist theologian." 
He states: 
A Buddhist theologian is, first of all, a Buddhist. This is not a banal observation, 
given that in today's theological climate there are many theologians who would 
claim that it is possible to engage in their task without allegiance to a religious 
tradition ... Buddhist theologians are individuals who have themselves tasted the 
emancipatory power of Buddhist doctrine, and who therefore speak out of 
experience.65 
In fact, it is these very lines that Kristin Kiblinger cites, and subsequently refutes, 
in defence of her chosen methodology. In contrast, I shall take heed. Indeed, in my 
63 Cabezon, "Buddhist Theology in the Academy." 25 
64 Rita M. Gross, "Buddhist Theology'?," in Buddhist Theology: Critical Reflections by 
Contemporary Buddhist Scholars, ed. Roger R. Jackson and John Makransky (Richmond, Surrey: 
Curzon Press, 2000). 57 
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endeavour to apply the teachings of Thich Nhat Hanh towards the potential 
construction of a Buddhist position of pluralism, the kind of 'religious 
scholarship' advanced by Buddhist theology is appropriate. Such an approach will 
enable me to combine descriptive and analytic, historical and contextual, and 
constructive and prescriptive methodologies in the service of a deeper 
understanding of pluralism from the perspective of Buddhism. This is something 
that I feel strongly about, both as a scholar of religion and a practitioner of 
Buddhism. To here attest to my own subjective agency, I would like to state that I 
approach the study of Buddhism from the perspective of personal belief, a belief 
that is underscored by··a liberal Pretestant and Quaker upbringiflg, but-has been 
nurtured by the teachings and practices of Buddhism itself. At the same time, 
however, I do not make any claims to mastery, neither intellectual nor spiritual, 
and so I will agree with Cabez6n that mine "is at most a psuedo-theology, born 
perhaps from minimal competence and good intentions, but in any case not 
sufficiently immersed in the rich waters of transformative praxis. "66 
Gross's Method of Inseparability 
Among Western Buddhist scholars, Rita Gross is considered an academic pioneer 
of the theological approach to studying Buddhism. In particular, she is noted for 
engaging in a "feminist revalorization of Buddhism" and thereby establishing a 
feminist theological approach to Buddhist Studies. 67 Conscious of the fact that her 
research covers new ground and stakes claims in uncharted territory, Gross has 
devoted time to articulating and explaining her chosen methodological vision. 
Defining herself as an "engaged historian of religions," Gross summarises her 
approach as "the simultaneous or inseparable practice of theology and of the 
history of religions.'>68 As I have already stated, my methodological approach to 
studying Thich Nhat Hanh will incorporate textual, contextual, and theological 
elements. As this approach has been informed by Gross's methods, it would be 
expedient to examine some of her suggestions here. 
65 Cabezon, "Buddhist Theology in the Academy." 41 
66 1bid. 41-2 
67 See Gross, B11ddhism after Patriarchy: A Feminist History, Ana~vsis, and Reconstn1ction of 
Buddhism. 
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As Gross has observed, the contemporary study of religion is hindered by a 
"division of labour" - scholars either opt for the historic-descriptive method of 
objective research, or the constructive-normative approach of the theologian. To 
choose either approach, Gross argues, is limiting and constrictive. Rather, she 
suggests that both approaches should be engaged in the study of religion, as each 
can inform and complement the other. As we discovered in our previous chapter, 
Gross is particularly concerned to establish the de-absolutism of religions. 
According to Gross, the cross-cultural study of religions can aid this process of 
de-absolutisation, and can offer such a perspective to the theologian. This 
perspective, argues Gross, constitutes the value of objective scholarship. She 
suggests: 
{T]o regard the de-absolutisation of one's worldview as a negative discovery is a 
rather limited and spirinmlly immantre response to the contemporary siruation. Free 
of the impossible burden that they be universally relevant, as well as scientifically 
and historically true, symbols and myths can shine more preciously in their culrurally 
conditioned matrices. When we learn to hear their claims and demands as symbols 
embedded in and growing out of a specific and relative context, ... then our symbols 
and myths can again speak to us ... in a way that is impossible so long as we try to 
take them as unconditioned givens.69 
From the opposite perspective, Gross suggests that theological methods can 
contribute to the cross-cultural or historic study of religions by confronting a 
prevalent and problematic "indifference" in such approaches. Gross discerns a 
pervasive "combative tone and a gamelike quality" within this kind of research, 
which is often only concerned with "winning. "70 Theological input into such 
methods has the potential to expose the fallacy of "the quest for neutrality and 
objectivity." Like Gadamer, Gross suggests that open acknowledgement of a 
scholar's "value stance" is the only way to determine objectivity, and also where 
the study of religions should begin: 
One does not maintain neutrality and objectivity by non-allegiance to religious, 
symbolic, or value systems, because such a value-free stance is quite impossible. 
Rather, they are protected by probing exploration, self-consciousness about, and 
open declaration of one's particular evaluative stance as a scholar of religions ... 
Every methodological stance includes values. I have long urged the practice of 
68 Rita Gross, "Appendix B - Religious Experience and the study of Religion: The History of 
Religions" in Ibid. 305 
69 Ibid. 310 
70 Ibid. 
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declaring such inclinations and interests openly as the only reliable form of 
objectivity and neutrality.71 
Once our positions are openly declared, Gross suggests that scholars may move on 
to more important tasks concerning the "ethical responsibilities" of engaged 
scholars. Such responsibility she locates in the critical imperative to use 
knowledge "to promote community rather than disunity in the global vi1lage ... and 
to increase empathy and respect, both in one's self and others, in a pluralistic 
world." The only way to fulfil such responsibilities, Gross argues, is through the 
unification of descriptive and normative methodologies. According to Gross, 
creating an "artificial division betwee~ critical reflective work and. cross-cultural 
scholarship" not only promotes "intellectual and spiritual schizophrenia," but also 
constitutes "a serious abdication of responsibility. "72 
Gross specifies four main elements and values that constitute her 'methodology of 
inseparability' . The first is objectivity, which "cannot mean that the scholar has no 
interest or involvement in her subject matter, but that she declares her 
methodologies and interests clearly." Furthermore, such a scholar evidences a 
"lack of apologetic fervour." The second element is empathy, which constitutes 
"the ability to speak in many voices, or from the point of view of many different 
outlooks and symbols." Such a scholar "should also be able to speak convincingly 
from any of these positions and should be able to switch from one to another 
readily. She should also be able to translate between the voices or positions. And 
in all these vocalisations, her own voice should be quite hidden."73 As Gross 
explains, these two elements - objectivity and empathy - should be utilised as the 
foundation, not the totality, of a sound methodology. 
Upon this descriptive and extrinsic foundation, Gross establishes the more 
subjective and normative elements ofher method. Of prime significance (and also 
relevance to this thesis), Gross affirms an imperative to foster pluralism. She 
states: 
71 1bid. 311 
72 Ibid. 312 
73 Ibid. 313 
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That we live in a world of competing, C{)nflicting, multiple religious symbol-systems 
is news to no historian of religions. That the historian of religions has some 
responsibility to think constructively and ethically about that sin1ation would be 
debated by many. But what else justifies the expenditure of time, resources, and 
energy on cross-cultural studies'? Who else is in a better simation to say something 
intelligent and helpful about the problems of living with diversity and pluralism?74 
Indeed, Gross affirms her central pursuit "to define a 'genuine pluralism, ' to 
describe carefully the concomitant de-absolutising of every specific symbol-
system, and to delineate the resulting appreciation of one' s own specificity." 
Within this pursuit, she also perceives the necessity to take up a "critical stance" 
against any "dysfunctional traditional values." Such values demand criticism if 
they "undermine the dignity of some members" of a religion, or "contradict the 
vision of genuine pluralism in a global village by promoting militancy or hostility 
toward 'the others' ."75 The combination of these four elements- objectivity and 
empathy, with the promotion of pluralism and the assumption of a critical stance-
constitutes Gross's ·method of inseparability'. As she proclaims: 
TI1e engaged study of religions, with its combination of dispassionate de-absolutised 
understandings and passionate existential commitment to just and humane values, is 
the single most powerful lens through which one can view religion. 76 
Despite the fact that it was only recently that Luis Gomez discontentedly claimed, 
"Buddhist Studies continues to be a Western enterprise about a non-Western 
cultural product,"77 the development of more holistic and integrated approaches, 
such as suggested by Cabez6n and Gross, indicates that the discipline is becoming 
increasingly more methodologically self-reflective and aware. This is particularly 
evident in the discourse of Buddhist theology, which, in its attempt to shake off 
the shackles of the Enlightenment and its insistence upon neutrality and objective 
social-scientific methodologies, is boldly nailing its colours to the mast. Indeed, it 
is becoming widely acknowledged that modernity's quest for neutrality and 
objectivity is illusive. Such acknowledgement, however, does not mean that we 
have no choice but to ally ourselves to the suspicious and deracinated arguments 
of the post-modernists. On the contrary, such acknowledgement may allow us, as 
74 Ibid. 314 
75 Ibid. 315 
76 Ibid. 317 
77 Luis 0. Gomez, "Unspoken Paradigms: Meanderings through the Metaphors of a Field," Journal 
oft he lllternan·anal Association of Buddhist Sn1dies 18, no. 2 (1995). 190 
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scholars of religion, to embrace a normative approach and use it, I would suggest, 
to confront critical issues concerning interreligious relations in the late modem 
world. As Harry Oldmeadow has aptly observed, 
As currently practised by many of its exponents comparative religion is quite clearly 
normative anyway. As soon as we are prepared, for instance, to talk of 'sympathy', 
of 'mutual understanding', of ' world conummity', and so on, we have entered a 
normative realm. It is time scholars ceased to be embarrassed by this fact and 
stopped sheltering behind the tattered banner of a psuedo-scientific methodology 
which forbids any engagement with the most interesting, the most protound and the 
most urgent questions which natmally stem from any serious study ofreligion.78 
Thus, it should now be clear that in my exploration of Thich Nhat Hanh and the 
possibilities of a Buddhist position of pluralism, I will be employing a plural 
methodology. Rather than opting for one kind of approach, my methodology will 
encompass the textual , the contextual, and the theological. It should also be clear 
by now that I am approaching the study of Buddhism as an avowed pluralist, who, 
while maintaining personal commitments, wishes to affinn all integral religions as 
vehicles of the most profound and precious truths. 
78 Kenneth ("Harry") Oldmeadow, Traditionalism: Religion in the Light of the Perennial 
Philosophy (Colombo: The Sri Lankan Institute of Traditional Studies, 2000). 205 
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On Tradition: 
Continuity, Adaptation, and Actualisation 
When I was in Vietnam, so many of our villages \-\.>ere being bombed. Along with 
my monastic brothers and sisters, I had to decide what to do. Should we continue 
to practice in our monasteries, or should we leave the meditation halls in order to 
help the people who were suffering under the bombs? After careful reflection, we 
decided to do both- to go out and help the people and to do so in mindfulness. We 
call it engaged Buddhism. Mindfulness must be engaged. Once there is seeing, 
there must be acting ... We must be aware of the real problems of the world. Then, 
with mindfulness, we will know what to do and what not to do to be of help. 
Thich Nbat Hanh 
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To commence our investigation ofThich Nhat Hanh and his approach to religious 
diversity, this chapter will examine his specific approach towards the Buddhist 
tradition. A critical exploration ofNhat Hanh's attitude towards his own tradition 
is relevant and necessary for two principal reasons. Firstly, by examining Nhat 
Hanh in relation to his tradition we will be able to contextualise him - that is, we 
will be able to locate him within the cultural-historic context of twentieth-century 
Vietnam, and in relation to the religious context of Vietnamese Buddhism. 
Secondly, Nhat Hanh's particular approach to his own tradition is reflective of his 
approach ttMeligieus-trtlditions in general, and their-diversity within the modern 
world. Thus, a sound comprehension of the former will help facilitate a sound 
understanding of the latter. This chapter is intended to be foundational and 
preliminary in its introduction of the man, monk, scholar and activist, Thich Nhat 
Hanh, and the context of the Vietnam War. Upon this contextual foundation, the 
ethical theory and forms of Engaged Buddhism will be analysed as representative 
of Nhat Hanh's approach to tradition. Finally, we will elucidate the principal 
dynamics of continuity, adaptation and actualisation that characterise Nhat Hanh's 
approach to tradition, and affirm the authenticity of his articulation of Engaged 
Buddhism. To begin, however, a few words should be said on the meaning of 
tradition itself. 
Tradition 
The etymology of 'tradition' is 'that which is transmitted' , as descendent from the 
Latin troditio, meaning 'delivery, surrender, a handing down'. This etymological 
definition refers to the most common interpretation of tradition as something - be 
it a cultural custom, belief, myth, a way of thinking or acting, a method or practice 
- which is handed down, inherited, from generation to generation through 
historical process, to become established, long-standing, and continuous. This 
prevalent comprehension of tradition usually stands in opposition to modernity, or 
that which is modern, where the latter is characterised by the contemporary, the 
innovative, the progressive, the 'post' and the 'neo' _I On a secular level, tradition 
1 The concepts of modernism and modernity will be discussed in greater depth in the following 
chapter. For now, all that needs to be conveyed is that we are examining modernism in a broad 
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may refer to a cultural tradition, such as the European Tradition, or to a literary 
lineage, such as the Shakespearean Tradition, or the term may fmd usage within 
the lexicon of the law - the Legal Traditions. However, a somewhat different 
significance is freighted to the word within the realm of religion. When used to 
signify one of the great world religions, the word tradition may refer to an entire 
corpus of doctrines, practices, myths, rituals, symbols and iconographies, or any 
one of these, that give formal expression to, that uphold the spiritual legacy of, 
and that integrate, sustain, and manifest a religious system as it is transmitted 
through time. Understood in this sense, a tradition is the formal embodiment of an 
accepted truth; it also constitutes the vehicle for-the transmission and verification 
of this truth, which will encompass the dynamics of spiritual methodologies, 
salvific actualities, and the nature of transcendent or ultimate reality. 
One of the most important questions surrounding the notion of tradition and its 
transmission is the question of continuity versus adaptation. On the one hand, 
continuity is a defining aspect of tradition. As a principle of homogeneity, lineage, 
heritage, and sometimes orthodoxy, it ascertains preservation and integrity. A 
religious tradition can be understood as a complete and self-sufficient entity which 
contains all of the necessary means for the realisation of its truth - be it a 
Christian salvation, or a Buddhist enlightenment. On the other band, a religious 
tradition ought not to be understood as a hypostatised artefact, frozen in time and 
preserved in classical purity. Indeed, the integrity of a tradition is dependent not 
on blind repetition and docile obedience, nor on the stagnant transmission of an 
obsolete deposit. Rather, for a religious tradition to maintain integrity, for it to be 
efficacious, to have vitality, continual impact and sustained meaning for its 
adherents, it must be dynamic, accessible, and contextually adaptable. 
Evidently, the adaptation of a tradition ought not to imply additions or alterations 
as such, but rather an unfolding or revealing of religious principles that may have 
previously been implicit, or a renewal of spiritual perspectives or practices that 
may have lost their vitality. However, a tradition must adapt without losing its 
sense as representative of a contemporary world-view, grounded in recent European and Western 
history, rather than simply a number of twentieth-century arts movements. 
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authenticity, severing its traditional roots, or denouncing its foundational 
authority. As we have seen, Buddhism is a tradition that has been successful in 
this profound challenge. The dynamics of continuity and adaptation have 
propelled the tradition through time up to its present encounter with modernity. 
The contemporary interpretation of Buddhism presented by Thich Nhat Hanh 
follows this established pattern of cultural transmission. Indeed, as we shalt now 
see, Nhat Hanh's representation of Buddhism resolves the dynamics of continuity 
and adaptation into a cohesive manifestation of the Dharma. 
Thich Nhat-Hanh 
On October 11 , 1926, Nguyen Xuan Bao was born in a small village in central 
Vietnam. The son of a petty government official and a loving, nurturing mother, 
Nguyen enjoyed a happy childhood.2 At the early age of nine, Nguyen came upon 
a picture of the Buddha in a magazine and was deeply impressed by a sense of 
peace and serenity in the image. Two years later, when his brother expressed an 
interest in becoming a monk, Nguyen also felt the stirrings of a vocation. 
Sometime later, Nguyen's school class went on an excursion to nearby Na Son 
Mountain, where a hermit was reputed to live. Nguyen had a longing to meet the 
hermit - he had heard that a hermit was "someone dedicated to becoming peaceful 
and happy like the Buddha."3 When the hermit did not materialise, Nguyen struck 
out on his own in search of the holy man. Instead, what Nguyen found was a deep 
well in the forest. Looking into the pool, the young boy had a moment of clarity. 
Thich Nbat Hanh bas remembered this inaugural transformative spiritual 
experience as akin to 'falling in .love': 
Suddenly, I heard the sound of water dripping, and I followed that sound until I 
found a beautiful well nestled among the stones. When I looked down into it, I could 
see every pebble and every leaf at the bottom. I knelt down and drank the sparkling, 
clear water and felt completely fulfilled. It was as if I was meeting the hermit face to 
face!4 
2 See Catherine Ingram, "Thich Nhat Hanh," in In the Footsteps of Gandhi: Conversations with 
Spirih1al Social Activists, ed. Catherine Ingram (Calcutta: Rupa & Co., 1990). 76. 
3 Thich Nbat Hanh, Cultivating the Mind of Love: The Practice of Looking Deeply in the 
Mahayana Buddhist Tradition (Berkeley, CA: Parallax Press, 1996). 8. Nhat Hanh has also 
published this story as a children' s book: see Thich Nhat Hanh, The Hennit and the Well 
(Berkeley, CA: Plum Blossom Books, 2003). 
4 Nhat Hanh, Cultivating the Mind of Love: The Practice of Looking Deeply in the Mahayana 
Buddhist Tradition. 8-9. 
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Evidently, the boy Nguyen discovered something of the hermit- we may ca11 it 
Buddha-nature- within himself. 
Four years later, in 1942, at the age of sixteen, Nguyen commenced his novitiate 
at Tu Hieu Pagoda near the imperial city of Hue in central Vietnam.5 By virtue of 
its geographical positioning, both Mahayana and Theravada traditions have been 
acculturated in Vietnam; the former filtered down from the North in China, and 
the latter was imported by seafarers from India and Sri Lanka into the South. The 
development of these two traditions in Vietnam has been complex and eclectic 
and influences from Taoism, Confucianism and indigenous elements have created 
a unique representation of the Dharma. The presence of Pure Land Buddhism and 
the dh.viina (S. 'meditation'; P. jhana) school (Thien in Vietnamese, Ch 'an in 
Chinese, and Zen in Japanese) further enriches Vietnamese Buddhism. Today, 
while the laity adhere to an amalgamation of Pure Land Buddhism, Confucianism, 
and Taoism, many ordained Buddhists belong to one of the schools of Thien . The 
dh.viina school was first introduced into Vietnam in the third-century by a central 
Asian monk called Tang Hoi, who taught meditation and translated many sfitras 
before he travelled onto China in 255 CE. Later, in the sixth-century, six 
important schools of Thien were established in Vietnam. The thirteenth-century 
saw the emergence of Thien Master Que Trung (1229-1291), who inspired King 
Tran Nhan Tong to abdicate the throne and become a monk. The King became 
Master True Lam, Que Trung's Dharma heir and first ancestor of /am-Te- the 
Bamboo Forest School of Vietnamese Buddhism, which is rooted in the Zen 
tradition of /in-chi (Chinese) or rinzai (Japanese) Buddhism. 
At his root temple in Hue, the young novice Nguyen (later to become Thich Nhat 
Hanh) was instructed by the Thien Master Thich Chan That.6 Throughout his one-
5 The full name of the pagoda is Tu Hieu Temple Named by bnperial Order. Tu means 'loving 
kindness' and Hieu means 'filial piety'. Tu Hieu Pagoda is located on Duong Xuan hill in the 
Huong Thuy district of Thua Thien province. It was established by Zen Master Hai Thieu Cuong 
Ky, a disciple of the first patriarch of the Lieu Quang school, Zen Master Nhat Dinh. 
6 Thich is the shortened form of Thich-Ca, the Vietnamese for Shakya, which is the abbreviation of 
Siil.:yamrmi, the formal name of the Buddha. Every monastic member in the Vietnamese Buddhist 
tradition has a name that begins with Thich. To clarify this point, a Vietnamese Buddhist monk or 
nun will have a lineage name, a Dhanna name, and sometimes a Dharma title. Nhat Hanh's teacher 
had the lineage name Thanh Qui, the Dharma name Cuu Canh, and the Dharma title Thich Chan 
That. Chan That belonged to the fortieth generation of the Lam-Ie lineage of Thien, which is today 
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year novitiate, Nguyen was schooled in the philosophies and doctrines of both 
Mahayana and Theravada, but the emphasis was on the traditional meditative 
methods of Thien practice, in particular the use of gathiis (S. 'religious verse') and 
kung-ans (Japanese, kOans). Nhat Hanh has offered some definition: 
The practice of Thien is by no means easy. It requires a profmmd and powerful inner 
life, long and persistent training, and a strong, firm will. 
The anintde of Thien toward the search tor truth and its view of the problem of 
living in the world are extremely liberal. Thien does not recognise any dogma or 
belief that would hold back man's progress in acquiring knowledge or in his daily 
life. Thien differs from orthodox religions in that it is not conditioned by any set of 
beliefs. In other words, Thien is an attitude or a method for arriving at knowledge 
and action. For Thien the techniques of right eating and drinking, or right breathing 
and right concentration and meditation, are far more vital than mere beliets.7 
Nhat Hanh has recounted some of the elements of his training, in particular the 
required memorisation of a small book called The Lillie Manual of Practice. 
Evidently, this was a Chinese vinaya text. It was divided into three parts: J) 
Practice in Everyday Life, 2) Essential Practices for a Novice, and 3) The 
Teachings of Zen Master Kuai Chan (Quoy Son, also known as Kuei-San, the 
Chinese Ch' an Master who founded the Kuei-Yang lineage, one of the Five 
Houses of Ch 'an). At first the young novice considered the monastic method of 
giithei training "a little old-fashioned"- he "thought The Little Manual was written 
for young people and those just beginning the practice of Thien." In retrospect, 
however, Nhat Hanh has concluded that this training was "the very essence of 
Zen."8 While Nhat Hanh' s monastic training was evidently traditional, be was to 
embark upon a "nontraditional career" that would involve, as Christopher Queen 
has recognised, "travel, administrative responsibilities, contact with members of 
the largest Buddhist order in Vietnam. He also belonged to the eighth generation of the Lieu 
~~a~g School, an ind~genous branch of~am-T~ fotmd~d in the eighteenth-century. 
Thich Nhat Hanh, Vwnam: The Loh1s m the Sea ojF1re (London: SCM Press, 1967). 12-13. 
8 Thich Nhat Hanh, Zen Keys: A Guide to Zen Practice (New York: Doubleday, 1995). 23-25. See 
also Thich Nhat Hanh, My Master's Robe: Memories of a Novice Monk (Berkeley, CA: Parallax 
Press, 2002). The latter is an autobiographical collection of short anecdotes - set within the 
contemplative life of the monastery and against a background of French invasion and colonisation, 
they recount the years 1942-1947, the time of Nhat Hanh 's noviciate and the early years of his 
ordination. 
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the opposite sex, and financial affairs"9 - certainly not the domains of a traditional 
Buddhist monk. 
In 1949, at age twenty-three, Nguyen received full ordination whereupon he 
entered the Bao Quoc Buddhist Institute and took the name Nhat Hanh . This name 
bears tribute to an eleventh-century Buddhist teacher called Van Hanh, who was 
renown as a politically engaged monastic. While Van Hanh means 'ten thousand 
actions', the name Nhat Hanh means 'one action' _JO Such a title proved apt for 
Nhat Hanh who became decidedly focused on 'one thing' - the renewal of the 
religi~f-bis-ancient Buddhist tradition. At Bao Quoc the first sign of 
this driving compulsion can be witnessed: Nhat Hanh voiced a radical challenge to 
the long-established Institute, proposing that the curriculum be expanded to 
include more emphasis on Western philosophy, science, languages and 
literature. 11 When the elders rejected Nhat Hanh's suggestion, he and four other 
monks left the Institute and relocated in Saigon, where they lived in an abandoned 
temple. Nhat Hanh went to Saigon University, excelling in his studies while 
editing several publications to support himself and his small community. At a time 
when monks and nuns were prohibited from reading literature, Nhat Hanh 
published a number of short stories, novels and poetry collections, in addition to 
more academically orientated books on Buddhism. 12 Indeed, this was a 
treacherous and violent time occurring, as it did, in the midst ofF rench invasion 
and colonisation and the ensuing French-Indochina War. It is clear that this 
context had direct bearing on Nhat Hanh 's motivations. As he has recalled: 
We belonged to the first generation of monks and nuns in Vietnam who had received 
a Western education. More than anything we wanted to help the people of our 
9 Christopher S. Queen, "Introduction: The Shapes and Sources of Eng11ged Buddhism," in 
Engaged Buddhism: Buddhist Liberation Movements in Asia, ed. Christopher S. Queen and Sallie 
B. King (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1996). 7. 
10 See Sallie B King, "Thich Nhat Hanh and the Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam: Nondualism 
in Action," in Engaged Buddhism: Buddhist Liberation Movements in Asia, ed. Christopher Queen 
and Sallie B. King (New York: State University ofNew York Press, 1996). 322. 
11 See Mrujorie Hope and James YoWlg, "Chapter 6- the Third Way: Thich Nhat Hanh and Cao 
Ngoc Phuong," in The Stmggle for Humanity: Agents of Nonviolent Change in a Violent World, 
ed. Maljorie Hope and James Young (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1977). 193. See also Ingram, 
"Thich Nhat Hanh." 76. 
11 These included his tirst two books of poetry The Autum11 Flute (1949) and Buddhist Teachings 
in Folk Poetry Form (1950); The Family in the Practice (1952); How to Practice Buddhism 
(1952); and Buddhist Logic ( 1952). 
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country during the time of war. But the teachings offered by the Buddhist Institutes 
had not changed for centuries. We were motivated by the desire to bring peace, 
reconciliation, and brotherhood to our society, and we felt frustrated that our teachers 
never addressed these needs. Every tradition has to renew itself from time to time in 
order to address the pressing issues of the day and offer the kinds of practices that 
are needed for renewal. 1 ~ 
Following his graduation, Nhat Hanh was in fact invited to return to Hue where 
the orthodox elders had agreed to implement a new policy to allow monks and 
nuns to study subjects beyond the established curriculum of the Institute. Nhat 
Hanh was convinced that knowledge in the areas of Western philosophy and 
science could help "infuse life into the practice of Buddhism" in Vietnam. "You 
have to speak the language of your time," he insisted, "to express the Buddha's 
teachings in ways people can understand."14 This progress towards the realisation 
ofNhat Hanh's vision was, however, cut short, as his ideas became too radical for 
those atop the hierarchy in Hue. 
Returning to Saigon in 1950, Nhat Hanh and fellow monk Thich Tri Huu 
established Ung Quang Temple. This Temple would later become An Quang 
Institute, Southern Vietnam's most prominent centre of Buddhist Studies and a 
stronghold of the Buddhist Struggle Movement of the 1960s. From this time 
onwards, Nhat Hanh became more active in his endeavours to implement a 
humanistic, unified, and renewed grassroots Buddhism. Nhat Hanb founded the 
first Buddhist high school in Vietnam, which offered an alternative to the colonial 
education imposed by the French administration. He was also appointed Editor-in-
Chief of the monthly journal Vietnamese Buddhism (Vietnamese, Phat Giao Viet 
Nam), which was the official voice of the Buddhist General Association of 
Vietnam. Nhat Hanh 's written output of journal, newspaper and magazine articles, 
as well as published books, was constant The time following the Geneva Peace 
Accords ( 1954) was particularly prolific. While this was a time of confusion for 
Vietnam and uncertainty for the Buddhist establishment, it was a time of great 
opportunity for Nhat Hanh. A daily newspaper commissioned him to write a series 
of articles addressing the contemporary role of religion. Presenting headlines such 
13 Nbat Hanh, Cultivating the Mind of Love: The Practice of Looking Deep~v in the Mahayana 
Buddhist Tradition. 31. 
14 Ibid. 32. 
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as Buddhism and the Question of God and Buddhism and the Problems of 
Democracy, the articles were well-received as they "presented Buddhism as 
something very refreshing and relevant."15 Moreover, Nhat Hanh took the lead in 
organising a new educational program for An Quang Buddhist Institute. At long 
last, Nhat Hanh was able to initiate the curriculum he had envisaged in his youth. 
He established a new periodical called The First Lotus Flowers of the Season to 
give expression to this new vision of an ancient tradition, the name referring to 
"the young monks and nuns who were the new lotuses for our time."16 
Armed with his immense intellectual and creative abilities, Nhat Hanh began to 
articulate his vision of an 'engaged' Buddhism. Nhat Hanh has been credited with 
coining the term 'engaged Buddhism,' 17 however the concept, known in 
Vietnamese as nhan gian Phat Giao, was in fact first used by a Buddhist revival 
movement in the 1930s. From the 1930s onwards, the historical involvement of 
the Sangha in political activism against colonialism spawned the perception of 
Buddhism as "the true national religion" of Vietnam.18 According to Nhat Hanh, 
the reform movement of the 1930s, 
. .. contributed importantly to the renovation of the native culture, the reformation of 
Buddhism, the abolition of superstitions, and gradually gave Buddhism intellectual 
prestige ... The Buddha's teachings were presented in a new light by a young 
generation of Western-educated intellecnmls and this helped enormously the task of 
bringing Buddhism to the young."19 
Within the above description, the typical Engaged Buddhist endeavour to 
reconstruct Buddhism as a politico-social force in the face of colonialism and 
modernity is implied. So too is a further distinguishing feature - what Gananath 
I ~ Jbid. 57. 
16 Ibid. 58. 
17 According to Kenneth Kraft, Nhat Hanh published a book called Engaged Buddhism in 1963. 
[See Kenneth Kraft, "Prospects of a Socially Engaged Buddhism" in Kenneth Kraft, ed., inner 
Peace, World Peace: Essays on Buddhism and Nonviolence (Albany, New York: State University 
of New York Press, 1992). 18. Writing in 1996, Christopher Queen noted that he could find no 
other reference to this work. [See Queen, "Introduction: The Shapes and Sources of Engaged 
Buddhism." 34, fn. 6.] Until recently, I was in agreement with Queen. However, Nhat Hanh 
himself refers to this work as having been published in 1964, and to another later work titled 
Actualised Buddhism, in his recent publication - Thich Nhat Hanh, Creating Tme Peace: Ending 
Conflict in Yourself Your Fami~v. Your Community and the World (London: Rider Books, 2003). 
See page 94. 
18 Stephen Batchelor, The Awakening of the West: The Encounter of Buddhism and Western 
Culhwe (Berkeley: Parallax Press, 1994). 355. 
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Obeyesekere has called the "rationalisation of the religious life". In addition to the 
emergence of a new kind of leader who symbolises a new order, and a shift 
towards this·worldly asceticism directed at political and social goals, Obeyesekere 
has noted this feature of rationalisation as defining of a new Buddhism at work in 
secular realms. According to Obeyesekere, this rationalisation involves "the 
discrediting of folk religious elements (such as theistic devotionalism or ritualism) 
and an emphasis on mental and moral development through education and 
virtuous living."20 These elements became characteristic features within Nhat 
Hanh' s representation of Engaged Buddhism. 
Despite the established history of reformist movements and the evident infusion of 
the idea of engagement within the monastic consciousness, Nhat Hanh continued 
to struggle against disapproval and censure from the Buddhist establishment. In 
1956, the publication of the journal Vietnamese Buddhism, which Nhat Hanh 
edited and frequently contributed to, was suspended. Time and again, Nhat Hanh's 
efforts to raise awareness, renew Buddhism and create social change in Vietnam 
were rebuffed by the "pillars of conservatism."21 Consumed by a sense of defeat, 
and suffering from ill health, Nhat Hanh eventually saw a need to retreat. He and 
his small Sangha chose the remote wilderness ofDai Lao Forest in which to build 
a hermitage. Deep in the highlands north of Saigon, the group of monks and nuns 
built Phuong Boi - an experimental community geared towards cultivating 
spiritual transformation. It was a place where they could continue their traditional 
practice of Buddhism, while cultivating new ways to socially actualise their 
beliefs. 
Nhat Hanh maintained contact with the world beyond Phuong Boi through not 
infrequent trips to various temples and pagodas in and around Saigon, where he 
19 Nhat Hanh, Vietnam: The Latus in the Sea of Fire. 52. 
20 Gananath Obeyesekere, "Religious Symbolism and Political Change in Ceylon," in The Two 
Wheels of Dhamma: Essays on the l7teravada Tradition in India and Ceylon, ed. Bardwell L. 
Smith, American Academy of Religion Studies in Religion (Chambersberg, PA: American 
Academy of Religion, 1972). 63-65. 
21 See Chan Khong (Cao Ngoc Phuong), Learning True Love: How I Learned and Practised Social 
Change in Vietnam (Berkeley: Parallax Press, 1993). 48. As Chan Khong recognised, "All the 
young monks were fond of him and wholeheartedly supported his efforts to renew the teachings 
and practice, but the more conservative elders were not supportive of his innovations . .. " 29. 
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offered teaching courses on aspects of Buddhist philosophy and practice. A core 
group of young university students and social activists gathered around Nhat 
Hanh, devout followers who were to become the foundational "thirteen cedars" of 
Nhat Hanh's engaged movement and monastic order. Among these thirteen was 
Cao Ngoc Phuong, a young woman who would later become Sister Chan Khong, 
Nhat Hanh's lifetime colleague and companion. Nhat Hanh trained these young 
activists to become "like strong cedars to help support the Buddha's teachings" to 
be implemented in the world.22 Inevitably, however, Nhat Hanh faced continual 
admonition and criticism for his activities. Moreover, around this time his name 
was removed-fr-om the membership reeoros-of the · livre de famille of the An 
Quang Pagoda, the temple he had helped to establish. This was a move akin to 
expulsion and is indicative of the growing resistance to his reforms from within 
the Buddhist ranks, as well as the government. Thus, in 1961, when he was 
offered a fellowship to study Comparative Religion at Princeton University in the 
United States (and a subsequent teaching position at Columbia), Nhat Hanh 
accepted and withdrew into the ivory tower for a period of intensive study, 
cultural experience, and personal reflection. 
The Buddhist Struggle Movement 
Due to the plethora of studies of the Vietnam War, and the extant number of 
exceptional analyses of the Buddhist Sbuggle Movement, a detailed examination 
of these will not be presented here. 23 Suffice to say, the escalation of the Vietnam 
22 See Ibid. 30, footnote. 
23 The Vietnam War is the subject of countless excellent political, social, military, and historical 
studies. A few worth mentioning, coming from both American and Vietnamese perspectives ar~: : 
NeilL. Jamieson, Understanding Vietnam (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993). Henry 
Karnm, Dragon Ascending: Vietnam and the Vietnamese (New York: Arcade Publishing, 1997). 
John Prados, The Hidden History of the Vietnam War (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, Publisher, 1998), 
Iran Van-Don, Our Endless War: Inside Vietnam (New York: Presidio Press, 1978), Alexander 
Woodside, Comm1mity and Revolution in Modern Vietnam (Boston: Houghton Miftlin, 1976). 
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(Westminster, California: Van Nghe Publishers. 2002), Robert Topmiller, The Lot11S Unleashed: 
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War brought intense suffering and mass destruction to Nhat Hanh's homeland. A 
protest collective led by the United Buddhist Congregation of Vietnam (UBCV) 
attempted to traverse the vast distance between Washington, the bastion of anti· 
Communism, and the rice fields of rural Vietnam, where ideologies were 
meaningless in the context of such extreme and horrific destruction. Based upon 
an ethical foundation of nonviolence and non-partisanism, the Buddhist Struggle 
Movement sided with neither the Communist North nor the American·allied 
South; they sought not victory for one side but an end to the warfare and suffering. 
As such, the Movement forged a 'middle path' and symbolised an alternative 
'third way' between-the competing ideologies-,·-In·-a··ceuntry that was eighty 
percent Buddhist, the Struggle Movement was a 'rice-roots' movement of the 
people that managed to bring down the iniquitous Diem government in 1963. By 
1966, Buddhism had become a powerful vehicle for nationalist sentiment and the 
Movement a nationalist struggle for peace that would ultimately confront the 
monstrous military might of the United States. 
Despite the successful employment of pacifist strategies in the coup d'etat, 
intensified violence and chaos followed the fall of Diem. At the urgent appeal for 
help from a faction of the Buddhist leadership, Nhat Hanh left the United States. 
Back in Vietnam, Nhat Hanh perceived an opportune situation in which to initiate 
his plans for the renewal and reform of Buddhism. Indeed, the following two 
years were a time of fierce activism, unwavering dedication, and prolific 
theorisation as Nhat Hanh began to establish the real meaning and practice of 
Engaged Buddhism. Whilst still lacking the approval of the Buddhist hierarchy, 
Nhat Hanh and his collective of young monks and nuns, university students, social 
workers, and activists began to move Buddhism beyond monastic walls and off 
the meditation cushion. In February 1964, Nhat Hanh founded Van Hanh 
University in Saigon, the name of the institution bearing tribute to his religious 
forebear and namesake. At Van Hanh, Nhat Hanh was able to fulfil his concept of 
Buddhist higher education, incorporating traditional Buddhist Studies within a 
broader secular Western curriculum. At this time Nhat Hanh also initiated another 
The Buddhist Peace Movement in South Vietnam, 1964-1966 (Lexington, KY: The University 
Pressof Kentucky, 2002). 
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new project centred on the creation of pioneer experimental villages. Using the 
university as a base, Nhat Hanh began galvanising and training young volunteers 
to go out into the surrounding countryside and establish schools and medical 
centres, teach villagers skills such as modern farming methods, and improve their 
public sanitation. As such the villages served as "models for social change."24 In 
1965, Nhat Hanh formally established the School of Youth for Social Services 
(SYSS) and it became the principal apparatus of his Engaged Buddhism. One 
commentator, Robert King, has acclaimed the SYSS as "undoubtedly, Nhat 
Hanh 's greatest contribution during this period." 25 Indeed, the American Press 
compared its programs and success to the Peaee· Coips. 26 Not unexpectedly, being 
unable to support what was seen as a radical departure from tradition, the 
Buddhist hierarchy withdrew the schools official status and affiliation with Van 
Hanh University in 1966. However, by this time the SYSS was sufficiently 
supported by agencies beyond the hierarchical realm. The SYSS helped to relieve 
suffering of all kinds, and provided aid to all people, regardless of political 
affiliation. Nhat Hanh instructed his students to "prepare to die without hatred": 
Our enemy is anger, hatred, greed, fanaticism, and discrimination against people. If 
you die because of violence, you must meditate on compassion in order to forgive 
those who kill you. When you die realising this state of compassion, you are truly a 
child of the Awakened One. Even if you are dying in oppression, shame, and 
vio lence, if you can smile with forgiveness, you have great power.27 
Among the more confrontational faction of the Buddhist Struggle Movement, both 
clergy and laity were involved in challenging the superpowers and their policies of 
destruction.28 Direct protest took many forms. Nbat Hanh has described some of 
these forms as manifestations of"love in action": 
24 KhOng (Cao Ngoc Phuong), Leaming Tnte Love: How 1 Learned and Practised Social Change 
in Vietnam. 60. 
2~ Robert H. King, Thomas Merton and Thich Nhat Hanh: Engaged Spirituality in an Age of 
G/obalisation (New York: Continumn, 2003). 82. 
26 Leo D. Lefebure, The Buddha and the Christ: Explorations in Buddhist Christian Dialogue 
(Maryknoll, New Yotic: Orbis Books, 1993). 146. 
27 Thich Nhat Hanh, Call Me by My Tme Names: The Collected Poems of Thich Nhat Hanh 
(Berkeley, CA: Parallax Press, 1993). 19. 
28 Sallie King has recognised three factions that made up the Buddhist Struggle Movement: Thich 
Nhat Hanh and the SYSS fonned one faction, in addition to a pro-NLF camp, and the most visible 
and politically active group led by the An Quang Pagoda monks. The most prominent leaders of 
the latter group were Thich Tri Quang, Thich Tam Chau, and Thich Thien Minh. See King, "TI1ich 
Nhat Hanh and the Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam: Nondualism in Action." 326. 
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During our struggle, many scenes of love arose spontaneously - a monk sitting 
calmly before an advancing tank; woman and children raising their bare hands 
against barbed wire; students confronting military police who looked like monsters 
wearing huge masks and holding bayonets; young women running through clouds of 
tear gas with babies in their arms; hunger strikes held silently and patiently; monks 
and nuns buming themselves to death to try to be heard above the raging noise of the 
war. And all of these efforts bore some fruit.29 
Nhat Hanh has also recalled members of the laity shaving their heads in evocation 
of Buddhist values and presence and family altars being placed in the streets in the 
paths of approaching tanks. In such instances, in Nhat Hanh' s words, the people 
were "relying on their culture and tradition to oppose the forces of 
destruction ... using their most potent spiritual force to directly confront the 
violence. "30 Other types of protest included fasting, the mobilisation of boycotts 
and strikes in non-cooperation with the government, nonviolent civil 
disobedience, and the formation of an underground network to shelter deserters 
and aid draft resisters. Some forms of protest were extreme, in particular the 
several self-immolations. Indeed, the image of an elderly Buddhist monk sitting in 
meditation engulfed in flames on a Saigon street has become a paradigmatic icon 
of the Buddhist Struggle Movement. 
Nhat Hanh documented the atrocities of war within his poetry and plays, which 
also served as pedagogical tools.31 One of his most powerful poems from this 
period, Condemnation, denounces the fratricidal war, and also relays his central 
axiom of recognising the 'true enemy'. An excerpt reads: 
29 Thich Nhat Hanh, Love in Action: Writings on Nonviolent Social Change (Berkeley, CA: 
Parallax Press, 1993). 40. 
JD Jbid. 40-41. 
31 The collection ofNhat Hanh's poetry published, and banned, during the war was called Prayers 
of the White Dove of Peace to Appear. Today, his poetry is most readily available in the collection 
Nhat Hanh, Call Me by My T1-ue Names: TI1e Collected Poems ofThich Nhat Hanh. See also the 
publication Thich Nhat Hanh, The Cry of Vietnam: Poetry, trans. Helen Coutant (Drawings by Vo-
Dinh) (Santa Barbara, CA: Unicorn Press, 1968). Nhat Hanh's sole dramatic work- "The Path of 
Return Continues the Jowney" - is published in Nhat Hanh, Love in Action: Writings on 
Nonviolent Social Change. 9-36. 
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"Beware! Tum around to tace your real enemies-
Ambition, violence, hatred, and greed." 
Humans are not our enemies- even those called "Vietcong," 
If we kill our brothers and sisters, what will we have left? 
With whom then shall we live?32 
]65 
Written in 1964, this antiwar poem was first published in the Buddhist weekly 
issue The Sound of the Rising Tide (Hai Trieu Am), which at the time had a 
circulation of fifty thousand. The poem was later turned into a peace song called 
"Do Not Shoot Your Brother" song by the popular musician Pham Duy: 
Our enemy has the name of hatred 
Our enemy has the name of inhumanity 
Our enemy has the name of anger 
Our enemy has the name of ideology 
Our enemy wears the mask of freedom 
Our enemy is dressed in lies 
Our enemy bears empty words 
Our enemy is the etTort to divide us 
Our enemy is not man. 
If we kill man, with whom shall we live?33 
The popularity of Nhat Hanh's poetry soon raised suspicions and once again he 
found himself at the end of many accusatory fmgers. Earning the title 'anti-war 
poet', Nhat Hanh was himself condemned by Hanoi and Saigon, both 
governments of which considered him a threat to their political agendas. While 
Saigon accused him of being a Communist, Hanoi declared: "His soul and body 
have obviously been bought by the Pentagon and the White House. "34 The 
controversy incited by his artistic works eventually resulted in their denouncement 
as contraband, and their distribution, which became necessarily subversive, 
contributed to Nhat Hanh's ultimate exile from Vietnam. 
Nhat Hanh emerged as arguably the chief theorist and leading spokesman within 
the Movement and was ceaseless in his call for peace and reconciliation. His 
important 1967 publication Vietnam: The Lotus in the Sea of Fire reveals an 
32 
"Condemnation" in Nhat Hanh, Call Me by My True Names: The Collected Poems ofThich Nhat 
Hanh. 39. 
33 See Ibid. and King, "Thich Nhat Hanh and the Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam: 
Nondualism in Action." 335. 
Chaf!_ter 4 166 
image of its author as a young activist-monk of incisive vision and resolute 
purpose, unambiguous motivation and clear conviction. The book presented a 
unique, penetrating, and assiduous analysis of the real causes of the Vietnam War, 
based upon a recognition of the fundamental incompatibility of American and 
popular Vietnamese sentiment. According to Nbat Hanh, an American military 
victory in Vietnam was never a possibility: 
The more American troops are sent to Vietnam the more the anti-American 
campaign led by the NFL becomes successful. Anger and hatred rise in the hearts of 
the peasants as they see their villages burned, their compatriots killed, their houses 
destroyed ... The coWttry is full of American soldiers. And these military men do not 
have any background. in the culture, folklore, and the way of living of the 
Vietnamese people ... The majority of the peasants take little or no interest in the 
problems of Communism or anti-Communism. They are direct victims of the war, 
and consequently they welcome every effort in the direction of ending the war . . . The 
more the war is escalated, the more they are its victims, since both sides threaten 
their lives and property ... The spirit of patriotism among the peasants is very high. 
They are not informed abo\lt the history of the war, or ideological struggles; what 
they see is a large force of white Westerners doing their best to kill their fellow-
countrymen, many of whom previously fought against the French. The peasants do 
not see the victims of the American military eftort as dead Communists, but as dead 
patriots ... I know it is a hard fact for Americans to face, but it is a fact that the more 
Vietnamese their troops succeed in killing, and the larger the torce they introduce 
into Vietnam, the more surely they build the very thing they are trying to destroy .35 
Such an analysis did not wash well with the United States military. They saw the 
Buddhists as nationalist fanatics , driven by political ambitions and capable of 
alliance with the Communists. As the Catholic peace activist Fr. Daniel Berrigan 
bas observed, the Buddhist Struggle Movement, with its emphasis on nonviolence 
and Vietnamese self-determination, "became a mortal threat to some of those for 
whom weapons were the indispensable means of survival or liberation."36 
Countless monks, nuns, and student volunteers were arrested and imprisoned or 
assassinated. One such attempt was made on the life ofNhat Hanh, who narrowly 
escaped. Fortuitously, a Christian-based organisation called the Fellowship of 
Reconciliation arranged for Nbat Hanh to travel to the United States to raise 
awareness and call an end to the war. Nhat Hanh realised that in order to continue 
34 Nhat Hanh, Vietnam: The Lctus in the Sea of Fire. 89. 
35 Ibid. 74-79. 
36 D. Berrigan, "Their Speech is All of Forgiveness," the Foreword to Nhat Hanh, Love in Action: 
W1itings em Nonviolent Social Change. 5. 
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his anti-war activism he would indeed have to leave Vietnam. It would take 
almost forty years for Nhat Hanh's 'path of return' to come full-circle. 
Christopher Queen has recognised two common defining features of Engaged 
Buddhist Movements and organisations: their colleclivism - "They presume that 
suffering and its relief have a social dimension that cannot be addressed by private 
spirituality and morality alone"; and their globalisation - "They have established 
themselves as global agencies, inviting participation, membership, and material 
support from sympathisers throughout the world, by the high visibility, mobility, 
and collaberation of tfteir-leaders."37 Nhat Hanh's international tour firmly 
established the Buddhist Struggle Movement as a 'global agency' . In the United 
States, Nhat Hanh spoke to public audiences, local and national media, and U.S. 
government officials, including the Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara and a 
large gathering of Congressmen. He also met with the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther 
King, Jr., the Catholic priest/activist Father Daniel Berrigan, and the Trappist 
monk/activist Father Thomas Merton. The three-week tour was soon extended to 
three months, with an included trip to Europe and a meeting with the Roman 
Pontiff Pope Paul VI. Despite Nhat Hanh's practical proposal for peace, his 
uniquely non-partisan and humane analysis of the war, and his world-wide clarion 
call for peace, his efforts to instigate reconciliation were ultimately ineffectual. 
Nevertheless, Nhat Hanh had entered the world stage and his impact was profound 
and far-reaching. Two encounters stand out in significance: Nhat Hahn's meetings 
with the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and Father Thomas Merton. Both 
deserve mention as they represent the beginnings of Nhat Hanh 's career as an 
interreligious dialogist, an exponent and exemplar of an engaged spirituality, and 
an apostle of world peace. 
Nhat Hanh and Martin Luther King met for the first time in Chicago in 1966 
where they held a joint press conference during which King announced his 
opposition to the Vietnam War. Evidently, Nhat Hanh's letter to King the previous 
" Christopher Queen, "Engaged Buddhism: Agnosticism, Interdependence, Globalization," in 
Westward Dharma: Buddhism Beyond Asia, ed. Charles S. Prebish and Martin Baumann 
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2002). 326. 
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year had a decisive influence on King's position regarding the war. Indeed, King 
saw affinities between the Buddhist Struggle Movement and the American Civil 
Rights Movement.38 A strong bond developed between the two spiritual activists; 
they were united by their shared beliefs in nonviolence, equality, justice, peace 
and love, beliefs that transcended their cultural and religious differences. At the 
same time, their relationship helped to transform Nbat Hanh 's view of 
Christianity. This had been tainted by his experiences of a Catholicism corrupted 
by the missionising dogmatism of colonialism, as in the case of the French 
occupation in Vietnam, and the power and wealth mongering manoeuvres of 
dictatorship and American alliance, as-in the-case ofthe-Gathelic leaders of South 
Vietnam. At the time of their last meeting in Geneva, only three months before 
King's assassination, Nhat Hanh recalls assuring King: "You know, Martin, in 
Vietnam they consider you a bodhisattva."39 Nhat Hanh perceived in King the 
spirit of truth and compassion, and the profound wisdom that belongs to the truly 
holy and surpasses religious boundaries. Nhat Hanh had a similar impression upon 
King, who nominated Nbat Hanh for the Nobel Peace Prize in 1967.40 In his letter 
to the Nobel Institute, King stated: 
I do not know of anyone more worthy of the Nobel Peace Prize than this gentle 
Buddhist monk from Vietnam ___ conferring the Prize on Nhat Hanh would itselfbe a 
most generous act of peace. It would remind all nations that men of good will stand 
ready to lead warring elements out of an abyss of hatred and destmction. It would 
reawaken men to the teaching of beauty and love found in peace. It would help to 
revive hopes for a new order of justice and harmony. 
I know Thich Nhat Hanh, and ant privileged to call him my friend ... He is a 
holy man, for he is humble and devout. He is a scholar of immense intellecmal 
capacity . .. he is also a poet of superb clarity and human compassion ... His ideas for 
peace, if agplied, would build a monument to ecumenism, to world brotherhood, to 
huntanity. 
38 See King, Thomas Merton and Thich Nhat Hanh: Engaged Spirituality in an Age of 
Globa/isalion. 161. 
39 See Ingram, "Thich Nhat Hanh." 87. 
40 Harry Oldmeadow has astutely observed that "Thich Nhat Hanh . . . would have been one of the 
most worthy recipients had those awarding the prize had more prescience. (It might be remarked in 
passing that the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to the Dalai Lama restored some of the luster 
which had been tarnished by some peculiar choices in earlier years ~ none more so than Richard 
Nixon and Henry Kissinger, both embroiled in the ruthless and unprincipled war against Thich 
Nhat Hanh's country.)" See Harry Oldmeadow, Journeys East: 20th Cenwry Western Encounters 
with Eastern Religious Traditions (Indiana: World Wisdom, 2004). 379. 
41 Martin Luther King Jr., "Letter to the Nobel Institute," (Oslo, NOJWay: 
www .mindfulness.orglletter.htm, 1967). 
ClwE_Ier 4 169 
A simiJar bond was fanned between Nhat Hanh and fellow-monk, war critic and 
mentor of peace activists, Father Thomas Merton. 42 The two monks met onJy 
once, in May 1966 at the Abbey of Our Lady of Gethsemani, a remote monastic 
community in Kentucky and home to Merton. As with his meeting with King, a 
kind of resonance characterised Nhat Hanh' s encounter with Merton. Nhat Hanh 
later recalled the ease with which they conversed and the unexpected depth of 
Merton's knowledge of Buddhism, and indeed, his spirituality. Nhat Hanh has 
recalled, "When we talked, I told him a few things, and he understood the things I 
didn't tell him." Indeed, Nhat Hahn was deeply impressed with Merton's 
intellectual-and-spiritual comprehension of nonduality, "one of the most difficult 
things concerning the understanding between East and West," as well as his 
tremendous "capacity for dialogue".43 A representative of the Fellowship of 
Reconciliation, John Heidbrink, who accompanied Nhat Hanh on his U.S. Tour, 
has recalled a "charismatic moment" of shared practice in the encounter of the two 
monks. Because they were interested in each other's religious practice, Merton 
recited one of the daily offices used by the monks at Gethsemani, and Nhat Hanh 
responded with a Buddhist chant in Vietnamese. Apparently, Merton was so 
moved that he began spontaneously to sing along - a moment of authentic 'post-
verbal' dialogue.44 Indeed, Nhat Hanh had a powerful effect on Merton, who 
described him as "first of all, a true monk; very quiet, gentle, modest, humble, and 
you can see his Zen has worked".45 Merton later wrote a public appeal on Nhat 
Hanh's behalf, titled "Tbich Nhat Hanh is my Brother". An excerpt reads : 
Thich Nhat Hanh is my brother. He is more my brother than many who are nearer to 
me by race and nationality, because he and I see things exactly the same way. He and 
I deplore the war that is ravaging his country. We deplore it for exactly the same 
reasons: human reasons, reasons of sanity, justice and love ... Nhat Hanh is a free 
man who has acted as a free man in favour of his brothers and moved by the spiritual 
dynamic of a tradition of religious compassion. He has come among us as many 
others have, from time to time, bearing witness to the spirit of Zen. More than any 
42 For a comprehensive study of the relationship between Nhat Hanh and Thomas Merton in the 
context of global spirituality and activism, see King, Thomas Merton and Thich Nhat Hanh : 
Engaged Spirituality in an Age ofG/oba/isation. 
43 This section of quotes comes from Pau1 Wilkes, ed., Merton by Those Who Knew Him Best (San 
Fransisco: Harper & Row, 1984). 151-2. 
44 See King, Thomas Merton and Thich Nhat Hanh: Engaged Spirituality in an Age of 
Globa/isation. 10. 
45 See Thomas Merton and Christine M. Bochen, Learning to Love : £wloring Solitude and 
Freedom, 1st ed. (San Francisco, CA: HarperSanFrancisco, 1997). 76. 
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other he has shown us that Zen is not an esoteric and world denying cult of iMer 
illumination, but that it bas its rare and unique sense of responsibility in the modern 
world.46 
These initial encounters with Christianity, and the seeds of open interreligious 
dialogue and understanding that they planted, were to bear beautiful fruits later in 
Nhat Hanh's career. For now, however, we must take note of Merton's reference 
to Nhat Hanh's motivations and his approach to the Buddhist tradition. According 
to Merton, Nhat Hanh's compulsion towards social and political engagement was 
directly informed by an experiential and spiritual comprehension of the inner 
meaning of compassion within Buddhism, and the imperative for that compassion 
to have real meaning in a suffering world. In other words, Merton is claiming the 
traditional authenticity of Nhat Hanh's actions . We will now leave behind the 
narrative of Nhat Hanh's activism during the Vietnam War and tum to an 
examination of Engaged Buddhism in general, and Nhat Hanh's renewal of 
traditional Buddhist philosophy and forms specifically. 
Engaged Buddhism 
Buddhism has conventionally been perceived as a world-denying, introspective, 
socially inept religion of monastic withdrawal. The image of a meditating Buddha 
is customarily recognised as representative of the renouncing ascetic, bent on 
personal inner enlightenment, an embodiment of passive peace and transcendent 
mysticism. This perception has been reflected within the discourses of Buddhist 
Studies, in which an idee refU41 depicts Buddhism as an otherworldly religion, 
indifferent to social ethics and neglectful of programs of socio-political-moral 
transformation. Max Weber popularised the image of the socially withdrawn and 
inept Buddhist in his theory of the "ideal types" which manifest in the history of 
religions. Weber contrasted the "other-worldly asceticism" of Buddhist monks 
with the "inner-worldly asceticism" of Protestant clergy. He claimed Buddhism to 
46 Thomas Merton, "Thich Nhat Hanh is my Brother", published in King, Thomas Merton and 
Thich Nhal Hanh: Engaged Spirihtality in an Age o.fG/obalisation. 104. 
47 D. S. Lopez notes a number of idee rept, or 'endw1ng ideas', which have shaped Buddhist 
Studies in the West and which are now being questioned: " ... that Zen Buddhism is, above all, an 
experience; that Tibetan Buddhism is polluted, or that it is pristine; that the Buddha image is of 
Greek or Roman origin; that the Asian is an introvert; that the classical source supersedes the 
vernacular; that the manu~cript supersedes the infonnant." D. S. Lopez, Jr., "Introduction" in 
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be "a specifically unpolitical and anti-political status religion", a "soteriology of 
intellectuals'' that had "established no 'socio-political goal'". Of Buddhist practice 
Weber declared "an insolvable gap yawns between the ethics of action and the 
technical rules of contemplation and only the latter yields salvation." Ultimately 
Weber considered the quest for enlightenment to be an egotistical endeavour, a 
perception that had far-reaching and lasting influence in the popular and academic 
understandings of Buddhism. 48 
As we have seen, however, Buddhism today is just as likely to be represented by 
relatively radical- images of Buddhists engaged in···various k:iftds--of nonviolent 
activism, peaceful protest, or dedicated social service. The Buddhist Struggle 
Movement of the Vietnam War was just one of the many contemporary 
manifestations of Engaged Buddhism. Beginning at the turn of the last century, 
the initial 'liberation movements' emerged throughout South, Southeast, and East 
Asia in response to the encroaching and often disastrous force of modernity. As 
modem movements of reform, they have been influenced by modernity, yet at the 
same time have presented challenges to the culturally and politically dominating 
modernist powers of colonialism, invasion, Westernisation and globalised 
capitalism.49 Christopher Queen and Sallie King have defined: 
They are concemed to mobilise the Buddhist laity to address their own economic, 
social and political, and spiritual needs; to contribute to the amelioration of 
conditions that produce suflering for all living be ings; and, finally, to reform, in light 
of the demands of modemity, Buddhist doctrines and institutions. It is, t1nally, their 
focus upon the relief of concrete economic, social, political, and environmental ills 
Donald S. Lopez, ed., Curators of the Buddha: The Study of Buddhism under Colonialism 
(Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1995). 1. 
48 See Max Weber, The Religion of India: The Sociology of Hinduism and Buddhism (Glencoe, Ill.: 
Free Press, 1958). 206-226. 
49 Among the most renowned is the Sarvodaya Shramadana Movement; Dr. B. R. Ambedkar's 
Buddhist mass-conversion movement of 'Untouchables' : the Venerable Sanghantkshita's TBMSG 
- TrailoJ.:va Bauddha Mahasangha Sahayaka Gana ("The Association of Friends of the Buddhist 
Order of the Tiuee Realms"); Thailand's 'Development Monks' and 'Forest Monks'; Chatsumam 
Kabilsingh and the Sakyadhita International Organisation of Buddhist Women, and other such 
eminent figures as Sulak Sivaraksa, Acham Buddhadasa Bhikkhu, Maha Ghosananda, Aung San 
Suu Kyi, and the Dalai Lama. For a comprehensive collection see Christopher S. Queen and Sallie 
B. King, eds., Engaged Buddhism: Buddhist Liberation Movements in Asia (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1996). See also Charles S. Prebish, Christopher S. Queen, and 
Damien V. Keown, Action Dhanna: New Sh1dies in Engaged Buddhism, Routledgecurzon Critical 
Sh1dies in Buddhism. (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003). And 
Karma Lekshe Tsomo, ed., Buddhist Women and Social Justice: Ideals, Challenges and 
Achievements (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2004). 
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that qualifies these movements as "liberation movements," and it is their 
commitment to pursue this end on the basis of Buddhist spirituality and heritage that 
makes them 'Buddhist liberation movements. '50 
Engaged Buddhism thereby presents an important challenge to one-dimensional 
assumptions and mystical imaginings about Buddhism and its soteriology. It also 
confronts the objectified view of Buddhism as a historically static artefact, and 
encourages a recognition of the many Buddhisms of the world. 
Sallie King has noted the prevalence of "certain key ideas and practices drawn 
from tradition" that define the core of Engaged Buddhist theory. According to 
King, these ideas and practices legitimise Engaged Buddhism "by placing it 
within the continuum of orthodoxy and tradition," while establishing "the 
foundational concepts and approaches upon which Engaged Buddhists build." She 
continues to note, ''The fact that these ideas and practices turn up again and again 
throughout the distinct Engaged Buddhist movements also has the consequence of 
establishing a degree of unity in both discourse and practice among Engaged 
Buddhists."51 Thich Nhat Hanh's engaged ethics, teachings, and practices can be 
understood as representative of these ' key ideas and practices', a number of which 
have already been mentioned. We will now take a closer look. Firstly, we will 
look at the central aspects of the Engaged Buddhist re-articulation of traditional 
Buddhist teachings and philosophies as represented by Nbat Hanh' s discourse. 
Secondly, we will examine the principal manifestations ofNhat Hanh's renewal of 
traditional forms - as represented by the Order of Interbeing - and of traditional 
practice- as represented by the Fourteen Mindfulness Trainings. 
Engaged Buddhist Ethical Theory 
Among the many contemporary voices contributing to discourses of political 
theory, global ethics, human rights, nonviolence, and social justice, Engaged 
Buddhism speaks clearly in articulating its irenic vision of global community. 
Certain key aspects of Engaged Buddhist ethical theory stand out in significance. 
We will here examine causality, interdependence and emptiness, the imperative to 
so Queen and King, eds., Engaged Buddhism: Buddhist Liberation Movements in Asia. x-xi. 
~1 Sallie B. l(jng, Being Benevolence: The Social Ethics of Engaged Buddhism (Honolulu: 
University of Hawai'i Press, 2005). 12. 
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act, the soteriological shift, nonviolence and being peace, and non-partisanism and 
the true enemy. 
Causality, Interdependence, Emptiness 
According to tradition, the Buddha's enlightenment constituted a direct experience 
of the web of causality in which all life subsists. This insight into the true nature 
of reality revealed the radical temporal and ontological interdependence and 
impermanence of all phenomena. Penetrating the veils of ignorance, the Buddha 
perceived the truths of selflessness (P. anottii, S. oniitman) and impermanence (P. 
anicco; S. onityo), and the consequeM-interconnecte6ness of reality and 
interpenetration of all things. This was the experiential foundation for the doctrine 
of co-dependent origination (P. pa!iccasamuppiidtl; S. prolityasomutpiido) which 
teaches that all phenomena are conditioned (P. swikhllta, S. SW!ISk!tc.J), lack 
intrinsic being, and arise and cease in a determinate series . The early formula is 
representative: "This being, that becomes; from the arising of this, that arises; this 
not being, that becomes not; from the ceasing of this, that ceases. "52 As we have 
already discussed, the siitras of the Prajiiiipcircmzitcl literature, such as the Heart 
Siitra and the Diamond Siitro53, and then the elaborations of the great Mahayana 
theorists, such as Niigarjuna, developed the later doctrine of emptiness (P. 
swiiiatii; S. siinyatii), which extends the truths of selflessness and interdependence 
ad infinitum. Today, these quintessential Buddhist teachings form the foundations 
of the Engaged Buddhist philosophical, ethical, and practical systems. 
Many Engaged Buddhist theorists and leaders have applied these teachings to an 
analysis of contemporary society and its multitude of ills. For example, the 
founder of the Sarvodaya Shrarnadana movement in Sri Lanka, A.T. Ariyaratne, 
has observed: 
Sl Swpyuttu Nikiiyu II, 28. This is an elaboration of the simplest expression of this doctrine: iduf!! 
suti ayul!l bhumti - "when this exists, that arises". See also MujjiiTUl Nikiiya in Thich Nbat Hanh, 
"The Individual, Society, and Nature," in The Path of Compassion: Writings on Socially Engaged 
Buddhism, ed. Fred Eppsteiner (Berkeley, CA: Parallax Press, 1988). 41. 
53 Otherwise known as the • Siltra of the Heart of the Perfection of Insight' or the Prajniipiiramita-
hn·daya-siitra, and the ' Sutra of the Perfection of Wisdom of the Diamond that Cuts Through 
Jllusion' or the Vajracchedikii-prajnapiiramitii-siitra. 
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One of the unique teachings of the Buddha is the theory of dependent ansmg. 
Everything is related to every other thing. If there is no peace in a society, there 
should be a variety of interdependent and interrelated causes that bring about such a 
sinullion. All these causes have to be attacked simultaneously and removed to make 
a reversal of the processes that have brought about a loss of peace in our society so 
that we can rebuild a culture ofpeace.54 
The Dalai Lama provides another example of social analysis in light of 
interdependence. In recognition of the interconnected nature of the social and 
global context of humanity, His Holiness confirms that "our every action, our 
every deed, word and thought" has direct implications for others. Consequently, 
our individual happiness and very survival can only be determined communally. 
The Dalai Lama proposes the critical global construction of sound ethical, 
political, social, and environmental systems as the only way to ensure the 
happiness and safety of one and all.55 The Dalai Lama further articulates his 
perspective through the notion of 'universal responsibility', which becomes ever 
more propounded with every advance of modernity: 
In the past, families and small communities could exist more or less independently of 
one another... Today's reality is so complex and, on the material level at least, so 
clearly intercomtected that a different outlook is needed. Modern economics is a case 
in point. A stock-market crash on one side of the globe can have a direct etiect on 
the economies of countries on the other. Similarly, our technological achievements 
are now such that our activities have an unambiguous effect on the natural 
environment. And the very size of our population means that we cannot any longer 
afl'ord to ignore others' interests ... In view of this, I am convinced that it is essential 
that we cultivate a sense of what I call universal responsibility. 56 
Nbat Hanh has voiced a similar proclamation: 
It has become clear that the fate of the individual is inextricably linked to the fate of 
the whole human race. People must let others live if they Themselves want to live ... 
The only alternative to co-existence is co-non-existence. 57 
Elaborating further upon the interdependence of self and society, Nhat Hanh has 
applied the Mahayana teaching of emptiness to the interdependence of spiritual 
practice and social change. In doing so, he articulates his very distinctive 
interpretation of sunyata: 
54 A. T. Ariyaratne, in King, Being Benevolence: The Social Ethics of Engaged Buddhism. 12-13 
55 HH the Dalai Lama, Ethics for the New Millennium, as discussed and cited in Ibid. 13 
56 Ibid. 14 
57 Nhat Hanh, "The Individual, Society, and Nature." 42. 
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When we go to a meditation centre, we may have the impression that we leave 
everything behind - family, society, and all the complications involved in them -
and come as an individual in order to practice and to search for peace. This is already 
an illusion, because in Buddhism there is no such thing as an individual. 
. .. the individual is made of non-individual elements. How do you expect to 
leave everything behind when you enter a meditation centre? The kind of suffering 
that you carry in your heart, that it society itself. You bring that with you, you bring 
society with you. When you meditate, it is not just for yourself, you do it for the 
whole society. You seek solutions for your problems not only for yourself, but for all 
ofus.~8 
The cornerstone of the entirety ofNhat Hanh's reinterpretation of Buddhism, that 
which represents the core vision of his metaphysical and ontological universe and 
which underlies every element of his teachings, is the Buddhist notion of 
interdependence, based upon the doctrines of co-dependent origination and 
emptiness. In his language, employing one of a number of neologisms, this 
quintessential Buddhist principle is appropriated and re-articulated in the term 
interbeing. lnterbeing is the key hermeneutical tool in the study of Nhat Hanh' s 
philosophy. Every aspect of his teachings and practices can be explained in 
relation to interbeing. In fact, they cannot really be totally understood from an 
academic perspective, or employed efficaciously from a perspective of praxis or 
activism, without a comprehension and actuaJisation of this tenet. The 
cloud/sunshine/paper analogy is a recurrent pedagogical device in Nhat Hanh's 
discourse. In his commentary on the Heart S1ilra, which out of all the 
Prajfiiip£1ramitcl siitras is most specifically focused on stlnyatii, he explains, "The 
paper and the sunshine inter-are .. . To be is to inter-be. You cannot be just by 
yourself alone. You have to be with everything else. "59 As the Buddhist scholar 
Peter Oldmeadow has recognised, Nhat Hanh offers a positive reading of the 
doctrine of stlnyatii which, as such, differs from the original negating articulations 
of emptiness expressed in the Prajiiiipiiramitii siitras and offered by Nagiiljuna 
and other Indian Madhyamika philosophers. Oldmeadow explains: 
According to the positive reading, given that things arise or exist in a network of 
relations, each thing necessarily involves every other thing. The being or coming 
forth of an entity is the coming forth of the totality. Any change in one entity implies 
58 Thich Nhat Hanh, Being Peace (Berkeley, CA: Parallax Press, 1987). 46-47. 
59 Thich Nhat Hanh, The Heart of Understanding: Commentaries on the Prajfiaparomaila Heart 
Srtlra (Berkeley, CA: Parallax Press, 1988). 3-4. 
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change to the entire system. The totality is not "assembled" out of particulars; rather 
particulars have their meaning in relation to, and are an expression of, the totality.60 
As Oldmeadow notes, Nhat Hanh's reading of siinyatii finds closer resonance with 
such positive illustrations as that found in the Avutat?tsuka Siitra 's celebrated 
metaphor, the 'Jewelled Net of Indra'. This depiction of siinyata envisions the 
universe like a web of jewels, each jewel reflecting the others so that, refle<:tion 
upon reflection, all jewels appear at once in one, and the one in alL The essential 
positivity of Nhat Hanh's reading is most apparent in his explanation of the 
• fullness' of emptiness: 
If I am holding a cup of water and I ask you, "Is this cup empty?" you will say, "No, 
it is full of water." But if I pour out the water and ask you again, you may say, " Yes, 
it is empty." But, empty of what? Empty means empty of something. The cup cannot 
be empty of nothing. "Empty" doesn't mean anything unless you know empty of 
what. My cup is empty of water, but it is not empty of air. To be empty is to he 
empty of something ... 
When A valokita says that our sheet of paper is empty, he means it is empty of a 
separate, independent existence. It cannot just be by itself It has to inter-be with the 
sunshine, the cloud, the forest, the logger, the mind, and everytlting else. It is empty 
of a separate self. But, empty of a separate self means full of everything. 61 
Within the history of Buddhist ideas, the evolution and development of siinyatii is 
significant in its complexity and diversity. While it is beyond our scope to enter 
into an extensive investigation of this development, something more should be 
said about the traditional and philosophical influences on Nhat Hanh' s 
interpretation. Centuries of debate between different schools of Mahayana, 
debates that continue today, have explored the intricacies, subtleties, and ultimate 
meaning of the doctrine of siinyatii. In what follows we will briefly explore 
interpretations of emptiness from the traditions of Madhyamika, Yogacara, and 
T'ien-t 'ai. 
We have already encountered the second-century Indian monk and philosopher 
Nagarjuna, and his elaboration of the doctrines of emptiness (S . slinyatii) and two 
truths (S. satya-dvaya). Important to recall here is the Madhyamika emphasis on 
60 Peter Oldmeadow, "Being and Emptiness in Heidegger and Indian Madbyamika Buddhism," 
Literature and Aesthetics: The Journal of the Sydney Society of Literature and Aesthetics 
December (2006). 
61 Nhat Hanh, The Heart of Understanding: Commentaries on the Prapiaparamaita Heart Sutra. 
8-10. 
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the 'emptiness of emptiness', and the interdependence of nin•il!Ja and sarrzsilra. 
The Madhyamika does not present emptiness as an ultimate truth in the sense of a 
separate realm or absolute reality. While emptiness is presented as the ultimate 
truth about what is ultimately true, it is not depicted as an ultimate truth in the 
sense of a primary existent - that is, something independent of the causal nexus, 
resistant to analysis, a permanent substratum underlying all reality. Things simply 
depend on other things - there is no deeper or transcendent reality that is the 
ultimate cause or origin. Thus, emptiness cannot be grasped - even as a 
philosophical construct or teaching it should not be an object of attachment. 
According-to the Modhyamika, emptiness is not an absolute; emptiness at the 
ultimate level is dependent on the conventional level; thus, emptiness is also 
empty. Like the proverbial raft that carries the practitioner to the other shore, or 
the fmger pointing to the moon, emptiness is to be understood as a conceptual 
tool, a pedagogic aid, a way of describing the true nature of reality. Ultimately, as 
a meditative instrument, emptiness is to lead the practitioner beyond conceptual 
constructs and discriminative thinking to a direct experience of that reality it 
attempts to define. Furthermore, the point of the Two Truths is that the realisation 
of all things as empty, i.e. on the level of ultimate truth, does not imply a shift to a 
separate world of emptiness, but an insight into the conceptually constructed 
nature of the conventional realm. The ultimate truth is not to be understood as an 
ultimate goal or realm beyond the conventional; it is not to be conceived as a 
move away from one towards the other, but rather what Paul Williams has called a 
"move of gnosis."62 Because it exists in relation to surrzsiim, and indeed is to be 
realised within Sllf!lSilra, nin•£11Ju too is empty. 
Despite Nagfu:juna's contemporary eminence, it has been recognised that in his 
own milieu he failed to have much impact on Buddhist thought. 63 Indeed, other 
schools of Indian Buddhism emerged post·Nagarjuna with their own 
understandings of emptiness. Furthermore, following its transmission into China, 
62 See Paul Williams, Buddhist Thought: A Complete Introduction to the Indian Tradition (London 
and New Yorlc Routledge, 2000). 148. 
6~ See Charles B. Jones, "Emptiness, Kenosis, History, and Dialogue: The Christian Response to 
Masao Abe's Notion of'Dynamic Sunyata' in the Early Years of the Abe-Cobb Buddhist-Christian 
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Nagarjuna's philosophy was critically amended and indeed transformed. Ofthese 
developments, the traditions of Yogacara in India, and T'ien-t'ai in China are 
significant. Both articulated what can be understood as positive interpretations of 
emptiness in response to an ostensible negativity and potential nihilism in 
Madhyamika philosophy. Moreover, because Yogacara was transmitted into 
China and became firmly established, it directly influenced Vietnamese 
Mahayana, as is apparent in Nhat Hanh's teachings. The same can be said of 
T'ien-t'ai Buddhism. Via its proposal of such methods as exercising mindfulness 
in everyday activities and the practice of perceiving ultimate truth through the 
contemplation-of-phenomenal reality, T'ien-t..!.ai-flad-direct bearing and influence 
on the development ofCh'an and thereby of Vietnamese Thien. 
The Yogacara tradition emerged in India in the fourth-century CE, in response to 
perceived epistemological and soteriological problematics within late 
Madhyamika. 64 Through the contributions of its founders, Maitreyanatha, Asailga 
and Vasubandhu, Y ogacara presented a significant corrective to the Madhyamika 
system, in particular its interpretation of emptiness. It is this more positive 
representation of emptiness, in addition to related Y ogacara teachings on the Mind 
and experience, which are reflected and translated within the teachings of Nhat 
Hanh. In addition to its principal focus on meditative discipline and experience (S. 
yoga), the Yogacara tradition specifically emphasises the domain and dimensions 
of Mind. This is indicated by its collection of additional names: Vijiilinavada (S. 
'the Way of Consciousness'), Vijiiaptimiitn• (S. 'Cognitive Representation Only'), 
and Cittamatra (S. 'Mind-Only'). Indeed, the category of Mind is the 
distinguishing feature of Y ogiicara in relation to Madhyamika; Mind indicates the 
mentalistic or psychological focus of Yogacara, as well as its recognition of a 
primary existent of reality. 
Dialogue," Buddhist - Christian ShJdies 24 (2004). And Richard Hayes, "Nagasjuna's Appeal," 
Journal of Indian Philosophy 22 ( 1994). 
64 It is beyond the scope of the present discussion to enter into these details. For a thorough 
analysis see Richard King, "Early Yogacam and Its Relationship with the Madhyamaka School," 
Philosophy East and West 44, no. 4 (1994). 
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The quintessential psychological Y ogacara doctrine of the 'store· house 
consciousness' is representative of the tradition's emphasis on Mind. The store· 
house consciousness (S. {i/aycH·ijiiiina) is an underlying foundation or substratum 
of Mind, which is described through the metaphoric image of the 'seedbed' . 
According to Y ogacara, this mentalistic seedbed acts as a repository for karmic 
seeds (S. bija) and habit energies (S. vasanas), which, as they come to fruition 
depending on causes and conditions, determine the nature of subjective and inter-
subjective experience. Indeed, Yogiicara philosophy defines subjective reality as a 
flow or 'torrent' of cognitive experiences. In addition to the cllaya-vijiiiina, the 
Y ogiidira system delineates seven types of consciousness that comprehend this 
experiential continuum. They are the normal five sensory consciousnesses, the 
mental consciousness (S. milno\•ijiiiina), and the 'tainted mind' (S. kli~fwnwws) .6~ 
As we shall see in the following chapter, this teaching distinctly resonates 
throughout Nhat Hanh' s discourse. Nhat Hanh has appropriated and embellished 
the metaphor of the seedbed of the mind- he consistently refers to the practitioner 
as a 'gardener', with frequent use of the analogy of 'organic gardening'. He also 
refers to the Dharma as 'rain' and teaches a practice called 'seed watering' . 
Moreover, one of Nhat Hanb's most recent publications is a translation and 
commentary on Vasubandhu's Vi,rsatiktl ('Twenty Verses') and Tri,!tiikcl ('Thirty 
Verses'), two principal Yogacara texts that deal with this psychological element of 
its teachings.66 
Turning to the quintessential epistemological Yogacara doctrine, the theory of the 
'Three Natures' (S. tri-svabhava), we find the foundations of the Yogaciira 
corrective to the Madhyamika doctrine of Two Truths and its interpretation of 
emptiness. The tri-svabhiiva theory attempts to bridge an ostensible gap between 
the experience of ultimate truth (S . paramartha-satya) and everyday experience 
(S. scli!Jvrti-sarya) by positing three aspects of the mind. The first (S. parikalpita) 
is the 'constructed' or 'imagined' aspect, which, due to the accumulation of bijas 
6
·
1 The Indian missionary Paramartha (490-569 CE) proposed a further ninth consciousness - the 
immaculate consciousness (S. anwla1•ijnilna) - which would replace the iilaya-1•ijniina upon 
enlightenment. Despite his view, the general Yogaciira belief seems to be that the iilaya-1•ijrnmu 
continues upon enlightenment and exists eternally in a radiant and purified form. 
66 Nbat Hanh studied and memorised Vasubandhu' s texts as a novice monic. See Thich Nhat Hanh, 
Understanding Our Mind (Berkeley, CA: Parallax Press, 2006). 
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and vasanas in the iilt.Jya-vijniina, generates a false representation of the self and 
projects illusive objects onto reality. This is the unenlightened realm of duality 
and linguistic constructs that corresponds to the mundane level of conventional 
truth. The third aspect (S. pariniwanna) is the 'perfected' aspect; it corresponds to 
the level of ultimate truth, as it is the dimension of the mind that directly 
apprehends the true nature of reality as empty of subject-object duality. The first 
and the third aspects are linked by a second aspect (S. paratantra), the 
'dependent' aspect, which signifies the conditioned flow of dependently 
originated experience that is falsely polarised by the first aspect but correctly 
perceived by the third. In fact, the third aspeet affirms a primary existent·cf 
reality; this is none other than the second dependent aspect correctly perceived as 
the continuum of experiential emptiness itself. It is believed that this unitary state, 
in which the store-consciousness is cleansed of all imprinted predispositions and 
illusions, is the natural state of the Mind. 
The Sw!zdhininnocana Sutra, a scripture from the second-century CE that 
contains the earliest presentation of the Y ogiicara system, proclaims the doctrine 
of tri-svabhiiva to be the antidote to Madhyamika nihilism. According to the 
Y ogacara, the Madbyamika had taken the doctrine of universal emptiness too far, 
to the point of over-negation, a place of absurd nihilism where everything was 
destroyed. In opposition, the Y ogiicara corrective asserted that in order for the true 
state of emptiness to be experienced, there had to be a something that was initially 
erroneously divided- an essential mentalistic unity. It is this unity of Mind that is 
posited as the primary existent and which defmes the fundamental positivity of the 
Y ogiiciira interpretation of emptiness that has directly influenced Nbat Hanh' s 
articulation of interbeing. 
Let us now shift our context to China, two centuries on, for another example of a 
positive reading of emptiness to which we can relate Nhat Hanh's. Buddhism first 
came to China around the turn of the first millennium and the initial focus, for 
several centuries, was mainly textual. Groups of monk-scholars tended to focus on 
one particular text or school in the endeavour to translate, both philologicaly and 
philosophically. One such group, the San-lun school, focused on the Mula-
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madhyamako-kiirikii but had difficulty comprehending Niigiirjuna.67 Then, in the 
early fifth-century, Kumiirajiva, the central Asian monk-scholar known as one of 
the four 'great translators' of Chinese Buddhist texts, arrived in the imperial city 
of Ch 'ang-an and presented an accurate understanding of Niigiirjuna' s philosophy. 
However, Kumiirajlva's revelations were not entirely well-received. In particular, 
a monk-scholar named Chih-i (538-597 CE) composed an extensive 
reinterpretation of Niigiif:iuna' s teaching of the Two Truths, thereby presenting a 
positive articulation of emptiness. According to tradition, Chih-i is the third 
patriarch of the T'ien-t'ai School of Chinese Buddhism, but historically he is 
considered to be the school's·-·foonder and principal theoretician. Within 
Niigiirjuna's theory of the Two Truths, Chih-i discerned a fragmented, negative 
and irreconcilable vision of reality. According to Chih-i, the ultimate truth of 
emptiness portrayed not a positive statement about the way things are, but a 'non-
affirming negation' that says what they are not.68 In order to affirm the essential 
positivity of reality, Chih-i, in a comparable fashion to the Yogaciira elaboration 
of tri-svabhiiva, transformed Niigar:juna 's theory of Two Truths into his own 
theory of Three Truths. In addition to the ultimate troth- emptiness, which breaks 
down the illusions of any permanence or inherent self-essence in things- and the 
conventional troth - provisionality, which confirms the existence of things as 
impermanent and subject to the laws of cause and effect - Chih-i posited a third 
truth - the middle troth. This third truth transcended, unified and integrated the 
Madhyamika metaphysical analysis, producing a positive statement about the 
nature of reality's suchness. This Suchness- the impermanence, interdependence 
and contingency of things - came to defme ultimate truth. 
In this way, Chih-i reconciled the apparent division between emptiness and 
relativity as two views of reality. As C.B. Jones has explained it, Chih-i 's truth of 
the middle was: 
67 For an oveJView of the many interpretations of the doctrine of emptiness in China at this time, 
see Paul L. Swanson, Foundations of T'ien T ai Philosophy: The Flowering of the Two Tmths 
Theor)' in Chinese Buddhi.sm (Asian Humanities Press, 1989). 
68 See Jones, "Emptiness, Kenosis, History, and Dialogue: lbe Christian Response to Masao Abe's 
Notion of 'Dynamic Sunyata' in the Early Years of the Abe-Cobb Buddhist-Christian Dialogue." 
126. 
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. . . an affinnation that after realising emptiness, one could return to the very 
conventional truths within which unenlightened beings operate, and both would be 
transformed in a vision of what reality is, its Suchness. Rather than enlightenment 
clearing away all delusions and leaving nothing behind, it would clear away 
delusions to reveal the luminous tmth of the way things really are.69 
Chih-i also thereby established a metaphysic of immanent transcendence, 
affirming the existence and movement of the absolute within the contingent. In 
Chih-i 's philosophy, the truth of the middle became a permanent, dynamic and 
immanent force in the world, akin to Buddha-nature. As Ng Yu-Kwan has 
recognised, Cbih-i's interpretation of emptiness is permanent, because it is the 
dharma-kiiya, the body of truth; it is dynamic, because it functions in the world; it 
is immanent, because it embraces all phenomena. According to Yu-Kwan, the 
truth of the middle, far from being an abstract statement of a philosophical truth, 
became a dynamic force working in the world towards the liberation of all 
beings.70 This understanding of truth became characteristic of the T'ien-t'ai 
perspective, and was to have far-reaching and long-lasting influence on East Asian 
Buddhism. In particular, it greatly informed the development of the 
aforementioned Hua-Yen School, founded by Fa-tsang (643-712 CE).71 It is worth 
noting further that both these schools appropriated the Yogacara doctrine of Mind 
as the foundation of reality. Through their East Asian exegeses, this became 
reinterpreted as One Mind - a dynamic, living and active representation of truth, 
which has real substance and functions in the world. A further significant 
contribution from Hua-yen was the doctrine of Perfect Interpenetration. It is this 
doctrine that is illustrated by the metaphoric image of the Jewelled Net of Indra, to 
which we have related Nhat Hanh ' s depiction of interbeing. 
It should now be apparent that a solid and ancient foundation of tradition underlies 
Nhat Hanh's reinterpretation of the doctrines of pratltya-samutpiida and sunyata, 
as represented by the notion of interbeing. As we shall now see, Nhat Hanh's 
69 Ibid. 
70 See Ng Yu-Kwan, Tien Tai Buddism and Early Madhyamaka (Honolulu: University ofHawai'i 
Press, 1993). 43-44. 
71 Like Chih-i, Fa-tsang was considered within tradition to be the third patriarch of the school, 
following Chih-yen (602-668) and Tu-shun (557-640). However, Fa-tsang was responsible for a 
core translation of the founding text -the At'UtUI!JSuku-sutru- and the skilful explanation of its 
abstruse philosophy in accessible languages and appealing metaphors, which attracted imperial 
patronage and consolidated the school's position. 
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principle of interbeing - his reinterpretation of causality, interdependence, 
emptiness, and the essential nondual nature of reality - is at the heart of all the 
following principles of Engaged Buddhism. Furthermore, in the following 
chapters it will become evident that the metaphysic of nonduality inherent in the 
notion of interbeing lies at the foundation of not only Nhat Hanh's ethics of 
engagement, but also his approach to conummity, spirituality, and indeed, 
religious diversity. With respect to tradition, its allocation of legitimacy, and Nhat 
Hanh's place within its continuum, we may turn to an observation from Harry 
Oldmeadow: 
A tradition is not static, an unchanging datum that persists in a frozen state through 
time. Traditions are dynamic: if needs be, they can grow, branch out and blossom. 
However, the principle of continuity ... must always be respected if the tradition is to 
remain an integral one ... One of the implications of the principle of continuity and of 
the homogeneity of the spiritual economy in question is this: the great doctrinal 
elaborations which follow a Revelation, usually at some historical distance, do not, 
essentially, constitute an 'addition' to the tradition but an unfolding of principles and 
perspectives which until then have remained implicit. One thinks of a Nagarjuna, a 
Shankara, an Aquinas. Such figures disavow any personal 'originality', claiming 
only to be elaborating the spiritual teaching to which they are heirs.72 
It is thus that we should understand the reformations of Thich Nhat Hanh, as be 
treads gently but surely in the footsteps ofhis forbears. 
The Imperative to Act 
Perhaps the most important outcome of the contemporary interpretation and 
application of emptiness within Engaged Buddhist discourse is the proposal that 
the experiential realisation of the interdependence of self and other gives rise to a 
spontaneous and instinctive compassion, benevolence, concern for the welfare of 
others, and a consequent compulsion towards altruistic action. Referring to the 
"values orientation inherent to the experience of wisdom," Nelson Foster, an 
Engaged Buddhist activist and commentator has called this the "politics of 
prajiia."73 Discussing Zen practice and social action, Foster confirms that the 
direct experience of nonduality and the acquisition of prujiicl (S. 'wisdom') entail 
an inevitable and natural movement towards service on behalf of others. In 
72 Kenneth ("Harry") Oldmeadow, Traditionalism: Religion in the Light of lhe Perennial 
Philosophy (Colombo: The Sri Lankan Institute of Traditional Studies, 2000). 65. 
ChaE.ter 4 184 
agreement, Kenneth Kraft, another Engaged Buddhist commentator, has perceived 
"a creative tension between withdrawal and involvement, an underlying 
synonymity between work on oneself and work on behalf of others." Kraft claims 
that, "evidence supporting this viewpoint is found in doctrine, in practice, in 
legend, and in history. Thus the pre--eminent virtues in Theravada Buddhism are 
self-restraint and generosity; in Mahayana Buddhism, the highest goals are 
wisdom and compassion.74 
The ethics of Theravada and Mahayana Buddhism have both directly influenced 
the evelution of Engaged Buddhist theory and practice. We will here mention a 
few key areas of influence from both. Morality (P. slla; S. sila), or the means of 
behavioural guidance and virtue cultivation, is without doubt a core feature of 
early Buddhism.75 From early Buddhism, the practice of cultivating the 
brahmavihiiras (P. & S. 'divine abodes') is significant. While much early 
Buddhist morality is focused on self-transcendence, the development of these 
'Four Immeasurable Minds' - compassion (P. & S. karu"!lii), joy (P. muditii}, 
equanimity (P. upekkhii; S. upe~cl}, and love (P. mettii; S. maitri)- shifts ethical 
observance to a more psychological context, concerning intentions and 
motivations, and to a more social context, concerning the projection of these 
divine abodes of the mind towards all beings. Furthermore, such early scriptures 
as the Mettii Sutta are indicative of the early Buddhist affirmation of the inherent 
worth of all sentient beings. 76 Nevertheless, there is some debate surrounding the 
?l Nelson Foster, "To Enter the Marketplace," in The Path of Compassion: Writings on Sociall_v 
Engaged Buddhism, ed. Fred Eppsteiner (Berkeley, CA: Parallax Press, 1988). 48. 
74 K. Kraft, "Introduction", Kraft, ed, Inner Peace, World Peace: Essays on Buddhism and 
Nonviolence. 3. 
15 Silo is the first of the three divisions of the Eightfold Path, encompassing steps three to five. Slla 
is also a central aspect of MayiiyAna Buudhisrn, constituting the second of the Six Pedcctions (S. 
sat)-jXirumita.). 
~6 An excerpt from the Metta Sutla reads: 
May all beings be happy and secure in themselves, trn~v happy. All in whom breath of life 
exists - moving and unmoving, long, large, middle-si::ed, subtle and gross in form, visible 
and invisible, far and near, those who hove been and those who will be - may all these be in 
themselves tmly happy. Let none deceive another, nor despise another anywher·e. Let none 
will ill to another because of dispute or enmity. In this way, as a mother protects her own 
child, her on~v child, as long as she lives, so should you develop an unlimited mind with 
respect to all beings. You should develop unlimited thoughts of spnpathyfor all beings in the 
world above, below, and across, unmarred by hate or enmity. Then, as you stand, walk, sit, 
or lie, love is ever present in the mind. This is called the holy state. When you hold onlo your 
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question of the extent to which early Buddhist ethics were explicitly directed 
towards the ideals and practice of social service and activism. Indeed, David 
Chappell has noted that while compassion in pre-Mahayana Buddhism is 
understood as an attribute of the Buddha and is prescribed as one of the 
brahmavihiiras, it is recommended only to arhats and occasional lay people as an 
antidote to hostile feelings - nothing more.77 In agreement, Harvey Aronson bas 
recognised that the Theraviida practice of meditation on the hrahmavihiiras does 
not directly entail social service to others, but rather "personal, psychological, or 
soteriological benefits."78 Even so, it is difficult to refute the possibility that such 
benefits, through the interaction of-enJained and lay~ WQuld also benefit society:-P. 
D. Premasiri's apologetics concern the quest for nin•iiTU.I in the Theraviida 
tradition: 
What is aimed at by such an ideal [the quest for nin•ii!lu) is not the production of a 
band of selfish seekers after individual salvation but spiritual leaders capable of 
setting the right moral pace for the whole of society.79 
While explicit ethical instruction towards social action and the 'imperative to act' 
may not be a transparent prescription within traditional early Buddhist ethics, 
more definite precedence can be found in the later Mahayana ethics of altruism 
exemplified by the 'way of the bodhisattva'. There are few ethical prescriptions 
more profound than the resolutions of the great Bodhisattva Vow: 
However innumerable sentient beings are, I vow to save them. 
However inexhaustible the defilements nre, I vow to extinguish them. 
However immeasurable the dharmas are, I vow to master them 
However incomparable enlightenment is, I vow to attain it.80 
opinions no more, when you are endowed ""'ith good conduct and tme insight, when you h(lVe 
expelled all craving for pleasures, you will he reborn no more. 
See Merta Sutto, in Sutta Nipilto, Pali Text Society 1:8, 143-52. 
77 See Chappell's exegisis of the Upasaka Precept Szitra. David W. Chappell, "Searching for a 
Mahayana Social Ethic," Journal of Religious Ethics 24, no. 2 (1996). 351-375. 
78 Harvey Aronson, "Motivations to Social Action in Theravada Buddhism," in Studies in the 
History· of Buddhism, ed. A. K. Narain (Delhi: B. R. Publishing Corp., 1980). 6-7. Aronson claims: 
"To seek in the discourse on 'love' and 'compassion' tor teachings on the motivation to social 
action is to seek in vain." See also Harvey Amnson, LCTVe and Sympathy in Theravada Buddhism 
(Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1980). 
79 P. D. Premasiri , in C. Eller, "The Impact of Christianity on Buddhist Nonviolence in the West", 
Kraft, ed., /nne1· Peace, World Peace: Essays on Buddhism and No11vio/ence. 93. 
80 The Bodhisattva's Vow, in Edward Conze, Buddhist Scriphtres (Hannondsworth, Middlesex: 
Penguin Books, 1959). 183-184. 
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Upon the bodhisattva path, the cultivation of wisdom and compassion is 
inseparable and synchronous. Armed with the sword of wisdom, which cuts 
through the illusions of the dualistic mind, the enlightened eye of the bodhisattva 
perceives the world as a moment by moment manifestation of dynamically 
interrelated fields of energy existing as a luminous and inherently sentient whole. 
This awareness of the true interdependent nature of reality manifests instinctive 
boundless compassion - maha kanma - for all life. The eighth-century Buddhist 
poet Santideva explains the compassionate consciousness of the bodhisattva: 
In the same way as the hands and so forth 
Are regarded as limbs of the body; 
Likewise, why are living things 
Not regarded as limbs of life? 
I should dispel the misery of others 
Because it is sutTering just like my own, 
And I should benetit others, 
Because they are living things, just like myself. 
When I work in this way for others 
I should not let conceit or feelings of amazement arise. 
It is just like feeding myself-
I ask for nothing in retum.81 
Like the salvific bodhisattva A valokitdvara, the Engaged Buddhist practices 
"looking with the eyes of compassion and listening deeply to the cries of the 
world."82 
Sallie King has elaborated upon this dimension of Nhat Hanh's activism, m 
which: 
... we see a compassion which is emotional, but at the same time, as Nhat Hanh 
understands it, is the fruit of that experiential wisdom that does not create a wall of 
separation between self and other, but allows itself to feel their interconnection. Just 
as one would act to remove the source of one's own pain- pulling a thorn out of 
one's skin- so, if one no longer felt separation between oneself and another, would 
one act to remove the cause of suffering in another: as an instinctual, natural, almost 
inevitable act. 83 
81 Shantideva, Bodhicaryavatara, trans. Stephen Batchelor (Dhararnsala: Library of Tibetan Wotks 
and Archives, 1979). 118. 
82 The Lotus Sutro, quoted in Thich Nhat Hanh, Teachings on Love (Berkeley, CA: Parallax Press, 
1997). 6. 
83 King, Being Benevolence: The Social Ethics qf Engaged Buddhism. 175. 
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As King explains, within the discourse of Engaged Buddhism, the ethical standard 
is transformed from the passive to the active. 84 The traditional practice of 
Buddhism becomes what Aung San Suu Kyi, the Burmese Engaged Buddhist 
leader, has called "active compassion or active metta,"85 akin to what Nhat Hanh 
calls 'love in action'. 
The Soteriological Shift 
Within the discourse of Engaged Buddhism, what can be defined as a 
soteriologica/ shift has relocated the traditional domains of Buddhist practice, 
belief, and salvation. The belief systems of most-religiaus- traditions incorporate 
both an explanation of the causes of suffering in the world, or what is known as a 
theodicy, and a complex of beliefs and practices with which to transcend the 
suffering of life- a soteriology. The theodicy offered by the Buddha presents a 
psychological diagnosis that locates the causes of suffering within the mind, in the 
akusala-mlila (S. the 'three roots of evil'; P. akusala-mt7la)- three fundamental 
negative states of consciousness defined as greed (P. laf!hli, S. tr~~ui), hatred (P. 
dosa, S. dve~a), and delusion (P. moho). However, the Buddha also provided a 
soteriology, a way to cleanse the mind of these misconceptions and replace 
problematic delusion with liberating insight. This eight-step path towards 
liberation prescribes relief from suffering via a program of self-cultivation and the 
re-training of the mind. Ultimately, Buddhism contends that rather than attempting 
to change the world to suit us, and our insatiable desires, it makes more sense to 
change ourselves, to transform our perception, to be in accord with the world. 
However, within this late modem age, the collective suffering inflicted by the 
spread of political tyranny, ideological warfare, terrorism, economic injustice, and 
environmental destruction has convinced many Buddhists that not only the self 
but also the world needs to be transformed. Evincing this shift in perception and 
recognition, Nhat Hanh has referred to the present context of globalised karma: 
The world of today is no longer the world of yesterday, when each country, each 
group of people, could live separately. Our karma now has come together, has 
become collective karma. Now the action of one group effects the other group. We 
84 1bid. 83 
85 Aung San Suu Kyi, The Voice of Hope: Conversations with A/.an Clements (London & New 
York: Penguin Books, 1997). 17. 
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must choose to sutler together or be happy together, be alive together or be 
destroyed together.86 
Perhaps the most profound impact Engaged Buddhism has had on the traditional 
philosophy and practice of Buddhism concerns its revision of Buddhism's 
theodicy, which has instigated an alteration in the Buddhist soteriology. The 
discourse of Engaged Buddhism asserts that the akusala-mula, the three roots of 
suffering traditionally located in the mind, have become institutionally and 
politically manifest within the policies and programs of corporations and 
governments and other societal structures. According to Engaged Buddhists, the 
negative individual mental states of greed,Jwred and delusion form the-cultural 
roots of violence and fear within society, and the institutionalisation of these 
forces has created collective suffering on a global scale. 
This relocation of the causes of suffering bas initiated a concurrent repositioning 
within the dynamics of salvation. In order to confront violence, oppression, or 
injustice in the here and now, the traditional metaphysical quest for individual 
inner liberation bas been relocated within the collective outer physical world. This 
transferral of the religious focus from within to without moves away from the 
individualistic, transcendent emphasis of monastic liberation, towards collective 
economic and cultural defmitions of liberation within lay communities. The 
Engaged Buddhist Sarvodaya Shramadana Movement of Sri Lanka uses the 
Sanskrit term laukodaya, or 'mundane awakening', to define this new locus of 
liberation. Cluistopher Queen has succinctly summarised: 
(A] profound change in the Buddhist soteriology- from a highly personal and other-
worldly notion of liberation to a social, economic, this-worldly liberation -
distinguishes [Engaged Buddhist] movements .. . The traditional conceptions of 
karma and rebirth, the veneration of the bhikkhu sangha, and the focus on ignorance 
and psychological attaclunent to account for suffering in the world (the second Noble 
Trudt) have taken second place to the application of highly rationalised reflections 
on the institutional and political manifestations of greed, hatred and, delusion, and on 
new organisational strategies for addressing war and injustice, povert~ and 
intolerance, and the prospects for 'outer' as well as 'inner' peace in the world.8 
86 Thicb Nhat Hanh and Daniel Berrigan, The Raft Is Not the Shore: Conversations toward a 
Buddhist-Christian Awa1•eness (Maryknoll, New York: Orb is Books, 2001 ). 119. 
87 Queen, "Introduction: The Shapes and Sources of Engaged Buddhism." I 0. 
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From Nhat Hanh's perspective, the soteriological shift is an inevitable 
consequence of the escalation of modernity. It is also understood as an inherent 
outcome of spiritually realising the interdependence of self and society, which, 
according to Nhat Hanh, defines the authentic practice of Buddhism in the modem 
world: 
When a village is being bombed and children and ad\dts are suffering from wounds 
and death, can a Buddhist sit still in his unbombed temple? If he has wisdom and 
compassion, he will find ways to practice Buddhism while helping other people. To 
practice Buddhism, it is said, is to see into one's own nature and become a Buddha. 
If we cannot see what is going on around us, how can we see into our own nature? 
There is a relationship between the nature of the self and the nature of sutTering, 
injustice;-amtwar. To see into the true-nature ofthe-world's weapons· is to see into 
our own true nature. 88 
The soteriological shift inherent within Engaged Buddhist discourse and practice 
constitutes an extension of the doctrine of emptiness. The central implication of 
this extension is the breakdown of any illusive dualism that persists between 
salvation on an individual transcendent level, and salvation on a collective this· 
worldly level. While Queen's above comment may imply that individual spiritual 
practice is somewhat left behind in the wake of the soteriological shift, it is 
important to realise that Engaged Buddhism asserts that the two dimensions of 
salvation can and indeed must be realised mutually and simultaneously. Moreover, 
as Nhat Hanh's above words relate, the soteriological shift implies the dissolution 
of a further illusive barrier - that which exists between the self and society, the 
mind and the world, or our own inner nature and the nature of reality. As Nhat 
Hanb explains: 
The peace we seek cannot be our personal possession. We need to find an inner 
peace which makes it possible for us to become one with those who suffer, and to do 
something to help our brothers and sisters, which is to say, ourselves ... This peace is 
not a barricade which separates you from the world. On the contrary, this kind of 
peace brings you into the world and empowers you to undertake whatever you want 
to do to try to help.89 
It is to Nhat Hanh's ethical prescriptions regarding peace that we now turn. 
88 Thich Nhat Hanh, lnterbeing: Fourteen Guidelines jo1· Engaged Buddhism (Berkeley, 
California: Parallax Press, 1998). 31. 
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Nonviolence and Being Peace 
When Nhat Hanh came to the West to call for an end to the Vietnam War, he was 
profoundly disturbed to witness a pervasive aggression and deep·seated violence 
evident within the anti·war movement. Accordingly, he began to teach what has 
been called "probably the single greatest contribution of any Buddhist to global 
thinking about peacemaking"90 - the practice of 'being peace': 
In the peace movement there is a lot of anger, frustration, and misunderstanding. The 
peace movement can write very good protest letters, but they are not yet able to write 
a Jove letter . 
. . . without being peace, we cannot do anything for peace. If we cannot smile, we 
cannot help other people to.smile. If we are not peaceful, then we cannot contribute 
to the peace movement. 
I hope we can bring a new dimension to the peace movement. .. A fresh way of 
being peace, of doing peace is needed . .. It would be wondernd if we could bring to 
the peace movement our contribution, our way of looking at things, that will 
diminish aggression and hatred. Peace work means, first of all, being peace.91 
While the idea of confronting war and violence with a smile may sound simplistic 
or even naive, as Sallie King explains, "we should not be misled by Nhat Hanh's 
gift for putting sophisticated ideas into simple words." King continues: 
In the simple idea of being peace is contairied a world of Engaged Buddhist 
philosophy, including the idea of approaching conflict free of an assumption of 
adversarial relations; a commitment to profound, principled nonviolence; an 
understanding of the web of interdependence as the fabric of our existence; and 
awareness of the great inlfortance of motivation and attitude in shaping the nature 
and outcome of an action.9 
And, like other aspects of Engaged Buddhist ethical theory, the practice of being 
peace is firmly grounded in a number of central aspects of traditional Buddhist 
practice and philosophy. The most significant that we will examine here are 
mindfulness (P. sali, S. smrti) and nonviolence (S. uhi1.nsu). 
The book that was perhaps Nhat Hanh's first big commercial seller was conceived 
during the Vietnam War as a letter written to a staff member of the SYSS. It was 
later expanded and translated and became The Miracle of Mindfulness: A Manual 
on Meditation for the Use of Young Activists. Nhat Hanh wrote it to remind his 
89 Tbich Nhat Hanh, The Sun My Heart (Berkeley, CA: Parallax Press, 1988). 127-128. 
90 King, Being Benevolence: The Social Ethics of Engaged Buddhism. 175. 
91 Nbat Hanh, Being Peace. 79-80. 
92 King, Being Benevolence: The Social Ethics C?f Engaged Buddhism. 175. 
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students of the imperative to maintain disciplined meditative awareness -
mindfulness - in the midst of contexts of conflict or danger. Mindfulness is an 
alert state of mind, constantly cultivated through conscious breathing, which 
forms the foundation for understanding and insight (S. prajiiU) into the true 
nondual nature of reality. It is a ' trans-traditional' term; it is found in all schools 
of Buddhism.93 Zen Buddhism, Nhat Hanh's tradition, places an emphasis upon 
mindfulness practice as a constant state of contemplative consciousness that is to 
be sustained throughout every moment and action of every day. The Miracle of 
Mindfulness demonstrates Nhat Hanh' s application of this traditional Zen 
understanding of the practice witbi-n-modem·eontex-ts-af war and-sociaJ--aetivism. 
Mindfulness is presented as the practical and spiritual means for engaged activists 
to maintain cabn, present moment clarity, and an awareness of interdependence -
to 'be peace' in the midst of war. Mindfulness is described as "the miracle by 
which we master and restore ourselves."94 Mindfulness practice, in addition to 
nonviolence, fonns the spiritual foundation of Nhat Hanh's activism and is thus 
the fundamental means of 'being peace'. 
Like mindfulness, nonviolence bas deep roots in the Buddhist tradition. The chief 
traditional source of nonviolence as an aspect of personal morality is found in the 
first precept prescribing abstention from taking life. Other sources, such as the 
Dhammapada, represents nonviolence as a virtue and a religious ideal: 
A man is not on the path of righteousness if he settles matters in a violent haste. A 
wise man calmly considers what is right and what is wrong, and faces different 
opinions with truth, non-violence and peace. This man is guarded by truth and is a 
guardian of truth. He is righteous and he is wise.9~ 
Indeed, the 'Universal Law of the Dharma' is not bound by violence, nor its root 
emotion anger, but love: "For hate is not conquered by hate: hate is conquered by 
93 For example, mindfulness is the seventh of the eight factors of the Eight-Fold Path, the ftrst of 
the five Factors of Awakening (bodhywigu), the third of the Five Powers (bala) , and many suttas 
and s\ltras address its cultivation and application, such as the ancient scripture the Satipu!fhi:mu 
Surtu (The Four Foundations of Mindfulness). 
94 Thich Nhat Hanh, The Miracle of Mindfulness: A Manual on Meditation (London: Rider Books, 
1991). 14. 
9~ Dhammapada, no. 256 -7 
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Jove. This is a law etemal."96 Engaged Buddhists have elaborated upon these 
traditional themes and applied the teachings to modem contexts and global 
problems. 
A further implication of the realisation of interdependence is revealed in Nbat 
Hanh's teaching of 'being peace' -the essential inseparability of means and ends. 
Violence can never be justified. As Nhat Hanh has declared: "I do not accept the 
concept of a war for peace, a 'just war,' just as I also cannot accept the concept of 
'just slavery,' 'just hatred,' or 'just racism. "'97 The evident similarities between 
Nhat Hanh's awroaeh to nonviolence·and--Gandhi's have been widely recognised. 
Despite coming from different religious perspectives, it is evident that Gandhi's 
religious thought and strategies of nonviolent protest and activism for creating 
peace and actualising liberation have directly influenced Nhat Hanh.98 Nbat Hanh 
has commented on the great "spiritual strength" of Gandhi, his simplicity and 
frugality, and his ability to actualise compassion and sacrifice.99 Indeed, both 
activists were working for peace in similar contexts of colonialism and foreign 
invasion, and both resolutely adhered to an essential policy of nonviolence, 
compassion and love. Nonviolence is as close to an absolute as the Engaged 
Buddhist movement comes, but as Nhat Hanh asserts, nonviolence is not a dogma 
or ideology. He explains: 
[P)eople's general understanding of the principle of nonviolence is very superticial. 
People tend to think of nonviolence more as a technique of action, rather than a 
source of strength. There is so much focus on the distinction between nonviolence 
and violence, between nonviolent people and violent people. But in reality it's not 
easy to take sides like that. One can never be sure that one is completely on the side 
96 Dhammapada, no. 5. We may also here ofter the resonating words of Martin Luther King: 
"Hate begets hate; violence begets violence; toughness begets a greater toughness. We must meet 
the forces of hate with the power of love." See J. M. Washington, ed., A Testament of Hope: The 
Essential Writings and Speeches of Martin Luther King (San Fransisco: Harper, 1986). 17. 
97 Nhat Hanh, Creating Tme Peace: Ending Conflict in Yourself. Your Fami~v, Your Community 
and the World. 4. 
98 See King, Thomas Merton and Thich Nhat Hanh: Engaged Spirituality in an Age qf 
Globalisation., particularly pages 155-161. Nhat Hanh, Zen Keys: A Guide to Zen Practice. 157ff. 
And Catherine Ingram, In the Footsteps of Gandhi: Conversations with Spiritual Social Activists 
(Calcutta: Rupa & Co., 1990). For an overview of Gandhi's activism, its connections to Liberation 
Theology, Engaged Spirituality, and a re-visioning of his philosophy in the context of 
globalisation, see Jospeh Prabhu, "Introduction: Gandhi Visionary for a Globalized World," 
ReVision 24, no. I (2001). 2-8. 
99 Nhat Hanh, Zen Krys: A Guide to Zen Practice. 157. 
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of nonviolence or that the other person is completely on the side of violence. 
Nonviolence is a direction, not a separating line. It has no boundaries. 100 
Non-Partisanism and the True Enemy 
The final aspect of Engaged Buddhist ethical theory that we will here examine 
concerns the fundamental stance of non-partisanism demonstrated by the Buddhist 
Struggle Movement, and the non-adversarial ethic which provided its theoretical 
foundation. This is represented by Nhat Hanh's notion ofthe 'True Enemy' . Once 
again, these features have traditional roots in the doctrine of interdependence and 
the experiential awareness of the nonduality of self and other. 
As we have already noted, the Buddhist Struggle Movement sided with neither 
North nor South during the Vietnam War; they maintained a strict position of 
neutrality in their support of the common people. They were on the side of life. 
From Nhat Hanh's perspective, the Vietnam War was a war of ideologies, 
tragically waged on a fratricidal battleground, yielding nothing but mass suffering 
and mindless destruction of the innocent. Nhat Hanh often refers to the bombing 
of a certain village in which, it was rumoured, a 'Viet cong' was being harboured. 
The village and hundreds of civilians were obliterated, while an army general 
justified, "We had to destroy the village in order to save it."101 Such is the inane 
'rationalisation' of ideological warfare. Central to this discourse of rationalisation 
is the goal of victory, which is enshrined as the ultimate end. In Nhat Hanh's 
discourse, however, the notion of victory is depicted as a direct product of 
ignorance. According to Nhat Hanh, victory for one side, and defeat for the other, 
will never create peace and will always be futile. Victory is the antithesis of the 
principles the Buddhist Struggle Movement adhered to: understanding, 
compassion, nonviolence, healing, reconciliation. This tenet is expressed in the 
Dhammapada: "Victory breeds hatred; the vanquished live in sorrow. The 
peaceful live in harmony, giving up both victory and defeat. , wz One of Nhat 
100 Ingram, "Thich Nhat Hanh." p. 87 
101 Nbat Hanb and Berrigan, The Raft Is NoT the Shore: Conversations toward a Buddhist-
Christian Awareness. 22. 
102 Dhammapada, no. 201 
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Hanh's poems reiterates: "Who will be left to celebrate a victory made of blood 
and fire?"10~ 
An Engaged Buddhist analysis of ideological warfare reveals that by definition 
such conflict is grounded in the dire realm of the fixed view (P. diffi, S. dr~!i). As 
we discussed in Chapter Two, the rigid attachment to a static viewpoint- whether 
it is the notion of a separate self, a theistic God, Capitalism or Communism - wi11 
inevitably cause suffering. "The conviction that we know the truth, and that those 
who do not share our beliefs are wrong, bas caused a Jot of harm" Nhat Hanh 
explains. 104 Nhat Hanh proposes that-Father than objectifying our fear, hatred and 
prejudice onto the 'other' , we must transform the roots ofviolence within the self 
through spiritual practice. Our own inner enemies of fear, hatred and prejudice 
can be transformed and the nonduality of self and other can be realised. The Dalai 
Lama has called this "internal disarmament". 105 Nbat Hanh further proposes that 
the realisation of the interdependence of self and other can induce a complete 
empathic nondual identification with both victim and perpetrator, the oppressed 
and the oppressor. This practice of nondual identification reveals that the 
perpetrators of suffering are in as much pain as their victims. 
OfNhat Hanh's body of poetic works, his most recognised and acclaimed poem, 
Please Call Me By My Troe Names, forms a poetic exposition of Nhat Hanh's 
non-adversarial ethic and the compassion for all that is its foundation and 
consequence. It reads in part: 
I am the frog swimming happily in the clear water of a pond, 
And I am also the grass-snake who, approaching in silence, feeds itself on the 
frog. 
I am the child in Uganda, all skin and bones, my legs as thin as bamboo sticks. 
And I am the arms merchant, selling deadly weapons to Uganda. 
103 Thich Nhat Hanh, "Our Green Garden," in Nhat Hanh, Love in Action: Wrifings on Nonviolent 
Social Change. 63 
104 Nhat Hanb, Creating Tme Peace: Ending Conflict in Yourself, Your Fami~v, Your Community 
and rhe World. 11-12. 
105 His Holiness the Dalai Lama XIV, "New Millennium Message," 
www .anglefire .com/on/GEAR2000/hhdl.html (2000). 
ChaJ!..fer 4 195 
I am the twelve-year-Qid girl, refugee on a small boat, who throws herself into the 
ocean after being raped by a sea pirate, 
And I am the sea pirate, my heart not yet capable of seeing and loving . 
. . . Please call me by my true names, so I can wake up, 
And so the door of my heart can be left open, the door of compassion. 106 
Something final should here be said about the nature of good and evil. The 
practice of nondual identification may seem to imply an avoidance of, or aversion 
to, the problem of evil. Indeed, a recurrent and typically Western criticism of 
Buddhism concerns the question of ethical sufficiency in relation to the doctrine 
of emptiness (S. sunyatii). Because the latter proposes the ultimate metaphysical 
groundlessness of all conceptual forms, it has thus appeared to a number of critics 
to present a seamless ultimate ontological reality devoid of any ethical 
commitment, call to action, or distinction between good and evil. This perspective 
can be understood as a reflection of the common popular and academic stereotype 
of Buddhism as other-worldly and socially removed. Such an assertion of the 
apparent incongruence between Mahayana metaphysics and ethics has been 
recognised by David Eckel in the work of John Cobb and George Rupp. 
Commenting on their misrepresentation of Buddhist morality, Eckel states that in 
their interpretations, "the gradual transformation of what is into what ought to be 
is dissolved in the contemplation of the eternal truth reflected equally in every 
moment." In response, Eckel insists that "the understanding of Emptiness is not an 
event outside time, but a continuous emptying in which moral action plays a 
significant, indeed a crucial, part." 107 Continuing Eckel's argument, Masao Abe 
has examined good and evil in relation to the doctrine of the Two Truths. While 
the dualistic and thus conventional truths of good and evil must inevitably 
dissolve at the level of ultimate truth, Abe argues that because emptiness 
ultimately empties itself, ethics are thereby re-established and good and evil are 
realised in their 'suchness' (S. tathata). He suggests, 
106 1bich Nhat Hanh, "Call Me By My Tnte Names" in Nbat Hanh, Love in Action: Writings on 
Nonviolent Social Change.l07. 
107 David Eckel in Masao Abe, "God, Emptiness and Ethics" in Masao Abe, Buddhism and 
lnteifaith Dialogue: Part One of a Two-Volume Sequel to Zen and Western Thought, ed. Steven 
Heine, Two vols., vol. I (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1995). 195ff 
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.. . this unity of the ontological realisation of Emptiness and ethical action rnlL~t 
include the dissolution of conventional ethics and the construction of ethics in light 
of true emptiness.108 
In this 'light', the distinction between good and evil is realised without any 
attachment to one or the other. Abe relates this to the Ch'an Master Ch'ing-yiian 
Wei-hsin's realisation that ultimately, 'Mountains are really Mountains, and 
Waters are really Waters' . So too, in their sucbness, 'Good' is realised as 'Good' , 
and 'Evil' is realised as 'Evil' .109 
It is in this 'light' that we should understand Nhat Hanh 's poem. What Nhat 
Hanh's poem relates is that an awakened understanding of good and evil 
transcends their duality and views them through the eyes of Buddha-nature. Such 
a perception synthesises the dual construction and constitutes a 'goodness' beyond 
good and evil that is called compassion.110 
Engaged Buddhist Forms 
In recognition of the decentralisation of Engaged Buddhism, Sallie King has 
observed: 
There are no institutional or ecclesiastical structures formalising Engaged Buddhism 
as a sect or as a sociopolitical movement, nor are any structures likely to develop. 
They would serve no purpose. Engaged Buddhism exists as an intention and as a 
practice within existing forms of Buddhism. Ill 
While King's observation holds weight, it is evident that Engaged Buddhism is 
initiating dynamics of renewal and adaptation within the 'existing forms of 
Buddhism'. Indeed, in addition to the ethical dimensions of Nhat Hanh' s 
contemporary representation of Buddhism, a renewal of religious fonns 
constitutes a vital aspect of his approach to tradition. Specifically, we will here 
address Nhat Hanh 's renewal of the monastic form and his reconfiguration of the 
precepts. 
108 Ibid. 200. 
109 Ibid. 199. 
110 Winston King, "Motivated Goodness and Unmotivated Perfection in Buddhist Ethics," 
Anglican Theological Review 71, no. 2 ( 1989). 143-152. 
111 King, Being Benevolence: The Social Ethics of Engaged Buddhism. 5. 
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Tiep Bien - The Order of Interheing 
In addition to the School of Youth for Social Service, perhaps Nhat Harth's 
greatest innovation of the Vietnam War era, which has endured with far-reaching 
significance, was his establishment of a new religious order- Tiep Hien, or the 
Order of lnterbeing. On February 5, 1966, at the height of the War and the 
Buddhist Struggle Movement's activism, Nhat Hanh ordained six of the thirteen 
'cedars', the original members of the SYSS. The Order of lnterbeing was 
deliberately constructed to serve as an expression of and vehicle for Nhat Hanh's 
vision and practice of Engaged Buddhism. Moreover, it was instituted as a new 
manifestation of contemporary menasticism~ It was conceived to be neither a 
clerical nor a lay order, but an inclusive, ecumenical community of Buddhist 
practitioners - men and women, clergy and lay; a community of resistance 
committed to a common life of spiritual practice and service. The Order of 
lnterbeing exemplifies the dynamics of continuity and adaptation, which define 
Nhat Hanh 's approach to tradition. To substantiate this claim, we will now 
examine the term tiep hien, and The Charter of the Order of lnterbeing. 
Tiep hien is a Vietnamese translation of a Chinese phrase found in the 
Avata'!zsak£1 Siitra.mlnterbeing, the central neologism ofNhat Hanh's teachings, 
is the English translation of this term. Tiep relates foremost to the sustenance of 
tradition; it has two meanings - 'being in touch with' and 'continuing'. As we 
have seen, being in touch with the reality of the world and the reality of the mind, 
and realising the ultimate unity of world and mind, is a fundamental principle 
within Engaged Buddhism and traditional Buddhism. By utilising this notion to 
define the Order, Nhat Hanh was planting roots in the solid ground and fertile soil 
of Buddhist heritage. In fact, Nhat Hanh has used an example from Christian 
theology to represent the antithesis of the meaning of liep. Against the modem 
112 The A••utUI!lsuka S1i1ra is a Mahayana sutra which was purportedly orated by the Buddha 
innnediately after his enlightenment. As such, it portrays the world as it would appear to the 
enlightened mind - as empty of inherent existence, perfectly interpenetrating, and arising and 
fading away each moment in response to the action of this mind. While only portions of this stura 
exist in Sanskrit, there are two complete Chinese versions and one complete Tibetan version. 
These are: (1) the translation by Buddhabhadra in 60 fascicles, completed in 420 CE (TaisbO 278); 
(2) the translation by Sik~ananda in 80 fascicles, completed in 699 CE (Taisho 279); and (3) the 
Tibetan translation in 45 chapters produced by Jinamitra in the eighth-century (Peking edition, 
vols. 25, 26). 
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Christian dualistic constructions of vertical and horizontal theology - spiritual life 
and being in touch with God informing the vertical dimension, and social life and 
being in touch with humanity informing the horizontal dimension - Nhat Hanh 
contends that "in Buddhism the vertical and horizontal are one."113 Ultimately, to 
'be in touch' is to realise the quintessential Buddhist teaching of the nonduality of 
mind and reality, self and world. The concept of "continuing" deepens and 
strengthens the traditional foundations, referring directly to the continuation of the 
spiritual heritage of Buddhism. Nhat Hanh explains: 
Tiep means to tie two strings together to make a longer string. It means extending 
and perpetuating the career of-enlightenment that was started-·and nourished by the 
Buddhas and bodhisattvas who preceded us ... this is the responsibility of all of us 
who undertake the practice of Buddhism. 114 
Hien refers primarily to the dynamic of adaptation; like tiep it also has two 
meanings - "realising", and "making it here and now". As we have seen, the 
imperative to ' realise' or actualise the Dharma, to adapt Buddhism so that it may 
respond and apply to contemporary contexts, is a central principle within Nhat 
Hanh's teachings and mission. In fact, according to Nhat Hanh, for the continuity 
of tradition to be authentic, it must be realised within a contemporary context, and 
this implies adaptation. Nhat Hanh's main intention has always been to ' realise' 
Buddhism - to make it real - so that it may function as a living tradition that has 
real meaning, purpose, and effect. Thus Nhat Hanh states, "Hien means not to 
dwell or be caught in the world of doctrines and ideas (i.e. static, non-living 
tradition), but to bring our insights into reallife".' 1 ~ Finally, realisation can only 
occur in the present moment, the "here and now". This aspect of hi en relates to 
Nhat Hanh's fundamental teaching of 'being peace'. Ultimately, salvation can 
only be found in the present moment: 
Means and ends cannot be separated ... Based on the insight that means are ends, all 
activities and practices should be entered into mindfully and peacefully . .. The secret 
of Buddhism is to be awake here and now. There is no way to peace; peace is the 
way. There is no way to enlightenment; enlightenment is the way. There is no way to 
liberation; liberation is the way .116 
113 Nbat Hanh, Jnterbeing: Fourteen Guidelines for Engaged Buddhism. 4 
114 Ibid. 4-5 
115 Ibid. 5 Parenthesis mine. 
116 Ibid. 6 
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Evidence of the concurrent sustenance and adaptation of tradition can be found 
throughout The Charter of the Order of lnterbeing. Herein, the aim of the Order is 
defined as the endeavour "to actualise Buddhism by studying, experimenting with, 
and applying Buddhism in modem life." However, special emphasis is also given 
to the traditional role of the bodhisattva idea1. 111 The Charter specifies the Lin-chi 
(Lam Te) school of dhyana Buddhism as its heritage and traditional bedrock. Yet 
its amalgamation of Buddhist teachings is clearly ecumenical or non-sectarian. 
This ecumenical approach is evidenced in the Order's inclusive attitude towards 
religious texts. The Order: 
... does not consider any sutra or group of sutras as its basic scripture(s). It draws 
inspiration from the essence of the Buddhadharma in all sutras. It does not accept the 
systematic arrangements of the Buddhist teachings proposed by any school. The 
Order of lnterbeing seeks to realise the spirit of the Dharma in early Buddhism, as 
well as the development of that spirit through the history of the Sangha, and its life 
and teachings in all Buddhist traditions. 118 
Asserting the authenticity of all siitras as Buddhist, the Order also professes that it 
finds "inspiration from the texts of other spiritual traditions."119 Finally, the 
Order's emphasis upon the critical connection with and perpetuation of the 
spiritual heritage of the Buddhist tradition, and the imperative to adapt this 
heritage to determine contemporary vitality and meaning, is indicated in the 
articulation of the 'Four Spirits'. These form the foundation of the Order's 
philosophy and are said to exist in all Buddhist traditions. 120 These 'spirits' 
amalgamate a number of traditional Buddhist tenets within a wider incentive to 
maintain vitality and deter stagnation through constant renewal generated by 
experimentation and applied spiritual practice: 
The Order considers the principle of nonattachment from views and the principle of 
direct experimentation on interdependent origination through meditation to be the 
two most importBnt guides for attaining true understanding. It considers the principle 
of appropriateness and the principle of skilful means as guides for actions in society. 
The spirit of nonattachment from views and the spirit of direct experimentation lead 
to open-mindedness and compassion, both in the realm of the perception of reality 
and in the realm of human relationships. The spirit of appropriateness and the spirit 
117 Ibid. 105. 
liS Ibid. 
119 Ibid. 
llO Ibid . 
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of skilful means lead to a capacity to be creative and to reconcile, both of which are 
necessary for the service of living beings.121 
By now, it should be becoming clear that the dynamics of continuity and 
adaptation, while seeming contradictory, are actually interrelated - authentic 
continuity of tradition depends upon the renewal and adaptation of that heritage. 
While the application of Buddhism to modem life, the ecumenical amalgamation 
of the Dharma, and the inclusive approach to other religions may seem to 
deconstruct, weaken, or dilute tradition, according to Nhat Hanh these are 
necessary measures in the articulation and practice of a 'living Buddhism'. 
The Fourteen Mindfulness Trainings 
Following the inauguration of the Order of Interbeing, the new community 
established fourteen precepts, or guiding principles. The motivation behind their 
composition was a development and application of the Eightfold Path and other 
aspects of the Buddha's original teachings. They are also based on the 'Ten 
Wholesome Things' - precepts taught by the thirteenth-century Bamboo Forest 
Thien Master True Lam. 122 And yet, they are specifically articulated for a 
contemporary monastic context of peacework and social service, and they 
therefore constitute a distinctive re-visioning of traditional Buddhist morality. As 
Fred Eppsteiner has defined, these fourteen precepts represent "a wonderful blend 
of traditional Buddhist morality and contemporary social concerns" and constitute 
"a true expression of the bodhisattva practice of socially engaged Buddhism.''123 
Originally, these ethical, spiritual, and practical guidelines were known as the 
Fourteen Mindfulness Precepts. However, in 1996, at the first International 
Council of the Order of Interbeing, the text of the precepts was amended in accord 
with the Order's principle of constant renewal. Most significantly, the word 
'precept' was replaced with ' training' to represent the Order's recognition of the 
process that is awakening. According to the Order, spiritual practice is not simply 
121 Ibid. 106. 
122 See Patricia Hunt-Perry and Lyn Fine, "All Buddhism Is Engaged: Thich Nhat Hanh and the 
Order of Interbeing," in Engaged Buddhism in the West, ed. Christopher Queen (Boston, MA: 
Wisdom Publications, 2000). 51. 
123 Fred Eppsteiner, "Editor's Introduction," Nllat Hanh, lnterbeing: Fourteen Guidelines f or 
Engaged Buddhism. ix. 
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a question of doing 'right' and not 'wrong', as implied by the word 'precept', but 
a continual unfolding and development of insight and understanding. The 
imperative form- 'do not' -was also removed, and replaced by statements of 
awareness and commitment. Finally, to express the critical importance of 
collective practice, commitment, and the building of community, the Trainings 
were recomposed in the collective 'we' .124 To demonstrate the impact of these 
changes, we may quote the old and new versions of the Fifth Training. The 
original precept read: 
Do not accumulate wealth while millions are hungry. Do not take as the aim of your 
life fame, profit, wealth, or sem~easure. Live simply and share-time, -energy;· and 
material resources with those who are in need. 
And the new: 
Aware that true happiness is rooted in peace, solidity, freedom, and compassion, and 
not in wealth or fame, we are determined not to take as the aim of our life fame, 
profit, wealth, or sensual pleasure, nor to accumulate wealth while millions are 
hungry and dying. We are committed to living simply and sharing our time, energy, 
and material resources with those in need. We will practice mindful consuming, not 
using alcohol, drugs, or any other products that bring toxins into our own and the 
collective body and consciousness. 
Space does not permit us to examine all the Trainings. (Please refer to the 
Appendix for the full text.) However, we will briefly examine Trainings One, 
Two, Three Ten, and Thirteen, which are relevant to our discussion here. 
The Fourteen Mindfulness Trainings concern the three domains of action in the 
self - the mind, speech, and the body. They are all intended to cultivate 
mindfulness, however the first seven deal specifically with the mind, the next two 
with speech, and the last five with the body. Emerging, as they did, out of the 
'crucible' of the ideological conflict of the Vietnam War, the first three Trainings 
are perhaps most relevant to our discussion. They denounce dogmatism, 
fanaticism, ideological attaclunent, and exclusivism. As an antidote, they promote 
and encourage total openness, absolute tolerance, nonattachment to ideologies 
(even to Buddhism), freedom of thought, nonviolence, and compassionate 
dialogue, as the means of achieving reconciliation and healing. These Trainings 
12~ An old version of the Fourteen Mindfulness 'Precepts' can be found in Nhat Hanh, Being 
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reflect the first two factors of the Eightfold Path- Right View and Right Thought. 
The First Training warns against absolutising any given position, even Buddhist 
positions, as they can lead to narrowness, prejudice, hatred, and even fanatical 
violence. The Second Training carries on from the first, warning against fixed 
knowledge. Nhat Hanh's teachings affirm that enlightenment is a process of 
inquiry, and that fixed knowledge is an obstacle to awakening. Christopher Queen 
has related Nhat Hanh's warnings about fixed views and his advocacy of mental 
and spiritual fluidity with the "beginner's mind" and "unknowing" of Zen 
Buddhism. Accordingly, Queen deems Nhat Hanh's approach as one of 
" h--~-1 . I . . " 125 E . 'l fi d . d I met uuu eg1ca agnostiCism ;- - ssenha1 y, txe v1ews an conceptua 
knowledge are barriers to living mindfully within a consciousness of interbeing. 
Leading on from the first two, the Third Training denounces the imposition of 
views onto others, advocating instead compassionate dialogue and nonviolent 
action. 
The Tenth Mindfulness Training represents non-partisanism, or non-separation 
from all parties. Throughout the Vietnam War, Nhat Hanh maintained that the 
Sangha should not take an active part in politics, as "to transform a religious 
community into a political party is to divert it from its true aim . .. The voice of 
caring and understanding must be distinct from the voice of ambition_"m The 
Thirteenth Mindfulness Training confronts the suffering caused by exploitation, 
social injustice, stealing, and oppression, and implores the practitioner to work for 
"a more liveable society :'127 This Training expresses an awareness of the unjust 
causal relationship between affluent countries and impoverished countries, and 
challenges the inhumanity of making profit through the suffering of humans and 
other beings. Nhat Hanh promotes active generosity, one of the six piiramitiis (S. 
'perfection') of the bodhisattva. He claims: "We can stay close to oppressed 
people and help them protect their right to life and defend themselves against 
Peace. 89-102 
m See Queen, "Engaged Buddhism: Agnosticism, Interdependence, Globalization." 330-333. 
126 Nbat Hanh. lnterbeing: Fourteen Guidelines for Engaged Buddhism. 43-4. 
127 Ibid. 49. 
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oppression and exploitation. The bodhisattva vows are immense, and each of us 
can vow to sit with the bodhisattvas on their life rafts."128 
Nhat Hanb has recently suggested that the Fourteen Mindfulness Trainings can 
provide ethical and spiritual guidance within any religious context, and even 
secular contexts. Indeed, as Fred Eppsteiner has perceived; 
The Order of lnterbeing [and the Fourteen Mindfulness Trainings] makes real what 
is implicit in Buddhism and all the world's great religious traditions: that 
compassionate living, engaged in society, is most efiective if based on the techniques 
for centering the self and the appreciation of the sacredness of all things great and 
smaiL.Ihe. teachings and practice of Buddhism engaged in society can help us all.129 
The Actualisation of Tradition 
As we have seen, Nhat Hanh's approach to tradition affirms the particularity and 
integrity of Buddhism while it dismantles any ossified traditional structures or 
lifeless bastions of orthodoxy and allows for a fluidity and flux of forms. This he 
calls the 'actualisation' of tradition. Nhat Hanh's perspective of actualisation 
offers a valuable contribution to the debate surrounding the question of the 
authenticity of Engaged Buddhism as an expression of 'traditional Buddhism' .130 
From the perspective of actualisation, Engaged Buddhism can be seen as neither 
continuous nor discontinuous with the Buddhist tradition, and this circumscribes 
its authenticity. In other words, Engaged Buddhism can be understood as 
discontinuous because it reconfigures traditional forms, but because this 
reconfiguration is prescribed by such traditional doctrines as skilful means and 
nonattachment, Engaged Buddhism in fact actualises Buddhism and so can be 
seen as continuous. According to this perspective, Nhat Hanh's particular 
interpretation of Buddhism is in fact validated and prescribed by tradition itself. In 
conclusion to this chapter, let us substantiate this claim with reference to some 
examples ofNhat Hanh's own articulation of his specific approach to tradition. 
128 Ibid. 51. 
129 Fred Eppsteiner, "Editor's Introduction," Ibid. xi. 
13
° For an overview of this debate see Thomas Freeman Yarnall, ''Engaged Buddhism: New and 
Improved!(?) Made in the U.S.A. Of Asian Materials," Journal of Buddhist Ethics Online 
Conference, no. April 7-14 (2000). 
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Since his early years in Vietnam as a young novice and a social activist, armed 
with the radical ideas of a non-conformist, an objective towards the revitalisation 
of the religious heritage of Buddhism has been a driving force within Nhat Hanh's 
career. One of his earliest books, a short treatise written in Vietnamese and later 
translated into French as Aujourd'hui le Bouddhisme,131 gave expression to this 
compelling impetus. Thomas Merton has described this work as a "militant 
criticism of traditional and conservative Buddhism.''132 Indeed, within this work 
Nhat Hanh denounces the ossification of traditional Buddhism, bound within the 
rigid structures and dogmatic blindness of inert authoritarian orthodoxy. 
According to Nhat Haah this· kind of Buddhism has m.nelevance in the modern 
world. Rather, as the foundational premise of this work contends, the survival of 
Buddhism as a living religion, one that has real contemporary meaning, 
significance, vitality, and purpose, is dependent upon its capacity for renewal, 
adaptation and actualisation. Nbat Hanh argues that without actualisation, 
Buddhism can have no real meaning or purpose within the modem world. This 
actualisation of tradition cannot occur, Nhat Hanh argues, solely through classical 
monastic textual study, but must involve an existential engagement with that 
which is at the heart of Buddhism - suffering. In a traditional context, entering 
into the experience of suffering, looking deeply into the causes of suffering, and 
cultivating the means to alleviate that suffering, would occur within the interior 
realms of the mind and within the confines of a monastery. However, within the 
modern Vietnamese context within which Nhat Hanh was writing, the imposition 
and infliction of Western civilisation via its agents of persistent colonialism and 
interminable warfare was creating very real suffering beyond monastic walls. 
Thus, Nhat Hanh called for Buddhism to respond to this suffering - to aid in the 
transformation of the lives ofVietnamese people in modem situations and thereby 
be actualised as a living religion in the present time. Nhat Hanh explains the 
dimensions of transformation and revitalisation involved in the ' enterprise of 
actualisation': 
131 Thich Nhat Hanh, Aujourd'hui Le Bouddhisme, trans. Lc: Van Hao (from Vietnamese) (Cholon, 
South Vietnam: La Boi Press, 1965). The English translation of the title from the: French is 
Buddhism Today, although this work has not yet been translated into English. The original 
Vietnamese title is Dao Phat Ngay Nay. 
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Le probleme qui se pose au Bouddhisme consiste moins a se moderniser qu'a 
s' acmaliser. L 'enterprise d 'acmalisation implique une refonte radicale des stmctures, 
une destmction des chaines formalistes qui liberera le contenu bouddhique. L 'heure 
vient oil le croyant se doit de s'engager dans Ia societe et d'y promouvoir une prise 
de conscience lucide qui est le point de depart d\me ideologie claire, opportune et 
urgente, capable de repondre aux besoins de l'homme d ' aujourd'hui, de detmire ses 
dotlles, angoisses et souffrances, de vaincre les fausses doctrines qui menacent 
d'ecraser sa liberte, son bonheur et sa paix. ll faut inventer pour le Bouddhisme des 
formes de vie nouvelles et rationelles qui puissent perpetuer les belles traditions 
creatrices d'une religion millt!naire. m 
In another of Nhat Hanh's early works that we have already had occasiOn to 
discuss - Vietnam: The Lotus in the Sea of Fire - this movement towards the 
revitalisation and actualisation of Buddhism is further elaborated and Clarified. 
Here, Nhat Hanh proposes that a fluidity of forms is necessary for the continuity 
of the essence of the tradition. Furthermore, he explains that such an approach is 
sanctioned and authorised by the doctrines of iJI!permanence and non-absolutism 
proclaimed by the Buddhadharma itself. He relates : 
The Vietnamese Buddhists ... conceive that this actualisation is necessary. Each 
country, each time, each place, has its own form of living conditions, and Jiving 
religion must change and adapt to these so that it may be a part of the social milieu 
of its time. The fomls of Buddhism must change so that the essence of Buddhism 
remains unchanged. This essence consists of the living principles that cannot bear 
any specific formulation. Being imprisoned in such forms would mean that the 
essence of Buddhism would be diluted and weakened, so that the discovery of new 
forms for Buddhism is in fact the way in which Buddhism itself may be 
perpetuated. 134 
Indeed, as we have seen, Buddhism's capacity for adaptation and reformation 
within new contexts has been a determining factor in its survival and perpetuation 
throughout centuries of cultural transmission. The essence of Buddhist teachings 
affirms that reality is transient, changeable and conditional, and warnings resound 
132 Thomas Merton, "Buddhism and the Modem World" in Thomas Merton, Mystics and Zen 
Masters (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1967). 286. 
133 Nhat Hanh, Aujourd'hui Le Bouddhisme. 132-133. My translation: 
"The problem which has arisen for Buddhism consists less of the need for mod<?misation than of 
th<? need for achwlisation. The enterprise of actualisation implies a radical recasting of the 
sfnlcWres {of Buddhism), a destruction of the formal chains, which will release the contents of 
Buddhism. The hour has come when [Buddhism) must engage in society and promote a lucid 
awakening, which may fonn the foundation of a clear ideology, opportune and urgent, able to meet 
the needs of man of today, to destroy his dor1bts, anguishes and sufferings, to overcome those 
distorted doctrines which threaten to cmsh his freedom, his happiness and his peace. It is 
necessary to invent new and rational vita/forms for Buddhism, which are able to perpehtafe the 
beautiful creative traditions of this ancient religion." 
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about the dangers of conceiving otherwise. These warnings apply not only to the 
error of reifying the self as a permanent and independent entity, but also to the 
reification of Buddhism itself as something unconditioned by historical and 
cultural contexts or resistant to change. The Dharma is not a fixed ideology but a 
path, or a way (P. nwggu; S. miirgu) which, before arriving in the midst of social 
activism and political protest, traversed many different terrains. 
As we shall discuss in the following chapter, the expanse of Western religious 
landscape is the most recent terrain across which Buddhism has found its way. In 
a more recent publication; Being Peace, Nhat Hanh refer~ttrthe integral necessity 
for adaptation, acculturation and actualisation if Buddhism is to continue as a 
living tradition in the West. Exemplifying skilful means, Nhat Hanh reiterates his 
assertion that the forms of Buddhism must evolve so that they may be contextually 
and culturally applicable and may convey the real meaning of the tradition. This, 
Nhat Hanh maintains once again, is sanctioned by the content of the tradition and 
is what will define Western Buddhism as authentically Buddhist: 
Buddhism is not one. The teaching of Buddhism is many. When Buddhism enters 
one counuy, that country always acquires a new form of Buddhism ... Buddhism, in 
order to be Buddhism, must be suitable, appropriate to the psychology and the 
culture of the society that it serves.m 
Nhat Hanh' s approach, in this sense, exemplifies the traditional doctrine and 
pedagogic tool of upiiya (S. 'skilful means') or what Nhat Hanh refers to as 
'Dharma doors' : 
A teaching, in order to bring about understanding and compassion, must reflect the 
needs of people and the realities of society. To do this, it must meet two criteria: it 
must conform with the basic tenets of Buddhism, and it must be truly helpful and 
relevant. It is said that there are 84,000 Dharma doors through which one can enter 
Buddhism. For Buddhism to continue as a living source of wisdom and peace, even 
more doors should be opened. 136 
Dharma doors include "images and methods created by intelligent teachers to 
show the Buddha's Way and guide people in their efforts to practice the Way in 
134 Nhat Hanh, Vietnam: The Lotus in the Sea of Fire. I 06 
m Nhat Hanh, Being Peace. 84. 
136 Nhat Hanh, l nlerbeing: Fourleen Guidelines for Engaged Buddhism. 8. 
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their own particular circumstances."137 In presenting this notion, Nhat Hanh is 
adhering to the traditional methodological principle of the verbal utility rather 
than the absolute truth of doctrines. As be explains it, "We cannot make any 
statement about the true nature of reality. Words and ideas can never convey 
reality .... We must go beyond all concepts if we want to be in touch with the true 
nature of things."138 We have already had occasion to discuss this doctrinal 
perspective, which has been represented in the proposals and practices of such 
Buddhist pluralists as Sallie King, Rita Gross, and the Dalai Lama. In articulating 
his own interpretation of this traditional principle, Nhat Hanh refers to some 
familiar analogies and parables. 
In his commentary on an early scripture called the Siitra on Knowing the Better 
Way to Catch a Snake, 139 Nhat Hanh refers to the simile of the Snake and the 
analogy of the Raft. As he explains, the simile of catching the snake represents the 
danger of absolutism: 
There are probably not many teachers who would compare their own teachings to a 
poisonous snake. There must not be many who would say that their teachings can be 
dangerous if not understood and practiced correctly. The Buddha never said that his 
teachings were the absolute truth. He called them skilful means to guide us in the 
practice. The way to make use of these teachings is with our own intelligence and 
skill. 
The Buddha described himself at other times as a doctor whose teachings are a 
kind of medicine. If the medicine is used correctly, it can help cure sickness. But if it 
is misused, it can threaten a patient's life.'40 
The warning against an uncritical absolutism is reiterated through the simile of the 
Raft, which emphasises the issue of nonattachment to the teachings. Nhat Hanh 
explains the potential danger: "The Buddha teaches impermanence, no-self, 
emptiness, and nirvana not as theories, but as skilful means to help us in our 
practice. If we take these teachings and use them as theories we will be 
137 Ibid. 
138 Thich Nhat Hanh, The Diamond That Cuts through Illusion: Commentaries on the 
Prajnaparamita Diamond Sutra (Berkeley, CA: Parallax Press, 1992}. I 09. 
139 This s11tra is recorded in Pali in the Alagaddupama Sutta, which means "Snake Simile''. It is in 
the Majjhima Nikiiya , sutta no. 22. It is also recorded in Chinese as the Arittha Siitra. This 
Chinese version is in the Madhyama Agama, sutra no. 220. In the Taisho Revised Tripitaka, the 
Madhyama Agama is no. 26. This sutra was translated from Sanskrit to Chinese by Gautama 
Sanghadeva in 397-398 CE. 
140 Thich Nhat Hanh, Thundering Silence: Sutra on Knowing the Belfer Way to Catch a Snake 
(Berkeley, CA: Paralla1t Press, 1993}. 29. 
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trapped." 141 Nhat Hanh explains that to be caught in the form of the teachings, or 
the words, means that one has not been in touch with the substance, or the 
experiential meaning and purpose of the teaching: 
Even if we undertake the crossing, if we are attached to what we learn, we have not 
understood it properly, and we have been bitten by the snake. In this case, a true raft 
is not available to us, and therefore we cannot cross the river ... All teachings are 
ofJered as skilti.1l means to help us along the path. They are not absolute truth. If we 
do not know how to use these teachings skilfully, we will be enslaved by them.142 
Nhat Hanh further relates the simile of the Raft to that of the finger pointing to the 
moon, 
143 
explaining: "These pointing fingers are not the moon itself, just as the 
raft is not the other shore. The teachings of the Buddha are not in themselves the 
experience of enlightenment, just as a map of Paris is not the city of Paris 
itself. "144 
According to Nhat Hanh, the quintessence of the Snake Siitra is contained within 
the Buddha's statement: "It is necessary to let go of all the true teachings, not to 
mention teachings that are not true." Fixed knowledge is only ever an obstacle to 
true insight and awakening, Nhat Hanh explains; attachment to views perpetuates 
the illusion of separation, blinds one to the true nature of interdependence, and 
further, has the dangerous tendency to become ideologised. To illustrate his point, 
Nhat Hanh cites the Sa1Jzyuttu Nikaya narrative of the ascetic Vacchagotta's visit 
to the Buddha - upon asking the Buddha whether there is a self, Vacchagotta 
receives nothing but silence in response. Nhat Hanh calls this a "thundering 
silence" and compares it to the roar of a lion. As the Buddha later explains to a 
disciple: 
The teaching of no-self that I give the bhikshus is a means to guide you to look 
deeply in your meditation. It is not an ideology. If you make it into an ideology, you 
will be caught in it. I believe the ascetic Vacchagotta was looking for an ideology 
and not for a teaching to help him in the practice. So I remained silent.145 
141 Ibid. 31. 
142 Ibid. 32-33. 
143 This simile is found in the SiirungumtJ Siirra, which proclaims: "If someone uses a finger to 
point out the moon to another person, if that person takes the finger to be the moon, he will not 
only fail to see the moon, but he will also fail to see the finger." (Taisho 945). It also features in 
the Lurikii1•utilru Srirro: "All the teachings in the slitras are fingers pointing to the moon." (Taisho 
640) 
144 Nhat Hanb, Thundering Silence: Surra on Knowing the Better Way to Catch a Snake. 33 . 
14~ Ibid. 37. 
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In addition to the ancient scriptures, Nhat Hanh's anti-ideological non-absolutist 
approach to tradition can be attributed to the context of ideological warfare in 
which his teachings evolved. As we have already seen, this approach is reflected 
in the first three of the Fourteen Mindfulness Trainings. It is also represented in 
the Order of lnterbeing's Charter, which explains the danger of ideological 
attachment not only for the individual but also for the collective: 
A person caught in a doctrine or system of thought can sacrifice millions of lives in 
order to put into practice his theory, which he considers the absolute truth, the unique 
path that can lead humankind to happiness. With a gun in hand, a person can kill 
one, five, or even ten people. But holding onto a doctrine or a system of thought, one 
can kill tens of thousand.u>(people.146 
So resolute is Nhat Hanh in this perspective that he once, and now famously, 
proclaimed: "If you have to choose between Buddhism and peace, then you must 
choose peace. Because if you choose Buddhism you sacrifice peace, and 
Buddhism does not accept that. "147 In this proclamation, we arrive at the heart of 
Nhat Hanh 's approach to tradition. To reify Buddhism as an ideological absolute, 
whilst sacrificing peace, would be the antithesis of all the Buddha taught. As such 
texts as the Heart Sutra express, the realisation of interdependence and emptiness 
must encompass Buddhism itself. Indeed, just as the Hearl Siilra 'empties' the 
doctrines of dependent origination and of the Four Noble Truths, so too does Nhat 
Hanh empty Buddhism itself. He states: "Buddhadharma is made of non-
Buddhadharma elements. "148 
From Nhat Hanh's perspective, engagement is an inevitable outcome of any 
authentic understanding or actualisation of Buddhism. He has stated: "Buddhism 
is already engaged Buddhism. If it is not, it is not Buddhism. "149 Indeed, within 
the context of the Vietnam War, as a monk of deep conviction, astute intelligence, 
and profound insight, but without adequate leadership from his religious 
institution, Nhat Hanh sought guidance instead his own inner actualisation of the 
146 Ibid. 38. 
147 Nhat Hanh and Berrigan, The Raft Is Nor the Shore: Conversations toward a Buddhist-
Christian Awareness. 23. 
148 Nhat Hanh, The Diamond That Cuts through Illusion: Commentaries on the Prajnaparamita 
Diamond Surra. 87. 
149 Hunt-Perry and Fine, "All Buddhism Is Engaged: Thich Nhat Hanh and the Order of 
Interbeing." 36. 
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Buddha's teachings. Certainly, Nhat Hanh received some Western education, was 
definitely influenced by Christianity, and he was undoubtedly compelled by a 
perceived need to respond to modernity. However, I would suggest that the 
evolution of Engaged Buddhism has not involved Western imperialism or 
European hegemony, but rather, the traditional dynamics of continuity and 
adaptation, in COI\iunction with a very specific situation of suffering, and a degree 
of cross-cultural dialogue and exchange. The Engaged Buddhism of the Vietnam 
War was not simply a case of Buddhism being Westernised, modernised, or 
colonised, but rather a profound manifestation of authentic, actualised tradition. 
This--vitality o-f tradition is what is ultimately valued in Nhat Hanh's-discourse as 
indicative of real spirituality and authentic belief - the capacity for religion to 
have effective meaning and to generate tangible compassion that is actualised in 
the world. 
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On Modernity: 
Spirituality, Community, and Dialogue 
Humankind has become a very dangerous species. 
Thich Nhat Hanh 
MeditaUon is to see deeply into things, to see hol-i' we can change, how we can 
transform our situation. To transform our situation is also to transfonn our mind5. 
To transform our minds is also to transform our situation, because the situation is 
mind and mind is situation. Awakening is important. The nature of the bombs, the 
nature of injustice, the nature ~f the weapons, and the nature ~four own beings 
are the same. This is the real meaning of engaged Buddhism. 
Thich Nhat Hanh 
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At the beginning of the third millennium, Tbicb Nbat Hanh issued a clarion call 
for the imperative reinstatement of the domain of the spiritual as the only means 
of addressing global conflict and stemming the torrents of suffering. Addressing 
an international, interreligious audience, Nhat Hanh declared: 
It has been said that the twenty-first century will be a century of spirituality, and J 
think it must be a century of spirituality if we are to survive. There has been so much 
violence, so much suffering, so much despair, confusion, and fear. So it must be a 
century of spirituality, or no century at al1 .1 
While displaying a deceptive simplicity, which we may now recogmse as a 
characteristic feature of Nbat Hanh's discourse, the words of the contemporary 
Buddhist teacher resound with a sense of urgency and conviction. Following his 
exile from Vietnam and his entrance onto the world stage, Nbat Hanh bas 
continued to reinterpret and actualise the Buddhist tradition in an attempt to adapt 
and apply it to the specific cultural context of Western modernity. Within this 
context, Nhat Hanh has encountered much human suffering. This he attributes to 
the secular, individualistic, nationalistic, and anthropocentric ideologies that have 
(mis)informed the endeavours of modernity. Nhat Hanh's approach towards 
modernity bears specific import within the wider framework of this investigation 
as the principal elements of his diagnosis of the malaise of modernity, and the 
cure he prescribes, directly inform his approach to religious diversity, and will be 
utilised in the following chapter towards our affirmation of a position of Buddhist 
pluralism. 
Before we can begin to examine Nhat Hanh's particular diagnosis and cure, we 
must first locate his critique in relation to modernity itself. Accordingly, this 
chapter will commence with a delineation of the dimensions of modernity and the 
modern Western worldview, and a more specific discussion of the place and 
meaning of religion and spirituality within these perimeters. Once we have located 
Nhat Hanb theoretically, we will then locate him geographically by picking up the 
narrative of his life-story following his exile from Vietnam and his relocation in 
1 Thich Nhat Hanh, "Spirituality in the Twenty-First Century," in Friends on the Path: Living 
Spiritual Communities, ed. Titicb Nhat Hanh and Jack Lawlor (Berkeley, CA: Parallax Press, 
2002). 9. See also Chapter 5: "A Century of Spirituality" in Thich Nhat Hanh, Calming the Feaiful 
Mind: A Zen Response to Terrorism (Berkeley, CA: Parallax Press, 2005). 87-98. 
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the West. We wiH then proceed onto a specific exploration of Nhat Hanh's 
critique of modernity. While aspects of this critique are related to Nhat Hanh's 
earlier teachings of Engaged Buddhism and his analysis of the Vietnam War, his 
diagnosis of modernity's ills is wider in scope and is thus drawn from a greater 
number of sources. These will be essentially primary sources, however, as this 
area of Nhat Hanh 's teachings is, to date, largely untreated in the extant scholarly 
literature. Specifically, our investigation ofNhat Hanb's critique of modernity will 
assess three interrelated domains of his discourse, constituting analysis and 
diagnosis at the level of the psychological, the social, and the global. 
Following our exploration of Nhat Hanb's diagnosis, we will turn to an 
examination of his cure. In fact, the entirety ofNhat Hanb's later interpretation of 
Buddhism can be understood as an offering of a solution to a 'world gone wrong'. 
This solution will be examined in reference to three central principles within Nhat 
Hanh 's discourse- spirituality, community, and dialogue. These three principles 
correspond with the three arenas of Nhat Hanb's diagnosis: spirituality offers a 
cure to the psychological suffering of modernity; community represents a solution 
to societal ills in modernity; and dialogue proposes a means towards the 
reconciliation of global interreligious discord, and indeed conflict of all kinds. In 
addition to textual analysis, we will also examine these principles within the 
context of Plum Village, Nbat Hanh's meditation and retreat centre and home to 
his core monastic community in south-west France. 
Modernity, Crisis, and Religious Resurgence 
For the purposes of this discussion, two related but distinct ways of understanding 
modernity need to be defined. The first understands modernity in a 'non-reified' 
sense, which can best be explicated in reference to the etymological foundations 
of the term. These lie in the Latin modernus. Modernus itself is derived from the 
adverb modo, which since the late fifth-century was used in equivalence with 
nunc, or 'now'.
2 Moreover, the term modernus was used during the Middle Ages 
as a whole to distinguish one's status from the antiqui and to define the Christian 
present from the Pagan past. Gustavo Benavides has recognised the 'trans-
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epochal' usage of the term, noting a number of disparate eras, including the 
Renaissance, the twelfth-century, and the late seventeenth-century, which all 
identified themselves in relation to an antiquity that was sometimes deemed naive 
and sometimes venerated.3 As the critical theorist Jiirgen Habermas confirms: 
[T]he term 'modem' again and again expresses the consciousness of an epoch that 
relates itself to the past of antiquity, in order to view itself as the result of a transition 
from the old to the new. 4 
In other words, this non-reified understanding of modernity can refer to any 
cultural-historic context that identifies itself in relation to the past - any past -
thus it could just as easily be applied to the age of the Roman Empire as to Meiji 
~ Japan: 
The application of this understanding of modernity to the recent intellectual and 
social movements of Western culture has generated a 'reified' conception of 
modernity. Modernity, in this respect, defines a specific socio-cultural, 
geopolitical, and historic entity. Moreover, as the foundation of the 
We/tanschaaung of the modern West, this understanding of modernity can be 
defined by certain ideologies, such as reason and progress, science and 
technology, individualism and humanism, democracy and capitalism. There is a 
general consensus that this particular culture of Western modernity has its origins 
in the European Renaissance and the Protestant Reformation of the fifteenth , 
sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries. It encompasses the Scientific Revolution, the 
Enlightenment, and the Industrial Revolutions; it witnesses the rise of capitalism, 
socialism, nationalism, and colonialism, culminating in the two World Wars, and, 
2 See Gustavo Benavides, "Modernity and Buddhism," in Encyclopedia of Buddhism: M-Z, ed. 
Robert E. Buswell, Jr. (New York: Macmi11an Reference USA, 2003). 544. 
3 Gustavo Benavides, "Modernity," in Critical Terms for Religious Sh1dies, ed. Mark C. Taylor 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998). 
4 Jtlrgen Habennas, "Modernity - an Incomplete Project," in The Anti-Aesthetic, ed. Hal Foster 
(Seattle: Bay Press, 1983). 3. 
5 See John Wilson, "Modernity," in Encyclopedia of Religion: Mary - Ndemb11 Religion, ed. 
Lindsay Jones (Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2005). 6109. Wilson distinguishes between 
reified and pre or nonreified interpretations of modernity, but in a somewhat different fashion as to 
how I have utilised the terms. Wilson suggests that a nonreified conception of modernity can be 
used as a "means of recognising that cultural change and awareness of that change are pervasive in 
contemporary societies." He argues that it is more helpful to think of modernity in this way, as 
opposed to a reitied conception that depicts modernity as a "spiritual medium in contemporary lite 
that necessarily rivals religious traditions." While I agree with Wilson' s analysis, I have used the 
concepts of nonreified and reified to represent modernity as a trans-historic and trans-cultural 
signitier, and a culturally and historically specific signifier. 
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fmally, decolonisation, globalisation, and the Western 'triumph' of democracy. A 
definition of modernism offered by Harry Oldmeadow will here serve us well: 
Modernism ... we may loosely define as the prevalent assumptions, values, and 
attitudes of a world-view fashioned by the most pervasive intellectual and moral 
influences of recent European history, an outlook in conformity with the Zeitgeist of 
the times.6 
Adding specifics to Oldmeadow's definition, Elisabeth Ellis perceives modernity 
as a ·condition ', aspects of which are associated with "historical trends arising out 
of Cartesian philosophy, industrial capitalism, revolutionary politics, and the 
cultural changes of the turn of the century."7 Modernity has also been defined as 
an 'axial period' or an 'axial age'. In 1953, Karl Jaspers asserted, "Man seems to 
have started from scratch four times," demarcating the Neolithic age, the earliest 
civilisations, the emergence of the great empires, and modernity.8 Similarly, 
Arpad Szakolczai and Laszlo Fustos have observed: 
An axial moment occurs whenever there is a global collapse of the established order 
of things, including the political system, the social order of everyday life, and the 
system of beliefs ... Such a period happened in t11e first cenn1ries (collapse of tl1e 
Roman republic and rise of Christianity), in the fifth-seventh centuries (collapse of 
the Roman Empire and rise of Islam), in the fifteenth - sixteenth centuries (the 
waning of the Middle Ages, Renaissance, and Protestantism), and finally the two 
major stages of the dissolution of absolutist politics and the traditional European 
social order, Enlighterunent and socialism.9 
It needs to be qualified that this understanding of modernity as a specific temporal 
and cultural era, conceived during the Renaissance and delivered by the 
Enlightenment, ought not to deny the reality of alternative and concurrent 
modernities taking place beyond the Western realm. Without refuting the advance 
of 'Europeanisation' or 'Westernisation' , this understanding of modernity should 
not assume the privilege or superiority of the West as modem. 
6 Kenneth ("Hany") Oldmeadow, Traditionalism: Religion in the Light of the Penmnial 
Philosophy (Colombo: The Sri Lankan Institute of Traditional Studies, 2000). I I 7. 
7 Elisabeth Ellis, "Modernity: Overview," in New Dictionary of the History of ldeas -
Machiave/Jism to Phrenology, ed. Maryanne Horowitz (Detroit: Charles Scribner's Sons, 2005). 
1473. 
8 Karl Jaspers, The Origin and Goal of Histor-y, in Yves Lambert, "Religion in Modernity as a New 
Axial Age: Secularization or New Religious Fonm? ," Sociology of Religion 60, no. 3 ( 1999). 304 
9 Arpad Szakolczai & Laszlo FUstos, 'Value Systems in Axial Moments: A Comparative Analysis 
of24 European Countries,' in Ibid. 305-6 
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The values that characterise and govern the culture of the modern West are hostile 
to the authority sources, leaders, and worldviews of religions. 10 The ideologies of 
modernity have the tendency to denounce the sacred, to disenfranchise tradition, 
and to disseminate spiritual impoverishment, a tendency that is today widely 
acknowledged. In a recent publication title-d Religion in Late Modernity, Robert 
Neville has observed a number of characteristics of the modem West, which have 
effectively undermined the traditional or religious worldview. These include: the 
notion of the autonomous individual, who is the ground of authority, and whose 
identity is separable from the history and identity of the group; the conception of 
the person as a duality of mind-and body, er like a machine or·o~t that can be 
controlled and manipulated; the belief that nature and social systems can be 
manipulated and controlled; and the notion that only that which is observable and 
measurable belongs to the real world.11 Such views find their origins in the 
Reformation, which, according to Steve Bruce, hastened the rise of individualism 
and rationalism, two currents that fundamentally changed the meaning of religion 
in modernity: 
[I)ndividualism threatened the communal basis of religious belief and behaviour, 
while rationality removed many of the purposes of religion and rendered many of its 
beliefs implausible.12 
These currents were later reified by the Enlightenment's challenge to the moral, 
social, and philosophical authority of the Church. Such philosophers as John 
Locke and Immanuel Kant argued for the segregation of religious discourse and 
authority from the public domains of politics, economics, science, and philosophy, 
so that such secular realms might be unimpeded by religious arguments and 
conflicts. The consequent process of religious removal was further reinforced by 
such ideologies as Francis Bacon's "knowledge is power," August Comte's 
affirmation of the historical inevitability of human progress, Karl Marx's 
"humanisation of nature," and the theory of social Darwinian competitiveness. 13 
Ultimately, this process evolved into the ideology of secularism, which instigated 
10 See Robert C. Neville, Religion in Late Modernity (Albany, NY: State University of New York 
Press, 2002). 149 
II Jbid. 145-6 
12 Steve Bmce, From Cathedrals to Cults: Religion in the Modern World (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1996). 230 
13 Tu Wei-Ming, "The Mirror of Modernity and Spiritual Resources for the Global Conununity," 
Sophia 34, no. I (1995). 80 
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the privatisation or individualisation of religion and was predicted as the logical. 
inexorable conclusion of the force of reason. As Gary Bouma has explained. 
"From the Enlightenment through Darwin, Freud and the founders of sociology 
the assumption has been that with the expansion of science. the sphere and power 
of religion would decline." 14 Indeed, as modernity advanced. the secular ideology 
of the progress of history, and the assertion of the finality of science as the agent 
of knowledge, usurped the authority of religion and became what the postmodern 
theorist Jean-Francais Lyotard has called •grand narratives', imparting great 
promises of freedom and self-fulfilment. 15 
Fuelled by the forces of reason and secularism, science and technology, the great 
ideological juggernaut of modernity advanced through the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, and into the twentieth-century. Here, however, it faltered in 
the face of the so-called 'crisis of modernity'. J. L. Mehta has explained the 
ultimate failure of the modernist project: 
Events and trends in European and world history have .. . shaken that simple faith fin 
progress] and its optimistic outlook on the future. The actual c.onsequences of the 
French and later revolutions, the two world wars, the rise of new despotisms and the 
purges and concentration camps that accompany them, the atom bomb, all of these 
have more than justified the gloomy forebodings of Flaubert and Baudelaire, 
Dostoevsky and Tolstoy, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. Crisis, catastrophe and 
extinction have overtaken civilisations and cultures in the past. 16 
Indeed, modernity's predictions of material fulfilment, rational and moral 
perfection, the 'triumph' of empiricism and science over superstition and religion, 
and the ascendancy of the eschatological faith in progress, were essentially 
undermined and proven illusive by the eventual bankruptcy of reason. 
Philosophers such as Nietzsche affrrmed an underlying nihilism within Western 
history, and a cold spiritual void at the heart of the modernist quest was revealed. 
Commenting on the philosopher Martin Heidegger' s insights into modern Western 
history, Mehta, again, observes: 
14 Gary D. Boluna, "From Hegemony to Pluralism: Managing Religious Diversity in Modernity 
and Post-Modernity," Australian Religious St11die.s Review ( 1999). 17 
1 ~ Jean-Fran~ois Lyotard, lA Condition Po.stmoderne: Rapport Sur Le Savoir (the Postmodern 
Condition: A Report on Knowledge) (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1979). 
16 J. L. Mehta, India and the West: The Problem of Understanding, S111dies in World Religions 
(Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1985). 74 
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Accompanying "progress" as its chill and deadening shadow is the spirirual night 
falling on mankind, "the darkening of the world, the flight of the Gods, the 
degradation of the earth," as Heidegger describes it. Man has become the subject of 
history, in this age of technology, objectifying the real and having it in his grip, 
calculating, planning and ordering, seeking to enlarge his domain over the realm of 
events by conceptual ising and representing them .... The dimension of the Holy ... 
has vanished; Nature has ntmed into a mere play of forces predictable and 
controllable by man; things have become mere objects, and history the narration and 
grasping of the facntal and objectifiable, instead of that invisible happening that has 
brought world-history to pass.17 
A number of theories, discourses, and proposals have manifested in response to 
the crisis of modernity, the bankruptcy of reason, and the Weberian 
'disenchantment of the world'. Most obvious has been the critical discourse of 
postmodemity, which has attempted to deconstruct the false edifices of the 
modern era. The social critique of postmodernism has pierced the illusions of 
modernist 'meta-narratives' (Lyotard), the linguistically constructed nature of the 
subject (Derrida), and the fabrication of reality through 'disciplines of power' 
(Foucault). While these postmodern and poststructuralist critiques have been a 
necessary antidote to modernist myopia, their perspectives, as we have already 
discussed, are generally deracinated and function according to a hermeneutics of 
suspicion. In particular, as David Loy has observed, postmodern critiques 
encompass a "secular suspicion of spiritual perspectives."18 Indeed, it is arguable 
whether any real alternatives to modernity are offered by the postmodernists, or 
whether, in contrast, Nietzschean nihilism is simply perpetuated. As Richard Falk 
has observed, the knowledge gained from critical postmodern discourse "tends to 
leave us stranded on [an] island of critical insight, producing over time a disabling 
sense of despair and futility."19 
In contrast to postmodern critiques, and in conflict with the predictions of 
modernist secularism, a different kind of response to the crisis of modernity has 
emerged in the form of social commentary and criticism, coupled with 
constructive suggestions and proposals, issuing from a ground of religious 
tradition. Such proposals are reflective of the contemporary global resurgence or 
reinstatement of religion. 
17 Ibid. 81-2 
18 David Loy, The Great Awakening: A Buddhist Social Theory (Boston: Wisdom, 2003). 9 
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Within the context of the late modern West, religious resurgence exemplifies a 
"widespread disillusionment with a 'modernity' which reduces the world to what 
can be perceived and controlled through reason, science, technology, and 
bureaucratic rationality, and leaves out considerations of the religious, the 
spiritual, and the sacred."20 The modern Western religious landscape is therefore 
witnessing the consolidation of specific traditional structures, the reaffirmation of 
diverse religious identities, and the emergence and growth of numerous spiritual 
movements. Beyond Western contexts, this resurgence can be understood as a 
response to the politically and culturally colonising Western endeavour to 
establish a global hegemony. In many post-colonial contexts beyend the First 
World the return to religion encompasses an affirmation of native culture, as 
opposed to an emulation of the West. Lacking the democracy and development 
once assured by the promise of the modern secular state, many countries are 
turning to religion in revolt against the West, and in search of national identity and 
cultural authenticity. 21 
Either way, the resurgence can have positive and negative consequences. We do 
not need to look far, either East or West, to find eruptions of religious fanaticism 
and fundamentalism. Indeed, every religion has the capacity to attract those 
claimants of absolute truth, in whose hands any religious message can be distorted 
and unleashed as dogmatism, oppression, violence, terror, and suffering. As 
Richard Falk has observed: 
To the extent that the new wave of religion is animated mainly by a negative 
spiritual energy, that is, by unconditional and extreme moves to negate the modem, it 
tends to be destructive of human potentiality, to deny treedom, to claim an exclusive 
access to truth, to be regressively other-worldly in its promises of salvation, and to 
fail to provide humanity with a positive way forward.22 
However, at the other end of the spectrum of late modern religious manifestations 
we fmd a reaffirmation of the role of religion in providing ethical guidance and 
spiritual resources that could help reinstate, as Nhat Hanh bas proposed, the 
19 Richard Falk, "Politically Engaged Spirituality in an Emerging Global Civil Society," ReJiision 
25, no. 4 (2003). 3 
20 Scott M. Thomas, "Taking Religious and Cultural Pluralism Seriously: The Global Resurgence 
of Religion and the Transformation oflntemational Society," Millennium: Journal of lntemational 
Srudies 29, no. 3 (2000). 816. 
21 See Ernest Gellner, Ppstmodernism, Reason, and Religion (London: Routledge, 1992). 
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domain of the spiritual within a global culture. Falk has also described this 
opposite perspective: 
[T]here are other more positive and emancipatory energies also contained in this 
renewal of religion that are associated with a reaffirmation of the spirintal sense of 
the person, a feeling for the sacred and the mystery that lies at the heart of human 
existence, an embrace of human solidarity, and a recognition that spiritual longing 
and religious tradition can take many authentic forms that otTer us many evocative 
metaphors for trutll and ultimate concern that no human agency can grasp with 
infallibility.13 
The resurgence of religion, from this perspective, embodies a conviction that the 
religions of the world contain valuable resources that could be utilised in tackling 
contemporary global crises. The scope of such crises, it is further recognised, goes 
beyond the boundaries of nation-states, and their resolution therefore depends 
upon a shared responsibility, an ecological awareness, a common morality, and 
often a 'global spirituality'. 
Before providing some examples of this new configuration of religion, a few 
words should be lent to the notion of spirituality. In contrast to the many negative 
associations of globalisation, a number of contemporary interfaith movements, 
such as the Council for a Parliament of the World's Religions, appear to be 
representative of a positive manifestation of global culture, which actualises 
global interconnectedness in the service of irenic and communitarian goals?4 
Nevertheless, such terms as 'global spirituality' and 'interspiritual unity' tend to 
cause alarm, and rightly so, for they may be suggestive of universalist, essentialist, 
or syncretic strategies that can lead to the debasement of the uniqueness, heritage, 
and integrity of religious traditions. Furthermore, the word 'spirituality' is itself a 
modern term, and a vague ·and woolly one at that, which ought not to be bandied 
about in an uncritical or unqualified fashion. 
22 R. Falk, Religion and Humane Global Governance (New York: Palgrave, 2001). 1. 
23 Ibid. 1-2 
24 ln addition to the Council for a Parliament of the World's Religions, we may also mention the 
Fellowship of Reconciliation, the International Association for Religious Freedom, the Temple of 
Understanding, the World Conference on Religion and Peace, and the World Congress of Faiths. 
For an overview see Marcus Braybrooke, Pilgrimage of Hope: One Hundred Years of Global 
lnteifaith Dialogue (New York: Crossroad, 1992). For an interesting television broadcast, see 
Compass, "The Quiet Revolution: New Prohpets (Episode 1 ), Pioneering City (Episode 2), Global 
Networks (Episode 3)," in The Quiet Revolution (Australia: ABC TV, 2007). 
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Understood on a popular level in the context of the modern West, spirituality is 
generally associated with the eclectic, esoteric mixing pot of the New Age 
movement. It may also refer to a fascination with 'exotic' Eastern spiritualities, 
such as feng shui, yoga, and Zen rock gardens; an interest in the occult and 
mysticism; or an undefined faith in gurus, aromatherapy, healing crystals, and the 
like. Without denying the integrity of these spiritual elements, it is apparent that 
contemporary popular spirituality has the tendency to extract traditional elements 
and 'interiorise' or 'psychologise' them, thereby creating an individualistic, self-
centred, and commodified 'capitalist spirituality'. While the notion of spirituality 
can· be-traced to Romantic reactions to-the rationality of modernity, from the 
perspective of 'New Age Capitalism' spirituality would seem to be merely a 
continuation of the modernist project and its violation of religious tradition. As 
Jeremy Carrette and Richard King have argued, "The proliferation of 'spirituality' 
and 'personal development' literature... reflects the capitalist takeover and 
privatisation of human meaning - all the more sinister for the way in which it is 
celebrated as 'holistic' and 'ethically' virtuous. The economic ideology of neo-
liberalism ... has entered the public space of religion in its disguised form as 
'spirituality' ."25 
From a less suspicious perspective, spirituality can also be understood as a way of 
living, or life-orientation, that is prescribed by a religious tradition and is 
manifested as the practice and actualisation of that tradition's truths. From this 
perspective, a number of scholars and theologians have articulated definitions of 
spirituality that are perhaps more functional and acceptable than their popular 
equivalents. For example, the Christian theologian and dialogist Alan Race has 
suggested: 
Spirituality signifies a sense of personal connectedness with reality and with the 
intimations of transcendence to be discovered in and through human engagement 
with reality. In so far as it is the function of religious tradition to nurture a sense of 
connectedness and transcendence, religions are not only bearers of 'spirituality' they 
are 'spirituality' - or better, ' ways of spirituality' .26 
2~ Jeremy R. Carrette and Richard King. Selling Spirituality: The Silent Takeover of Religion 
(London & New York: Routledge, 2005). 46 
26 Alan Race, Interfaith Encounter: The Twin Tracks of Theology and Dialogue (London: SCM 
Press, 2001). 144 
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Race is particularly concerned with the dialogical, ethical, and pluralistic 
capacities of spirituality. In this sense, he suggests that spirituality can contribute 
towards "interreligious collaboration for the sake of alleviating poverty, coupled 
with the acceptance of the authentic value of the many religions.'m Race therefore 
determines that spirituality can be authentic and constructive if it is informed by 
tradition and manifested in a dialogical, experiential, and engaged way. On these 
grounds, he proposes the construction of a cross-cultural, multifaith 
'interspirituality' , which does not attempt syncretism or assert naive or idealistic 
common ground, but sees the possibility of religious complementarity and 
convergence at the "levels -of--the moral and spiritual fruits of religious 
experience."28 In contrast to token garden statues of the Buddha, incense sticks, 
and 'dream catchers,' this kind of understanding of spirituality in the late modem 
world would seem more integrated and genuine. 
A sannyasin in the tradition of Bede Griffiths, a Benedictine monk, religious 
scholar, and a pioneer in the contemporary interfaith movement, Wayne Teasdale 
is known for introducing the term 'interspirituality'. According to Teasdale, late 
modernity is witnessing the dawning of an 'lnterspiritual Age' that is defined by a 
'global spirituality'. While the notion of global spirituality may appear idealistic 
or utopian, Teasdale suggests that it constitutes "the foundation that can prepare 
the way for a planet-wide enlightened culture, and a continuing community among 
the religions that is substantial, vital, and creative."29 Teasdale's definition of this 
kind of spirituality can provide us with some further identifying criteria for 
distinguishing genuine from popularised and individualistic instances of 
spirituality. 
Teasdale is particularly concerned to directly confront the problems in the world-
problems that represent the failure of modernity - from the perspective of the 
religions: 
The religions contain certain inner resources of a psychological, moral, and 
contemplative nature that can bring about an inward transformation of human 
27 1bid. 152 
28 1bid. 156 
29 Wayne Teasdale, The Mystic Hearl: Discovering a Universal Spirituality in The World~r 
Religions (California: New World Library, 1999}. 26 
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motives that would then be consistent with a needed sensitivity toward the Earth, 
other species, and how we live and use technology. It would be totally shortsighted 
to assume that changes in motivation could be achieved without these resources of 
the religions, for surely the political, economic, social, educational, and scientitic 
realms have failed to move the masses in this regard.30 
To this end, Teasdale proposes seven common elements definitive of a global 
spirituality: a capacity to live morally, deep nonviolence, solidarity with all life 
and the Earth itself, a spiritual practice and a mature self~knowledge, simplicity of 
life, selfless service, and prophetic action.31 Furthermore, he delineates seven 
capacities of such a spirituality: openness, presence, the ability to listen, to be, to 
see, the capacity for spontaneity, and joy.32 
Richard Falk, a scholar from the field of international law and politics, a social 
commentator and anti~war critic, is exemplary in his proposal of a "socially 
engaged spirituality". According to Falk, the core assumptions of modernity have 
engendered a world order characterised by ''inhumane governance." Such 
assumptions include convictions 
.. . that science and reason will ensure the progress of human society; that religion 
and spirituality are essentially supert1uous in the public order; and that such secular 
ideas as political boundaries, sovereignty, territorial supremacy, and the mle of the 
law provide solid growtds for optimism about human destiny.33 
In reality, however, such assumptions have been invalidated. As Falk discerns, the 
impact of modernist order has ultimately transpired to "fracture the peoples of the 
world, to neglect the plight of those who are most deprived and vulnerable, to 
place nonsustainable burdens on the environment that seem likely to diminish the 
life quality of future generations, to deepen over time the disparities between rich 
and poor, and to engender an ethos of consumerism that forecloses the most 
fulfilling forms of individual and social self~realisation."34 
In opposition, Falk proposes a "reconstructive" postmodern discourse as the 
medium in which to articulate a "politically engaged spirituality" within an 
30 Wayne Teasdale, "The lnterspiritual Age: Practical Mysticism for the Third Millennium," 
Journal of Ecumenical Studies 34, no. I (1997). 76 
31 Ibid. 80ff 
32 Ibid. 85ff 
33 Falk, "Politically Engaged Spirituality in an Emerging Global Civil Society." 4 
34 Falk, Religion and Humane Global Governance. 17 
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emergent "global civil society." From this perspective, Falk endeavours to 
"reverse the political optic by claiming that transformative patterns of behaviour 
will result from 'spirituar interventions in societal processes, rather than from 
'mechanical' or 'material' causes." Furthermore, his primary concern is with 
... transformation, a radical turning of consciousness, which depends on spreading or 
deepening the realisation that human behaviour in all its aspects needs to become far 
more reverential toward the sacredness of life .3~ 
According to the Beat poet, deep ecologist, and Zen Buddhist Gary Snyder, 
Buddhism has much to offer in the way of an alternative social reality. For 
example, 
The joyous and voluntary poverty of Buddhism becomes a positive force. The 
traditional harmlessness and avoidance of taking lite in any torm has ntJtion-shaking 
implications. The practice of meditation, for which one needs only "the ground 
beneath one's feet," wipes out mountains ofjunk being pumped into the mind by the 
mass media and supermarket universities.36 
Indeed, Snyder proposes the construction of a "true community (sangha) of all 
beings" and the evolution of a "planetary culture", representative of a social 
configuration defined by the natural, the imperfect, the familial, cautionary, and 
traditional, as opposed to the legalised greed and monopolised violence inherent 
within the nation state. "If we are lucky," Snyder suggests, "we may eventually 
arrive at a world of relatively mutually tolerant small societies attuned to their 
local natural region and united overall by a profound respect and love for the mind 
and nature of the universe.'m 
A similar vein of Buddhist social commentary can be found in the work of David 
Loy, which is particularly concerned with the interface between Buddhism and 
modernity. Loy has observed areas of congruence between the postmodem 
recognition of the constructed nature of the world, our sacred canopies and our 
selves, and Buddhist deconstructive insights regarding the impennanence and 
interpenetration of all things, especially the Buddha's essential teaching of "the 
deconstruction and reconstruction of the fictive self." However, while the Western 
35 Faile, "Politically Engaged Spirituality in an Emerging Global Civil Society." 2 
36 Gary Snyder, "Buddhism and the Possibilities of a Planetary Culture," in The Path of 
Compassion: Writings on Socially Engaged Buddhism, cd. Fred Eppsteincr (Berkeley, CA: 
Parallax Press, 1985). 83 
37 1bid. 84-85 
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postmodern perspective "grows out of, and depends upon, a secular modernity 
that privileges empirical rationalism over religious superstition," the "more 
religious perspective [of Buddhism] implies different possibilities," as well as 
potential "remedies for our postroodem nihilism."38 
It is in relation to these representations of religion in late modernity - articulations 
of spirituality, suggestions of engagement, and penetrating social commentary-
that we should understand Thich Nhat Hanh's critique of modernity and his 
continued reinterpretation of the Buddhist tradition. As we shall see, Nhat Hanh' s 
approaeh to modernity encompasses all of these-elements, while it skilfully 
balances the particular and the universal, the traditional and the modern, his own 
commitment as a Buddhist monk and his openness to an unconfined spirituality. 
Before we examine Nhat Hanh 's critique of the modern West, let us return to the 
narrative of his life-story and his relocation within the modem West. 
When Thich Nhat Hanh Came to the West ... 
At the conclusion ofNhat Hanh's international speaking tour in the mid-l%0s, he 
was strongly advised not to return to Vietnam by those who feared for his safety 
and his freedom. Consequently, Nhat Hanh remained abroad and continued his 
anti-war efforts as an emissary for the Buddhist peace movement. When the Paris 
Peace Talks began in 1968, the Overseas Vietnamese Buddhist Association, which 
was based in Paris, formed a Buddhist Peace Delegation with Nhat Hanh as its 
chair. Whi\e the delegation was not officially recognised among the superpowers, 
the French government allowed the Buddhists to host a conference in order to 
represent the voice of the Vietnamese people. The delegation also organised press 
conferences, strategic meditation gatherings, and published newsletters, and in this 
way they were instrumental in the peace process. 
When the Paris Peace Accords were finally signed in 1973, Nhat Hanh was in 
Bangkok making plans with the Unified Buddhist Church for the post-war 
reconstruction and social development of Vietnam. By this time, the SYSS had 
become a well-established organisation and Nhat Hanh foresaw its principal role 
38 Loy, The Great Awakening: A Buddhist Social Theory. 5-6 
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in the rebuilding of Vietnam. However, following the violation of the peace treaty 
by North Vietnam, its occupation of South Vietnam, and the ascension of 
Communist rule, the Buddhist movement was barred from social involvement and 
Nhat Hanh was officially refused permission to enter Vietnam. Forced into exile, 
Nhat Hanh sought refuge in France. 
Just as he had done during the war when he retreated to Phuong Boi, Nhat Hanh 
once again turned to his community for support. This small Vietnamese Sangha 
managed to purchase a dilapidated farmhouse on a small plot of land in quiet 
countryside not far from Paris. Here;-Nhat Hanh returned ttHhe--simplicity of 
monastic life and found a place of healing within his spiritual practice. A few 
years earlier during a conversation with Father Daniel Berrigan, Nhat Hanh made 
the observation that "communities of resistance" need not only refer to resistance 
to war, but also to the onslaught of secular modem society. He suggested: 
... living in modern society, one feels that he cannot easily retain integrity, 
wholeness. One is robbed permanently of huma1mess, the capacity of being 
oneself... So perhaps, first of all, resistance means opposition to being invaded, 
occupied, assaulted, and destroyed by the system. The purpose of resistance, here, is 
to seek the healing of yourself in order to be able to see clearly .. . 
I think that communities of resistance should be places where people can return 
to themselves more easily, where the conditions are such that they can heal 
themselves and recover their wholeness.39 
This was precisely Nhat Hanh 's intention when he retreated to the rural property 
that became known as Les Patates Douce.s, or 'Sweet Potatoes' , in reference to the 
main food source of the Vietnamese poor. Here Nhat Hanh stayed put; he ceased 
travelling, attending conferences, meeting with the press or world leaders, and 
instead focused on his practice - meditating, writing, gardening, drawing. 
However, as a community of resistance that represented healing and wholeness in 
the midst of suffering and alienation, Sweet Potatoes gradually began to attract 
large numbers of people, including Vietnamese refugee families, but also those 
seeking refuge from modem society. Therefore, in the 1980s Nhat Hanh began 
leading meditation retreats and resumed his public role. 
39 Thich Nhat Hanh and Daniel Berrigan, The Raft Is Not the Shore: Conversations toward a 
Buddhist-Christian Awareness (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 2001). 129 
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As Nhat Hanh's popularity grew, it became apparent that the Sweet Potatoes 
property was not large enough to accommodate the growing numbers of 
practitioners. In 1982, Nhat Hanh and his Sangha found a property for sale in 
south·west France, eighty-five kilometres east of Bordeaux. The initial purchase 
was of two tracts of land, which were named the Upper and Lower Hamlets. 
Together, they formed Plum Village (Vietnamese, Lang Mai; French, Villages des 
Pnmiers), the name referring to the community's plan to grow and sell plums to 
raise money for Vietnamese aid. 
Today, Plum Village funetiens-as a eentre of monastic training in Nhat Hanh's 
particular fusion of mindfulness practice and socially engaged spiritual activism. 
Plum Village also offers a place of retreat for outside practitioners of any faith, or 
none. Since its inception, both the physical size of Plum Village and the number 
of its monastics has grown. Plum Village now encompasses seven hamlets within 
a thirty-kilometre radius and is home to Nhat Hanh's permanent monastic 
community of about one hundred and fifty monks and nuns.40 Apart from the 
original Upper and Lower Hamlets, there is the Middle Hamlet, West Hamlet and 
New Hamlet, Gatehouse New Hamlet and Hillside New Hamlet. Five main 
temples are spread among the hamlets: the Dharma Cloud Temple and the Foot of 
the Mountain Temple are both at the Upper Hamlet, the Loving Kindness Temple 
is at the New Hamlet, and the Dharma Nectar Temple and the Assembly of Stars 
Temple are at the Lower Hamlet. In 2006, the international Order of Interbeing 
consisted of approximately one thousand lay practitioners and two hundred and 
fifty monastic practitioners, outside of Vietnam.'u Those monastics not based in 
Plum Village live in Germany, at the Intersein Monastery in Bavaria, or at one of 
the monasteries in the United States: Deer Park Monastery in California, 
Magnolia Village in Mississippi, or Blue Cltff Monastery in New York State.42 
Since Nhat Hanh's return trips to Vietnam in 2005 and 2007, the Order of 
Interbeing has grown by the hundreds and two monasteries have been re-
established that practise under Nhat Hanh's supervision - the Tu Hieu Temple 
near Hue, and the Prajna Temple in the central highlands. Finally, throughout the 
..o See Plum Village website: http://www.plumvillage.org/liTMIJaboutUs.htm. 
41 See Order oflnterbeing website: http://www.orderofinterbeing.orglaboutoi.html. 
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United States and Canada, many Mindfulness Practice Centres (MPCs) have been 
established. While avowedly "in the tradition of Thich Nhat Hanh", these MPCs 
are run by lay practitioners who present the teachings in a non-sectarian 
environment that is spiritual rather than explicitly Buddhist.43 
Evidently, Nhat Hanh' s ministry is today global in scope. Indeed, it is often 
asserted that next to the Dalai Lama, Nbat Hanh is the most acknowledged and 
esteemed Buddhist leader in the world. Since coming to the West, Nhat Hanh has 
led retreats and workshops not only in France, but also in Australia, Canada, the 
United States, throughout-South America and Eurepe, and in the Middle East and 
Asia. Nhat Hanh and his Sangha continue to work tirelessly on humanitarian and 
social development projects in Vietnam. At the same time, Nhat Hanb has 
reinterpreted his teachings of Engaged Buddhism to apply to Western contexts 
and deliver a more universal message. He explains: 
Engaged Buddhism does not only mean to use Buddhism to solve social and political 
problems, protesting against bombs, and protesting against social injustice. First of 
all we have to bring Buddhism into our daily lives.44 
Nhat Hanh' s retreats generally focus on this kind of universalised, experiential 
and pragmatic Buddhism, or what Nhat Hanh calls 'mindfulness practice'. Indeed, 
mindfulness practice constitutes the core ofNhat Hanh's pedagogy. According to 
Nhat Hanh, it is the key to creating peace in the self and peace in the world; it is 
the means and the end, the way to deal with all conflicts, both internal and 
interpersonal, and indeed international and interreligious; it is the foundation of 
insight into interbeing, present moment awareness, and 'being peace'. In addition 
to the general mindfulness retreats, Nhat Hanh has also held more specific retreats 
for families, teenagers, war veterans, members of Parliament/Congress, law 
enforcement officers and other public servants, people in jails and other kinds of 
correctional facilities, people of colour, counsellors and therapists. Furthermore, 
42 Note that the original Maple Forest Monastery and the Green Mountain Dharma Centre 
Nunnery both closed in 2007 and relocated to the Blue Cliff Monastery in Pine Bush, New York. 
43 See Patricia Hunt-Perry and Lyn Fine, "AJI Buddhism Is Engaged: Thich Nhat Hanh and the 
Order of lnterbeing," in Engaged Buddhism in the West, ed. Christopher Queen (Boston, MA: 
Wisdom Publications, 2000). 62. And for examples ofMPCs, see the Mindfulness Practice Centre 
of Fairfax: www.mpcf.org, the Still Water Mindfulness Practice Centre: www.stillwatennpc.org, 
and the Mindfulness Practice Centre of Vancouver: www.mindfulnessvancouver.org. 
44 Thich Nhat Hanh, Being Peace (Berkeley, CA: Parallax Press, 1987). 53 
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retreats for academics and professionals have focused on such specialised fields as 
psychology, psychotherapy, the science of the mind, and quantum physics. It is 
worth noting that Nhat Hanh is particularly concerned to nurture the spiritual 
aspects and practices of all religious traditions, which he does through the 
proposal of mindfulness practice. From a non-dogmatic and de-absolutised 
perspective, Nhat Hanh encow-ages the revitalisation and actualisation of all 
religions by offering his teaching of mindfulness for inclusion within other 
religions' often spiritually impoverished praxial systems. 
The universalism·"6f-Nhat Hanh's contemporary teachings is further indicated by 
his global approach to nonviolence and peace. ln 2000, Nhat Hanh was involved 
in the drafting of the Manifesto 2000, a declaration consisting of six pledges to 
promote a culture of peace and nonviolence in the world, which was signed by 
many Nobel Peace Prize Laureates. The following year, Nhat Hanh publicly bore 
witness to those who suffered during the 9/ II attacks, but he also urged the 
American government against violent retaliation. Nhat Hanh has spoken 
consistently against war in the Middle East, and has led numerous demonstrations 
and 'Peace Walks' that have been attended by thousands. He has also addressed 
the issue of global warming. In 2005, Nhat Hanh spoke before UNESCO, 
presenting a characteristically pragmatic proposal for ending violence, war, and 
global warming. He offered the concept of a weekly 'No Car Day' as a potential 
measure that could be promoted globally. Most recently, Nhat Hanh has spoken in 
support of the nonviolent protests of the Buddhist monks in Burma. 45 
In contrast to the evident global reach of his later discourse and ministry, recent 
years have also seen Nhat Hanh placing more emphasis on the traditional form of 
monasticism, or what Thomas Merton called "monastic formation. "46 Nhat Hanh 
is clearly concerned to anchor his contemporary teachings in the solid rock of 
4~ Nhat Hanh and American Buddhist teacher and author I ack Komfield released a joint statement 
of support on October 5th, 2007. See Plum Village website: 
http://www .plumv111age.org/HTML/pressreleasdbuddhachannel_ tnhjackkom.htrnl. See also 
interview with Nhat Hanh in Time Magazine, David Van Biema, "Bunna's Monks: 'Already a 
Success'," Time Magazine http://www.time.com/time/worldfarticle/0,8599 ,16709II,OO.html 
(2007). 
46 See Robert H. King, Thomas Merton and Thich Nhat Hanh: Engaged Spirifllality i11 an Age of 
Globalisation (New York: Continuum, 2003). 99 
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tradition, as represented by this most ancient and inviolable traditional form.47 In 
response to the growth of his monastic community, Nhat Hanh seems focused as 
never before on providing the members of his Order with sufficient training and 
the relevant resources, so that they may continue his tradition and actively 
implement his teachings in the world, where, he contends, they may be of some 
help. 
Diagnosis: Hungry Ghosts, Toxic Culture, Global Terror 
Thich Nhat Hanh's diagnosis of the malaise of the modem age begins with the 
same observation made by the Buddha himself over 2500 years ago. As 
represented in the Four Noble Truths, this observation concerns the fundamental 
problem of human suffering, and the nature of its essential cause, which is, 
according to the Buddhist tradition, the wrong perception of a separate and 
permanent self. While this diagnosis can apply equally to the inhabitants of 
ancient India as to the current subjects of the modem West, Nhat Hanh' s 
interpretation of the Noble Truths constitutes a contemporary analysis based upon 
modem contexts of individual and collective suffering. Within these contexts, 
Nhat Hanh discerns a fundamental ignorance or denial of interbeing, which, he 
considers, is the underlying cause of an array of symptoms that are afflicting not 
only the individual, but also the collectives of societies, and indeed the entire 
planet. 
A Psychological Analysis 
To begin with, Nhat Hanh's psychological diagnosis of modern subjectivity 
reveals a fundamental ignorance, a lack of awareness, a pervasive forgetfulness , 
displacement, and mental dispersion, elements which have generated a culture of 
'false selves'. Individualism, greed, and consumerism characterise these false 
selves, which, ignorant of their true natures, are often afflicted by alienation, 
'rootlessness', and a sense of meaninglessness or anomie. Within the Buddhist 
47 Nhat Hanh has written a number of books on contemporary monasticism. For example, see 
Thich Nhat Hanh, Freedom Wherever We Go: A Buddhist Monastic Code for the 21st Centrtry 
(Berkeley, CA: Parallax Press, 2004), Thich Nhat Hanh, Jo}folly Together: The Art of Building a 
Harmonious Community (Berkeley, CA: Parallax Press, 2003), Thich Nhat Hanh, My Master's 
Robe: Memories of a Novice Monk (Berkeley, CA: Parallax Press, 2002), Thich Nhat Hanh, 
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tradition, the Sanskrit term that defines these beings is preta (P. peta) - 'hungry 
ghosts'. As Nhat Hanh elucidates: 
Every time I see someone without roots, I see him as a hungry ghost. In Buddhist 
mythology, the tenn 'hungry ghost ' is used to describe a wandering soul who is 
extremely hungry and thirsty but whose throat is too narrow tor food or drink to pass 
through .. . 
Hungry ghosts long to be loved, but no matter how much we love and care for 
them, they may not have the capacity to receive it.. . Something seems to be standing 
in their way preventing them from touching the refreshing and healing elements of 
life. They want only to forget life. __ Our society produces millions of hungry ghosts, 
people of all ages- I have seen some not yet ten years old- who have no roots at all . 
They have never experienced happiness at horne, and they have nothing to believe in 
or belong to. This is the main sickness of our times. 411 
In recognition of the prevalence of "anxiety, fear, and the dispersion of mind" 
among the hungry ghosts of modernity, as well as tendencies towards 
"forgetfulness, acquiescence to the status quo ... and egotism of all kinds," Nhat 
Hanb is concerned for the mental health of modernity. According to Nhat Hanh, 
the mental illness of modern society is the consequence of a fragmentation of 
humanity's essential collectivism. As he perceives, "many people are victims of 
our modem life which separates human beings from the rest of the human 
family.'"'9 The afflictions that characterise modern mental illness- forgetfulness, 
aggression, dispersion, and separation - are manifestations of a more fundamental 
lack of awareness of interbeing, which is instilled and reinforced by modern 
society itself and its many distractions. 
Nhat Hanh acknowledges a pervasive tendency amongst modem people to take 
refuge in what he calls "toxic cultural products," including violent or graphic 
films, magazines, books, and television shows. These products ''water the seeds of 
suffering, hatred, and fear" in individual and collective consciousness, and thus 
perpetuate our delusion and unhappiness. 50 Nhat Hanb also recognises the 
tendency for people in the modem West to take refuge in alcohol and drugs as a 
Stepping into Freedom: An lnh·oduction to Buddhirt Monastic Training (Berkeley, CA: Parallax 
Press, I 997), Thich Nhat Hanh, Zen Keys: A Guide to Zen Practice (New York: Doubleday, 1995). 
48 Thich Nbat Hanh, Touching Peace: Practicing the Art of Mindful Living (Berkeley, CA: 
Parallax Press, 1992}. 99-100 
49 Thich Nhat Hanh, "The Individual, Society, and Nature," in The Path of Compassion: Writings 
on &cially Engaged Buddhism, ed. Fred Eppsteiner (Berkeley, CA: Parallax Press, 1988). 44-5 
~ Thich Nhat Hanh, "The Roots of War" in Thich Nhat Hanh, Love in Action: Writings on 
Nonviolent Social Change (Berkeley, CA: Parallax Press, 1993). 83 
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means of escapism or the evasion of reality. Nhat Hanh is highly critical of this 
false solution of "self-anaesthesia."5 1 As Nhat Hanh observes, the problem in the 
modern world is that "consumerism itself can become a kind of addiction, because 
we feel so lonely. "52 In addition to the distractions of toxic cultural products and 
the Jure of drugs and alcohol, Nhat Hanh observes that "many of us also take 
refuge in consumption. When we do not feel good about ourselves, when we feel 
empty or depressed, we tum to the refrigerator or go to the shopping mall in order 
to fill the void and forget our suffering. We take refuge in the act of eating, 
drinking, or shopping. We are trying to fill the emptiness inside because we do not 
know what to takerefttge-itr.We seek distraction by feeding-oor senses."53 
According to Nhat Hanh, the illusion of separation at the heart of individualism 
bas generated a pervasive alienation within modem subjectivity, or what he calls 
"rootlessness". As Nhat Hanh explains, many people in the modem world have 
been wounded or disillusioned by negative or destructive relationships with their 
families, their communities, their religion, or their country, and consequently they 
may no longer have any connection to their tradition or their past. Consequently, 
as Nhat Hanh observes, "some of us may not like to talk or think about our roots 
because we have suffered so much from the violence of our family or our culture. 
We want to leave these things behind and search for something new."54 Thus, 
people become uprooted, and, more often than not, cannot find anything of 
substance to replace their roots. They become "like trees without roots, they 
cannot absorb nourishment."55 Rootlessness reinforces isolation, anomie, and 
loneliness. It constitutes an ignorance of our interbeing not only with our 
immediate families , but also with our extended families, our family history, as 
well as the heritage of our religious traditions, our communities and society. 
According to Nhat Hanh, to be rootless is to suffer. 
~ ~ Thicb Nbat Hanh, Creating True Peace: Ending Conflict in Yourself, Your Fami(v, Your 
Communil)• and the World (London: Rider Books, 2003). 63 
Sl Nbat Hanh, Touching Peace: Practicing the Art of Mindful Living. 92 
~3 Nhat Hanh, Creating True Peace: Ending Conflict in Yourself, Your Family , Your Comm11nity 
and the World. 63-4 
~ Nhat Hanh, Touching Peace: Practicing the Art of Mindful Living. 103 
55 Ibid. 106 
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Nhat Hanh' s diagnosis of the ailments of the individual in modernity translates 
into the context of the family and the lives of children. Nhat Hanh recognises a 
great deal of interfamilial conflict in the modern world, which he attributes to the 
dilation of individual psychological suffering and rootlessness. Emphasising the 
importance of the role of the parent, Nhat Hanh explains that the internal suffering 
of, or difficulties between, parents have a profound impact on children. 56 
Nhat Hanh's psychological analysis of Western modernity diagnoses a population 
of individualistic, unaware, materialistic, escapist consumers - hungry ghosts 
whose appetites are never satisfied, false selves-who have severed their roots and 
pass on little nourishment, hope, or happiness to their children. As we shall now 
see, within collective contexts of society, the diagnosis is not much brighter. 
A Social Analysis 
When the internal suffering of hungry ghosts is manifested collectively, the 
society that emerges is plagued by the same ailments and delusions that plague the 
individual, as it is constructed upon the same fundamental ignorance of interbeing. 
Nhat Hanh's social analysis of modernity reveals and critiques the underlying 
ideologies that reinforce this collective ignorance, and their dire and insidious 
consequences. These include the ideologies of individualism and reason, and the 
outcomes of rampant consumerism, a runaway economic system, and an ensuing 
widespread social and economic injustice. 
According to Nhat Hanh, the second half of the twentieth-century and beyond 
have been dominated by "the cult of individualism". Individualism he defmes as 
"the desire to do things only for the sake of our separate self."57 As he has 
perceived, "Our civilisation, our culture has been characterised by individualism. 
The individual wants to be free from the society, from the family. The individual 
does not think he or she needs to take refuge in the family or in the society and 
thinks that he or she can be happy without a Sangha." However, Nhat Hanh insists 
56 Nhat Hanh, Creating True Peace: Ending Conflict in Yourself, Your Fami~v. Your Community 
and the World. 16-17. See also Nhat Hanh, Joyjillly Together: The Art of Building a Hannonious 
Community. 94 
57 Nhat Hanh, Creating True Peace: Ending Conflict in Yourself, Your Family, Your Community 
and the World. 171-2 
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that this individualistic thinking and behaviour is the reason "why we do not have 
solidity, why we do not have harmony, why we do not have the communication 
that we so need."58 While the ideology of individualism has appeared to offer 
freedom from the past, from family, from tradition, and society, in fact Nhat Hanh 
argues that it has imprisoned us in delusion - "the prison of the self."59 He 
suggests, "As individuals, we have suffered tremendously. Individualism is 
predominating, families are breaking down, and society has become deeply 
divided... Despair is a great temptation in our century. Alone, we are 
vulnerable."60 In addition to this social disintegration and despair, Nhat Hanh 
argues that within the context "Of society individualism translates into a destructive 
greed that steals humanity from its spiritual roots: 
Our society has been dominated by the desire for tame and wealth, material things, 
and hedonism. As a result, many people have fallen away from their spirintal 
traditions and their families. We cannot have healthy families and conununicate if 
we believe joy can be found only in the pursuit of power, sex, and wealth. Happiness 
does not come from consumption of things ... We let individualism prevail in the 
twentieth century, and frankly, we have made a mess of it. 61 
The disastrous impact of individualism on humanity and its spiritual foundations 
has been reinforced by another modem ideology - reason. Incorporating 
traditional terminology, Nhat Hanb bas presented a Y ogacara analysis of the 
prioritisation of reason. From the perspective of Yogiiciira, reason, or the intellect 
(S. manovijniina) is only one of the seven sense-consciousnesses that are 
grounded in the fundamental store-consciousness or 'seed bed' (S. iilaya-viji'Jiina). 
As we discovered in the previous chapter, this 'seed bed' is the foundation of 
consciousness and is where transformation takes place, insight is attained, and the 
true self is realised. As Nhat Hanh discerns, only imbalance and disharmony can 
result from the prioritisation of just one element of consciousness: 
Life today is organised according to "reason." We participate in lite with only part of 
our being - our intellect, our manoviji'ilina. The other half, deeper and more 
important, is the store consciousness, the foundation of the roots of our being. This 
part caiUlot be analysed by reason or even by the manovijfilina itself. Man today 
sa Thich Nhat Hanh, "Go as a Sangha," in Friends on the Path: Living Spiritual Communities, ed. 
Thich Nhat Hanh and Jack Lawlor (Berkeley, CA: Parallax Press, 2002). 19-20 
s9 Nhat Hanh, Creating Tme Peace: Ending Conflict in Yourself, Your Family, Your Community 
and the World. 171 
60 Nhat Hanh, Calming the Fearful Mind: A Zen Response to Terrorism. 90 
61 Nhat Hanh, Creating True Peace: Ending Co1if/ict in Yourself. Your Fami~t', Your Community 
and the World. 171-2 
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loves reason. He trusts his rationality so much that he is uprooted from his true 
being. From this comes the feeling of alienation from which he suffers and through 
this, little by little, his humanity becomes more and more mechanical.62 
The combined force of individualism, consumerism, and reason has further 
subsumed the truth of interbeing and reinforced an economic system that has 
trapped humanity in a steely grip. Lost in the oblivion of self-absorption, 
consumed by modernity ' s destructive distractions and empty refuges, stuck in an 
economic rat race, bent on a trajectory to nowhere, and severed from the 
nourishing roots of tradition and family, the modem person becomes a victim of 
society. 
The ignorance and illness of society, manifested as exploitation, social and 
economic injustice, and ecological destruction, can ultimately, according to Nhat 
Hanh, only be understood as a form of insanity: 
Causing harm to other human beings brings harm to ourselves. Accumulating wealth 
and owning excessive portions of the world 's natural resources deprives fellow 
humans of the chrutce to Jive. Participating in oppressive and unjust social systems 
creates and deepens the gap between rich and poor, and aggravates the situation of 
social injustice. Yet while tolerating excess, injustice, and war, we usually are 
completely unaware that the human race suffers as a family. While the rest of the 
human family suffers and starves, enjoying false security and wealth can only be 
seen as a sign of insanity. 
It has become clear that the fate of the individual is inextricably linked to the 
tate of the whole human race ... The only alternative to co-existence is co-non-
existence.63 
This incisive and penetrating analysis of the social context of modernity clearly 
represents the interconnection between individual behaviour and the state of the 
world. "If your daily life has not much to do with your government," Nhat Hanh 
asks, "then what does have to do with the government? That is a hard question. 
Has your daily life anything to do with the people who are dying in the third 
World? This is the same question."64 Nhat Hanh is adamant that the collective 
suffering in society is directly related to individual suffering - this is the reality of 
interbeing. He states: "Our daily lives, the way we drink, what we eat, has to do 
with the world's political situation ... The nature of the bombs, the nature of 
62 Nhat Hanh, Zen Kevs: A Guide to Zen Practice. 152 
63 Nhat Hanh, "The Itldividual, Society, and Nature." 41-2 
64 Thich Nhat Hanh, "Please Call Me by My True Names," in The Path of Compassion: Writings 
on Socially Engaged Biuldhism, ed. Fred Eppsteiner (Berkeley, CA: Parallax Press, 1988). 37 
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injustice, the nature of the weapons, and the nature of our own beings are the 
same."
65 
A Global Analysis 
Individual and societal ignorance of interbeing is further evidenced on a global 
scale by widespread ecologica1 destruction and the environmental crisis, as well as 
the spread of global warfare and terrorism. Let us examine Nhat Hanh's critiques 
of these issues. 
Firstly, Nhat Hanh is concemed-wi:th· the ever-expanding "separation-between the 
rich and the underdeveloped countries." He perceives, "The debts that poor 
countries have to pay to the rich are greater each year than the sums they receive 
in aid to help them develop economically. '>66 The proliferation of the arms trade 
and the concurrent escalation of famine and starvation intensify the iniquity of this 
economic injustice. Nhat Hanh is particularly critical of the fact that "Millions of 
people make a living off the arms industry, manufacturing 'conventional' and 
nuclear weapons."67 
Furthermore, Nhat Hanb consistently affirms that the problem in the First World 
is that "the affluent societies of the West consume the vast majority of the Earth's 
recourses and pollute the Earth and its atmosphere by this consumption. "68 He 
asserts, "Our Earth, our green beautiful Earth is in danger, and all of us know it. 
Yet we act as if our daily lives have nothing to do with the situation of the world. 
If the Earth were your body, you would be able to feel many areas where she is 
suffering." Using poetic analogy, Nbat Hanh continues to configure the sun as 
"our second heart, our heart outside of our body" and he suggests that "forests are 
our lungs outside of our bodies. Yet," he continues, "we have been acting in a way 
that bas allowed millions of square miles of land to be deforested, and we have 
also destroyed the air, the rivers, and parts of the ozone layer. We are imprisoned 
in our small selves, thinking only of some comfortable conditions for this small 
M Nhat Hanh, Being Peace. 74 
66 Nhat Hanh, Zen Keys: A Guide to Zen Practice. 154 
67 Thich Nhat Hanh; lnterbeing: Fourteen Guidelines for Engaged Buddhism (Berkeley, CA: 
Parallax Press, 1998). 46 
68 Nhat Hanh, Zen Keys: A Guide to Zen Practice. 154 
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self, while we destroy our large self" Ultimately, Nhat Hanh calls for not only a 
"deep ecology" but a "universal ecology", one that would recognise the 
interconnection between the pollution of nature and the "pollution in our 
. ,.69 
consciOusness. 
A final aspect ofNhat Hanh's diagnosis of the malaise of modernity concerns the 
spread of global warfare and the immediate threat of terrorism. In relation to 
contemporary conflicts in the Middle East and the 9/11 attacks, Nhat Hanh 
reiterates his Engaged Buddhist axiom concerning the 'true enemy': the other is 
not the- enemy, it is the discrimination of self an~r as separate entities that is 
the ultimate enemy and the essential cause of war. The principal corollary of this 
teaching is that a war can never be won, because all parties involved are victims -
victims of the wrong perception of separation and its related negative emotions of 
fear, anger, and hatred. Violent defeat of the 'other side' does not resolve this 
wrong perception, it simply perpetuates and intensifies it. This perspective also 
therefore determines the futility of retaliation, punishment, or revenge, as 
ultimately everyone suffers the consequences of violence. In a similar fashion to 
David Loy's analysis, Nhat Hanh has applied the Buddhist perspective of 
nonduality to the 'Holy War' between the United States and Islam, commenting 
on the first Gulf War and the current 'War on Terror', as well as the ongoing 
conflict between Israel and Palestine. 
Nhat Hanh's analysis of war reveals the deluded dualistic 'logic ' that fuels its 
many strategies of destruction. He is concerned to expose the cyclic nature of war 
and thereby reveal the failure of strategies of punishment, retaliation, and revenge. 
"The war machine is horrible," he states. "If you get into it, you will be crushed, 
and you will have to crush the lives of others. "70 Nhat Hanh emphasises the failure 
of war to achieve any kind of resolution and thereby affirms the essential irony of 
this cyclic dynamic. From this perspective, Nhat Hanh suggests "I don't believe 
that the CIA, the Pentagon, or the Army can stop terrorism. It will take all of us, 
looking deeply into our human condition, to understand and help stop terrorism. A 
69 Thich Nhat Hanh, "The Sun My Heart" in Nhat Hanh, Love in Action: Writings on Nonviolent 
Social Change. 129-32 
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terrorist is a human being who needs help."71 Like a doctor who heals the sick, 
Nhat Hanh makes his diagnosis: "A terrorist, like you, is a human being who has 
been heavily infected by the viruses of wrong perception and wrong belief. 
Terrorists suffer just as we do."72 Nhat Hanh's principal insight here is that the 
roots of war lie in the self. In one way or another, we are all terrorists, and in order 
to uproot terrorism we must begin by disarming ourselves, by resolving the wars 
within and transforming our own internal battles of fear, discrimination, and 
hatred into peace. 
We say we want to strike against terror, we want to destroy terrorism, but do we 
even know· where to find it? Can we locate-it-with a radar? Can the army find 
terrorism using its night goggles and heat sensors? Misunderstanding, fear, anger and 
hatred are the roots of terrorism. They cannot be located by the military. Bombs and 
missiles cannot reach them, let alone destroy them, for terrorism lies in the hearts of 
human beings. To uproot terror, we need to begin by looking in our hearts ... With 
compassion and communication, terrorism can be uprooted and transformed into 
love.73 
Essentially, all of the elements of Nhat Hanh's critique of modernity are 
interrelated. Within Nhat Hanh's analysis, war in the Middle East can be directly 
related to the single actions of a single American citizen - whether they argue 
with their partner, whether their child overhears, and then how much violence that 
child may consume by watching the television, and how much petrol it takes for 
the parent to drive the child to school. When asked during an interview, "What 
was the reason for the attacks on the United States?" Nhat Hanh answered by 
referring to all these different but interrelated contexts: 
The deep reason for our current situation is our patterns of consumption. U.S. 
citizens consume sixty percent of the world's energy resources yet they account for 
only six percent of the world's total population. Children in Anterica witness 
I 00,000 acts of violence on television by the time they finish elementary school. 
Another reason for our current situation is our foreign policy and the lack of deep 
listening within our relationships. We do not use deep listening to understand the 
suffering and the real needs of people in other nations. 74 
70 Thich Nhat Hanh, Peace Begins Here: Palestillian:s and Israelis Listening to Each Other 
(Berkeley, CA: Parallax Press, 2004). 113 
71 Nhat Hanh, Calming the Fearful Mind: A Zen Respom·e to Terrorism. 24 
n Nhat Hanh, Creating Tme Peace: Ending Conflict in Yourself, Your Fami~y, Your Community 
and the World. 200-1 
73 Nhat Hanh, Calming the Fearful Mind: A Zen Response to Terrorism. 10 
74 Thich Nhat Hanh, "What I Would Say to Osama Bin Laden" in Ibid. 112. This interview is also 
available: http://wwW.beliefnet.com/story/88/story _ 8872 _1.html 
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The principal implication of this view is that we are all essentially responsible for 
the state of the world. The violence in the Middle East is directly related to the 
violence in our individual minds, our interpersonal relationships, our societies and 
their cultures, just as much as it is related to our politics and our governments. 
Therefore, as we shall now see, Nhat Hanh's cure for the malaise of modernity 
begins with the self and proposes that the individual transformation of 
consciousness can generate real peace in our communities, societies, and 
ultimately, the whole world. 
Cure: Spiritualityt Community, Dialogue 
Thich Nhat Hanh 's contemporary representation of the Dharma offers an antidote 
to the malaise of modernity. For the psychological ailments that plague modern 
individuals, Nhat Hanh presents the cure of spirituality, or what he calls 'the art of 
mindful living'. Mindfulness practice provides a means of healing the self by 
transforming destructive emotions into peace and happiness, and wrong 
perceptions into understanding and compassion. For the fragmentation of modern 
society and its deluded ideologies of individualism and greed, Nhat Hanh presents 
the cure of community - the Sangha. The interdependent dynamic of the Sangha 
provides support and strength in the practice through the collective energy of 
mindfulness. To take refuge in the Sangha provides real protection. It also 
actualises the reality of interbeing, both between people and with the natural 
world. Finally, for the international and interreligious conflicts of the world, Nhat 
Hanh offers the cure of dialogue. Through the practice of deep listening and 
loving speech on a global level, true communication between warring parties can 
be established, genuine understanding may be attained, and conflict may be 
resolved. 
Spirituality 
One of the principal features of Plum Village is its large number of bells - some 
that stand outdoors in elaborate shrines and others shaped like large bowls that sit 
more humbly on the floors of meditation halls. They are known as 'mindfulness 
bells' and when they are sounded at random times throughout the day, it is a Plum 
Village practice to stop whatever you are doing, be silent, focus on your breath 
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and the present moment, and return to your 'true home', your 'true self. This is 
mindfulness practice. The sound of the bell, however, is only meant to be a 
reminder, a means of refreshing awareness. Nhat Hanh teaches that mindfulness, 
rather than being an abstract notion or something that only occurs during sitting 
meditation, should be practised and actualised in every moment of everyday life. 
Indeed, this applies to all of Nhat Hanh's teachings. From a non-intellectual, 
experiential perspective, Nbat Hanh offers such teachings as interbeing, love, and 
the true self not as ideologies or doctrines but as living truths that can be realised. 
This, he insists, constitutes authentic spiritual practice. Let us here examine what 
Nhat Hanh means by mindfulness practice and bow-it actually works. 
Within Nhat Hanh's discourse, the notion of the 'true home' represents the 
immediate availability of awareness and peace within the refuge of the present 
moment, the here and now. Throughout Plum Village, hanging on walls, carved 
into stones, or written on signposts along the garden paths, are many giithas -
phrases or sayings that are intended as meditation aids for the practitioner. A 
recurrent gathii reads "I have arrived ... I am home". Addressing his Western, and 
mainly Christian audience, Nhat Hanh explains the meaning of this gathii: 
Our tme home is in the present moment. To live in the present moment is a miracle. 
The miracle is not to walk on water. The miracle is to walk on the green Earth in the 
present moment, to appreciate the peace and beauty that are available now. Peace is 
all around us - in the world and in nature - and within tL~ - in our bodies and our 
spirits. Once we learn to touch this peace, we will be healed and transformed. It is 
not a matter of faith; it is a matter of practice. 75 
The miracle of the present moment and the refuge of the true home are always 
available, as long as we are available to them. If you are rootless, alienated, 
distracted, consumed, or unaware, like so many "wanderers" in modern society, 
you may not have been able to reach your true home - you may be lost. However, 
as Nhat Hanh explains, through the practice you can find your way: 
When you are carried away with your worries, fears, cravings, anger, and desire, you 
run away from yourself and you lose yourself. The practice is always to go back to 
oneself. You have a wonderful vehicle. And you don' t have to buy gasoline. 76 
75 Nhat Hanh, Touching Peace: Practicing the Art of Mindful Living. 1-2 
76 Thich Nhat Hanh, Going Home: Jesus and Buddha as Brothers (London: Rider Books, 1999). 
50 . 
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Nhat Hanh is adamant that "To suffer is not enough"- we also need to be aware 
of the wonders of life. "Life is filled with suffering, but it is also filled with many 
wonders, like the blue sky, the sunshine, the eyes of a baby."77 Furthermore, he 
suggests that through the practice of looking deeply, which perceives the 
interbeing of all things, we can realise that "our home is everywhere . .. the trees 
are our home and the blue sky is our home."78 
As a traditional Buddhist practice, mindfulness (P. sati; S. sm.rti) constitutes the 
meditative cultivation of an aware and present state of mind that forms the 
foundation of insight and- understanding. Sn~rti--fs---the first-· of the three 
emblematic, guiding principles of Plum Village, the second being samadhi, or 
concentration, and the third prajna, meaning wisdom or understanding. (See 
Figure ll) As Nhat Hanh explains, these three principles are interrelated: 
Mindfulness is the prnctice of stopping and becoming nware of what we are thinking 
and doing. The more we are mindfhl of our thoughts, speech, and actions, the more 
concentration we develop. With concentration, insight into the nature of our own 
suffering and the suffering of others arises. We then know what to do and what not 
to do in order to Jive joyfully and in peace with our surroundings. 79 
By way of expressing this process of healing, transformation, and growth, Nhat 
Hanh uses a number of recurrent metaphors. Most frequently, he suggests that 
practitioners are like 'organic gardeners' who turn the fertile soil of the mind, 
using the compost of suffering to grow beautiful flowers of peace and happiness. 
This metaphor is based upon the Yogacarii teaching of the 'seedbed' of 
consciousness, the 'storehouse' of the mind which is like a plot of land that 
contains numerous 'seeds' - seeds of suffering, happiness, joy, sorrow, fear, 
anger, and hope. The quality of our mental health and our lives in general is 
dependent on the quality of the seeds in our consciousness - which seeds sprout 
often, which are growing the strongest. As Nhat Hanh explains, "To practice 
mindfulness means to recognise each seed as it comes up from the storehouse and 
to practice watering the most wholesome seeds whenever possible, to help them 
77 Nhat Hanh, Being Peace. 3 
78 Nhat Hanh, Going Home. 41 
79 Nbat Hanh, Creating True Peace: Ending Co•iflict in Yourl·e/f. Your Fami~v. Your Community 
and the World. 18 
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grow stronger.''80 Over time, this process of 'selective watering' strengthens the 
mind and helps to develop equanimity, so that when difficult emotions or distorted 
perceptions arise, we have the ability to deal with them in ways that do not cause 
any harm. 
Nbat Hanh has recognised that of the many ways Buddhism could be presented to 
a modern Western audience, the 'Dharma door' of psychology is the most 
appropriate. In a recent interview, Nhat Hanh commented on the importance of the 
role of psychology in Western Buddhism: 
I think Buddhism should open the door of psychology and healing to penetrate more 
easily into the Western world. As tiu as religion is concerned, the West already has 
plenty of belief in a supernatural being. It's not by the law of faith that you should 
enter the spiritual territory of the West, because the West has plenty of this . 
So the door of psychology is good. The abhidharma literature of Buddhism 
represents a very rich understanding of the mind, which has been developed by many 
generations of Buddhists. If you approach the Western mind through the door of 
psychology, you may have better success helping people to tmderstand their mind, 
helping people to practice in such a way that they can heal the mind.81 
Community 
One of Nhat Hanh's more recent works, Finding Our True Home, constitutes a 
contemporary commentary on the Smaller Sukhiivat'fvyiiha St7tra, one of the three 
central texts of the Pure Land School of Buddhism 82 As a devotional cult of the 
Buddha Amitabha, the Pure Land School is characterised by a doctrine of future 
salvation in Amitabha's Pure Land Sukhiivati, the 'Western Land of Great 
Happiness'. At a popular level, the founding myths of this school contend that all 
beings may gain rebirth in Sukhavati, regardless of how enlightened they may be 
upon death. In the Smaller Sukhiivativytlha Szltra, the Buddha's discourse praises 
80 Nhat Hanh, Touching Peace: Practicing the Art of Mindful Living. 25 
81 Melvin McLeod, "This Is the Buddha's Love: An Interview with Thich Nhat Hanh," Shambalo 
Sun 2006. 54-5 
82 The other two texts are the Longer Sukhavativyiiha S1itra and the Amitiiyurdhyana Siitro. The 
two Sukhiivativyiiho Siitras were composed in India during the development of MahAyana 
Buddhism, yet they have been most ini1uential in China, Japan, and other pa11s of east Asia where 
Pure Land schools have flourished. Both have extant versions in Sanskrit and Chinese, and a 
Tibetan version of the Smaller Siitra still exists. In Chinese there are five different translations of 
the Longer SOtra (TaisM 362, 361, 360,310, and 363) and two of the SmaJJer Siitra (TaisM 366 
and 367). While the Amitiiyurdhyiina Siitra has a Sanskrit title, no Sanskrit text is known to exist. 
The work only exists in Chinese and central/east Asian languages that are obvious translations 
from the Chinese. Consequently, there is general scholarly consensus that this text was not 
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the merits, beauties, and wonders of Sukhavati, and he encourages his disciples to 
seek rebirth in this 'Land of Bliss'. Nhat Hanh's commentary offers a revitalising 
interpretation of the text. He re-articulates and demythologises the Pure Land 
teachings, skilfully combining them with his own teachings of mindfulness 
practice. Nhat Hanh deconstructs the dualistic notion of future happiness and 
salvation and insists "the promised land is available to us as soon as we are 
available to it."83 Once again he addresses the issue of the interdependence of 
happiness and suffering. Happiness, Nhat Hanh impresses, cannot exist without 
suffering; happiness depends upon our ability to transform our suffering, and this 
ability is determined by the quality of our prac-tiee:--Nlurt-Hanh thereby relocates 
the Pure Land so that it is no longer a mythical Western Paradise to be finally 
reached after death, but a present place of refuge, peace, and freedom from 
suffering, which can be actualised in the here and now through mindfulness 
practice. He states: 
If we use the eyes of a meditator, the Pure Land practice is no longer an eternal 
longing or a superstition but a very realistic doctrine_ The Pure Land is something we 
live in our daily life_ Every step, every breath, every word, every look, can produce 
the Pure Land. The practice of building a Sangha can be identified with the practice 
ofbuilding a Pure Land.84 
Essentially, Nhat Hanh's commentary proposes that the Pure Land can be 
internally manifested in one's mind, where it becomes the true self or the ' true 
home', as the title of the book suggests. Furthermore, he also suggests that the 
Pure Land can be externally manifested in the collective embodiment of a Sangha, 
a community of spiritual practitioners. 
Perhaps the most pronounced ofNhat Hanh's later teachings are his prescriptions 
concerning the Sangha and Sangha building. Against all the sufferings of modern 
society - its rootlessness, fragmentation, secular ideologies of individualism, and 
illusions of greed and separation - Nhat Hanh' s discourse on the value and 
strength of a spiritual community is poignant. In all of his recent publications, 
Nhat Hanh reiterates his conviction that the very survival of humanity and the 
\:.()t\\~'!.t<\ \~\~<:\\a b"\l\ \t\ C:t\\M.. be\'fl~tt\ .!\1..!\ a\\<:\ .!\.!\1. <:.L, -.m\\ \\\a\\\\> \\\\e \os a \\~\\\e\\c'<l.\ 
'\.':..~W:.~'""'~ "'~ ~":.. '-.~<:..~ 't-_'\\.~'1\ 'N'-\.2\.\~:..'(\<s~<.)\.\. \<.) ~\'(\'b-
n 1\Ucb. "Nb.a\ \\anb., Finding Our Tme Home: Living in lne Pme Land Here and Now $m~\e-j , 
CA: Parallax Press, 2003). 42 
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Earth depends upon a realisation of Sangha, or community. Understood as a 
community of spiritual practitioners, the Sangha provides a true refuge from the 
dangers and toxins of modem society. Furthermore, as a manifestation of 
interbeing, it functions according to a symbiotic dynamic that provides support in 
the practice. When members of a Sangha take their practice into the wider context 
of society, their mindful actions and conscious consumption have direct impact 
and contribute towards the manifestation of a societal Sangha. Finally, Nhat Hanh 
emphasises the notion of a planetary Sangha based upon hwnanity's realisation of 
our essential interbeing with the natural world. According to Nhat Hanh, such a 
realisation provides a means of reversing the destructive trajectory of the 
environmental crisis. Once again, these teachings are founded upon tradition: the 
Sangha is one of the 'Three Jewels' -Buddhism's three confessional refuges, in 
addition to the Buddha and the Dharma. However, it is evident that within the 
context of the modern West, Nhat Hanh has expanded the traditional boundaries 
of the definition of Sangha to include society, and indeed, the whole planet. 
According to Nhat Hanh's definition, a Sangha is "a community of people -
monks, nuns, laymen, and laywomen - who are walking together on a spiritual 
path."8~ More specifically, it is "a community of friends practicing the Dharma 
together to bring about and maintain awareness," and it provides: 
... the kind of environment that can help us become rooted. A Sangha is not a 
community of practice in which each person is an island, unable to communicate 
with each other - this is not a true Sangha. No healing or transformation will result 
from such a Sangha. A true Sangha should be like a family in which there is a spirit 
of brotherhood and sisterhood.86 
The critical necessity of Sangha building is a recurrent axiom in Nhat Hanh' s later 
teachings. Sangha building is "the most important practice - the most important 
action - of our century. How can the twenty-first century be a century of 
spirituality," he asks, "if we do not take up the work of Sangha building?',s7 Nhat 
Hanh contends that the practices of Sangha building are today "even more 
important than studying the sutras, practicing sitting meditation, listening to 
84 Ibid. 49 
S$ Nhat Hanh, Joyfullcv Together: The Arl of Building a Hannonious Community. 7 
86 Nhat Hanh, "Go as a Sangha." 18 & 20 
87 Nhat Hanh. "SpiritUality in the Twenty-First Century." lO 
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Dharma talks, or attending Dharma discussions."88 The responsibilities of Sangha 
building include consistent and dedicated mindfulness practice; accepting all 
members, even the difficult ones, with a spirit of equanimity, inclusivism, and 
love; utilising communication skills such as compassionate speech and deep 
listening rather than reprimanding, correcting, or placing blame; relinquishing a 
desire for self-gratification or possessions; and embracing a simple lifestyle. In 
either a monastery or a practice centre, if each member fulfils these 
responsibilities, the Sangha will be successful in facilitating healing, 
transformation, and collective awakening. 
The palpable peace and harmonious dynamic that are instilled at Plum Village 
bear witness to Nbat Hanh's teachings on the Sangha. As an exemplar, Plum 
Village manifests the peace of a Pure Land and the symbiotic support structure of 
a true Sangha. Nhat Hanh and his associates have developed a number of new 
forms and methods that enable the Sangha to run smoothly. These new structures 
have been based upon real instances of conflict and resolution that have occurred 
at Plum Village, as well as traditional monastic resources. The Plum Village 
Sangha structure combines the traditional authorial model of seniority with 
contemporary democratic principles. Furthermore, every hamlet has a Caretaking 
Council and a Dharmacharya (Teaching) Council, as well as an Abbot or Abbess. 
Amongst the monks and nuns there is a Mentor System and a Second Body 
System. While a monk or nun's mentor will be an elder in the community, their 
'second body' will be a fellow brother monk or sister nun whom they specifically 
care for, and who cares for them. The Plum Village Sangha has also developed 
certain practices that are used to resolve conflicts in the community, such as 
Triangle Practice, Beginning Anew, and the Seven Methods of Resolving 
Conflicts. Another set of practices, including Shining Light, Flower Watering, and 
Bringing Our Teacher Inside are communal practices, but they are intended to aid 
individual spiritual progress. 89 
According to Nhat Hanh, when you practise as part of a Sangha you develop 
powerful inner resources that enable you to confront the various perils of modern 
88 Nhat Hanh, Joyfull;v Together: The Art of Building a Harmonious Community. 11 
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society with strength, equanimity, and resilience. The prophetic vision of the 
Buddhist tradition proposes that the forthcoming Buddha will be Maitreya, the 
Buddha of 'loving kindness'. Nhat Hanh has suggested that this future 'Buddha of 
Love' will not manifest in the form of a person, but as a vast Sangha: 
A Sangha that practices loving kindness and compassion is the Buddha that we need 
for the twenty-tirst century. Each of us is a cell in the body of the Buddha of Love. 
Each cell has its own role to play, and we cannot afford to miss one of our cells. We 
have to stay together. We have the power to bring Sangbakaya, the Sangha body, and 
Maitreya Buddha into existence just by sitting together and practicing deeply. 
So the next Buddha may not take the form of an individual. In the twenty-first 
century the Sangha may be the body of the Buddha .. . All of us have the duty to 
bring that Buddha into being, not only for our sake, but for the sake of our children 
and the planet Earth. This is not wishful thinking, this is a real detennination.90 
Dialogue 
Nhat Hanb's vision of a planetary Sangha encompasses the individual, families, 
society, nature, and also, finally, the geo-political domain of international and 
interreligious relations. In response to the conflicts that plague this domain, in the 
form of warfare, ideological conflict, and terrorism, Nhat Hanh again offers a 
cure. This cure is based upon his approach to individual and societal suffering, 
however it adds a further element. In addition to mindfulness, Sangha practice, 
and ethical action in society, Nhat Hanh's cure for international and interreligious 
conflict incorporates the principle of dialogue. It needs to be recognised that this 
kind of dialogue is not the kind of conceptual exchange implied by 'discursive 
dialogue ' but is based upon spiritual practice and insight into interbeing. Nhat 
Hanh proposes specific nonviolent, spiritually grounded communication practices 
that can bring about insight and understanding, resolution and peace. Thus, Nhat 
Hanh's cure can best be understood as a form of 'interior dialogue' conjoined with 
a form of 'engaged dialogue' . We will here examine the different aspects of Nhat 
Hanh's approach to dialogue, his suggestions of how they could be utilised within 
global political contexts, and how they have advanced the peace process in the 
Middle East by uniting Palestinians and Israelis in collective practice at Plum 
Village. 
89 See Chapter 5 ·:caring for each Other" in Ibid. 70-91 
90 Nhat Hanh, "Go as a Sangha." 17 
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As with all of Nhat Hanh's teachings, the peace process must begin with the self 
and individual spiritual practice. As we have already discerned, Nhat Hanh' s 
analysis of the nature of conflict locates its fundamental cause in wrong 
perceptions and prejudices that become manifest as fear, discrimination, anger, 
hatred, and violence. For the peace process to be successful, it must begin with the 
healing and transformation of these wrong perceptions and strong emotions. 
According to Nhat Hanh, the failure of conventional peace negotiations in the past 
has been due to the lack of this essential spiritual dimension: 
Too often in the past, peace conferences have been environments where people came 
and fuught each other;not with weapons-but with fear. When we are carried away-by 
our fear and prejudices, we cannot listen to others. We cannot just bring two sides 
together around a table to discuss peace when they are still filled with anger, hatred, 
and hurt. If you cannot recognise your fear and anger, if you do not know how to 
calm yourself, how can you sit at a peace table with your enemy? Facing your enemy 
across a table, you will only continue to tight. 91 
Without a spiritual dimension to the peace process, peace talks are just talking, 
and as Nhat Hanh has recognised, "A lot of talking has been done for many years, 
and it has not worked."92 In contrast, Nhat Hanh proposes that true peace 
negotiations need to practise peace, not just talk about it. He suggests, "Our 
capacity to make peace with another person and with the world depends very 
much on our capacity to make peace with ourselves . .. When we have peace 
within, real dialogue with others is possible.93 Accordingly, Nbat Hanh proposes 
that peace dialogues should be organised like meditation retreats, so that they 
create the right environment of calm, trust, and non-judgement, that is essential 
for individual practice and fruitful communication. In this sense, the strength 
provided by the collective practice of the Sangha can be beneficial: 
When warring parties come to a peace conference, each side is full of suspicion, 
anger, and distrust. With those emotions in their hearts, not much can be achieved, 
because there is no peace inside as a basis for making peace with the other . . . A real 
peace conference should be organised like a retreat, and both groups should be given 
time to calm themselves and take care of their emotions, their fear and suspicion ... 
Some of us know how to help .. . and we can help prepare the ground for mutual 
understanding. 94 
91 Nhat Hanh, Creating Tn~e Peace: Ending Conflict in Yourself, Your Family, Your Community 
and the World. 189 
92 Nhat Hanh, Peace Begins Here: Palestinians and Israelis Listening to Each Other. 16 
93 Thich Nhat Hanh, Living Buddha. Living Christ (London: Rider Books, 1995). I 0 
94 Nhat Hanh, Peace Begins Here: Palestinians and Israelis Listening to Each Other. 47-8 
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Finally, fruitful dialogue is dependent upon the right motivations. When 
approaching the dialogical or negotiating table, the prime motives should be 
understanding, reconciliation, resolution, and peace. Nhat Hanh has observed, "If 
we talk to each other, if we organise a dialogue, it is because we believe there is a 
possibility that we can understand the other person better."95 Moreover, "In a true 
dialogue, both sides are willing to change ... If we think we monopolise the truth 
and we still organise a dialogue, it is not authentic." Thus, in contrast to attitudes 
of imperialism or dogmatism, Nhat Hanh affirms that "Dialogue must be practiced 
on the basis of 'non-self."96 It is only on the basis of non-self, or an awareness of 
interbeing, that the suffering of the other can be truly-tmderstood. 
We can delineate four steps in Nhat Hanh's teachings on dialogue in the peace 
process: deep listening, loving speech, mutual understanding, and finally 
compassion. Together, according to Nhat Hanh, these practices constitute a cure to 
global conflict. Let us examine each of these steps. 
In September 2001, following the 9/ 11 attacks in the United States, Nhat Hanh 
gave an interview that was later titled "What I Would Say to Osama bin Laden" . 
Offering a Buddhist response to the terrorist attacks, the perspective voiced by 
Nbat Hanh differed sharply from the mainstream reaction of the American people 
and government. He stated: "If I were given the opportunity to be face to face with 
Osama bin Laden, the first thing I would do is listen."97 Evidently, 'listening' to 
bin Laden bas not been a top priority in the policies of America's 'War on Terror' . 
Indeed, many would consider simply 'listening' to be narve and futile in the face 
of such an extreme act of violence. From Nhat Hanh's perspective, however, 
initial listening is the only way to respond that will ensure an eventual resolution. 
He continues to define his motivations for listening: 
I would try to understand why he bad acted in that cruel way. I would try to 
tmderstand all of the suffering that had led him to violence. It might not be easy to 
listen in that way, so I would have to remain calm and lucid. I would need several 
friends with me, who are strong in the practice of deep listening, listening without 
reacting, without judging and blaming. In this way, an atmosphere of support would 
9~ Nhat Hanh, Living Buddha, Lh·ing Cht-ist. 85 
96 1bid. 9 
97 Nhat Hanh, "What I Would Say to Osama bin Laden" in Nhat Hanh, Calming the Featfr.tl Mind: 
A Zen Response to Terrorism. I 03 
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be created for this person and those connected so that they could share completely, 
trust that they are really being heard.98 
Nhat Hanh describes the practice of listening as a kind of 'art'. The 'art of deep 
listening' must be practised in conjunction with mindfulness, insight, and 
compassion. Nhat Hanh explains: 
Compassionate and deep listening means that the other person, or the other nation, 
has a chance to say what they have never had the opportunity or courage to say, 
because no one ever listened deeply to them before. 
At first, their speech may be full of condemnation, bitterness, and blame. If you 
can, continue to sit there calmly and listen ... If you intemtpt, deny, or correct what 
they say, you will be unable to go in the direction of reconciliation. Deep listening 
allows-the other· person to speak ewn-if what he says contains misperceptions and 
injustice . .. 
Listening to someone with compassion can turn him into a friend ... You 
become a bodhisattva, a being who ends sutiering. You lose an enemy and win a 
friend.99 
The next step that follows listening is compassionate or loving speech. After 
listening to bin Laden, Nhat Hanh suggested that "we might need to take a break 
to allow what has been said to enter into our consciousness. Only when we felt 
calm and lucid would we respond. We would respond point by point to what had 
been said. We would respond gently but firmly in such a way to help them to 
discover their own misunderstandings so that they will stop violent acts from their 
own will." 100 Loving speech incorporates skill, nonviolence, and ' fierce 
compassion' in a pursuit to reveal wrong perceptions in both self and other. The 
principal aim of deep listening and loving speech is to acknowledge the suffering 
of the other and restore communication. Nhat Hanh explains this process in terms 
of the doctor/cure analogy: 
The virus you see is made of fear, hatred, and violence. You can be a doctor for a 
person with this illness. Your medicine is the practice of restoring communication .. . 
If the patient refuses the doctor's help, doesn't trust her, and fears the doctor may be 
trying to kill him, he will never cooperate. Even if the doctor is motivated by a great 
desire to help, she cannot do anything if the patient will not collaborate. So the first 
thing the doctor has to do is find ways to open communication. If you can talk to the 
patient, there is hope. If the doctor can begin by acknowledging the patient's 
sutTering then mutual understanding can develop and collaboration can begin. 101 
91 1bid. 
99 Ibid. 17-18 
100 Nhat Hanh, "What I Would Say to Osama bin Laden'' in Ibid. 103 
101 Jbid. 24 
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Mutual understanding is the third step in the dialogical peace process. At the time 
of 9/l J, Nhat Hanh recognised that the attacks were a desperate caJI for 
understanding, attention, and help.102 According to Nhat Hanh, understanding the 
9/11 attacks would involve cultivating insight into the root causes of the conflict, 
and the wrong perceptions of both the self and the other/nation. Understanding 
also encompasses a comprehension of 'Right Action' -the correct response to a 
conflict. We have already discussed Nhat Hanh's perspective on revenge and 
punishment and his assertion of the traditional Buddhist principle that you cannot 
fight violence with violence. Alternatively, Nhat Hanh affirms that with true 
understanding, compassion is born. "If we use compassion to embrace these who 
have harmed us," Nhat Hanh suggests, "it will greatly diffuse the bomb in our 
hearts and in theirs." Finally, compassion is "the antidote to violence and hatred ... 
There is no other medicine."103 Unfortunately, as Nhat Hanh perceives, "they do 
not sell compassion in the supermarket. If they sold compassion, we wouJd only 
need to bring it home and we could solve the problem of hatred and violence in 
the world very easily."104 Instead, compassion depends upon spiritual practice, 
dialogue, and understanding. Through these practices, peace is possible. 
It is apparent that Nhat Hanh's teachings concerning the role of dialogue in the 
peace process are mainly directed at the United States. Following 9/11, Nhat Hanh 
made many public statements in the U.S. urging the American government not to 
retaliate with violence on the Arabic nations. Two days after the attacks, in a 
public talk in Berkeley, California, Nhat Hanh proclaimed: 
In this very moment we invoke all of our spiritual teachers, Buddhas and 
bodhisattvas to be with us, helping us to embrace the suffering of America as a 
nation, as a country, to embrace humanity as a family, so that we can become lucid 
and calm, so that we will know exactly what we should do, and what we should not 
do to avoid making the sinmtion worse ... America can be a great nation if she knows 
how to act with compassion instead of punishment. 10~ 
Furthermore, a number of Nhat Hanh' s later works have contributed towards the 
opening of an interreligious dialogue between Christianity and Islam. A week 
102 See "What I Would Say to Osama bin Laden" in Ibid. I 06 
103 Nhat Hanh, Creating Tme Peace: Ending Con.flict in Yourself, Your Family, Your Community 
and the World. 196 
104 Nhat Hanh, "What I Would Say to Osama bin Laden" in Nhat Hanh, Calming the Femful 
Mil1d: A Zen Response to Terrorism. 107 
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after the attacks, the New York Times published a statement, in which Nhat Hanh 
specifically calls upon the teachings of Christianity: 
Many people in America consider Jesus Christ as their Lord, their spiritual ancestor, 
and their teacher. We should heed his teachings especially during critical times like 
this. Jesus never encourages us to respond to acts of violence with violence. His 
teaching is, instead, to use compassion to deal with violence ... I have the conviction 
that America possesses enough wisdom and courage to perform an act of forgiveness 
and compassion, and I know that such an act can bring great relief to America and to 
the world right away. 106 
Nhat Hanh's focus on the U.S. can be understood as a continuation of his activism 
and engagement from the days of the Vietnam War. Indeed, Nhat Hanh has 
recognised similarities between the wars in Vietnam and Jraq.107 The principal 
suggestion Nhat Hanh offers to the U.S. government is to cease its military actions 
in foreign countries and return to the suffering within its own borders, the roots of 
war, which need urgent attention. He implores: 
We do not need to go overseas to a war zone to see violence. The Los Angeles 
policemen beating Rodney King, that was also Vietnam. War manifests itself in so 
many ways here and now. It is a reflection of our collective consciousness, which is 
ftlled with suffering. With this heritage, the violence will repeat itself over and over. 
There will be other Vietnams, other Gulf wars. It is our task to look deeply into the 
violence, hatred, and fear to see their roots.108 
In acknowledgement of all the marginalised, impoverished, misguided, and 
excluded people in American society, Nhat Hanh affirms the need to enact the 
First Noble Truth- the recognition of suffering. "The first step towards peace is to 
listen to and understand yourself and your fellow citizens," he suggests. 
"Otherwise, how can you listen to and understand the suffering of other people. 
How can you understand the suffering of Afghanistan, Israel , Palestine, or 
Iraq?"109 To recognise the internal suffering of America, Nhat Hanh proposes the 
creation of a 'Council of Sages' - a group of non-political people who have 
experience of suffering and are trained in the practice of dialogue and 
peacemaking. The Council would create a forum for deep listening and 
10~ Nhat Hanh, "A Prayer: The Best Flowers of Our Practice" in Ibid. 99-100 
106 Nhat Hanh, "Cultivating Compassion to Respond to Violence," New York Times , September 18, 
2001, published in Ibid. 101-2 
107 See Bob Abernethy, "An lntaview with Thich Nhat Hanh," Religion and Ethics Newsweekzv 
www. pbs.orglwnet/religionandethics/week703/interview .html (2003 ). 
108 Nhat Hanh, "To Veterans" in Nhat Hanh, Love in Action: Writings on Nonviolent Social 
tlwnge. 90-1 
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compassionate communication, in which people who had suffered exploitation, 
discrimination, or social injustice, could express themselves. Once suffering and 
its causes are acknowledged (the First and Second Noble Truths), America can 
move towards resolving such suffering (the Third and Fourth Noble Truths). As 
Nhat Hanb perceives, "America can be a role model for the world, but only if 
America can practice listening to herself. This would be her most beautiful export. 
God will indeed bless an America capable of doing this."110 
Having begun to deal with its own internal suffering, Nhat Hanh suggests 
Antefica eould then-enter into dialogue with other nations. Based upon the-model 
of the Council of Sages, Nhat Hanh proposes the creation of an International 
Council as a forum in which to confront global suffering. He defines: 
The setting must be one of safety and love. Countries from armmd the world can 
come together not as enemies that bomb and destroy each other but as wise people 
sponsoring sessions of deep listening. All nations could come and help with the 
practice; people from different cultures and civilisations would have the opportunity 
to speak to one another as fellow human beings who inhabit the same planet.11 1 
In addition to such a Council, Nhat Hanh also proposes the renewal of the 
structure and function of the United Nations. Nhat Hanh is critical of how the 
monopolising strategies of the U.S. government use the United Nations as an 
"instrument to serve their own national interests." In opposition, Nhat Hanh 
suggests that the UN should be transformed into a "community of nations", a truly 
"global Sangha". As a Sangha of nations, the UN could draw upon the collective 
insights and strengths of all countries and become a real peace organisation with 
acknowledged authority: 
If the UN could become a true community, the tensions between various countries 
could be taken care of by the Sangha of the United Nations. The United Nations' 
General Assembly could also be a place where people learn to listen to each other as 
brothers and sisters ... If d1e United Nations can become a real Sangha body and if 
the Security Council can become a true instrument of peace, we could act quickly 
and solve many of the problems of violence around the world ... d1e UN is our 
hope.112 
109 Nhat Hanh, Creating Tme Peace: Ending Conflict in Yourself. Your Fomi~v. Your Community 
cmd the World. 194 
110 Ibid. 
Jll Ibid. 196 
ll2 Nhat Hanh, Calming the Fearjitl Mind: A Zen Response to Terrorism. 96 
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Nhat Hanh' s discourse on global dialogue includes a number of examples of 
successful peace negotiations. South Africa's Troth and Reconciliation 
Commission, which was established by Bishop Desmond Tutu to deal with 
apartheid, provides an ideal exemplar. Nhat Hanh recalls, "Televised sessions 
were organised where members of the different racial groups were able to listen to 
and be heard by each other, with the tangible result that blacks and whites could 
begin to find a way to coexist peacefully and respectfully in South Africa. This is 
a concrete example of the powerful effect that direct compassionate 
communication can have on-a-national-and international level. .. m 
In J 997, Nhat Hanh himself was instrumental in introducing nonviolent practice 
into the Parliament of India. While on a visit, he suggested to Mr. K. R. 
Narayanan, the vice president of India, that Parliament sessions could be 
improved by practising mindfulness, deep listening, and loving speech during 
congress. Consequently, a committee for the Ethics of the Parliament was 
inaugurated and given the specific task of improving the quality of 
communication. Nhat Hanh has commented, "This kind of practice of 
nonviolence is possible everywhere, in every country. We urgently need to reduce 
the animosity and tension in government. If there is an atmosphere of harmony, 
calm, and sharing in government, there will be a future for our country and for 
every country."114 
A final example comes from Plum Village itself. Since 2001 , the Plum Village 
Sangha bas been sponsoring groups of Palestinians and Israelis to come to Plum 
Village and participate in retreats. The Palestinians and Israelis are taught bow to 
practise mindful breathing, mindful walking, mindful eating, and deep relaxation, 
so they may be able to address their own individual suffering. The intention of the 
practice is to develop insight into their essential interbeing. Nhat Hanh explains, 
"When they first come, they are often suspicious of each other. They can't look at 
each other with sympathetic eyes. But with the practice and the support of the 
Jl3 Nhat Hanh, Creating Tn1e Peace: Ending Conflict in Yourself, Your Fami~v. Your Communi~v 
and the World_ 19 
114 Ibid. 191 
Cha2.1er 5 255 
community, they are able to calm their suffering, their anger, their suspicion, and 
their hate. After several days, they are able to see that the other group also suffers. 
It takes time."m Once insight has begun to emerge, the Plum Village Sangha 
organises special sessions for the Palestinians and Israelis to engage in dialogue 
based upon the practice of mindfulness, deep listening, and loving speech. The 
aim, once again, is to open communication and to introduce the spiritual 
dimension so that peace is not just being talked about, it is being generated in the 
minds, actions, and words of the participants. So far, the dialogues and retreats 
have been successful. Through insight into interbeing and peaceful 
communication, the veils of separation are lifted and understanding is-·born. As 
Nhat Hanh explains: 
Injustice is suffered on both sides. The Palestinians have suffered so much. And 
when the Israelis come and describe to us their suffering, we are able to see that they 
too have suffered. That kind of understanding is crucial.. . Then we will discover 
each other as human beings and we will not be deceived by outer layers like 
"Buddhism," "Islam," "Judaism," "pro-American," "pro-Arab," and so on. This is a 
process of liberation from our ignorance, ideas, notions, and our tendency to 
discriminate. When I see you as a human being who suffers so much, I will not have 
the courage to shoot you .116 
Where it has been possible, Sanghas of both nationalities have been established in 
the Middle East, where the process of healing and transformation continues and 
peace is practised, even in the midst of war. Commenting on such a Sangha, a 
Palestinian woman has revealed: 
I feel that something is beginning to settle and grow stronger. There is a real process 
happening and there seems to be equal participation from both sides, pushing the 
boat in the right direction. The members of the Sangha belong to two fighting 
nations. The fight is deeply rooted and is very painful. It has a background of many 
decades of hatred. Our group is different from others in one major way: it deals with 
conflict resolution through practicing inner peace, deep listening, and talking with 
affection and love ... We have to practice in a very grounded way because we live in 
a cruel reality. There are many obstacles that can disturb our attention and focus and 
can water the seeds of hatred and rage in us. Our experience [in the Sangha] settles 
our taith and strengthens it inside each ofus.117 
115 Nhat Hanh, Peace Begins Here: Palestinians and Israelis Listening to Each Other. 15 
116 Ibid. 101 
JJ7 Ibid. 69-70 
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The existence of such Sanghas is an exceptional achievement in the peace process, 
and while it may be only a small scale achievement, as Nhat Hanh affirms, "If we 
can do it on a larger scale, there will be peace in the Middle East."118 
In conclusion, it should be recognised that despite being forcibly removed from 
the context of war in Vietnam, Nhat Hanh, in his later teachings, is still principally 
concerned with the notion of engagement. However, having undergone 
transmission into the context of the modern West, Nhat Hanh's teachings of 
engagement have evolved and refocused their application on the ' roots' of war. 
Nhat Hanh's later- teachings are therefore not so much concerned with---aetively 
confronting the military forces of the great superpowers, as with engagement with 
the internal wars the are waged between 'true enemies' within the individual 
psyche and contemporary collective consciousness. According to Nhat Hanh, 
these wars have been fuelled and intensified by an array of deluded ideologies that 
support the edifice of modernity. Indeed, Nhat Hanh is highly critical of the 
illusions of modernity, its secular ideologies of greed and destruction, 
individualism and consumerism, and the mass manifestation of fear and hatred 
that are the substance of contemporary global warfare and terror. However, 
through skilful means and modernising strategies, Nhat Hanh has continued to 
reinterpret Buddhism within this specific cultural-historic context, in order to 
alleviate the suffering of as many people as possible. Assuming the traditional role 
of the 'holy physician', Nhat Hanh 's later teachings offer the balm of mindfulness 
practice, the healing refuge of the Sangha, and the pragmatic prescription of 
dialogue in the peace process, as salvific cures to modernity's ailments. It is 
important to note that these cures are not just simple solutions. As Nhat Hanh is 
fond of saying, they do not sell compassion or mindfulness at the supermarket. 
Nor is it simply a matter of believing in these cures. Rather, the curative agency of 
mindfulness, community, and dialogue is dependent upon spiritual practice, 
Sangha building, and the actualisation of peace in deep listening and loving 
speech. Nhat Hanh's cures are not ideologies or dogmas that are upheld as 
ultimate solutions or exclusive means, but are presented as living practices that 
must be experienced or enacted for their potency to have effect. As we shall now 
JJI Ibid. 18 
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see, it is on the basis of this non-ideological, non-dogmatic, and experiential 
approach to spirituality that Nhat Hanh offers his teachings for inclusion in the 
religious systems of other, non-Buddhist traditions. Furthermore, it is in relation to 
Nhat Hanh's universalising yet de-absolutising approach to Buddhism that we will 
now construct the notion of Religious lnterbeing as a means of affirming 
pluralism among the world's religions. 
IJIJ{tUJ !LfPIJWVS ?J-iutS :MOPD!A\ SS8(!)-p;JU!lflS ;J3811!A WR(d 
II 
} .tatdOl(:J 
259 
6 
On Religious Diversity: 
Interbeing, Mindfulness, and Peace 
Although God is in everything, we can't compare God with creatures that live on 
Earth, just as we cannot compare water 1-vith a wave, because one is the ultimate 
nature and one is the phenomenon. We can compare one wave with another, but 
we cannot compare the water with the wave. It is the ultimate nature, and no 
words can be used to give it a name or describe it. We could call it God, we could 
call it Allah, we could call it the creator, but these are just ways of naming it. All 
these expressions and ideas are our unsuccessful attempt to define God. 
Therefore, whether "H'e say God, or 'Dit->u' (French), or 'Thuong De' (Vietnamese) 
or Allah, these are just names, and are not strong enough to contain the wonderful 
reality that is the ultimate dimension. 
God does not need to be famous in human society, like a movie star or a 
president. God is not a little bag of peanuts for us to fight over. And God does not 
want to compere with us to be more famous than we. To be in touch with the 
wonderful reality of the ultimate dimension, we have to go beyond the name, and 
only then can we find the true hallowed nature. 
Thicb Nhat Hanh 
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The central proposal of this thesis suggests that the teachings of Thich Nhat Hanh 
contain valuable resources that could contribute towards the discourse of Buddhist 
pluralism. To demonstrate and verify this proposal, our methodological intention 
has been to analyse and understand Nhat Hanb's approach to other religions in 
relation to the Buddhist tradition, Nhat Hanb's cultural-historic context, and the 
corpus of his teachings. In accord with this strategy, the previous two chapters 
have established a textual and contextual foundation of understanding by 
analysing Nhat Hanh's approach to tradition and to modernity. As such, we are 
now equipped to undertake an analysis-ef-Nhat Hanh's approach to religious 
diversity. 
This final chapter will attempt to weave together the various discourses and issues 
we have examined thus far. It will draw upon our initial examination of Christian 
and Buddhist responses to religious diversity, focusing principally on the 
discourse of pluralism. The central categories and principles of Nhat Hanh's 
teachings, which have been textually illustrated and contextually located, will also 
inform our analysis. Specifically, this chapter will present three readings of Nhat 
Hanh' s approach to religious diversity, based upon three central categories within 
his teachings: the perspective of interbeing, the practice of mindfulness, and the 
principle of peace. Each reading will demonstrate how each category corresponds 
with established positions within the discourse of Buddhist pluralism, such as we 
examined in Chapter Two. The readings will also analyse how each category has 
been constructively applied within Nhat Hanh's dialogue with Christianity. To 
conclude, we will address and respond to potential criticisms that could be 
levelled against Nhat Hanh's approach. 
Nhat Hanh's approach to religious diversity proposes the interdependence of 
religions. Presenting an alternative to Western Christian positions of identist and 
differential pluralism, Nhat Hanh's approach constructs an experiential, 
dialogical, and ethical form of pluralism, which affirms both the unity and 
diversity of religions, whilst asserting the need for interreligious engagement with 
the suffering of the world. This approach will herein be conceptualised as a 
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position of Religious Interbeing. Ultimately, this thesis contends that the position 
of Religious Interbeing is of significant value, not only to Buddhist 
understandings of pluralism, but also to the Christian theological debate 
concerning pluralism, and the practical domain of interreligious encounter and 
exchange within the late modern world. 
Thicb Nhat Hanb and Religious Diversity 
In his hennitage at Plum Village, Nhat Hanh has effigies of both the Buddha and 
Jesus on his personal altar. In fact, Nhat Hanh counts Jesus Christ as one of his 
·~spi.ritual· aneestors."1 However, this dual religious belonging has not always been 
part ofNhat Hanh' s religious identity. Nhat Hanh's youth in Vietnam was spent 
under the oppressive conditions of colonialism. The early coercive efforts of 
French missionaries to convert the Vietnamese population and the later 
evangel ising enforcements of the Diem government combined to create a negative 
perception of Christianity among the majority of twentieth-century Vietnamese 
Buddhists. Reflecting on his initial encounter with Christianity, Nhat Hanh has 
recalled that "in such an atmosphere of discrimination and injustice against non-
Christians, it was difficult for me to discover the beauty of Jesus' teachings."2 
Nevertheless, during these early days as a young activist monk, Nhat Hanh's 
involvement in the peace movement led him into dialogue with more liberal-
minded Christians also involved in resistance. Within Vietnam, a strong Catholic 
presence of opposition to the war emerged and eventually formed an alliance with 
the Buddhist Struggle Movement. The irony of this alliance, as Robert King has 
observed, was that "the conflict that had so deeply divided the Vietnamese people 
had brought Buddhists and Catholics closer together."3 As a leader of the 
Buddhist movement, Nhat Hanh was vocal about the Buddhist position, declaring 
their willingness to "co-operate with other religious groups - Cao Daiist, Hao 
Haoist, and especially Catholics - in order to realise peace and reconstruction in 
Vietnam." Nhat Hanh suggested that the "determination to work for peace and a 
1 Thich Nhat Hanh, Living Buddha, Living Christ (London: Rider Books, 1995). 6 
2 1bid. 5 
3 Robert H. King, Thomas Merton and Thich Nhat Hanh: Engaged Spiri171ality in an Age of 
Globolisation (New York: Continuum, 2003). 123 
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democratic society can serve to unite the various elements that have sometimes 
been divided, and lead them to an acceptance of each other based on this common 
interest." Such an approach, Nhat Hanh proposed, would enable Buddhists and 
Catholics to "overcome the obstacles and lay aside the ghosts that had haunted 
them for so many cenruries.'"' Nhat Hanh's further encounters with Christian 
members of the international peace movement, such as Thomas Merton, Martin 
Luther King, and Daniel Berrigan, helped to deepen his understanding and 
appreciation of the Christian tradition. Evidently, the roots of Nhat Hanh's 
emphasis on interreligious complementarity and collective engagement, which 
define his contemporary approach to religious diversity,ean be traced back to-this 
time. 
In his later years of exile, Nhat Hanh' s endeavours to transmit Buddhism in the 
West Jed him into even greater contact with a diversity of religions. In response, 
Nhat Hanh bas built upon his earlier encounters to establish a significant dialogue 
with Christianity. More recently, he has expanded the scope of his dialogue to 
include the traditions of Judaism and Islam. However, while Nhat Hanh has 
affirmed the differences between religions, he has not focused on them. Rather, he 
is interested in dialogical areas of complementarity, especially at the levels of 
practice, experience, and engagement with the world. To utilise one of his 
metaphors, Nhat Hanh does not 'water the seeds' of difference in religions. 
Instead, be waters the seeds of interreligious understanding and commumon, 
intending to cultivate and nurture an organic garden of faiths subsisting in 
symbiotic harmony and reciprocal support. Nhat Hanh's approach envisages 
Religious Interbeing: he presents a pluralist vision of the interdependence of 
religions, engaging with each other on contemplative and dialogical levels, while 
working together for the benefit of humanity and the planet. 
Reading One: lnterbeing 
Within Nhat Hanh's discourse, each concept he defmes, each doctrine he explains, 
and each practice he prescribes refers back to the fundamental teaching of 
interbeing. Interbeing is the cornerstone ofNhat Hanh's pedagogic system and his 
4 Thich Nhal Hanh, Vietnam; The Lotus in the Sea of Fire (London: SCM Press, 1967). 93-4 
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pluralist vision of religions. As we saw in Chapter Four, the teaching of interbeing 
imparts the inseparability of spiritual practice and social engagement, and thereby 
supports every aspect of Engaged Buddhist ethics and practice. Moreover, as we 
saw in Chapter Five, the realisation of interbeing within the self, the context of 
society, and between nations, provides a potential cure for a fragmented, deluded, 
and suffering world. In this chapter, we will discover how the perspective of 
interbeing can also support a theological position of pluralism. We will commence 
this reading by briefly recapitulating the meaning of emptiness within the 
discourse of Buddhist pluralism. We will then examine how Nhat Hanh has 
utilised emptiness within his -discourse·an-rel-igiotls diversity, and will thereby 
delineate the concept of Religious Interbeing. Finally, we will investigate how 
Nhat Hanh has applied the perspective of interbeing in his dialogue with 
Christianity. 
Emptiness and Buddhist Pluralism 
As we discussed in Chapter Two, a number of Buddhist scholars have recognised 
the important implications of the doctrine of emptiness (S. sunyata) for the theory 
and practice of pluralism. From Judith Simmer-Brown to Buddhadasa Bhikkhu, 
Marco Pallis to Masao Abe, Frederick Streng to Rita Gross, this wide range of 
scholars and teachers have utilised the perspective of silnyatii as a resource for 
concurrently affirming the unity and diversity of religions. To briefly reiterate, the 
realisation of emptiness involves the deconstruction of erroneous mental processes 
of discrimination that segregate reality into a world of separate entities. This 
deconstruction transforms consciousness and generates a nondual perspective, 
which perceives reality as it truly is. The perspective of emptiness still discerns 
the diversity of forms in the world, and thus acknowledges difference. But it also 
sees the true conditioned nature of forms, and thus realises their emptiness and 
interdependence. 
When the realised perspective of emptiness is applied to a discernment of 
religious diversity, similarly, a difference of religious forms is acknowledged, but 
so is their conditioned nature. As such, religions are not perceived as reified 
statements of truth, or absolute representations ofreality. Rather, they are located 
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m the conventional realm of relativity and are therefore understood to be 
provisional linguistic constructs or 'skilful means'. Religions are to be utilised as 
methods that can facilitate a direct encounter with truth. However, they must 
ultimately be relinquished or transcended in order for such encounter to occur. 
As many commentators have recognised, the important coro1lary of this 
application of emptiness to religious diversity is that the 'emptying' of religious 
forms asserts their equality. From the perspective of emptiness, the variety of 
religions is affirmed. But as they are all located in the realm of the conditioned, as 
methods rathef than statements of truth, nfr one religious form can be considered 
as superior, including Buddhism. In other words, emptiness undermines 
absolutism. As such, the 'emptying' of religions asserts their diversity, as well as 
their equality, and therefore their unity. Moreover, in breaking down false barriers 
of separation, the 'emptying' of religions opens avenues for dialogue and 
establishes the potential for reciprocal exchange and support 
Jnterbeing and Religious Diversity 
By way of clarification, let us turn to Nhat Hanh's comments on the 
interdependent nature of reality. Composing a "meditation on interbeing endlessly 
interwoven", Nhat Hanh explains: 
All phenomena are interdependent. When we think of a !.-peck of dust, a flower, or a 
human being, our thinking cannot break loose from the idea of unity. of one, of 
calculation. We see a line drawn between one and many, one and not one. But if we 
truly realise the interdependent nature of the dust, the flower, and the human being, 
we see that unity cannot exist without diversity. Unity and diversity interpenetrate 
each other freely. Unity is diversity, and diversity is lDlity. This is the principle of 
interbeing.~ 
As we have discussed, Nhat Hanh's teaching of interbeing constitutes a 
contemporary interpretation of the doctrines of co-dependent origination, non-self, 
and emptiness. Nhat Hanh uses a variety of metaphors to illustrate the nature of 
interbeing, including loaves ofbread, pieces of paper, and flowers: 
When we look into the heart of a flower, we see clouds, sunshine, minerals, time, the 
earth, and everything else in the cosmos in it. Without clouds, there could be no rain, 
~ Nhat Hanh, "The Sun My Heart" in Thich Nhat Hanh, Lcve in Action: Writings on Nonwolenr 
Social Change (Berkeley, CA: Parallax Press, 1993). 129 
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and there would be no flower. Without time, the flower could not bloom. In fact, the 
flower is made entirely of non-flower elements; it has no independent, individual 
existence. It 'inter-is' with everything else in the universe.6 
Within his discourse on religious diversity, Nbat Hanh applies the insight of 
interbeing to the different religious forms to produce a pluralist vision that affirms 
their integrity as different and distinct forms, but also their complementarity, 
interdependence, and unity as spiritual, experiential, and ethical systems: 
Just as a tlower is made only of non-flower elements, Buddhism is made only of 
non-Buddhist elements, including Christian ones, and Christianity is made of non-
Christian elements, including Buddhist ones. We have different roots, traditions, and 
ways of seeing, but we share the common qualities of love, understanding, and 
acceptance ... When we see the nature of interbeing, barriers between ourselves and 
others are dissolved, and peace, Jove, and understanding are possible.7 
Nhat Hanh's articulation of the interdependence of religious forms represents a 
pluralist perspective of what we will herein caB Religious Interbeing. In accord 
with the realisation that 'form is emptiness', Nhat Hanh's perspective of Religious 
Interbeing affrrms an interreligious unity that experientiaJJy transcends the 
boundaries of religious forms. However, because 'emptiness is also form', he 
concurrently affirms the value of religious difference. Concerning the differences 
between the philosophical systems of Buddhism and Christianity, Nhat Hanh has 
acknowledged discrepancies between the Buddhist teachings of rebirth, non-self, 
and emptiness, and the Christian teachings of one life, real self, and enduring 
existence.8 Indeed, Nhat Hanh is careful to affirm the significance of such 
diversity, claiming: "We have to preserve the differences. It is nice to have 
differences. Vive Ia dif.ferance."9 Nevertheless, he also claims that irreconcilable 
philosophical differences do not preclude the possibility of interreligious concord 
in relation to the experiential and moral dynamics of religious meaning. He states: 
"If the philosophical ground is so different, the practice of compassion and loving-
kindness in Buddhism and of charity and love in Christianity is different. All that 
seems to be a very superficial way of seeing."10 The perspective of interbeing 
looks beyond the surface of philosophical and formal difference towards what 
6 Nhat Hanh, Living Buddha, Living Chnst. II 
7 1bid. 
1 Thich Nhat Hanh, Going Home: Jesus and Buddha as Brothers (London: Rider Books, 1999). 15 
9 1bid. 16-17 
10 Ibid. 15 
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Nhat Hanh considers to be the 'essence' of religious traditions, a substance of 
experiential truth that is unlimited by form. In this sense, he contends: 
I do not think there is that much difference between Christians and Buddhists. Most 
of the boundaries we have created between our two traditions are artificial. Truth has 
no bowtdaries. Our ditTerences may be mostly differences in empbasis. 11 
Nhat Hanh uses a recurrent analogy of fruit to represent the importance of 
difference and the foundation of sameness. He states: "We don't want to say that 
Buddhism is a kind of Christianity and Christianity is a kind of Buddhism. A 
mango cannot be an orange ... they are two different things." However, beyond the 
surface; Nhat Hanh discerns that the essential substance of the mango-aad the 
orange is the same. He explains: 
It is good that an orange is an orange and a mango is a mango. The colours, the 
smells, and the tastes are ditferent, but looking deeply, we see that they are both 
authentic fruits. Looking more deeply, we can see the sunshine, the rain, the 
minerals, and the earth in both of them. Only their manifestations are different. 
Authentic experience makes a religion a true tradition. Religious experience is, 
above all, human experience. If religions are authentic, they contain the same 
elements of stability, joy, peace, understanding, and love. The similarities as well as 
the difierences are there. They differ only in terms of emphasis. Glucose and acid are 
in all fruits, but their degrees differ. We cannot say that one is a real fruit and the 
other is not. 12 
Nhat Hanh utilises certain resources from the Buddhist tradition to reinforce his 
pluralist position. Most significantly, he prescribes nonattachment to religious 
doctrines and an unfixed faith as necessary means for realising Religious 
Interbeing. As we have discussed, on the path of Buddhist practice doctrines are 
valued more for their 'verbal utility' than for their 'verbal truth'. Rather than 
being understood as conclusive statements of religious truth, doctrines are utilised 
as praxial tools that aid the practitioner towards an experience of truth. The 
Buddhist tradition therefore sees religions like 'rafts', or 'fingers pointing to the 
moon', and instructs that attachment to these 'vehicles' or 'signposts' will impede 
the process of practice and obstruct access to transfonnative experience. 
Therefore, Buddhism asserts the imperative to relinquish attachments to doctrines. 
As Nhat Hanh explains, "The Buddha did not present an absolute doctrine ... For a 
Buddhist to be attached to any doctrine, even a Buddhist one, is to betray the 
11 Nhat Hanh, Living Buddha, Living Christ. 154 
12 1bid. 194-5 
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Buddha. It is not words or concepts that are important. What is important is our 
insight into the nature of reality and our way of responding to reality."1 ~ 
In response to his experiences of ideological conflict during the Vietnam War, 
Nhat Hanh has consistently proclaimed the dangers of attachment to views. The 
first of the Fourteen Mindfulness Trainings guards against idolatry and attachment 
to doctrines, theories, and ideologies.14 Nhat Hanh' s later teachings confirm the 
importance of nonattachment for healthy interreligious interaction: "Learn and 
practice non-attachment from views in order to be open to receive others' 
viewpoints."1) Ultimately, attachment to religious views reinforces tbe· ffl~se -and 
potentially dangerous perception of separation between religions. Nhat Hanh has 
observed, "People may think of Buddhism as something that can exist by itself, 
independent of Christianity, Judaism, or anything else." In response, he refers to a 
Buddhist teacher who rinsed out his mouth every time he pronounced the word 
'Buddhism': "Rinsing his mouth was a kind of preventative medicine to remind 
himself (and his students) not to cling to the concept 'Buddhism' as something 
that can exist an by itself." 16 
Attachment to religious doctrines is the antithesis of actualisation. Attachment 
reifies and ossifies the structures of religions and thereby separates them; the real 
and effective meaning of doctrines stagnates, their vitality is stifled, and belief can 
become dangerously blind. Indeed, Nhat Hanh has been particularly critical of 
recent expressions of Christian exclusivism as represented in the work of Pope 
John Paul II. Commenting on a book titled Crossing the Threshold of Hope, Nhat 
Hanh repudiates its implication that "Christianity provides the only way of 
salvation and all other religions are of no use." He very simply states: "This 
attitude excludes dialogue and fosters religious intolerance and discrimination. It 
does not help." 17 In contrast, Nbat Hanh prescribes the continual renewal of faith 
13 1bid. 54-5 
14 See Appendix. 
1 ~ Thich Nhat Hanh, Peace Is Every Step: The Path of Mindfulness in Everyday Life (Berkeley, 
CA: Parallax Press, 1991 ). 127 
16 Nhat Hanh, Living Buddha, Living Christ. 148 
17 1bid. 192-3 
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and an openness of religious knowledge. Commenting on the nature of faith, Nhat 
Hanh explains: 
[l]f you are conunined only to a set of ideas and dogmas that may be called faith, 
that is not !rue faith ... but it gives you energy. That energy can still blind and can 
lead to sutTering ... Having the kind of energy that can keep you lucid, loving, and 
tolerant is very different from having energy that is blind .. . We have to distinguish 
between true faith and blind faith. That is a problem in every tradition .. . The object 
of faith should not be a mere notion, a mere concept or an idea. It should be true 
insight into reality, true direct experience. 18 
In other words, Nhat Hanh suggests that faith must constantly reform, renew, and 
actualise itself in relation to the practice of religious teachings and the cultivation 
of insight. "A true teaching is not static," Nhat Hanh explains. "It is not mere 
words but the reality of life."19 Indeed, Nhat Hanh affirms that the authentic 
practice of any religion will reveal that "no single tradition monopolises the 
truth."20 
According to Nhat Hanh, the non-dogmatic perspective of interbeing establishes a 
favourable environment for authentic and effective dialogue. This applies to 
exchanges between nations, which we have discussed, as well as dialogue 
between religions. Within his discourse on interreligious dialogue, Nhat Hanh 
once again affirms the importance of religious differences and insists upon the 
necessity of approaching dialogue from a position of commitment. He suggests, 
"For dialogue to be fruitful, we need to live deeply our own tradition and, at the 
same time, listen deeply to others."21 Despite this emphasis on the particular, Nhat 
Hanh also suggests that the experiential realisation of interbeing entails a shift of 
perspective in which "the distinction between observer and observed 
disappears."22 Nhat Hanh suggests that dialogue based upon the awareness of the 
interbeing of self and other disables any proselytising pursuits and undermines 
any imperialistic assumptions, while it facilitates deep existential engagement and 
transformation. He explains: 
18 Nhat Hanh, Going Home. 72 & 117. Emphasis added. 
19 Nhat Hanh, Living Buddha. Living Christ. 56 
20 Ibid. 114 
11 Ibid. 7 
22 Ibid. II 
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Dialogue is not a means for assimilation in the sense that one side expands and 
incorporates the other into its 'self. Dialogue must be practiced on the basis of 'non-
self. We have to allow what is good, beautiful, and meaningful in the other's 
tradition to transform us. 23 
While dialogue based upon the perspective of Religious Interbeing would 
acknowledge formal philosophical and conceptual differences between religions, 
it would be more concerned with sharing the complementary 'fruits' of practice 
within a contemplative, interior, and experiential fonn of exchange. Within the 
dynamics of such exchange, syncretism is no longer a danger to be avoided. Nhat 
Hanh's recollection of a conference in Sri Lanka of theologians and scholars of 
religion is illustrative. He recalls the Indian Christian theologian Stanley Samartha 
addressing the assembly and proclaiming: "We are going to hear about the 
beauties of several traditions, but that does not mean we are going to make a fruit 
salad." When it was Nhat Hanh's turn to talk, he declared: "Fruit salad can be 
delicious!" In other words, Nhat Hanh discerns concord amongst different 
religion's experiential expressions and therefore sees no conflict in a spiritual 
sharing or praxial synthesis of religions. He states: "To me, religious life is life. I 
do not see any reason to spend one's whole life tasting just one kind of frui t. We 
human beings can be nourished by the best values of many traditions. "14 
Jntt!rbeing and Nhat Hanh 's Dialogue with Christianity 
Nhat Hanh' s dialogue with Christianity encompasses an interpretation of the 
Christian tradition from the perspective of interbeing. In particular, Nhat Hanh 
presents a nondualistic interpretation of the traditional Christian understanding of 
the nature of reality, and he thereby offers an alternative view to mainstream 
Christian theological attempts to define God. Appealing to those traditions of 
Christianity that affinn both the immanence and the transcendence of God, Nhat 
Hanh proposes that the authentic practice of Christian teachings can manifest the 
Kingdom of God in the here and now. 
A defining feature of Nhat Hanb 's dialogue with Christianity is his negative 
attitude towards the tradition of Christian theology. Nhat Hanh contends that 
2) Ibid. 9 
24 Ibid. 1-2 
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words, concepts, or religious doctrines cannot adequately describe ultimate reality, 
because the dualistic construction of language cannot encompass the nondual and 
ineffable absolute. Nhat Hanh contends that this is the reason why the Buddha 
never speculated about the nature of ultimate reality. He explains: 
Nirvana is the kind of reality that cannot be described by notions or words. Nirvana 
means literally extinction, and here extinction means the extinction of notions and 
concepts and ideas and words- even the word nirvana .. . With any word you use to 
point at the noumenal dimension you have to be carentl. You should not get caught 
in that word.2~ 
This traditional recognition of the limits of language informs Nhat Hanh's anti-
theological attitude. "Discussing God is ·not-tbe best use of our energy," he 
suggests. Rather, we should "touch God not as a concept but as a living reality."26 
In particular, Nhat Hanh criticises the Christian tradition of onto-theology as one 
in which "theologians have spent thousands of years talking about God as one 
representative." According to Nhat Hanh, this constitutes "talking about what we 
should not talk about. ,,n In contrast, he contends that ultimate reality can only be 
understood through the transcendence of concepts and direct experience. He 
explains, "Once the ultimate is touched, all notions are transcended ... God and 
nirvana as concepts have been transcended."28 Accordingly, Nhat Hanh contends 
that "a good theologian is one who says almost nothing about God."29 
Nhat Hanh does refer to a number of Christian theologians and philosophers who 
have been "more careful in making statements about God," such as Paul Tillich, 
Ludwig Wittgenstein, and Martin Heidegger.30 He also discerns complementarity 
between Christian mystics and Zen masters: 
I have noticed that Christians and Buddhists who have lived deeply their 
contemplative lives always come to express themselves in more non-dualistic, non-
dogmatic ways. Christian mystics and Zen masters never sound speculative or 
intellectual. A dialogue between a Christian mystic and a Zen master wollld not be 
difficult to lmderstand. Their speculative minds have given way to a nondiscursive 
spirit. Because they have learned not to get caught in notions or representations, they 
ts Nhat Hanh, Going Home. 148-9 
26 Nhal Hanh, Living Buddha, Living Christ. 21 
27 1bid. 139-140 
28 1bid. J 89 
29 1bid. 150 
30 See Ibid. 139, 143, & 140, respectively. 
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do not speak as though they alone hold the truth, and they do not think that those in 
other traditions are going the wrong way." 
Finally, he appeals to the Christian mystical tradition of apophatic or negative 
theology, the "theology of the Death of God", which proposes "the death of every 
concept we may have of God in order to experience God as a living reality 
d. I ,.32 · trect y. 
The principal implication of Nhat Hanh 's emphasis on the experience of God is 
that God is available to be experienced. Indeed, Nhat Hanh cites the French writer 
Andre Gide as having claimed: "God is available to us twenty-four hours a day.''33 
Moreover, Nhat Hanh refers to Orthodox Christian doctrine, which "states very 
clearly that every human being has the divine nature of God and shares in the 
Divine goodness of God."34 From the perspective of interbeing, which discerns 
the interrelatedness of all things, there is a direct connection between the self and 
u1timate reality, whatever it may be called. According to Nhat Hanh, Buddhism 
represents this interconnection in a clear and uncomplicated way, but he also 
suggests that all religious traditions contain such an insight.3$ In a discussion of 
idolatry and prayer, Nhat Hanh questions: "Who is the person to whom we pray? 
Who is Allah? Who is God? Who is Buddha? Who is the bodhisattva 
Avalokiteshvara? Who is Our Lady?"36 In response, he proposes the immanence 
of the divine: "God and we are of the same substance. Between God and us there 
is no discrimination, no separation ... It is a mistake to think that God is only 
outside. "37 
In accord with this assertion of the immanence of God, Nhat Hanh offers 
Christianity a nondual intetpretation of the nature of reality. He suggests that 
through authentic spiritual practice and genuine religious experience, God, or the 
'ultimate dimension', can be encountered within the ' historical dimension' of 
31 Ibid. 180 
32 Ibid. 150 
33 Nhat Hanh, Going Home. 2 
34 Thich Nhat Hanh, The Energy of Prayer: How to Deepen Your Spiritual Practice (Berkeley, 
CA: Parallax Press, 2006). 73 
~~ See Ibid. 3 1 & 42 
36 Ibid. 29 
37 Ibid. 31 & 57 
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mundane, phenomenal reality. In so doing, be suggests that the Kingdom of God 
can be manifested in the here and now. In a discussion of The Lord's Prayer, Nhat 
Hanh observes: 
Christians pray, sing psalms and hytruts, receive the sacraments - all these are 
prayers directed to the aspiration your kingdom come, the aspiration that the 
Kingdom of God be present in this very moment. If we ·re able to bring the ultimate 
dimension into the historical dimension, then we can live both dimensions at the 
same time. There is no reason why we can't touch the ultimate dimension while we 
are living in the historical dimension.3~ 
From the perspective of interbeing, the interconnection of the historical and 
ultimate dimensions means that "You do not have to die in order to enter the 
Kingdom of God; in fact you are already in it now and bere."-~9 Just as St. Francis 
experienced God in the almond tree, so too, Nhat Hanh suggests, can all 
Christians experience God in the world.40 To illustrate the interbeing of the 
phenomenal world and the world of God, Nhat Hanh draws upon the Christian 
discourse of horizontal and vertical theology. While horizontal theology deals 
with the phenomenal dimension of separate forms, vertical theology deals with the 
ultimate dimension of God. Nhat Hanh suggests, "If you do not succeed in getting 
in touch with the horizontal dimension, you will not be able to get in touch with 
the vertical dimension ... There is interbeing between the two. If you cannot love 
man, animals, and plants, I doubt that you. can love God."41 
Nhat Hanh also offers an analogy of water and waves to represent the 
interconnection between the phenomenal and the ultimate. The horizontal or 
phenomenal world of forms is depicted as an ocean ofwaves. Just as each wave in 
the ocean is dependent on and conditioned by other waves, so too is every 
phenomenon in the world of forms dependent on and conditioned by every other 
phenomenon. But there is another dimension, which is represented by the water. 
This is the vertical dimension of ultimate reality - of emptiness, the extinction of 
all forms and concepts, and of God. Just as interbeing defines the relationship 
3
' Ibid. 78. See also Nhat Hanb, Living Buddha, Living Christ. 182 and Nhat Hanh, Going Home. 
98-102 
39 Nhat Hanh, Going Home. !55 
40 See Nhat Hanb, The Energy of Prayer: How to Deepen Your Spiritual Practice. 70 and Nhat 
Hanh, Living Buddha, Living Christ. 43 & 152-3 
41 Nhat Hanh, Going Home. 3 
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between phenomena in the historical dimension, it also defines the relationship 
between the historical and ultimate dimensions. Nhat Hanh explains: 
It seems as though the wave and the water are two ditTerent things, but in fact they 
are one. Without water, there would be no wave, and if we remove the wave, there is 
no water.42 
In reference to the theological question of defining God as a person, Nhat Hanh 
contends that the ultimate cannot be characterised in terms of the phenomenal. 
Nevertheless, he proposes that the ultimate can be experienced through 
phenomena: 
God is not a being in the phenomenal world. He or She is the ground of all being. It 
would not be difficult for Christians and Buddhists to agree on this. 
We can talk about the phenomenal world, but it is very ditlicult to talk about the 
noumenal world ... We can say that this wave is high or low, big or small, beautiful 
or ugly, has a beginning and an end. But all these notions cannot be applied to water. 
God is neither small nor big. God has no beginning or end. God is not more or Jess 
beautifhl. All the ideas we use to describe the phenomenal world cannot be applied 
to God. So it' s very wise not to say anything about God. 
[Nevertheless], the practice of touching things deeply on the horizontal level 
gives us the capacity to touch God - to touch the noumenal level or the vertical 
dimension ... We can touch the noumenal world by touching the phenomenal world 
deeply.4~ 
In our endeavour to delineate the dimensions of a Buddhist position of pluralism, 
Nhat Hanh's analogy of wave and water can be constructively applied to the 
diversity of religions. Each distinct religious form can be represented by the 
metaphor of the wave. Insight into the true nature of the wave, however, reveals 
that its form is not permanent, independent, nor absolute. Rather, it is dependent 
upon all the other waves for its existence, structure, and continuity. Insight into 
the true nature of religions reveals that they too are not permanent, independent, 
nor absolute, but are dependent upon all other religions for their existence, 
structure, and continuity. Further insight into the nature of the wave reveals that 
its form is merely an external appearance or construct that functions like a kind of 
vehicle, and that its true substance is the water. In this sense, each religion can be 
understood also as a vehicle that leads its adherents towards a direct encounter 
with its true substance or ultimate referent - the great ocean of the absolute. Like 
the Buddha, Nhat Hanh does not speculate on the nature of this absolute, nor on 
42 Ibid. 6 
43 Ibid. 7-9 
ChaJ!..fer 6 274 
the nature of the experience of the absolute. However, it seems evident that he 
considers the ultimate dimension to be unitive and each religion to be a different 
representation of this one reality: 
In Christianity, Judaism, and Islam, we can call this omnipresent presence "God". 
God and Buddha are not two different things. We should not allow words and 
expressions to deceive us. The important thing is that we are able to be in touch with 
reality. The yellow fruit that you peel is called "chui" in Vietnamese and "bamma" in 
English, but it 's the same fruit. Both words point to the same reality.44 
To conclude this reading of interbeing, it can be maintained that Nhat Hanh 's 
approach to religious diversity affirms both the unity and diversity of religions 
upon die foundation of an experiential pluralism. In relation to the phenomenal 
dimension of form and language, Nhat Hanh asserts the value of each religion as 
distinct and unique. However, each of these forms is essentially understood to be 
no more than a linguistic representation of a unitive non-linguistic ultimate reality 
that has to be experienced to be known. In relation to the experiential dimension 
of the ultimate, the religious forms are realised as 'empty' and thereby 
transcended. As Nhat Hanb proclaims, all religious expressions are "unsuccessful 
attempts to defme God ... just names, [which] are not strong enough to contain the 
wonderful reality that is the ultimate dimension. "45 
Reading Two: Mindfulness 
In order to develop our understanding of Nhat Hanh' s experiential pluralism, this 
second reading of his approach to religious diversity will explore his interreligious 
application of the practice of mindfulness. Nhat Hanh proposes that the authentic 
practice of any religious system can lead to a direct encounter with its religious 
truth in the here and now. As we have seen, he does not speculate on the nature of 
this absolute. Nor does he assume that followers of different religions will 
experience it in the same way. What he does claim is that it can be experienced in 
the present moment of the phenomenal world. Or rather, he afftrms that a spiritual 
practitioner can participate in ultimate reality within daily life. While Nhat Hanh 
contends that all religions contain the necessary resources to facilitate such 
experience or participation, he also considers that Buddhism has much to offer in 
44 Nhat Hanh, The Energy of Prayer: How to Deepen Your Spirih1al Practice. 58 
u Ibid. 76 
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the form of "concrete methods of practice.'>46 In accord with the dynamic of 
reciprocity established by the perspective of Religious lnterbeing, Nhat Hanh 
offers the practice of mindfulness as a trans-religious praxial tool. He proposes 
that mindfulness can help to revitalise other religions' rituals and practices and 
thereby help to actualise a direct experience of God, Allah, Y ahweb, etc., in the 
here and now. Essentially, Nhat Hanh considers that living in the presence of God, 
or participating in the ultimate dimension, constitutes the manifestation of 
spirituality in daily life. As we have seen, Nhat Hanh considers spirituality to be 
an imperative means of establishing individual healing, social transformation, 
international concord, and global community in-the twenty-first-century. 
This reading of mindfulness as a resource for pluralism will commence by briefly 
reiterating arguments for the experiential nature of religious truth from the 
discourse of Buddhist pluralism. We will then examine Nhat Hanh's offering of 
mindfulness as a universal practice and means of generating religious experience. 
Finally, we will investigate how Nhat Hanh has applied mindfulness to aspects of 
Christian belief and practice, including the notion of the Holy Spirit, the Christian 
practice of prayer, and the ritual of the Eucharist. 
Buddhist Pluralism and the Experiential Nature of Religious Truth 
As we have seen, the Buddhist tradition emphasises the affective dimension of 
religious doctrines. Doctrines are valued for their efficacy as tools upon the path 
of practice, and it is believed that attachment to a doctrine must be relinquished 
for liberation to occur. As the discourse of Buddhist pluralism has recognised, this 
understanding of the provisional nature of doctrines situates them all within the 
realm of relativity, which guards against any hazardous claims to absolute truth. 
Underlying this approach to doctrines is one of the most significant elements of 
Buddhist pluralism- the assertion that religious truth is experiential. Essentially, 
the experience of religious truth is understood to be nondual, non-conceptual, and 
non-linguistic. As such, it cannot be completely captured by any one religious 
46 See Bob Abernethy, "An Interview with Thich Nhat Hanh," Religion and Ethics Newsweekly 
www.pbs.org/wnet/religionandetbicslweek703/interview.html (2003). 
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doctrine or philosophy but must be experienced, and such experience is dependent 
upon the efficacy of religious practice. 
As we discussed in Chapter One, an ongoing debate within Christian theological 
discourse argues the opposing philosophical merits of identist pluralism and 
differential pluralism. In a recent addition to the debate, an alternative voice has 
suggested that pluralism should be understood experientially rather than 
philosophically. In particular, Judson Trapnell and Rose Drew have explored the 
dynamics of such an experiential pluralism in relation to traditions from the East. 
Arguing against the finality of the theories of Perspectivism and Constructivism, 
they demonstrate that traditions such as Buddhism present the possibility of 
having experiences that transcend the conceptual categories of specific religious 
traditions. Such transcendent experience is capable of producing new modes of 
consciousness that can discern the integrity of the part and the unity of the whole, 
or the value of separate and different religions as well as their congruence and 
complementarity as a collective interdependent unity. On the basis of such 
possible experience, Trapnell and Drew propose that contradictions between truth 
claims that appear at cognitive, rational, and analytic levels can be reconciled 
through spiritual training and the transcendence of the epistemological boundaries 
of religious frameworks. While such an argument implies that religious 
experience is illogical and irrational, it is asserted that this does not undermine the 
validity of such experiences as informing modes of consciousness. Trapnell and 
Drew, and other scholars such as Diana Eck, and exemplars such as Thomas 
Merton, have affirmed that while tradition-specific language may be necessary to 
express ineffable experience, this does not mean that such experience is 
necessarily bound by that language or traditional context.47 
In a similar fashion, a number of Buddhist pluralists that we examined in Chapter 
Two have affmned the limits of language in relation to the exJlerientia\ nature of 
religious truth. Among them, the Thai monk and venerated teacher Buddhadasa 
. , See Rose Drew, "Reconsidering the Possibility of Pluralism," Journal of Ecumenical Shtdies 40, 
no. 3 (2003), Diana L. Eck, Encountering God: A Spiritual Journey from Bozeman to Banaras 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1993), Judson B. Trapnell, "Indian Sources on the Possibility of a Pluralist 
View of Religions," Journal of Ecumenical Shldies 35, no. 2 ( 1998). 
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Bhikkhu has proposed different levels of language and experience in his analysis 
of religious diversity. Buddhadisa delineates three levels of religious perception 
and meaning. On an outer level, where religions appear as separate and dissimilar, 
a form of "conventional language" applies. On an intermediary level, where 
religions are united by a shared altruistic goal, Buddhadasa proposes the 
"language of the Dharnma", which de-absolutises and equalises the religions. 
Finally, however, at an inmost level, experiential insight dissolves all religious 
forms and the reality to which they all refer is directly apprehended. At this level, 
language is not possible or necessary .'~8 
A number of contemporary scholars have confirmed Buddhadasa's insights. 
Among those we have examined is Sallie King, who has related her dual religious 
identity as a Buddhist and a Quaker to both religions' recognition of the limits of 
language and the experiential nature of religious truth. King explains that religious 
truth is "epistemologically transcendent," meaning that it is beyond conceptual 
knowledge, language, and culture, and cannot be mediated through beliefs, 
tradition, or religious authority alone. Rather, as she affirms, it is experiential, and 
moreover, it is universally available.49 
As we saw in the previous reading of interbeing, Thich Nhat Hanh acknowledges 
the limits of language and affirms the experiential nature of ultimate reality. As 
we shall now see, he also argues for the universal availability of such experience 
and encourages its actualisation by proposing the universal applicability of the 
practice of mindfulness. 
Mindfulness Practice and Religious Diversity 
Where interbeing is the cornerstone and ultimate referent of all Nhat Hanh' s 
teachings, mindfulness encompasses the living and breathing practice of the 
teachings. Mindfulness practice constitutes the constant meditative cultivation of 
48 See Buddhadasa Bhikkhu, Christianity and Buddhism: Sinclair Thompson Memorial Lechtre 
(Bangkok: Kam Pim Pranakorn Partnership, 1967), Buddhadasa Bhikkhu., ''No Religion," in Me 
and Mine: Selected Essays of BhikkJm Buddhadasa, ed. Donald Swearer (Albany, NY: State 
University ofNew York Press, 1989). 
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present moment awareness. This cultivation involves conscious breathing, 
concentration in every movement and every thought, and the development of 
insight or wisdom through deep looking into the interdependent nature of reality. 
The practice of mindfulness constitutes what Nhat Hanh calls the 'path of return': 
mindfulness brings the practitioner back to their true home in the present moment 
and in the refuge of the true self. It creates peace and equanimity, it facilitates 
understanding and generates compassion, and it aids the transformation of 
suffering into happiness. Finally, the practice of mindfulness reveals the true 
reality of interbeing. It thus opens a doorway onto the ultimate dimension and 
allows the practitioner to fully participate in··t.be-ttkimate within the phenomenal 
world. 
According to Nhat Hanh, mindfulness is a universal practice - it functions as a 
kind of essential awareness of life that can be practised by everyone. Mindfulness 
is "to become completely alive and live deeply each moment of your daily life."50 
By practicing mindfulness, "every moment can be a holy, sacred minute."51 As 
such, Nhat Hanh asserts the trans-religious relevance of mindfulness practice and 
equates it with the Christian and Jewish practice of living in the presence of God: 
The word mindfulness is not used in Christian and Jewish circles because 
mindfulness is a Buddhist word. But what is mindfulness? Mindfulness is to be 
aware of everything you do every day. Mindfulness is a kind of light that shines 
upon all your thoughts, all your feelings, all your actions, and all your words. 
Mindfulness is the Buddha. Mindfulness is the equivalent of the Holy Spirit, the 
energy of God. 52 
Nhat Hanh consistently states that you do not have to be a Buddhist to practise 
mindfulness. He insists: "Each one of us knows that we have mindfulness in us ... 
You know that mindfulness is not a foreign thing to you. "53 Mindfulness is the 
energy of awareness that allows you to enjoy more fully whatever you might be 
doing, whether it is drinking a glass of water, holding your child's hand, or doing 
49 See Sallie B. King, "A Pluralistic View of Religious Pluralism," in The Myth of Christian 
Superiority: Multifaith Explorations of Religious Pluralism, ed. Paul F. Knitter (Maryknoll, NY: 
Orbis Books, 2005). 
~ Nhat Hanh, Going Home. 84 
st Thich Nhat Hanh, Peace Begins Here: Palestinians and Israelis Listening to Each Other 
(Berkeley, CA: Parallax Press, 2004). 
Sl Nhat Hanh, Going Home. 18 
53 Ibid. 88 
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the dishes. "That kind of mindfulness," be explains, "improves your happiness, 
your peace. That is universal."54 As such, Nhat Hanh offers mindfulness for 
inclusion within other religious systems, suggesting that it may enhance their 
potential for actualisation. He observes, 
Why do we not enjoy God? Because we are not free. Our mind is not t11ere. We have 
no capacity of touching God, or of enjoying Him or Her. The practice of mindfulness 
helps us to free ourselves to enjoy what is there.~s 
Nhat Hanh even suggests that mindfulness can be practised in secular or simply 
spiritual contexts without any reference to Buddhism or religions in general. 
Commenting on a-r-ecent retreat he held for police officers and-criminal justice 
workers in the United States, Nbat Hanh suggests, "it is important to organise 
mindfulness retreats in a non-sectarian way. You don't have to be Buddhist, have 
a Buddha statue, burn incense, or bow, to practice mindfulness." At this particular 
retreat, he recalls, "we only practiced to walk, sit, eat, listen, and speak in 
mindfulness. We didn' t worship; we didn't so anything religious. Yet the 
atmosphere was very spiritual."56 
The principal intention behind Nhat Hanh's trans-religious offering of 
mindfulness practice is to help religious others to experience their religious truth 
in the here and now. Nbat Hanh affirms the diversity of practices, beliefs, and 
rituals that may be used by other religions to access their religious truth. Indeed, 
he does not intend to undermine these differences. He offers mindfulness practice 
as a means of boosting the efficacy of these means and forms and enriching the 
praxial Jife of other religions. Ultimately, his intention is to encourage religious 
experience. Nhat Hanh does not explore the nature of religious experience 
because, as Buddbadasa, Trapnell, Drew, and Sallie King all assert, such 
experience transcends the linguistic. As such, Nhat Hanh leaves open the 
possibility that different religious contexts may manifest different religious 
experiences, an argument posed by such theorists as John Cobb and R.C. Zaehner. 
While religious experiences may differ, what is important to Nhat Hanh is that 
54 Ibid. 87 
~~ Ibid. 2 
~6 Thich Nhat Hanh, Calming the Fearji1/ Mind: A Zen Response ro Terrorism (Berkeley, CA: 
Parallax Press, 2005) .. 76-7 
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they actually occur, that religious truth is actualised in the lives of adherents, and 
that ultimate truth is participated in, in the here and now. 
Mindfulness and Nhat Hanh 's Dialogue with Christianity 
To demonstrate exactly how the practice of mindfulness can enhance non-
Buddhist religious practice, we will conclude this reading by presenting a few 
examples from Nhat Hanh 's own interior dialogue with Christianity. In particular, 
we will examine his application of mindfulness to the notion of the Holy Spirit, 
the Christian practice of prayer, and the sacrament of the Eucharist. While Nhat 
Hanh-remains a devout Buddhist menk-; it is apparent that his spiritual 'roots' are 
diverse. He has openly embraced the Christian tradition through what Raimundo 
Paoikkar calls an intrareligious dialogue. He has explored Christianity from within 
and has interior knowledge of its difference and otherness. As Richard King bas 
observed, ''Nbat Hanh shows himself to be unusually conversant with both 
traditions; he is in that sense 'bilingual'.57 Indeed, Nhat Hanh 's knowledge of the 
Christian tradition is comprehensive. Moreover, it is evident that he has 
experientially realised the teachings of Christianity within his own spiritual 
practice. Based upon the perceived inter being of Buddhism and Christianity, Nhat 
Hanh sees no problem in following the teachings of both traditions. On a level of 
fonn and doctrine, the philosophical, soteriological, and teleological structures of 
the two religions would seem to be at odds. However, as we have said, Nhat Hanh 
is not interested in ' religious ends ' but 'religious nows' , and in the focused 
moment of the present, the universal experience of the now, it is apparent that he 
considers the religions' experiential dynamics and praxial fruits to be the same. 
Nbat Hanh is particularly critical of the sporadic devotion, blind belief, and rigid 
faith of many so-called followers of religions, including Buddhism. Concerning 
Christianity, he queries, "Is it sufficient to go to church every Sunday?" 
Answering in the negative, he observes, "People seem to be very kind while in 
church, but as soon as they get out, it seems that all their kindness has gone."58 To 
~ 7 King, Thomas Merton and Thich Nhat Hanh: Engaged Spiriht(llity in an Age ofG/obali.sation. 
13 J . Emphasis added. 
~ 8 Nhat Hanh, Going Home. 96 
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follow Christianity in such a way is "to practice only the form, not the essence."59 
Many Christian commentators have also acknowledged this lack within their 
tradition. The Dominican monk Brian Pierce, OP, has observed an ensuing "crisis 
of practice" within Christianity. He elaborates: 
We are often baptised Christians by name, though many of us have not awakened to 
the riches that such a grace entails. We are swimming in the ocean of God's presence 
and yet still spend much of our Jives frantically searching for water. I would 
characterise the situation as a crisis of mindfulness. To a great extent, we have lost 
the capacity to practice the unfolding of the grace of baptism. We have the ancient 
rituals in place and our theological libraries are filled with writings on the 
sacraments, but we have forgotten how to make it all real. How to live out our full 
baptismal enlightenment. It is here, it seems to me, where Thich Nhat Hanh 's 
practice of mindfillness sheds such needed light onto the path for so many Christians 
today.60 
Indeed, within Nbat Hanh's dialogue with Christianity, he asserts the need to 
practise the essence, not just the form, to realise the grace of God's presence in the 
here and now. This involves the integration of the meaning of beliefs and rituals 
into daily life so that they become aspects of effective daily practice. 
According to Nhat Hanh, "Jesus was very clear about the need to practice the 
teaching."61 Emphasising the fact that Jesus was not only the Son of God but also 
the Son of Man, Nhat Hanh proposes, "It is important to look deeply into every 
act and every teaching of Jesus during His lifetime, and to use this as a model for 
our own practice. Jesus lived exactly as He taught, so studying the life of Jesus is 
crucial to understanding His teaching. For me, the life of Jesus is His most basic 
teaching, more important than even faith in the resurrection or faith in etemity."62 
To follow Jesus as an exemplar and actualise his teachings is to manifest Jesus as 
a 'living reality'- as the 'Living Christ'. Nhat Hanh explains: 
The Living Christ is the Christ of Love who is always generating Jove, moment after 
moment. Christians have to help Jesus Christ be manifested by their way of lite, 
showing those around them that Jove, 1mderstanding, and tolerance are possible. This 
will not be accomplished just by books and sermons. It has to be realised by the way 
we live.63 · 
s9 Nhat Hanh, Living Buddha, Living Christ. 126 
60 Pierce (OP), Brian J. , We Walk the Path Together: Learning from Thich Nhat Hanh and Meister 
Eckhart (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 2005). 70 
61 Nhat Hanh, Living Buddha, Living Christ. 70 
62 1bid. 36 
6~ Ibid. 57 
ChliE_Ier 6 282 
Nhat Hanh's suggestions are intended to provide guidance on the Christian path, a 
means of rediscovering extant values and spiritual meanings that may have been 
submerged beneath centuries of theology and an uncritical acceptance of dogma. 
Pierce confirms: 
The Buddhist teaching on dwelling fully and mindfully in the present moment is 
helping Christians to rediscover this dimension in our own tradition . .. Certainly 
there are different philosophical frameworks underlying our two traditions, but the 
Buddhist emphasis on having access to the ultimate dimension, the presence of God, 
in each moment of our lives is vitally important for Christians, and to affirm this 
truth is to recover ancient insights from our own mystical traditionM 
On the basis of its potential efficacy as a doctrine, Nhat Hanh has discerned a 
correspondence between the practice of mindfulness and the notion of the Holy 
Spirit. He suggests, "the Holy Spirit is the kind of energy that is capable of being 
there, of Wlderstanding, of accepting, of loving, and of healing ... It is the same 
thing as the energy of mindfulness. "65 Nhat Hanh understands the Holy Spirit to 
be "the energy of God" and proposes that "if we touch the Holy Spirit, we touch 
God not as a concept but as a living reality ."66 As such, Nhat Hanh suggests that 
the Holy Spirit offers Christians "a door to the Trinity."67 Indeed, of the three 
elements, Nhat Hanh considers the Holy Spirit to be the "safest" or least 
problematic way of accessing the Trinity as it constitutes a tangible energy that 
can be manifested within the self. Like the universal seed of mindfulness, Nhat 
Hanh suggests that "all of us also have the seed of the Holy Spirit in us, the 
capacity of healing, transforming, and loving. When we touch that seed, we are 
able to touch God the Father and God the Son."68 
This interpretation of the Holy Spirit offers a nondual perspective of the 
traditional Christian division between the sacred and the profane, or the divinity of 
Jesus and God in comparison to the Original Sin of humans. Indeed, Nhat Hanh 
has argued against the belief that Jesus is the only Son of God, implying that we 
are all offspring of the divine. In his analysis of The Apostles' Creed, Nhat Hanh 
64 Pierce, We Walk the Path Together: Learning from Thich Nhat Hanh and Meister Eckhart. 19 & 
21 
65 Nhat Hanh, Going Home. 194 
66 Nhat Hanh, Living Buddha, Living Christ. 21 
67 lbid. 20 
68 lbid. 15 
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states: "You are also a daughter or a son of God. You are Jesus. All of us are 
Jesus."69 While such an interpretation would seem typically Buddhist, and 
definitely contentious, it is certainly not unheard of in the Christian contemplative 
and mystical traditions. Resonance may be found in the words of Thomas Merton: 
Contemplation ... knows God by seeming to touch God. Or rather it knows God as if 
it had been invisibly touched by God ... touched by God who has no hands, but who 
is pure reality and the source of all that is real! Hence contemplation is a sudden gift 
of awareness, an awakening to the Real within all that is real. A vivid awareness of 
infinite Being at the roots of our own limited being ... received as a present from God, 
as a free gift of love. This is the existential contact of which we speak when we use 
the metaphor of being 'touched by God'.70 
We can also refer to the thirteenth-century German mystic Meister Eckhart, who 
words curiously echo Nhat Hanh's: 
God's seed is in us. If it were tended by a good, wise and industrious gardener, it 
would then flourish all the better, and would grow up to God, whose seed it is, and 
its fruits would be like God's own nature. The seed of a pear tree grows into a pear 
tree, the seed of a nut tree grows to be a nut tree, the seed of God grows to be God.71 
Finally, Nhat Hanh himself refers to the Greek Orthodox teaching of deification to 
support his interpretation of the Holy Spirit as provisional of direct access to God 
within the self: 
[T]he idea of deification, that a person is a microcosm of God, is very inspiring. It is 
close to the Asian tradition that states that the body of a humau being is a 
minicosmos ... A human being is a mini-God, a micro-theos who bas been created to 
participate in the divinity ofGod.72 
The idea of the immanence of God plays a central role in one of Nhat Hanh's 
recent publications called The Energy of Prayer. Within this book, prayer, like the 
Holy Spirit and like mindfulness, is represented as an effective spiritual practice 
and an agent of transformation and healing that draws upon the immanent energy 
of God. In contrast to the understanding of prayer as a function of pure faith or 
69 Nhat Hanh, Going Home. 138 
70 Thomas Merton, New Seeds ofContemplation (New York: New Directions, 1972). 2-3 
71 Meister Eckhart , "Of the Nobleman," in Meister Eckhart: The Essential Sermons, 
Commentaries, Treatises and Defense, ed. Edrntmd Colledge OSA and Bernard McGiiUl (New 
York: Paulist Press, 1981). 241 
72 Nhat Hanh, Living B11ddha, Living Christ. 123 
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divine will, Nhat Hanh suggests that prayer can function effectively, like 
mindfulness, as a tangible transmission of energy within our consciousness.73 
Nhat Hanh proposes two principal ingredients that constitute effective prayer: 
relationship and energy.74 The first concerns establishing an understanding of the 
relationship between the self, as the subject of prayer, and God, as the o~ject of 
prayer. Affirming the immanence of God, Nhat Hanh explains: "We hear 
repeatedly that God is within us. To me this means that God is within our 
consciousness."75 God, as the object of prayer, is therefore equated with the seed 
of.-ftwakening in the soil of our consciousness; if this seed is watered--\vith the 
energy of mindfulness, or prayer, it will bloom as an agent of understanding and 
transformation. 
The second ingredient of effective prayer concerns the necessary energy. Nhat 
Hanh uses an analogy of a telephone connected to its wire to symbolise the initial 
relationship of prayer. He then suggests that the energies of mindfulness, 
concentration, insight, and loving kindness are like the electrical current that 
transmits the message of the prayer. These energies function in the consciousness 
to generate understanding and thereby effect change. Nhat Hanh suggests that 
without these effective energies, "our prayer is just superstition."76 Thus, Nhat 
Hanh represents prayer as an internal process of contemplation and insight that 
creates transformation within the mind and thereby in the world. Essentially, Nhat 
Hanh's 'de-mythologising' analysis of the dynamics of prayer discerns its 
pragmatic and efficacious potency as a religious practice that is not geared on 
placing demands or achieving desired results but developing spiritual insight. 
Akin to his interpretations of the Holy Spirit and of prayer, Nhat Hanh presents 
the sacrament of the Eucharist as an effective spiritual practice. He suggests that 
the ritual of the Eucharist can effect understanding and transformation in the self 
and facilitate encounter with the ultimate dimension of reality. Nhat Hanh first 
73 Nhat Hanh, The Energy of Prayer: How to Deepen Your Spi1·itua/ Practice. 31-2 
74 See Ibid. 41-5 
7~ Nhat Hanh, Livjng Buddha, Living Christ. 155 
76 Nhat Hanh, The Energy of Prayer: How to Deepen Yortr Spirihtal Practice. 44 
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took the Eucharist with the Catholic priest and anti-war activist Father Daniel 
Berrigan. In a dialogue with Berrigan, Nhat Hanh reflects on the meaning of the 
ritual. He proposes that Jesus' offering of the bread as His body and the wine as 
His blood was a drastic way of awakening His disciples from "forgetfulness" and 
"ignorance" so that they might encounter true reality. He therefore suggests to 
Berrigan, "When you perform the rite of the Eucharist, you have a role that is very 
similar to the act of Jesus. Your role is to bring back life and reality to a 
community that is participating in the worship."77 In other words, Nhat Hanh sees 
the ritual of the Eucharist as an act of direct participation in God, or life: 
When we look around, we see many people in whom the Holy Spirit does not appear 
to dwell ... The practice of the Eucharist is to help resurrect these people so they can 
touch the Kingdom of Life ... Holy Communion is a strong bell ofmindfulness.78 
One of the prevalent giithas used at Plum Village is "Eat your Bread, Eat the 
Cosmos". To eat a piece of bread in mindfulness is to be in direct contact with, 
and be participating in, the true reality of interbeing. Applying this teaching to the 
Eucharist, Nhat Hanb suggests that to practise the sacrament with mindfulness, or 
the energy of the Holy Spirit, is to be in direct contact with, and be participating 
in, the presence of God: 
If Christ is the body of God, which he is, then the bread he ofters is also the body of 
the cosmos. Look deeply and you notice the sunshine in the bread, the blue sky in the 
bread, the cloud and the great earth in the bread . . . the whole cosmos has come 
together in order to bring you this piece of bread ... Eat it mindfully. Eat it in the 
presence of God. Eat it in such a way that the Holy Spirit becomes an energy within 
you.79 
Obviously, many Christians would voice objections to Nhat Hanh's 
interpretations.80 However, others may find resonance and guidance within his 
teachings. Representing the latter, Brian Pierce, OP, has recognised: 
Much of Christianity has a rich and liturgical and sacramental life, but unfortunately 
it has been largely limited to something that is done on Sunday momings within the 
77 Thich Nhat Hanh and Daniel Berrigan, The Raft Is Not the Shore: Conversations toward a 
Buddhist-Christian Awareness (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 2001). 3 
78 Nhat Hanh, living Buddha, Living Christ. 30-1 
79 Nhat Hanh, Going Home. 107 
80 See Kristin Kiblinger's comments on Nhat Hanh 's interpretation of the Eucharist in Kristin 
Beise Kiblinger, "Buddhist Attitudes to Other Religions: An Overview" (paper presented at the 
Buddhist Attitudes to Other Religions - Seventh Conference of the European Network of Buddhist-
Christian Studies, University of Salzburg, Austria, 2007). Unpublished. Podcast available at 
http://www.buddhist-christian-studies.org 
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walls of a church building. The btidge linking liturgy and life has broken down. This 
is indeed one of the great tragedies of modernity ... we must liberate sacramentality 
from the limits of the sanctuary and bring it back into the realm of daily lite. This is 
the great insight ofThich Nhat Hanh's practice ofmindfulness.81 
Pierce suggests the notion of "sacramental mindfulness" as a means of translating 
Nhat Hanh 's teachings into Christian practice. Pierce does not see this proposal as 
a dubious synthesis of Christianity and Buddhism but as a means of utilising the 
message of Christ in constructive ways so that it may respond to the suffering 
world: 
What happens in the Last Supper is a re-membering, that is, a "bringing of all the 
scattered members back together" into communion. The fragmented body of Christ 
present in our world - with its separated families, its divided nations, its decimated 
rain forests, and its broken human hearts - is reunited... The eucharistic re-
membering, when celebrated wit11 a true spirit of mindfulness, connects us with the 
world around us .. . Through this sacramental action, we participate in the mission of 
Christ to reconcile and unite all things on earth and in heaven, helping to give 
expression to a world where there are no more divisions.82 
Pierce's suggestions are representative of the kinds of contemplative dialogue, 
experiential exchange, and spiritual synthesis that are implied by Nhat Hanh's 
affirmation of Religious Interbeing. Moreover, his location of the meaning of the 
Eucharist within a global perspective that addresses suffering in the world leads us 
towards our final reading of Nhat Hanh's approach to religious diversity, which 
concerns the imperative for global community and peace. 
Reading Three: Peace 
Thich Nhat Hanh proclaims the ontological interdependence of religions and the 
experiential interdependence of reality as the foundation of his approach to 
religious diversity. While this is evidently a Buddhist view of religions and reality, 
it contains a number of resources and internal dynamics that affirm it as a position 
of pluralism, rather than religious inclusivism or imperialism. Firstly, the position 
of Religious Interbeing declares the non-absolute status of all religions, including 
Buddhism. Secondly, the position is supported in reference to religious 
experience, which enables the affirmation of religious diversity on a level of 
language and form, and religious unity on a level of practice and experience. 
81 Pierce, We Walk the Path Together: Learning from Thich Nhat Hanh and Meister Eckhart. 15 
82 1bid. 110-1 
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Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Nhat Hanh's approach ultimately refers to 
the ethical principle of peace. 
Nhat Hanh's teachings of religious actualisation and non-absolutism, and his 
universal application of mindfulness, are essentially proposed as ways to manifest 
peace within the self, between religions, and thereby in the world. Indeed, the 
principle of peace constitutes the fundamental motivation behind Nhat Hanh's 
approach to religious diversity. Where ossified religious structures, dogmatic 
belief, and blind faith generate fierce and exclusive claims to religious superiority, 
Nhat Hanh proposes that actualised religious expressions can-help to break-down 
barriers between religions. He asserts that religions that are renewed through 
practice will not cause conflict or generate suffering. While Nhat Hanh could be 
accused of imposing a nondual structure of reality onto religious others, his 
intentions, rather than encompassing the assertion of Buddhist superiority, are 
irenic. Essentially, the need for peace can be understood as a global ethic. In this 
sense, Nhat Hanh 's interreligious discourse on peace presents a contribution 
towards the understanding of religious diversity that is both possible as a pluralist 
affirmation, and imperative as a means of interreligious reconciliation. 
In this final reading of peace as a resource for affirming pluralism, Nhat Hanh' s 
position of Religious Interbeing will be further substantiated by what we will 
herein call an engaged pluralism. The perspective of an engaged pluralism unites 
the world religions on the basis of a common moral or altruistic ground and a 
shared ethical goal ofrelieving suffering in the world.83 1t affirms the presence of 
universal qualities of compassion and nonviolence within the ethical systems of 
all religions and thereby asserts the capacity and imperative for all religions to 
engage in the world to alleviate suffering, reconcile conflict, and create peace. 
This reading will commence with a recapitulation of the significance of ethics in 
the discourse of Buddhist pluralism, and a delineation of the proposition of 
83 The theologian Paul Knitter is a leading proponent of such an tmderstanding of pluralism. See 
Paul F. Knitter, ~Towards a Liberation Theology of Religions," in The Myth of Christian 
Uniqueness: Toward a Pluralistic Theology of Religions, ed. John Hick and Paul F. Knitter 
(Maryknoll , NY: Orbis Books, 1987), Paul F. Knitter, ed., Pluralism and Oppression: Theology i11 
World Perspective, vol. 34, The Annual Publication of the College 17reological Society (Lanham 
and New York: University Press of America, 1988). 
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engaged pluralism. We will then examine how Nhat Hanh utilises the ethical 
principle of peace and evidences the notion of engagement within his approach to 
religious diversity. Finally, we will demonstrate how he has applied the principles 
of peace and engagement in his dialogue with Christianity, particularly to the 
ethical teachings of Jesus and the question of the role of the Church in society. 
Buddhist Pluralism, Ethical Criteria of Evaluation, and Engagement 
A central dilemma within the position of pluralism concerns the question of its 
limits. As a pluralist, should one affirm the value of those who hold a hostile 
position-of-aelusivism? As we-saw in Gbapter Two, the discourse of Buddhist 
pluralism provides a definite solution to this dilemma of relativism. This solution 
affirms that pluralists cannot avoid the need to evaluate religious beliefs and 
practices. However, it is suggested that such evaluations be made according to 
ethical rather than doctrinal absolutes. In other words, the value of the religious 
other is determined not by the feasibility of their understanding of salvation, or the 
accuracy of their representation of the absolute, but in relation to the degree of 
kindness, love, compassion, and nonviolence that their practice manifests. Rita 
Gross has clearly articulated this approach of ethical criteria, arguing that an 
emphasis on the morality of religions, rather than the question of their 
metaphysics, is critical for positive and peaceful interreligious interaction today. 
She states: 
It is more important that we learn how to live together than that we all think alike 
religiously_ And since we are never all going to think alike religiously, we must not 
pin peace and security on theological agreement. Theological agreement is irrelevant 
to building a better, more peaceful world.84 
Sallie King has also affirmed the need to evaluate religions according to their 
morality, claiming, "We know the presence of the Spirit by its fruits." King offers 
a collection of such fruits as universal ethical imperatives, including: 
unconditional love, compassion, concern for others, and kindness to all; 
selflessness, or altruistic generosity and courage; nonviolence and gentleness as a 
84 Rita M. Gross, "Excuse Me, but What's the Question?: Isn't Religious Diversity Nonnal?," in 
The Myth of Christian Superiority: Multifaith Explorations of Religious Pluralism, ed. Paul F. 
Knitter (Maryknoli,-NY: Orbis Books, 2005). 82 
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general rule; and finally, an avoidance of rigid dogmatism. 8~ A further example 
can be found in the Dalai Lama's approach to other religions, which prioritises 
morality and practice over philosophy and metaphysics. His Holiness emphasises 
the shared qualities of love, compassion, sincerity, and honesty between religions 
and proposes a common altruistic goal to benefit humankind.86 Indeed, the Dalai 
Lama's approach can be understood as representative of a prevalent concern 
within contemporary Buddhism for social engagement and the need to establish 
global community. This concern provides the impetus for much Buddhist 
interreligious dialogue. As David Chappell has observed, such dialogue is "based 
not-{:)ft--ffi.tellectual curiosity-but-on moral values in an effort to deepen ~spiritual 
life of society, to remove discrimination and exploitation, and to nurture a sense of 
global community in a divided world."87 
As we have seen, ethical endeavours of engagement have propelled the career of 
Thich Nhat Hanh, as both a monk and an activist. As we shall now see, Nhat 
Hanh's teachings of engagement also underlie his approach to religious diversity. 
Indeed, the notion of Engaged Buddhism can inform our construction of engaged 
pluralism. A position of engaged pluralism would affum the equality of religions 
in reference to the ethical efficacy of their doctrines and practices. Furthermore, it 
would assert a collection of necessary universal ethics, including compassion, 
altruism, nonviolence, an acknowledgement of religious differences and 
commitments, but an equal avoidance of religious imperialism. Essentially, an 
engaged pluralism would affirm each religion's capacity to integrate their spiritual 
practice with a form of compassionate action in the world, and this capacity would 
be prioritised over the affirmation of religious differences. In a world plagued by 
war and conflict, social and economic injustice, and environmental destruction, 
engaged pluralism would affirm the critical imperative for the religions to unite, to 
ss King, "A Pluralistic View of Religious Pluralism." 100 
86 See Dalai Lama XIV (HH Tenzin Gyatso), The Good Heart: A Buddhist Perspective on the 
Teachings of Jesus (London: Rider, 1996), Dalai Lama XIV (HH Tenzin Gyatso), Kindness, 
Clarity, and Insight, trans. Jeffrey Hopkins (New York: Snow Lion Publications, 1984), Dalai 
Lama XN (HH Tenzin Gyatso), "'Religious Harmony' and Extracts from the Bodhgaya 
Interviews," in Christianity through Non-Christian Eyes, ed. Paul J. Griffiths (Maryknoll, NY: 
Orbis Books, 1990). 
87 David W. Chappell, "Buddhist Interreligious Dialogue: To Build a Global Community," in 
Buddhist-Christian Dialogue: Mutual Renewal and Transformation, ed. Paul 0. Ingram and 
Frederick J. Streng(Honolulu: University ofHawai'i Press, 1986). 4 
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realise their collective humanism, and cultivate communal spiritual values so that 
everyone and everything may be liberated from suffering. The religious 
complementarity and collaboration implied by such a pluralist approach would 
constitute an authentic manifestation of Religious Interbeing. 
Peace and Religious Di11ersi(v 
Where interbeing is the cornerstone of Nhat Hanh's teachings, and mindfulness 
their living and breathing practice, the principle of peace constitutes their primary 
motivation, means, and goal . Since his initial renewal of Buddhism during the 
Vietnam War, Nhat Hanh has prior-itised peace, even over Buddhism itself. 
Moreover, the cultivation of peace on individual, social, and global levels 
constitutes the crux of Nhat Hanh's contemporary representation of Buddhism 
within the modem West. Finally, because Nhat Hanh considers that every religion 
bas the capacity to manifest peace, it is at the centre of his approach to religious 
diversity. While Nbat Hanh 's pluralist position could appear to imply an uncritical 
acceptance of any and all religious practices, the application of the principle of 
peace defines its limits. Indeed, it could be suggested that peace represents a kind 
of ethical absolute in Nhat Hanh's pedagogic system and pluralist position. At the 
same time, as we have seen, Nhat Hanh's teachings on peace are presented as 
pragmatic and accessible practices that can be incorporated into any religious 
system. In Nhat Hanh's interreligious vision, peace becomes the common ground, 
and establishing this common ground becomes critical for interreligious harmony 
and our collective survival. 
As has been mentioned, Nhat Hanh is more interested in religious 'nows' than 
religious 'ends'. He has stated: "All soteriologies belong at frrst to the historical 
dimension." However, with the cultivation of insight, "the notions of beginning 
and ending are transcended."88 In Nbat Hanh's interreligious vision, the present 
moment becomes the locus for all religious meaning and experience. As such, be 
considers the object of all religious meaning to be reality, or life. He c1aims, "the 
object of praying and meditating is life - life in the most beautiful, glorious 
meaning of the word. The existence of Buddhism, of Christianity, and other 
sa Nhat Hanh, Living Buddha, Living Christ. 190 
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religious disciplines has to do with life, with reality.'.s9 According to Nhat Hanh, 
when the interdependence of religions is actualised, and the present moment of 
reality is directly encountered, discrimination becomes superfluous, separation 
dissolves, and humanity is united. He suggests: 
We are separated by names like "Buddhist," "Christian," "Jew," "Muslim." When 
we hear one of these words, we see an image and we tee! alienated, we don't feel 
connected. We have set up many stn1ctures in order to be separated from each other 
and make each other suffer. That is why it is very important to discover the human 
being in the other person, and to help the other person discover the human being in 
us. As human beings we are exactly the same.90 
Within Nhat Hanh's discourse, the recognition of the unity of humanity is 
conjoined with a fundamental recognition of the universality of suffering. "What 
exactly is reality?" Nhat Hanh asks. He responds: "The suffering of everyone is 
reality. Rich and poor, North and South, black, yellow, red, and white is reality. 
Our daily consumption of poisons and our weapons industry are reality. Our lack 
of time and energy for ourselves and others is reality. The destruction of human 
life, of other species, and of the environment by our unmindful way of living -
these are reality.''91 Nhat Hanh insists that all religions have a responsibility to 
respond to the suffering of others and of the world by cultivating understanding, 
practicing nonviolence, and generating peace. He asserts: 
Each one of us can draw from the wisdom of his or her own spiritual tradition -
whether it is Judaism, Islam, Christianity, Buddhism, or any other. .. There is hope 
for future generations only if we can put into practice oUT deep aspiration for a 
cultUTe of peace and nonviolence. If we cannot take practical measures to bring about 
a global ethic of nonviolence, we will not have enough strength to face and deal with 
the difficulties we will encounter in this new century. We can do this. True peace is 
possible.92 
According to Nhat Hanh, the ethical systems of all religious traditions advocate 
inclusiveness and non-discrimination, and advance the imperative to help others. 
He observes, "We know that everyone suffers, even those who have tried to hurt 
us. As a living continuation of Jesus Christ, of Muhammed, of Moses, of the 
89 Nhat Hanh and Berrigan, The Raft Is Not the Shore: Conversations toward a Buddhist-Christian 
Awareness. 
90 Nhat Hanh, Peace Begins Here: Palestinians and Israelis Listening to Each Other. 98 
91 Thich Nbat Hanh, Creating Tme Peace: Ending Conflict in Yourself Your Family, Your 
Community and the World (London: Rider Books, 2003). 180 
92 1bid. 10 
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Buddha, and of all spiritual ancestors, you have to help everyone."93 The 
important interreligious implication here is that non-discrimination, inclusion, 
nonviolence, and compassionate engagement must also characterise one's 
approach to religious others. Nhat Hanh suggests, "An attitude of openness, the 
willingness to recognise and accept the diversity of human experience and the 
spiritual values of other traditions and cultures, is essential in the practice of 
nonviolence. We create true peace when we are inclusive of others."94 According 
to Nhat Hanh, the embrace of the other, and the realisation of the interdependence 
of self and other, is the foundation of peace. He claims, "God is compassion and 
inclusiveness. If God loves everyone,-how can we exclude anyon&.-Do not believe 
that by eliminating the other you can find peace. Helping them is the on~v way ."95 
To establish peace between religions, the vision of Religious Interbeing must 
ultimately become a reality. Commenting on the actualisation of religious 
interdependence, Nhat Hanh explains, "It is not necessary that aJl share the same 
religious ideals. What is important is that you ftnd yourself in a situation where 
nobody discriminates. I think religions ought not separate people. Yet there should 
be the particularity, the identity, of each group or each person."96 The point of 
realising Religious Interbeing is that separate religious identities do not, indeed 
cannot, exist in isolation. He explains: 
In fact, an identity can be an identity only when there are things that describe it as a 
nonidentity ... So, all things rely on each other in order to be. My identity meets your 
identity in order to be possible. Why don't we come together in order to find ways to 
preserve not only my identity but your identity and that of others too? Resistance 
against boundaries, against the setting up of false frontiers and limitations, is so 
important.97 
According to Nhat Hanh, the realisation of Religious Interbeing can help to 
manifest peace between religions. Moreover, the consequent dynamics of 
interreligious reciprocity and collaboration can contribute towards a collective 
awakening. Nhat Hanh asserts: "We must glean the best values of all traditions 
93 Ibid. 180 
94 Ibid. 15 
9~Ibid.l81 
96 Nhat Hanh and Benigan, The Raft Is Not rhe Shore: Conversations roward a B11ddhisr-Chris rian 
Awareness. 143 
97 Ibid. 120 
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and work together to remove the tensions between traditions in order to give peace 
a chance. "98 Finally, it is on the foundation of this interreligious unity and peace 
that Nhat Hanh suggests collective spiritual engagement in society: 
We can bring the spiritual dimension into our daily life, as well as our social, 
political, and economic life. This is our practice. Jesus had this intention. Buddha 
had this intention. All of our spiritual ancestors, whether Christian, Jewish, Muslim, 
Hindu, or Buddhist had this intention. We can display the light of wisdom and come 
together in order to create hope and prevent society and the younger generation from 
sinking in despair. 
We can learn to speak out so that the voice of the Buddha, the voice of Jesus, 
the voice of Mohammed, and all our spirinw ancestors can be heard in this 
dangerous and pivotal moment in history. We otTer this light so that the world will 
not sink.into total darkness.99 
Peace and Nhat Hanh 's Dialogue with Christianity 
As we discussed earlier in this chapter, the Vietnam War witnessed the union of 
Buddhism and Christianity in pursuit of peace. Perhaps the most obvious form of 
protest during the war, which was practised by both Buddhists and Christians, was 
the act of self-immolation.100 During a conversation with Daniel Berrigan, Nhat 
Hanh recalls an incident of self-immolation from 1967 involving one of the 
original members of the Order of Interbeing, a nun named Nbat Chi Mai . Before 
setting fire to herself, Mai placed in front of her "a statue of the Virgin Mary and a 
statue of a woman Bodhisattva, Quan Am, the Buddhist saint of compassion." She 
also placed a poem beside her that read: "Joining my hands, I kneel before Mother 
Mary and Bodhisattva Quan Am. Please help me to realise fully my vow." The 
image of this young Buddhist nun, engulfed in flames on a Saigon street, kneeling 
before both Christian and Buddhist effigies of compassion, presents a powerful 
symbol of the convergence of the two traditions in the cause of peace. Indeed, 
Nhat Hanh suggests to Berrigan the possibility of consonance between the death 
ofMai and the death of Jesus, as both sacrificed themselves for others. 101 
93 Nhat Hanh, Living Buddha, Living Christ. 114 
99 Nhat Hanh, Calming the Fearfitl Mind: A Zen Response to Terrorism. 97-8 
100 For an insightful discussion of Quaker and Buddhist immolations during the Vietnam war, see 
Sallie B King, "They Who Burned Themselves for Peace: Quaker and Buddhist SeJf.JmmolatoTS 
During the Vietnam War," Buddhist· Christian Studies 20 (2000). 
101 Nhat Hanh and Berrigan, The Raft Is Not the Shore: Conversations toward a Buddhist· 
Christian Awareness. 67· 71 
Clraf!_ler 6 294 
Within Nhat Hanh's dialogue with Christianity, he places great emphasis on 
Jesus' ethical teachings on anger, revenge, and Jove, and attempts to demonstrate 
their pragmatic potential for creating peace. He cites the Sermon on the Mount: 
"Blessed are the peacemakers: for they shall be called the children of God." To be 
a peacemaker, Nhat Hanh asserts that you must have a peaceful heart- that you 
must have inner peace in order to create peace in the world. In contrast, action 
based on anger or hatred will only create more anger and hatred, within the self 
and others. In support of this view, Nhat Hanh refers to Jesus' admonishment 
against killing and his declaration that ''whosoever is angry with his brother 
witheut-a·-cause shall be in danger of-the judgement. . . Whosoever-shaH -say 'Thou 
fool, ' shall be in danger of hellfire." Nhat Hanh offers a characteristically nondual 
interpretation of Jesus' depiction of hell, maintaining that you are not punished for 
you anger by being expelled to hell, but that anger creates a hell in your mind. He 
makes a similar comment regarding killing in the mind. However, Nhat Hanh 
further cites Jesus' teachings on the futility of revenge and the need to ' turn the 
other cheek' as provisional of an alternative to conflict and kiJJing and the means 
of creating peace. Finally, Nhat Hanh cites Jesus' teaching on 'loving your 
enemies' , and equates it with his own teaching of discerning the 'true enemy' .102 
Ultimately, Nhat Hanh considers that all religions contain teachings on peace, 
nonviolence, and love: "Hatred cannot overcome hatred. Violence cannot 
overcome violence. The Bible, the Koran, the Torah, and the Sutras teach us 
that "103 
Turning to the Church, Nhat Hanh affirms its potential capacity to function in the 
world as an agent of engagement, compassion, and peace. He questions, "Are we 
making Jesus' presence real in our Churches today?" He follows this question 
with six more that challenge the communal practice of the Christian tradition. In 
doing so, he articulates a collection of trans-religious engaged ethics. Firstly, he 
asks whether the Church is engaged in interreligious dialogue. Secondly, he 
affirms the need for social engagement, questioning "Are we bringing the service 
102 This discussion of Jesus' ethical teachings was first presented in a dharma talJc at Plum Village 
in March 1991. It has been published as 'A Peaceful Heart' in Nbat Hanh, Love inAction: Writings 
on Nonviolent Social Change. 13-80, and in Nhat Hanh, Living Buddha, Living Christ. 74-9 
10~ Nhat Hanh, Calming the Feaiful Mind: A Zen Response to Terrorism. 29 
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of the church to those who suffer, to those who are discriminated against?" Third, 
Nhat Hanh argues for the ordination of femaJe priests. Fourth, he questions the 
wealth and consumption of the Church, declaring the necessity of simple living. 
Fifth, Nhat Hanh questions whether the Church is in touch with the suffering of 
the poor and oppressed or whether it chooses to associate only with the wealthy. 
And finally, he proclaims Jesus' gospel of nonviolence. He questions, "Are we 
blessing wars and sending priests along with our armies to support the efforts of 
war? ... Do the churches practice nonviolence and social justice, or do they align 
themselves with governments that practice violence and hatred?"104 
The ethics revealed in Nhat Hanh's questioning of the Christian Church are 
representative of those criteria that limit his avowal of pluralism. For Nhat Hanh 
to affirm the validity of a religion, it must encompass all the above tenets of 
dialogue, engagement, gender equality, mindful consumption and voluntary 
poverty, non-discrimination, and nonviolence. We can find further evidence of 
Nhat Hanh's ethical tenets in the Five Mindfulness Trainings, which Nhat Hanh 
offers as trans-religious ethical guidelines. He explains that they "are worded in 
such a way that everyone can apply them, regardless of spiritual tradition or 
cultural background."105 In fact, Nhat Hanh suggests that the deep meaning of the 
Trainings can be discerned in all religious traditions, suggesting the Judaic and 
Christian congruent example of the Ten Commandments. 106 Once more, Nhat 
Hanh's emphasis is upon the practice of the Christian teachings and their 
actualisation of the immanence of God as the essential means of deterring 
absolutism, achieving experience and insight, and manifesting and assuring peace. 
He concludes: 
God may be a notion for some, but God as the energy of mindfitlness, concentration, 
and compassion is not a notion. For me the energies of peace, wisdom, and stability 
are the energies of God, of the Holy Spirit. When we generate peace, loving-
kindness, and understanding in ourselves, we are generating the energy of God 
within us. 107 
104 See Nhat Hanh, Living Buddha, Living Christ. 7 I -3 
105 Nhat Hanh, Creating Tnte Peace: Ending C.onjlict in Yourself. Your Family , Your Community 
and the World. 72. See Appendix A for the full text of the Five Mindfulness Trainings. 
106 Nhat Hanh, Living Buddha, Living Christ. Ill 
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Critique and Response 
In order to examine Thich Nhat Hanh's approach to religious diversity, we have 
undertaken three readings based upon the categories of iuterbeing, mindfulness, 
and peace . In each of these readings it has been suggested that Nhat Hanh's 
application of the categories towards the diversity of religions has revealed 
valuable resources that could be utilised within the construction of a Buddhist 
position of pluralism. In relation to Nhat Hanh's fundamental teaching of 
interbeing, this position of pluralism has been conceptualised by the notion and 
vision of Religious Inter being. An experiential form of pluralism and an engaged 
form of pluralism subsumtiate this position -af - Religious lnterbeing. To 
summarise, the application of interbeing towards religious diversity affirms the 
unity and diversity of religions - their difference, equality, and interdependence. 
The application of mindfulness practice towards religious diversity affirms the 
equal capacity of all religions for praxial and experiential actualisation. Finally, 
the application of peace towards religious diversity asserts the equal capacity, and 
indeed equal responsibility, of all religions to engage with one another, in order to 
unite in compassionate engagement with the suffering of the world. 
As we have seen, a discourse of critique and debate surrounds the theological 
position of pluralism. At the centre of this discourse are issues concerning 
religious superiority and imperialism, the dangers of distortion and 
misrepresentation, the quest for unity and common ground, and the assertion of 
religious difference. These issues have been most fully articulated and debated 
within the discourse of Christian theology. As we discussed in Chapter One, the 
position of identist pluralism has been criticised by the position of differential 
pluralism for its apparent imposition of tradition-specific categories onto the 
religious other, which results in the misrepresentation or distortion of the other, 
and a denial of its difference. 
As we saw in Chapter Two, these issues have also emerged within the discourse 
of Buddhist pluralism. In a similar fashion, the use of the doctrine of emptiness 
107 Nhat Hanh, Creating Tme Peace: Ending Conflict in Yourself. Your Fami~v. Your Communily 
and the World. 35 
Chap_fer 6 297 
within Buddhist pluralism has been criticised for its supposed denial of religious 
difference via its assumption of a positionless position. Such critiques contend that 
emptiness undermines the value of religious differences by asserting that the very 
perception of difference is a product of the deluded, dualistic, and discriminating 
mind, and is thus the cause of suffering. 108 Moreover, it is argued that the 
positionless position implied by the emptiness of emptiness is just as much a 
particularist, tradition-specific position as any other religious point of view. Thus, 
to assert the equality of all religions on the basis of emptiness still constitutes the 
imposition of a Buddhist framework and Buddhist criteria of judgement. This 
apparent imposition is deemed a claim to Buddhist superiority; resulting in the 
colonisation of the other, or at least the misrepresentation or distortion of the 
other, and thereby, once again, the denial of its difference. 109 
Further criticism of the implied experiential ism of the positionless position issues 
from the theoretical perspective of Constructivism. It is apparent that the 
positionless position depends upon the experiential transcendence of the doctrine 
of emptiness itself. However, the theory of Constructivism argues that all 
experiences are contextually constructed and that it is therefore impossible to 
transcend tradition-specific boundaries and frameworks .11° Furthermore, even if 
such experiences were possible, because they purportedly transcend the linguistic, 
critics contend that there is no way of proving their transcendence, as the only 
means of expressing and communicating the experience is limited within the 
confmes of tradition-specific language. 111 Thus, despite its appeal to 
experientialism, according to this critique the positionless position remains a 
Buddhist position and cannot therefore affirm pluralism. 
108 See David W. Chappell, "Buddhist Responses to Religious Pluralism: What Are the Ethical 
Issues?," in Buddhist Ethics and Modem Society, ed. Charles Wei-hsun Fu and Sandra A. 
Wawrytko (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), Jamie Hubbard, "Topophobia," in Pruning the 
Bodhi Tree: The Stonn over Critical Buddhism, ed. Jamie Hubbard and Paul L. Swanson 
(Honolulu: University ofHawai'i Press, 1997). 
109 See Kristin Beise Kiblinger, Buddhist lnclusivism: Attitudes Towards Religious Others 
(Aidershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2005), Kristin Beise Kiblinger, "Using Three-Vehicle Theory to 
Improve Buddhist Inclusivism," Buddhist - Christian Studies 24 (2004). 
11° For example, see Steven T. Katz, "Language, Epistemology and Mysticism," in Mysticism and 
Philosophical Anaf;vsis, ed Steven T. Katz (London: Sheldon Press, 1978). 
111 For example, see S. Mark Heim, "Salvations: A More Pluralistic Hypothesis," Modem 
Theology 10 (1994). 
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Evidently, such criticisms could be levelled at Thich Nhat Hanh's approach to 
religious diversity. Nhat Hanh' s affirmation of the unity and diversity of religions 
on the basis of the realisation of interbeing could be critiqued as a dubious 
assumption of a positionless position. Just because Buddhism is 'de-absolutised' 
along with all other religions, it can be argued that this 'emptying' still constitutes 
a Buddhist strategy, and therefore does not necessarily assert the equality of 
religions or the value of religious difference. Moreover, while Nhat Hanh does not 
fully articulate an assumption of the final soteriological identity of religions, he 
implies the singularity of the absolute in the universal 'religious now' and insists 
on the trans-religious · realisation -{}~that ' now'. Thtls,he could- be ·accused--of 
imposing a nondual structure of religious meaning. Finally, Nhat Hanh's appeal to 
experientialism is open to clear criticism. The arguments of Constructivism would 
firmly discredit Nhat Hanh' s suggestion of a trans-religious experiential encounter 
with reality in the here and now as supportive of a position of pluralism. 
As we saw in Chapter Three, such a critique has been articulated in the work of 
Kristin Kiblinger. Kiblinger argues that Nhat Hanh both denies differences and 
imposes Buddhist categories onto the religious other. She contends that Nhat 
Hanh's "anonymous Buddhism and his habit of seeing a common core to all world 
religions - a core that seems to be Buddhist - dissolve the distinctiveness of the 
other and absorb the other into his own Buddhism. "112 Furthermore, Kiblinger 
questions Nhat Hanh's application of interbeing and critiques his appeal to 
experientialism. She argues that his prescription against attachment to views and 
the need to transcend views do not lead to a positionless position. She states: "The 
problem . .. is that this goal of striving for non-attachment from all views is itself a 
view; it arises from the very Buddhist presuppositions that its supposedly 
transcends. Every stance and value is exclusive of some other. The aim of such a 
mystical or intuitive breakthrough, especially for those who have yet to achieve 
that aim, cannot free Buddhism from the conflicts involved in being one religion 
alongside others. " 113 
112 Kiblinger, Buddhist lnclusivism: Alfitudes Towards Religious Others. 102 
113 Ibid. 100 
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While such criticisms may appear to hold weight, it has been the principal 
methodological assertion of this thesis that an analysis ofNhat Hanh's approach to 
religious diversity in relation to a comprehensive understanding of his teachings, 
the contexts out of which they emerged, and the nature of his intentions, may 
reach a different conclusion. Indeed, in responding to such potential criticism, we 
need to recall the methodological suggestions of the discourse of Philosophical 
Hermeneutics, which we examined in Chapter Three. Having completed our 
investigation of Thich Nbat Hanh within his 'hermeneutical circle' , having 
covered a sizeable portion of his written body of work, and having grasped the 
nature of his perspecti-ves-ftfld-prejudices as a Buddhist monk; a peace activist, and 
a contemporary spiritual teacher, it should now be clear that Nhat Hanh is not 
interested in asserting the superiority of Buddhism, in denying the difference of 
the religious other, nor in converting that other. Employing a 'hermeneutics of 
trust', rather than suspicion, fear, or discrimination, and by way of concluding this 
chapter, let us delineate the dimensions of Nbat Hanh 's volition. In doing so, it 
can be confirmed that Nhat Hanh's approach to religious diversity can best be 
understood in relation to the discourse of pluralism. 
Firstly, it needs to be recognised that Nhat Hanh is not making any claims to 
objectivity - he is approaching the issue of religious diversity as a Buddhist monk 
and his interpretations of other religions will therefore be Buddhist interpretations, 
based upon Buddhist categories. As Gadamer's notion of the role of 'prejudices' 
implies, the fact that Nhat Hanh brings his prejudices, or his perspective, to the 
'dialogical table' does not undermine his approach. Rather, it equips him with an 
array of resources from the Buddhist tradition that can be used constructively to 
comprehend, and possibly to reconcile, the diversity of religions in the late 
modem world. Nhat Hanh's approach to religious diversity will inevitably be 
based upon Buddhist categories; what is important is bow he uses those categories 
to affirm religious unity and diversity and what his intention may be in applying 
them. 
The significance of the proposal of Religious Interbeing is its capacity to affirm 
the distinction of religious forms and their interdependent unity at the same time. 
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Indeed, Nhat Hanh emphasises the value of the differences between religions, 
while he maintains their essential equality by revealing their interbeing and unity 
as praxial means. This capacity to affirm diversity and unity is determined by the 
nondual perspective that is the result of the realisation of emptiness. While this 
realisation and its resultant perspective is defined by tradition-specific language, 
the discourse of Buddhist pluralism asserts that its inherent transcendence of 
religious forms, including Buddhist forrns, undermines any claim to absolutism. 
As such, it is contended that the perspective of emptiness is able to affirm 
religious difference, equality, and unity, without proclaiming Buddhist superiority. 
Representing a position of Religious lnterbeing, Nhat Hanh 's approach to 
religious diversity therefore presents an alternative model of pluralism to the 
models of identist and differential pluralism that have been articulated within 
Christian theological discourse. !dentist pluralism contends the unitive nature of 
ultimate reality and a singular salvific end. In contrast, differential pluralism 
argues for a multidimensional ultimate reality and a diversity of salvific ends. 
Reconciling these two views, the position of Religious Interbeing, as represented 
by Nhat Hanh, affirms a diversity of salvific means but emphasises the importance 
of the 'salvific now' . Within the salvific now, the ultimate dimension is 
encountered in the phenomenal dimension as a direct salvific experience of 
reality, or life, which is conceived as both multidimensional and unitive at the 
same time. 
While the position of Religious lnterbeing is determined by transcendent 
experience, Nhat Hanh contends that such experience can occur in any religious 
context through authentic spiritual practice. It is on these grounds that Nhat Hanh 
offers the practice of mindfulness. 
The realisation of the interdependence of religions reveals that no one religion is 
complete within itself. The principal implication of this realisation is that through 
the dynamics of dialogue and exchange, elements from one religious tradition can 
enhance and complement another tradition. This reciprocal dynamic of dialogue 
and exchange is at the heart of Nbat Hanh' s affirmation of the interbeing of 
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religions. An example of interreligious reciprocity can be discerned in the 
suggestion that elements from Christian social ethics have influenced the 
evolution of Engaged Buddhism. In response, it can be understood that elements 
of Buddhist meditation can enhance Christian spiritual practice. The central 
dialogical dynamic of exchange and reciprocity informs Nhat Hanh's offering of 
mindfulness practice as an interreligious praxial tool. It also explains the dynamic 
of 'reverse inclusivism' through which Nhat Hanh makes his offering. Indeed, it is 
apparent that Nhat Hanh is Jess concerned to include other religions beneath the 
'universal canopy' of Buddhism than he is with offering his Buddhist teachings up 
for inclusion and assimilation within the praxial systems of other religions,-which 
in many cases may have become ossified, stagnant, ineffective, and meaningless. 
Essentially, Nhat Hanh's intention is not to distort, impose, or misrepresent, but to 
help renew, revitalise, and actualise religious traditions. Essentially, Nhat Hanh 
wants to help religious others rediscover the affective dimensions of their own 
traditions. And most importantly, he offers his assistance on the basis of a solid 
ethical foundation of nonviolence and non-proselytism, and with the ultimate 
intention of creating peace. 
Therefore, it can be discerned that Nhat Hanh uses Buddhist categories as the 
Buddha intended them to be used - as tools to aid religious practice upon the path 
to realisation and liberation. Nhat Hanh's teachings of interbeing, mindfulness, 
and peace are not applied to religious diversity as absolute doctrines that represent 
absolute truths, but as praxial means that can renew or enhance the meaning of 
religious life for other religions. Nhat Hanh presents his position from a non-
absolute perspective and with the intention of initiating dialogue. He offers his 
contributions as a monk, a scholar, a theologian of sorts, and a dialogist. But most 
importantly, he makes these offerings as a teacher. Nhat Hanh is less concerned 
with scholarly pursuits and theological debate than with the altruistic endeavour to 
alleviate peoples' suffering. 
Evidently, the verification of Nhat Hanh' s non-absolutism lies within the 
experiential realisation of interbeing, which is based upon a fundamental Buddhist 
teaching. However, according to traditional exegesis on emptiness, the actual 
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experience of 'emptying', or the experience of 'inter-being', leaves no room or 
need for an exclusive assertion of the finality of Buddhism, or the subversive 
dissemination of the superior Dharma. Because this verification in interbeing 
ultimately appeals to non-linguistic experience, it will inevitably bear the brunt of 
the philosophical critiques of Perspectivism, Constructivism, and the discourse of 
difference. Nevertheless, to employ a hermeneutics of trust rather than suspicion, 
it can be suggested that Nhat Hanh's non-absolutist stance can be verified in 
reference to his morality, his non-proselytism, and fmally, his life and presence as 
exemplar. 
Certainly, Nhat Hanh is not a relativist. Within his approach to religious diversity, 
he guards against relativism by positing definite ethical limits to his affirmation of 
pluralism. He evaluates religious principles and practices according to moral 
criteria and an absolute stance of nonviolence and peace. He also affirms the need 
for such evaluations to take place within contexts of ethical dialogue, so as to 
avoid the imposition of tradition-specific values and categories. He states: 
Real dialogue makes us more open-minded, tolerant, and understanding. Buddhists 
and Christians both like to share their wisdom and experience. Sharing in this way is 
in1portant and should be encouraged. But sharing does not mean wanting others to 
abandon their own spiritual roots and embrace your faith. That would be cruel.114 
Nhat Hanh bas emphasised the importance of religious roots for authentic 
interreligious dialogue. 115 In fact, he emphasises the importance of roots for 
happiness in general. In response to the many 'hungry ghosts' who have turned to 
his teachings over the years, Nhat Hanh has consistently asserted the importance 
of returning to one 's original roots. He explains, "a person without roots cannot be 
a happy person. You have to go back to your roots. You have to go back to your 
family. You have to go back to your culture. You have to go back to your 
Church." 116 Buddhist practice may help people to return to their roots, but 
ultimately Nhat Hanh is not interested in, and does not encourage, conversion. 
114 Nhat Hanh, Living B11ddha, Living Christ. 196 
1 1 ~ Nhat Hanh, Going Home. 180 
116 Ibid. 183 
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Above all , Nhat Hanh 's intention is to a11eviate suffering and create peace. 
Thomas Merton once claimed of Nhat Hanh, "Just the way he opens a door and 
enters a room demonstrates his understanding. He is a true monk."117 Indeed, Nhat 
Hanh exemplifies his own teaching of 'being peace' . As such, he is ultimately 
motivated to transform interreligious exclusivism, intolerance, and conflict by 
fostering and cultivating interreligious dialogue, understanding, and harmony. 
Nbat Hanh has recognised that actualised religions, which are based upon 
authentic spiritual practice and experience and ethical realisation and action, are 
less likely to make claims to absolutism and superiority than religions that are 
based upon superficial -practice, blind belief; and rigid faith ·- religions that are 
trapped within reified and dangerous claims to absolute truth. Therefore, he 'de-
absolutises' all religions, he encourages practice over theology, and affirms 
religious equality in relation to the capacity to 'be peace'. From Nhat Hanh's 
perspective, the only possible options for common religious ground in the late 
modern world are those that can contribute towards establishing global 
community and interreligious reconciliation. Thus, relativity and interdependence, 
shared practice and experience, and the universal quest for peace emerge as both 
viable and imperative meeting points for religions today. Ultimately, however, it 
is evident that even these means of establishing interreligious unity should not be 
reified as ideologies. Nor should the position of pluralism itself be upheld as a 
dogma or an absolute. Rather, as Nhat Hanh affirms, interreligious understanding 
and unity in the late modem world depends upon the continual renewal of 
relations through genuine religious practice and consistent interreligious dialogue. 
The notion of Religious lnterbeing should not be a reified construct, set in stone, 
but something to be realised and actualised. Finally, just as the realisation of 
emptiness can liberate the mind from suffering, so too could the realisation of 
Religious Interbeing help to resolve interreligious conflicts, by uniting the 
religions, without undermining their differences, upon the common ground of 
reality and peace. 
117 See Deer Park Monastery website: 
http:/lwww.deerparkmonastery.orglabout_ u.<;/ourteacher .html 
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Conclusion 
On a Saigon evening in May 1966, at the height of the Vietnam War, Thich Nhat 
Hanh, prepared to embark upon an international tour to call an end to the violence 
that was afflicting his homeland. As the war raged around him, he contemplated 
his immanent departure and recorded his thoughts in his diary: 
T61light the sky is- strangely bright. Tomorrow I'll leave Vietnam, hut already I miss 
my home. I know that wherever I go, there will be stars, clouds, and a moon, but I 
am determined to return to my homeland.1 
It took almost forty years for Nhat Hanh's 'path of return' to come full-circle. In 
2005, he was finally granted a return visa to Vietnam. Following lengthy 
negotiations, Nhat Hanh was given pennission to offer public teachings, and, after 
forty years of prohibition, it was agreed that a selection of his books would be 
legally published. Nhat Hanh was finally allowed to go home. 
While waiting to board his flight to Hanoi in Charles de Gaulle airport, Nhat Hanh 
spoke of his impending return: 
My practice is to live in the present moment. I do not Jose the present moment, the 
here and now. So I am in touch with the present moment in France, in Europe, but I 
am also in touch with Vietnam now. Vietnam is not there, it is right here, in me. So 
that moment when the plane lands is not the real moment when I get in touch with 
Vietnam. I am in touch with Vietnam right now, right here.2 
Over the years since he was forced into exile, the idea of the 'true home' has 
become a resounding principle in Nhat Hanh's teachings. Our true home, he 
affirms, is not to be found in any geographical location, but in the true self, and in 
the here and now. Nhat Hanh often defines the journey of spiritual practice that 
leads to the true self in terms of 'the path of return' or 'going home' . It could be 
suggested that the context of exile has informed Nhat Hanh's teachings and has 
1 Thich Nhat Hanh, Fragrant Palm Leaves: Journals 1962-1966, trans. Mobi Warren (London: 
Rider Books, 1998). p. 205 
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contributed to their universalisation. Indeed, as we have seen, Nhat Hanh asserts 
that all religions provide a spiritual path that can lead the adherent home to their 
true self, which may be the self of Buddha-nature or the self that lives in the 
presence of God. We all have the capacity, he insists, to go home to our true 
selves in the present moment. 
Despite Nhat Hanh's emphasis on the universal spiritual path of return, however, 
it is apparent that his own particular geographical path of return is of significance. 
Indeed, Vietnam remains the land ofNhat Hanh's birth, the place of his noviciate 
and ordination, -the foundation- of his ancestry 1Ulti-heritage, the bedrock of his 
religious tradition, and his own interpretation of that tradition. Nhat Hanh 's return 
to Vietnam was a historically momentous occasion, which evidenced the growth 
of religious tolerance in Vietnam. It also verified Nhat Hanh' s teachings on the 
very real possibility of establishing understanding, reconciliation, and peace in the 
world. 
Patently, one of Nhat Hanh' s principal intentions in returning to Vietnam was to 
reconnect with his heritage, and work towards the reinstatement and renewal of 
Vietnamese Buddhism, which had been undermined by years of war and 
Communist rule. A further intention was to establish a Buddhist-Communist 
dialogue. To this end, when Nhat Hanh was eventually permitted to give talks 
beyond the temples, he invited many intellectuals, government officials, and Party 
members. During one such talk, an audience member posed the question: 
Does Buddhism allow its disciples to love the Country, the People, and the Party? 
Nhat Hanh's answer posed another question, which skilfuHy encapsulated his 
concern for ideological exclusivism and oppressive dogmatism: 
If a Buddhist were not allowed to love the Country and the Party, then why be a 
Buddhist?3 
2 Transcribed from footage in the tilm Going Home. See George Schouten, "Going Home: Zen 
Teacher Thich Nhat Hanh's Return to Vietnam," (The Netherlands: Buddhist Broadcasting 
Foundation, 2005). 
3 See Ibid. 
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While there is much apparent incongruence between Buddhism and the 
Communist system, Nhat Hanh was determined to locate a common spiritual 
ground. As such, he spoke at length on the spiritual dimensions of Marx's original 
philosophy, contending that the loss of this aspect within twentieth-century 
Communism has been the cause of much suffering.4 He also repeatedly affirmed 
one of the central principles of his teachings - the imperative to value humanity 
and peace over and above any ideology or religion.5 Ultimately, Nhat Hanh 
located the common ground between Buddhism and Communism in the potential 
capacity within the practice of both philosophies to "cherish the presence of the 
other human being."6 Indeed, according to Nhat Hanh,- the visit to Vietnam 
facilitated the removal of many obstacles of fear, suspicion, and 
misunderstanding, and this was the measure of its success.7 
Nhat Hanh's proposal of a common ground, upon which all divergent ideologies, 
religious or otherwise, may unite, encompasses a humanistic spirituality that 
affirms the ultimate value of the other. Moreover, compassion for the other is 
prescribed as the essential means of achieving reconciliation and establishing 
peace. Within Nhat Hanh's pluralist vision, the other is cherished on the basis of 
the realisation of interbeing. This vision is thus representative of the classic 
bodhisattva realisation of wisdom and compassion. However, within Nhat Hanh 's 
teachings this exalted vow becomes a universal possibility, and the means of 
establishing reconciliation and very real peace in the world. While such a view 
would seem to assert a Buddhist truth above all others, it needs to be recalled that 
Nhat Hanh affirms peace as a global ethical absolute that is valued above all 
religions and ideologies, including Buddhism. While this, in turn, may seem to 
undermine the distinction of the separate religions or ideologies, including 
4 Nhat Hanh states: "Marx has spoken about the spiritual life. [Cotrummists] distinguish between 
religion and spirituality. [Marx] is not for religion, but he is for spirituality. And sometime later he 
said that maybe man has to go through religion to get to spirituality. So his thinking should be 
better wtderstood - he was afraid that people would misunderstand his thinking and create a 
Communism without a spiritual dimension, that would create a lot of sutiering." Transcribed from 
Thid. 
5 Nhat Hanh states: "There is no religion, there is no ideology, that is higher than brotherhood. 
Brotherhood should be above everything. You cannot sacrifice brotherhood for the sake of 
religion, for the sake of ideology." Transcribed from Ibid. 
6 lbid. 
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Buddhism, as we have seen it is the especial capacity of the perspective of 
interbeing to affirm the value of separate forms while discerning their relativity 
and interdependence. Moreover, it is the especial capacity of Buddhism to be able 
to 'de-absolutise' or 'empty' itself, according to its own doctrinal tenets, so that it 
may affirm the equality of all religions and ideologies. 
This essential capacity to affirm both the particular and the universal, the 
difference and the identity, the diversity and the unity, is at the heart of the notion 
of Religious lnterbeing. Indeed, it constitutes Nhat Hanh's principal contribution 
to the discourse of pluralism and the dynamics of inteffeligious efte6Utlter in the 
late modem global community. Due to their quiet simplicity, Nhat Hanh's 
teachings are often deemed inconsequential and irresolute by angry activists and 
hard-line Buddhists alike.8 In response, it ought to be recalled that Nhat Hanh is a 
man who lived through the Vietnam War and did not tum away from the horror 
and suffering but embraced it with a ' fierce compassion'. This engaged and 
compassionate volition defines his approach to religious diversity. His vision of 
the interdependence of religions does not rest upon meaningless platitudes of 
'interreligious harmony' or vague truisms of 'world peace' .Rather it proposes the 
deep engagement with religious difference in order to realise a common spiritual 
ground, upon which the religions may unite in order to deeply engage with the 
suffering of the world. Finally, it should be clear that Nhat Hanh 's affirmation of 
the interbeing of religions is but one aspect within his all-inclusive spiritual 
vision, which encompasses the interbeing of the nature of reality itself, and thus 
affirms an ultimate vision of global interbeing, a vision of the unity of the world 
abiding in diversity. 
7 It should be noted that Nhat Hanh, the Plum Village sangha, and an international sangha returned 
once again to Vietnam in 2007, and that a further trip is planned for May of this year. 
s While this is a common assumption, it is dit1icult to find any explicit denWJCiations of Nhat 
Hanh's teachings. For a critique of Engaged Buddhist practices, sec Ken Knabb, "Lessons tor 
Engaged Buddhists and Evading the Transtormation of Reality," Socia/ Policy 33, no. l (2002). 
50-55. Elsewhere, Nhat Hanh's teachings have been deemed "Buddhism Lite". See Perry 
Garfinkel, "Politics of a Still Mind," Shambala Sur! 2007. 62-65. 
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Appendix 
The Fourteen Mindfulness Trainings of The Order of lnterheing 
1 
Aware of the suffering created by fanaticism and intolerance, we are determined 
not to be idolatrous about or bound to any doctrine, theory, or ideology, even 
Buddhist ones. Buddhist teachings are guiding means to help us learn to look 
deeply and to develop our understanding and compassion. They are not doctrines 
to fight, kill, or die for. 
2 
Aware of the suffering created by attachment to vi'-"l\'S and wrong perceptions, we 
are determined to avoid being narrow-minded and bound to present views. We 
shall learn and practice nonattachment from views in order to be open to others' 
insights and experiences. We are aware that the knowledge we presently possess 
is not changeless, absolute truth. Truth is found in life, and we will observe life 
within and around us in every moment, ready to learn throughout our lives. 
3 
Aware of the suffering brought about when we impose our views on others, we are 
committed not to force others, even our children, by any means whatsoever- such 
as authority, threat, money, propaganda, or indoctrination - to adopt our views. 
We will respect the right of others to be different and to choose what to believe 
and how to decide. We will, however, help others renounce fanaticism and 
narrowness through compassionate dialogue. 
4 
Aware that looking deeply at the nature of suffering can help us develop 
compassion and find ways out of suffering, we are determined not to avoid or 
close our eyes before suffering. We are committed to finding ways, including 
personal contact, images, and sounds, to be with those who suffer, so we can 
understand their situation deeply and help them transform their suffering into 
compassion, peace, and joy. 
5 
Aware that tn1e happiness is rooted in peace, solidity, freedom, and compassion, 
and not in wealth or fame , we are determined not to take as the aim of our life 
fame, profit, wealth, or sensual pleasure, nor to accumulate wealth while millions 
are hungry and dying. We are committed to living simply and sharing our time, 
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energy, and material resources with those in need. We will practice mindful 
consuming, not using alcohol, drugs, or any other products that bring toxins into 
our own and the collective body and consciousness. 
6 
Aware that anger blocks communication and creates suffering, we are determined 
to take care of the energy of anger when it arises and to recognise and transform 
the seeds of anger that lie deep in our consciousness. When anger comes up, we 
are determined not to do or say anything, but to practice mindful breathing or 
mindful walking and acknowledge, embrace, and look deeply into our anger. We 
will learn to look with the eyes of compassion at those we think are the cause of 
our anger. 
7 
Aware that l~fe is available only in the present moment and that it is possible to 
live happi~v in the here and now, we are committed to training ourselves to live 
deeply each moment of daily life. We will try not to lose ourselves in dispersion 
or be carried away by regrets about the past, worries about the future, or craving, 
anger, or jealousy in the present. We will practice mindful breathing to come back 
to what is happening in the present moment. We are determined to learn the art of 
mindful living by touching the wondrous, refreshing, and healing elements that 
are inside and around us, and by nourishing seeds of joy, peace, love, and 
understanding in ourselves, thus facilitating the work of transformation and 
healing in our consciousness. 
8 
Aware that the lack of communication always brings separation and suffering, we 
are committed to training ourselves in the practice of compassionate listening and 
loving speech. We will learn to listen deeply without judging or reacting and 
refrain from uttering words that can create discord or cause the community to 
break. We will make every effort to keep communications open and to reconcile 
and resolve all conflicts, however small. 
9 
Aware that words can create suffering or happiness, we are committed to learning 
to speak truthfully and constructively, using onJy words that inspire hope and 
confidence. We are determined not to say untruthful things for the sake of 
personal interest or to impress people, nor to utter words that might cause division 
or hatred. We will not spread news that we do not know to be certain nor criticise 
or condemn things of which we are not sure. We will do our best to speak out 
about situations of injustice, even when doing so may threaten our safety. 
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10 
Aware that the essence and aim of a Sangha is the practice of understanding and 
compassion, we are determined not to use the Buddhist community for personal 
gain or profit or transform our community into a political instrument. A spiritual 
community should, however, take a clear stand against oppression and injustice 
and should strive to change the situation without engaging in partisan conflicts. 
11 
Aware that great violence and injustice have been done to our environment and 
society, we are committed not to live with a vocation that is harmful to humans 
and nature. We will do our best to select a livelihood that helps realise our ideal of 
understanding and compassion. Aware of global economic, political and social 
realities, we will behave responsibly as consumers and as citizens, not investing in 
companies that deprive others of their chance to live. 
12 
Al1•are that much suffering is caused by war and conflict, we are determined to 
cultivate non-violence, understanding, and compassion in our daily lives, to 
promote peace education, mindful meditation, and reconciliation within families, 
communities, nations, and in the world. We are determined not to kill and not to 
let others kill. We will diligently practice deep looking with our Sangha to 
discover better ways to protect life and prevent war. 
13 
Aware of the suffering caused by exploitation, social injustice, stealing, and 
oppression, we are committed to cultivating loving kindness and learning ways to 
work for the well-being of people, animals, plants, and minerals. We will practice 
generosity by sharing our time, energy, and material resources with those who are 
in need. We are determined not to steal and not to possess anything that should 
belong to others. We will respect the property of others, but will try to prevent 
others from profiting from human suffering or the suffering of other beings. 
14 
(For lay members): Aware that sexual relations motivated by craving cannot 
dissipate the feeling of loneliness but will create more suffering, frustration, and 
isolation, we are determined not to engage in sexual relations without mutual 
understanding, love, and a long-term commitment. In sexual relations, we must be 
aware of future suffering that may be caused. We know that to preserve the 
happiness of ourselves and others, we must respect the rights and commitments of 
ourselves and others. We will do everything in our power to protect children from 
sexual abuse and to protect couples and families from being broken by sexual 
misconduct. We will treat our bodies with respect and preserve our vital energies 
(sexual, breath, spirit) for the realisation of our bodhisattva ideal. We will be fully 
aware of the responsibility of bringing new lives into the world, and will meditate 
on the world into which we are bringing new beings. 
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(For monastic members): Aware that the aspiration of a monk or a nun can only 
be realised when he or she whol(v leaves behind the bond~· of worldly love, we are 
committed to practicing chastity and to helping others protect themselves. We are 
aware that loneliness and suffering cannot be alleviated by the coming together of 
two bodies in a sexual relationship, but by the practice of true understanding and 
compassion. We know that a sexual relationship will destroy our life as a monk or 
nun, will prevent us from realising our ideal of serving living beings, and will 
harm others. We are determined not to suppress or mistreat our body or to look 
upon our body as only an instrument, but to learn to handle our body with respect. 
We are determined to preserve vital energies (sexual, breath, spirit) for the 
realisation of our bodhisattva ideal. 
Thich Nhat Hanh, lnterbeing: Fourteen Guidelines for Engaged Buddhism, 
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